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In May of 2006, The University of Denver Sturm College of Law
and The Cable Center sponsored the Inaugural Summit on Intellectual
Property and Digital Media (Summit).1 The Summit brought together
academics and industry leaders in a search for common ground and prac-
tical policy solutions concerning issues related to intellectual property
and digital technology. Through a number of panels and roundtable ses-
sions, academics and industry leaders outlined and addressed a variety of
issues concerning existing business models, digital technology, and intel-
lectual property rights. The Summit highlighted the ways in which
scholars, representatives from various industries, public interest groups,
and other organizations, despite their differences, are able to engage in
productive conversation about the digital future and the legal structure
shaping that future. This symposium issue of the Denver University Law
Review includes the papers authored for the Summit and is dedicated to
examining real world problems concerning the interaction between law,
technology, innovation, and creativity. One of the strengths of intellec-
tual property scholarship is its attention to the practical issues facing
industries, individual users, and regulators, and the papers included in
this volume reflect that strength.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
tt Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The authors
would like to thank The Cable Center for organizing the Summit on Intellectual Property and Digital
Media. Susan Greene had the initial vision for the conference and through sheer force of will
brought it into being. We also thank the Denver University Law Review for publishing this sympo-
sium issue.
1. For more information on the Summit, see The Cable Center, http://www.cablecenter.org/
education/academic/digitalipsummit.cfm (last visited September 26, 2006). In addition to the par-
ticipants who contributed papers, the speakers at the Summit included Sandra Aistars, Associate
General Counsel for Intellectual Property, Time Warner, Inc.; Joseph Cantwell, Vice President of
Marketing, Advanced Services, Starz Entertainment Group; Peter M. Fannon, Vice President, Tech-
nology Policy, Government & Regulation, Panasonic Corporation of North America; Edward Felten,
Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University; Richard Fickle, Executive
Vice President of Strategic Development, Ascent Media Group; Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor
of Law and Director of the High Tech Institute at Santa Clara University School of Law; Vince
Groff, Director, Video Product Development, Cox Communications; Greg Harper, President, Cer-
berus Corporation; Robert Kasunic, Principal Legal Advisor, Copyright Office, and Adjunct Associ-
ate Professor of Law, American University's Washington College of Law; Ron Lamprecht, Vice
President, New Media, NBC Universal Cable; Maria Mandel, Partner, Executive Director of Digital
Innovation, Ogilvylnteractive Digital Innovation; Scott Teissler, Executive Vice President, Chief
Information Officer and Chief Technology Officer, Turner Broadcasting System; and Bob Zitter,
Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer, HBO.
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Ralph Oman, the former Register of Copyrights, the Pravel, Hewitt,
Kimball and Kreiger Professorial Lecturer in Intellectual Property and
Patent Law at George Washington University Law School, and attorney
with Dechert LLP; and Peter Yu, Associate Professor of Law and Direc-
tor of the Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program at
Michigan State University College of Law, submitted papers and partici-
pated in our Academic Roundtable Discussion entitled "Digital Rights
Management: Searching for Common Ground.",2 This panel provided
the academic viewpoint on how intellectual property principles may be
changing in a digital environment and how the digital environment may
ultimately affect the legal infrastructure. In his essay, How Digital
Rights Management Will Save Authorship in the Age of the Internet,
Ralph Oman argues that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
and digital rights management (DRM) technologies have stabilized the
marketplace and allowed parties to contract for content using legitimate
services. According to Mr. Oman, some of the problems--ease of copy-
ing and distribution of quality copies of copyrighted works-and some of
the benefits-widespread dissemination of copyrighted works-that digi-
tal technology and the internet allow are not new and mirror some of the
issues raised by older technologies, such as the printing press, radio, tele-
vision, laser printers, VCRs and CD players. Mr. Oman asserts that
"[t]he best copyright laws have always protected the power of creators
against the power of the companies that build the machines that exploit
the creators' work." He believes that DMCA and the DRM technologies
protected by DMCA will enable authors to use the internet and digital
technology as strong allies in the creative process.
Professor Yu provides a very different perspective on the role of the
DMCA and DRM technologies in the digital environment. Professor
Yu's article, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, examines
the DRM debate, the anticircumvention regime, and makes four observa-
tions. Professor Yu asserts that DMCA has resulted in many negative
unintended consequences and likely has not created benefits for copy-
right holders. He then extends his analysis to the international level and
laments the extension of statutory schemes similar to DMCA to other
countries through multilateral, bilateral, and plurilateral treaties. Impor-
tantly, his article concludes by offering four suggestions to provide guid-
ance for the creation of the next wave of DRM systems and the legal
scheme that supports those systems. His observations for policy makers
include: awareness of how difficult it can be to change an entrenched
law, the distinction between DRM and technological protection meas-
ures, understanding the difference between machine-interpretable nonin-
2. Phil Weiser, Associate Professor and Executive Director, Silicon Flatirons Telecommuni-




fringing uses and machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses, and the
accommodation of consumer interests.
In response to a call for papers concerning DRM and the adaptation
of the business sector to the shrinkage of the distribution change between
creator and consumer in the digital world, many scholars submitted
thought-provoking papers. The Summit committee selected five of these
papers for presentation and publication.3 Megan LaBelle's article, The
"Rootkit Debacle": The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Recording
Industry and the War on Music Piracy, focuses on Sony's decision to
install invasive DRM on its music CDs sold in late 2005. As the title
indicates, the attempt at curbing unlawful copying was a debacle for
Sony, causing a public relations fiasco and ultimately forcing Sony to
recall the CDs and to agree not use that form of DRM in the future. Ms.
LaBelle uses the Sony story as a focal point for discussing the problems
posed by the ease of digital copying in general. The article sets forth the
background against which Sony's decision to install the rootkit on its
CDs arose and evaluates the legal questions presented by the rootkit de-
bacle. Finally and most importantly, the article proposes "a solution that
attempts to strike a balance between the recording industry's right to
protect its intellectual property and a consumer's right to enjoy pur-
chased music." Concluding that DRM is the only reasonable way for the
recording industry to protect itself against unauthorized copying of
CDs-as there are no indirect infringers to pursue and tracking the copy-
ing of CDs is virtually impossible-Ms. LaBelle makes a number of con-
crete proposals for addressing the concerns of a variety of interested
groups. She suggests that the Copyright Office "adopt a narrowly-
tailored Security Research Exemption" for the purposes of protecting the
work of academics, scientists and other researchers. She also proposes
that the record companies take a different approach to copy-protecting
CDs. In general, they should be mindful of security and privacy risks to
individual consumers and, more specifically, have all DRM software
independently analyzed and tested. In addition, Ms. LaBelle recom-
mends that all copy-protected CDs carry "sufficient notice" of any anti-
piracy technology they contain. Finally, the record companies ought to
be more sensitive to consumer preferences in developing copy-protection
or other DRM technology.
3. Two other scholars presented papers at the Summit, but those papers do not appear in this
volume. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, the Raymond P. Niro Professor of Law and founding director of
the Center for Intellectual Property Law & Information Technology Law at DePaul University
School of Law, discussed her work on section 108 of the Copyright Act. Professor Kwall's com-
mentary is published in the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Commentary: Library Reproduction Rights for Preservation and Replacement in the Digital Era: An
Author's Perspective on § 108, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343 (2006). In addition, Tal Zarsky pre-
sented his paper, Reassessing Alternative Compensation Models for Copyright in the Digital Age,
which will appear in issue 84:2 of the Denver University Law Review.
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Christine Galbraith's essay, Remembering the Public Domain,
traces the ways in which public domain materials are increasingly being
restricted with technological, contractual, and legislative measures.
These measures have generally been supported and upheld by courts
such that much information that "constitute[s] the building blocks of
knowledge" is made proprietary. Professor Galbraith argues that the
legal support for these measures is the result of a "myopic view of prop-
erty rights" that treats virtual space as equivalent to real property and
thus tends to grant the "ability to exclude whomever and whatever they
choose." Professor Galbraith concludes with the admonition that courts
and legislators must acknowledge the importance of the public domain,
something that is essential "for an enlightened citizenry."
Jeremy deBeer's article, Locks & Levies, provides a valuable com-
parative perspective on the digital piracy and DRM war raging in the
United States. Professor deBeer compares the U.S. approach of strength-
ening the legal support for technological protection measures to Can-
ada's broad levy system. Rather than adopting specific anti-
circumvention legislation, Canada has adopted a levy on manufacturers
of goods and service providers to address the issue of private digital
copying. Professor deBeer compares the two approaches from a variety
of perspectives: those of creators, technology firms, and consumers. The
two approaches are not exclusive, however, and Professor deBeer ex-
plores "a worldwide trend toward the simultaneous presence of both
locks and levies in digital entertainment markets." The paper discusses
the consequences of "lock" systems, "levy" systems, and hybrid sys-
tems. Professor deBeer concludes that hybrid systems, which may be the
most likely result of compromise between the various interests, may also
present the worst possible scenario, placing consumers between a rock
and a hard place: "consumers risk being caught in the middle of a regime
that prohibits the circumvention of DRM systems in order to access or
copy digital content, but at the same time mandates levy payments to
compensate for copying that either cannot occur, is already licensed, or
constitutes fair use/dealing." Professor deBeer's article thus provides a
very real world understanding of both consumer behaviors and prefer-
ences and the likely results of political compromises over the issue of
digital copying. In conveying this perspective, Professor deBeer empha-
sizes the practical problems that may result if the legislative and techno-
logical approaches to the issue are not coordinated and well thought out.
In his article, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with
DRM, Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger also takes a broad perspective on
DRM, arguing that it might be useful "beyond the narrow confines of
copyright" for managing "rights over information more generally." Pro-
fessor Mayer-Schdnberger describes the ways in which DRM systems
are able to define specific usage rights of the information they accom-
pany, arguing that these systems can be used for more than just copyright
[Vol. 84:1
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protection. Professor Mayer-Sch6nberger then sets forth the ways in
which privacy claims might be managed through DRM systems, con-
cluding that such an approach has some specific advantages, including
increased privacy protections for individuals, an improved ability to
manage and control the information that does exist, and, potentially, a
more nationally and internationally harmonious approach to privacy and
information management issues. There are, of course, challenges posed
by using DRM systems to manage informational privacy. Professor
Mayer-Sch6nberger identifies and labels three challenges in particular:
technical, foundational, and conceptual. He then proposes some methods
of addressing these three broad challenges in order to make an informa-
tional-privacy DRM system successful.
Finally, there are two pieces included in this symposium issue con-
cerning patent law. First, we have an article by Amy Landers, a profes-
sor at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, and sec-
ond, a comment by Thomas Walsh, a student at the University of Den-
ver, Sturm College of Law. Professor Landers' article is titled Liquid
Patents. She argues that a trend has emerged in the patent system
wherein patent holders have developed systemized and strategic plans to
leverage value from asserting patent rights. She labels this practice "liq-
uidizing patents," and asserts that this practice is in contravention of the
goals of the patent system. To address the problem of liquidizing pat-
ents, she proposes a modification of the remedies provisions of the Patent
Act and an elimination of the antitrust protections for patent holders. In
his comment, Walsh reviews and analyzes the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
concerning whether the existence of a patent on a tying product raises a
presumption that the patent holder has market power in an unlawful tying
claim. Walsh argues that the decision by the Supreme Court to eliminate
the presumption that a patented product confers market power was the
correct decision for three reasons. Those reasons include the lower
court's erroneous interpretation of a prior Supreme Court decision, the
fact that presumptions are traditionally disfavored by the Supreme Court
in antitrust law, and the unfairness that results when an alleged tie is sub-
ject to an irrebutable presumption that a patent creates market power.
Walsh argues that the adversarial system is well-equipped to determine
the question of the market power of a particular product; that both parties
will be able to muster evidence concerning the questions; and that, there-
fore, an irrebuttable presumption is inappropriate.
Thank you to all of the participants, presenters, and contributors to




How DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT WILL SAVE
AUTHORSHIP IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
RALPH OMANt
Editor's Note: The following is an edited transcript of Ralph
Oman's presentation at the Inaugural Summit on Intellectual Property
and Digital Media held at The Cable Center, Denver on May 23, 2006.
RALPH OMAN: Thank you very much for inviting me to the Uni-
versity of Denver Law School and The Cable Center for the Intellectual
Property Summit. I like the idea of holding a summit meeting in the
Mile High City. And I like the title of the conference-"Working To-
gether in the Digital World." That is a concept I have advocated for a
long time.
Unless all of the parties in the chain of distribution work together-
the equipment manufacturers, the internet service providers (ISPs), the
cable companies, the broadcasters, the content providers, and the con-
sumer-we will never see the internet reach its full potential as a broad
avenue for scholarly discourse, mass entertainment, and e-commerce.
Without security for the content and certainty of payment, the internet
will not attract the really valuable content, and authors will find other
ways to get compensated, and the constitutional purpose of encouraging
the broad public dissemination of copyrighted works will be thwarted.
The internet will remain an email convenience and a haven for hackers,
pirates, and porno creeps.
Let me mention some of the history of copyright to help us under-
stand that these new technology-driven problems are not really all that
new. They are just the latest wrinkle in a recurring theme that goes back
to the invention of the printing press-the tension between new machines
and authors' rights. We saw a terrific display of those wizard machines
yesterday. Of course, they would be much less valuable without con-
tent-the songs, movies, and computer games that make them so popu-
lar.
t Ralph Oman is counsel in the intellectual property group of the Washington, DC office of
Dechert LLP. Mr. Oman was the Register of Copyrights of the United States from 1985-93. Before
becoming Register, he served as Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. In his 10 years on Capitol Hill, he participated
directly in many legislative enactments, most notably the 1976 revision of the copyright law. In
addition, Mr. Oman has taught for 13 years as an adjunct professor of intellectual property law at
George Washington University Law School. Mr. Oman is a graduate of Hamilton College (AB,
1962) and Georgetown University Law Center (JD, 1973).
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First, the history: In 1897, Congress created a new right for song-
writers-the exclusive right to perform their music publicly, and the ex-
clusive right to license other people to perform their music publicly.' At
the outset, that new right was more theoretical than real. The songwriters
found that they could not enforce their right. They had no way to know
when and where their music was being performed in the tens of thou-
sands of locations across the United States that used their music.
There was another problem. The people who used the music had no
practical way to locate the copyright owners and negotiate licenses for
the music they wanted to perform.
Enter the performing rights organizations. Beginning in 1914, indi-
vidual songwriters and music publishers created organizations to collec-
tively manage their rights. They licensed and monitored the live public
performances of music in concert halls, hotels, dance halls, sporting
events, restaurants, taverns, theaters, and amusement parks. Starting in
the 1920s, they licensed and monitored performances by radio broadcast.
They licensed motion picture theaters, television, and now the internet.
And they didn't normally license individual works. Under collective
management, they usually negotiated blanket licenses that allowed peo-
ple to use all of the music in their repertoire-millions of songs.
Now the songwriters are thinking creatively about marketing their
music online. We have seen the tremendous innovation on the hardware
side. We are also seeing fresh thinking on the creators' side. They are
not locked into the old paradigm of physical distribution of hard copies.
Let's see what the songwriters are doing to accommodate the new con-
sumer options before we declare the Death of Copyright and the un-
workability of business models based on exclusive rights. The songwrit-
ers have taken many concrete steps to make it easy for the online music
websites to license the public performance right.
* FAST TRACK
2
The songwriters have standardized the digitized copyright manage-
ment information for over 20 million musical works.3 They call it Fast
Track, and it creates the digital tools needed to manage authors' rights
around the world in the online environment.
4
1. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (1897).
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* UNILICENSE
5
The music industry has also proposed what they call the UniLi-
cense. 6 To expedite the licensing process for the new online music web-
sites, this new license would permit the songwriters and the music pub-
lishers to offer "one-stop-shopping. 7  An online music service could
obtain a single license to clear all rights for an interactive subscription
service. 8 Of course, to do so, all the parties would need an antitrust ex-
emption from Congress and some explicit authorizations. 9 Congress
would establish a fixed license rate as a percent of website revenues
(with minimum fees as appropriate).'° This rate under the UniLicense
would give the songwriters and music publishers reasonable compensa-
tion for the use of their songs on the internet." It is the ultimate blanket
license.
* DIGITAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY'
2
Last, let me vent on a new technology that is about to be launched
that will use pattern recognition technology to identify music distribu-
tions and performances, and motion picture distributions and perform-
ances, from any electronic source-radio, television, cable, satellite, the
internet. 13 It is extremely accurate, and only has to "listen to" or "watch"
one second of the song or movie. It will help solve the monitoring prob-
lem, as well as the problems that have always bedeviled the distribution
of royalties among the various copyright claimants.
So the songwriters are thinking creatively about how to make this
amazing digital technology a strong ally in the creative process.
Let me put on my ex-Register of the Copyrights hat. On-line hack-
ing and piracy undermines creativity, hurts songwriters, singers, film-
makers, actors, and musicians, and costs us jobs in the record and movie
business all over the world. Worst of all, it destroys the market for le-
gitimate online music and motion picture delivery services. The honest
entrepreneurs who pay for licenses can't compete with "free." Digital
rights management will bring order to the chaos and move us in the right
direction. It's not there yet, but we see more and more of the key players
starting to work together. The last panel confirmed the importance of
5. Music Licensing Reform: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property, 109th Cong., July 12, 2005 (statement of Del R. Bryant, President & CEO, Broadcast
Music, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearingsearch.cfm (search witness testimony







12. See BMI.com, http://www.bmi.com/news/200508/20050830a.asp.
13. See id.
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working together. Just last month in Washington, I moderated a panel
that included a senior lawyer for a motion picture powerhouse and a sen-
ior lawyer for one of the major telephone companies. After a decade of
confrontation and name calling, the two sides are finally singing from the
same hymnal. They finally agree on the need for security on the net.
The Grokster decision, 14 and its reaffirmation of copyright, helped
create that new environment. The Supreme Court decision has encour-
aged the ISPs to get actively involved in enforcement and security-
implementing filtering technology, installing digital fingerprints, and
pulling the plug on their infringing customers-all without losing their
safe harbors as passive carriers.
And in that new environment, the movie studios are aggressively li-
censing their content online.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) " and digital rights
management have stabilized the online marketplace and prompted the
parties to do deals for content over legitimate services.
Verizon is making a deal with Disney for the exclusive rights to
carry dozens of hot Disney programs over its fiber optic broadband net-
work to compete against cable. 16 And with companies like Verizon help-
ing enforce security on the net, we have a much better chance of shutting
down the hackers and pirates. Sure, there will be losses around the
edges-just as cable lost some revenue to amateur hackers who figured
out how to break into the wire to get the signal for nothing; just as pay-tv
has lived with theft; just as satellite delivery companies lost revenues to
unlicensed dish owners; and just as the telephone companies lost long-
distance revenues because some computer nerds could figure out how to
install switches to break into the dial tone.
But, the large mass of the population just wants to get the services
conveniently and at a reasonable cost. They want to obey the law. Digi-
tal technology greatly accelerates the magnitude of the theft problem, but
there is no reason to throw up our hands and admit defeat. The answer to
the machine is in the machine, and this technology will get as sophisti-
cated as necessary to protect the lion's share of the market. You don't
need Fort Knox, as Peter said. Business models will evolve and legal-
ized markets will develop that rely on digital rights management (DRM).
As Mr. Vitter said, DRM is the enabler for the evolution of these new
consumer choices.
14. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
15. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1205, 1301-1332 (West 2006).
16. Verizon andDisney in Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at C18.
[Vol. 84:1
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CONCLUSION
Since we live in a free society, motion picture producers, songwrit-
ers, publishers, and record companies will ultimately decide how best to
harness the internet to serve their needs. The new digital technologies
will allow much more flexibility in licensing. The industry will be able
to offer users a rich menu of options, with terms and conditions spelled
out in great detail, if that is what users want. If users want instead the
convenience of a blanket license-a monthly or yearly charge for access
to the entire repertoire-then that too is easily accommodated.
The copyright industries had a tough time detecting unauthorized
uses in the flesh and blood world of penny arcades, circuses, theaters,
and dance halls at the turn of the last century. Remembering that experi-
ence, but not dwelling on it, they know they will have to be careful mar-
keting their works in cyberspace. Energized, computerized, and digi-
tized, they will shape that future in ways that will make the internet reach
its full potential. The trick is to encourage the development of these ter-
rific new technologies in a way that discourages piracy and promotes the
creation of the new works that the technologies can then exploit.
The best copyright laws have always protected the power of crea-
tors against the power of the companies that build the machines that ex-
ploit the creators' works. This has been so whether the technology was
the printing press, radio, television, laser printers, photocopying ma-
chines, motion picture projectors, jukeboxes, VCRs, cable systems, CD
players, satellite transmitters, digital tape recorders, CD burners, record-
able DVD players, mainframe computers, personal computers, or the
internet. The debate over technology and the interests of authors is the
very essence of copyright thinking-the core that makes copyright law








I. THE D RM D EBATE ........................................................................... 16
A. Where Should Copyright Law Strike the Balance? .................. 17
B. Is the Leakage in the Existing Copyright System Acceptable? ..... 19
C. Are the Existing Technological Measures Sufficiently Effective? 22
D. Who Should Sacrifice in Early DRM Systems? ......................... 25
E. How Should Society Respond to the Digital Challenge? ...... 29
F . Sum m ary .................................................................................. 3 1
II. THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION REGIME .............................................. 32
A. The D omestic Regime ............................................................... 34
B. The International Regime ........................................................ 40
1. Mismatch with Local Conditions ........................................ 42
2. Lack of Empirical Evidence ................................................ 50
3. Unintended Consequences ................................................... 54
4. Backdoor Lawmaking .......................................................... 54
III. FOUR OBSERVATIONS .................................................................. 57
A. Entrenched Laws and Lock-in Effects ...................................... 57
B . D RM v. TP M ............................................................................ 61
C. Machine-Interpretable Noninfringing Uses ............................. 63
D. Market Responsiveness ............................................................ 73
C ON CLU SION ....................................................................................... 77
t Copyright © 2006 Peter K. Yu. Associate Professor of Law & Director, Intellectual
Property & Communications Law Program, Michigan State University College of Law; Core Fac-
ulty, Asian Studies Center & Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, Information Studies and
Media, Michigan State University; Research Fellow, Center for Studies of Intellectual Property
Rights, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. This Article is based on the remarks delivered
on May 23, 2006, at the Inaugural Summit on Intellectual Property and Digital Media organized by
The Cable Center and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The Author would like to
thank Susan Greene, Michael Mireles, and Viva Moffat for their kind invitation and hospitality. He
is also grateful to Jeremy deBeer, Richard Enbody, Megan LaBelle, Jacqueline Lipton, Michael
Mireles, and Mark Schultz for their valuable comments and suggestions; Philip Weiser, Ralph Oman
and the Summit participants for a very stimulating panel discussion; and Lisa Hammond and Alex-
ander Kanous for excellent research and editorial assistance.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
MSG LEFT BY: RED REBEL
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BEAGLE BROTHERS SOFTWARE FROM SAME
ANY OF THE VARIOUS NON MASKABLE (NMI) INTERRUPT CARDS SUCH AS:
CRACK-SHOT, REPLAY II, WILDCARD
I
INTRODUCTION
Digital rights management ("DRM") systems, including technologi-
cal measures that are used to protect copyrighted works, are not new.
2
They have existed for at least the last couple of decades. Similarly, cir-
cumvention tools have been widely available for a long time, and it is not
uncommon for individual users to circumvent the technological measures
used to protect copyrighted works.
Those who played with computers in the early Apple II days may
still remember the wide variety of cracking software and hardware they
could obtain-Bag of Tricks, Locksmith, Wildcard, you name it. Today,
however, DRM systems have taken on greater significance because of
the growth of electronic commerce and the explosion of the Internet.
What was once fascinating to only techies and geeks is now also of great
interest to policymakers and the consuming public.
In the current DRM debate, just like in most other intellectual prop-
erty-related debates, there is a considerable divide between the rights
holders, their investors and representatives on the one hand and academ-
ics, consumer advocates, and civil libertarians on the other.3 Although
1. Cracking Techniques, http://boutillon.free.fr/Underground/Deplombage/Cracking_
Techniques/1984/1984.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
2. For excellent collections of articles discussing DRM systems and related laws, see gener-
ally DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS (Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT]; Sympo-
sium, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management-
Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 597, 619
[hereinafter Bechtold, Present and Future] ("[Olver the last few years, the DRM debate has devel-
[Vol. 84:1
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these two groups rarely talk to each other, each of them is convinced that
"its position is obvious and natural, whereas the other side is radical and
contrived."4 They concoct their own "doomsday scenarios" and argue
for laws and policies that vindicate their positions.5
Unfortunately, neither side has sufficient empirical evidence to ei-
ther support its position nor disprove its rivals'. Instead, as David
McGowan noted, both sides tactically push the burden of proof back and
forth, knowing full well that "[w]hoever has to prove the unprovable
facts is likely to lose.",6 As the digital economy grows, the debate inten-
sifies, and the divide between the two sides widens.
Today, there has emerged an urgent need to find the common
ground on this very divisive issue, and this Inaugural Summit and the
resulting symposium issue cannot be timelier. Although finding this
proverbial common ground has been difficult, we as academics fortu-
nately can step back from the debate to analyze the positions taken by
both sides. As a businessman once told me, "You have the luxury of
saying 'on the other hand,' but we don't. We have to make decisions."
oped into a discussion about extremes. Depending on the point of view, digital rights management is
perceived as either heaven or hell on earth."); James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the
Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 97, 107-09 (F. Scott Kieff & John M. Olin eds., 2003) (crudely dividing the
intellectual property field into "'maximalists' or high protectionists, on the one hand, and 'minimal-
ists,' or those with a heightened concern about the public domain, on the other"); Anupam Chander
& Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004) (noting
"the increasingly binary tenor of current intellectual property debates"); R. Polk Wagner, The Per-
fect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 424 (2005) (observ-
ing the existence of "a virtual crisis for reasoned dialogue and deliberation; the gulf between advo-
cates of 'the public domain' and the content creators is so broad as to virtually preclude the sort of
discussion that could lead to mutually beneficial agreement about the policy changes that must occur
in this new era of the copyright law"); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Eco-
system, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 9 ("Today, the intellectual property debate is highly polarized.
Policymakers and commentators tend to fall into one of the two rival camps: the high-protectionists
or the low-protectionists--or in academic parlance, the maximalists or the minimalists.").
4. Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and
Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium, " 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1347 (2005) (stating that "each
side [in the debate] tries to convince the other that its position is obvious and natural, whereas the
other side's is radical and contrived").
5. See, e.g., id. at 1321 (stating that both sides in the intellectual property debate "agree that
the barbarians are at the gates, the city is under siege, and the situation is grave"); Jane C. Ginsburg,
How Copyright Got a Bad Namefor Itself 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 65 (2002) (recalling sugges-
tion that "the players in the debate over technological means of committing or forestalling copying
were all paranoid, each suspecting the other of bottomless malevolence in their respective endeavors
to control or to liberate copyrighted material"); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism,
69 MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (observing that "those who debate copyright often seem to talk past each
other").
6. As David McGowan observed:
It is easy for each side to poke holes in the other side's positions. It is hard for either side
to make an affirmative, instrumental case for their views. For this reason, and because
scholars favor consequentialist rhetoric, the debate often consists of competing narratives
that use hunches and conjectures to link the result an author desires to the policy the au-
thor favors. Because the evidence in such arguments is so weak, the legal endgame is to
place the burden of proof on the other side. Whoever has to prove the unprovable facts is
likely to lose.
McGowan, supra note 5, at 2.
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Fully exploiting this luxury, Part I begins by examining the posi-
tions taken by the proponents and critics of DRM systems and related
laws. Part II then focuses on anticircumvention laws, highlighting their
harms at both the domestic and international levels. Contending that an
unbalanced international anticircumvention regime is more harmful than
its domestic counterpart, this Part calls for countries, in particular less
developed countries, to be more cautious about the ratification and sub-
sequent implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") Internet Treaties. 7 Part III concludes with four observations
which I hope will provide some insight into the development of the next
generation of DRM systems and the supporting legal regime. Resuscitat-
ing this Summit's larger theme of "working together in the digital
world," this Part also seeks to find more common ground between the
many stakeholders in the DRM debate.
I. THE DRM DEBATE
In today's DRM debate, there are generally two different camps.
While rights holders, their investors and representatives are on one side,
academics (usually liberal academics), consumer advocates, and civil
libertarians are on the other. Even though these two camps disagree con-
siderably, they do agree on many issues, and their positions are not irrec-
oncilable. In addition, there are many who fall in between the two
camps, as well as those whose affiliations vary depending on the specific
issue at hand. Thus, despite the increasing polarity of the debate, it may
be misleading to explore it as if there are only two camps.
Nevertheless, to underscore the need to find common ground be-
tween the many stakeholders in the DRM debate, this Part intentionally
polarizes the positions of the pro-anticircumvention camp and the anti-
anticircumvention camp. In particular, it discusses their disagreements
over (1) where copyright law should strike the balance, (2) whether the
leakage in the current copyright system is acceptable, (3) whether the
technological measures deployed thus far by the content industries are
sufficiently effective, (4) who should sacrifice in the early DRM systems,
and (5) how society should respond to the challenge created by the Inter-
net and new media technologies to the content industries. After explor-
ing these differences, this Part concludes with a reminder that the debate
is actually more complex and dynamic than what the bipolar debate has
suggested and that stakeholders align their positions with those of others
at times while opposing them at other times.
7. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
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A. Where Should Copyright Law Strike the Balance?
Most members of the two camps agree that intellectual property is
valuable and that the copyright system provides the needed economic
incentives to promote creativity.8 Without copyright protection, they
understand, most professional authors and their investors will not able to
recoup the time, effort, or resources expended in the creative process,
and society will suffer as a result. Copyright therefore ensures that au-
thors participate in the creative process, rather than in other, more remu-
nerative activities.
What these two camps disagree about, however, is the amount of
incentives the copyright system needs to generate to promote creativity
and whether support for creative works should come solely from the
copyright system.9 Although an increase in copyright protection will
generally increase the authors' economic incentives to create, such incen-
tives are not the only motivation behind creative activities. For example,
I do not need economic incentives to write a thank you email to the or-
ganizers of this interesting summit, even though such an email is eligible
for copyright protection if it is original and sufficiently creative and if it
satisfies the other requirements under copyright law. Likewise, parents
do not need economic incentives to take snapshots of their children, al-
though these snapshots are also eligible for copyright protection. In fact,
if the right circumstances arise, these snapshots may be worth a large
sum of money (think Brangelina's Baby! 10).
In addition, more is not always better, and small can be beautiful. 1"
To participate in the creative process, authors need access to a richly
endowed public domain. The more protection society gives to a single
author, the less access to the copyrighted works thousands, or even mil-
lions, of future authors (and many more consumers) will have. At some
point, the lack of access to needed raw materials and the fear of copy-
right infringement lawsuits will prompt future authors to abandon their
aspiring profession.
As Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,'2 "[o]verprotecting intellectual prop-
erty is as harmful as underprotecting it.' 3 Judge Kozinski's concern has
8. Inevitably, there are commentators who consider copyright obsolete and irrelevant in the
digital world and therefore have called for its abolition. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of
Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 732-33 (2005) (discussing these commentaries).
9. See id. at 733-39 (examining alternative compensation models).
10. See Julie Bosman, In Web Era, Big Money Can't Buy an Exclusive, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2006, at CI (reporting that People Magazine paid a substantial sum for the rights to publish the
pictures of Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt cuddling their days-old infant).
11. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED (1975).
12. 989 F.2d 1512 (9thCir. 1993).
13. White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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become particularly important today, in light of the ever-expanding
scope of intellectual property protection. Indeed, critics have repeatedly
questioned whether the existing copyright system has struck the appro-
priate balance between rights holders and the consuming public. As Jes-
sica Litman, one of the most vocal critics of the copyright industries,
stated:
There is no overarching vision of the public interest animating the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"]. None. Instead, what
we have is what a variety of different private parties were able to ex-
tract from each other in the course of an incredibly complicated four-
year multiparty negotiation. Unsurprisingly, they paid for that with a
lot of rent-seeking at the expense of new upstart industries and the
public at large. 14
Similarly, Glynn Lunney noted that "[o]rdinary consumers seldom
play any direct role in the extended (and often private) negotiating ses-
sions required to craft such compromises" and that consumer interests
are "represented only indirectly in these sessions, when it happens to
coincide with the interest of one of the participants. 15 Joseph Liu also
pointed out that the relationship between copyright and consumer inter-
ests remains underexplored in legal scholarship.
1 6
While the historical lack of consumer participation in crafting copy-
right legislation is lamentable, the continued lack of such participation is
especially alarming, as digital technologies and the Internet open up
many new political, social, economic, educational, and career opportuni-
ties. It is therefore understandable why academics, consumer advocates,
and civil libertarians have widely criticized the recent expansion of intel-
lectual property laws, including the introduction of anticircumvention
14. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144-45 (2001). For a classic treatment of public
choice problems in copyright lawmaking, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legis-
lative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the recent
expansion of intellectual property laws have stifled creativity and innovation); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (articulating the needs for the development of a free culture move-
ment); LITMAN, supra (detailing the expansion of copyright laws in the past two centuries); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (describing how the increasing corporate control over the
use of software, digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copyright
law away from its historical design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy). But see Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137,
137 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation] (describing the DMCA as "the fruit of
intensive lobbying by a wide range of interest groups of copyright owners, on the one hand, and,
particularly, users, on the other" (emphasis added)).
15. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 898 (2001).
16. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REv. 397, 401
(2003) (stating that "copyright law currently does not have any persuasive or coherent theory of the
consumer, and that examining consumer interests in more detail may shed some useful light on a
number of existing copyright law debates").
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protection. To them, DRM systems and related laws are just another
alarming feature of the ever-expanding copyright regime.
B. Is the Leakage in the Existing Copyright System Acceptable?
Both camps agree that unauthorized downloading is widespread, se-
rious, and probably detrimental to the economic health of the content
industries.' 7  However, they bicker about the actual volumes of illegal
downloading and the resulting adverse financial impact on the indus-
tries.1 8 They also disagree on whether the leakage in the current copy-
right system is acceptable. From the standpoint of rights holders, the
more airtight the protection is, the more profits they will make, and the
more worthwhile their investments will be. Thus, it is ideal for the con-
tent industries to deploy technological measures to ensure zero leakage
from the production facilities to consumers. 19
From the standpoint of consumers, however, this position is not
only unsupportable, but socially detrimental. As Mark Lemley observed:
[T]he effort to permit inventors [and creators] to capture the full so-
cial value of their invention-and the rhetoric of free riding in intel-
lectual property more generally-are fundamentally misguided. In
no other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of
social benefits. Competitive markets work not because producers
capture the full social value of their output-they do not, except at
the margin-but because they permit producers to make enough
money to cover their costs, including a reasonable return on fixed-
cost investment. Even real property doesn't give property owners the
right to control social value. Various uses of property create uncom-
pensated positive externalities, and we don't see that as a problem or
a reason people won't efficiently invest in their property.
20
17. For example, although Raymond Ku disagrees with the recording industry's position that
file sharing is theft and considers such activities instead as part of a socially beneficial creative
destruction process, he has made it clear that he "doles] not mean to suggest that consumer copying
is not a threat to the recording industry or other content distributors." Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Con-
sumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539,
564, 566 (2003). In fact, he believes that file sharing "is a serious threat, one that strikes at the very
foundation of a business model based upon distributing content to the public." Id. at 566. His dis-
agreement with the industry mainly comes from his belief that "copyright does not protect against
this type of threat" and that "[c]opyright protects the distribution of creative works in general, not a
particular industry or business model." Id.
18. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 658 n.15 (providing
sources disagreeing over the adverse economic impact of file sharing on the recording industry).
19. As Eben Moglen observed, "[tihe content industries want to make a leakproof pipe that
leads from their production facility directly to the eyeball and eardrum of the consumer." Tina
Gasperson, SSSCA Gets a Hearing Oct. 25-Can It Be Stopped?, NEwsFORGE, Oct. 19, 2001,
http://www.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=0 1/10/19/1546246.
20. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1032 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]. But see John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isola-
tionism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2005) (responding to Professor Lem-
ley). See also Mark A. Lemley, REPLY. What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1097 (2005) (replying to Professor Duffy).
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Thus, there are many good policy reasons for harnessing the copyright
system to promote spillovers that are beneficial to innovation and crea-
tivity.2 ' As Professor Lemley pointed out, "[t]he goal of eliminating free
riding ... is ill-suited to the unique characteristics of intellectual prop-
erty ... [, and e]fforts to permit intellectual property owners to fully in-
ternalize the benefits of their creativity will inevitably get the balance
wrong.1
22
Moreover, the First Amendment seems to require some form of ac-
commodation of individual interests in copyright law. Although the Su-
preme Court in Eldred v. Ashcrofl 3 stated that the First Amendment
"bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches," as compared to making or declining to make one's own
speech, the Court recognized that copyright law incorporates "built-in
24free speech safeguards" to address First Amendment concerns, such as
the idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privilege, and the many statu-
tory exceptions cited in the decision. Because of these safeguards, the
Court declined to impose on copyright term extension the "uncommonly
strict scrutiny" applied in First Amendment cases.2 5  As the Court ex-
plained, strict scrutiny is unnecessary as long as "Congress has not al-
tered the traditional contours of copyright protection.,
26
Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility for strict First
Amendment scrutiny when the DMCA or sophisticated DRM systems
have altered those traditional contours. Because the DMCA threatens to
take away the "built-in free speech safeguards," some cyberlaw and First
Amendment scholars, like Jack Balkin, Daniel Farber, and Lawrence
Lessig, suggested that the DMCA may be open to challenge on First
Amendment grounds. 7 Others, by contrast, have questioned whether
21. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1052 (contending that "part of the point of
intellectual property law is to promote uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas
and works that might otherwise be kept secret are widely disseminated"); see also Brett M. Frisch-
mann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2006),
http://ssm.com/abstractid=855244; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark Lemiey, Spillovers, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssm.com/abstractid=898881.
22. Lemiey, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1032; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 130 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE] (explaining why "perfect
control is not the control that law has given owners of intellectual property").
23. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
24. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227.
25. See id. at 218-19 ("We reject petitioners' plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scru-
tiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.");
see also id. at 219-20 (discussing the various exceptions in the copyright statute).
26. Id. at 221.
27. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 4, at 1349 (contending that Eldred has "suggest[ed] that more
transformative uses might come out differently under the First Amendment ... [and that] further
First Amendment scrutiny is in order when Congress has altered those contours"); Lawrence Lessig,
Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 41 (stating that "[t]he Court stated that laws that do
not change the 'traditional contours' of copyright protection are not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny, leaving the implication that laws that change those 'traditional contours' do get First
Amendment scrutiny"); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2003_01_12_balkin archive.html#87596430 (Jan. 17, 2003, 11:45 EST) ("Is the Digital Millennium
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there has ever been any "traditional contours of copyright protection,,
28
suggesting that these contours may have to be defined, constructed, or
even "invented., 29  Notwithstanding this continuous debate, it seems
correct to assume that the copyright system needs to accommodate some
form of First Amendment interests. After all, the Court rejected the posi-
tion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that copyrights are "categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment. 30
In addition to First Amendment interests, commentators have sug-
gested that the "breathing space ' 31 in the copyright system extends to
cover other individual interests and socially-beneficial activities. For
example, Julie Cohen criticized the DMCA for taking away the "breath-
ing space for thought, exploration, and personal growth" usually pro-
tected by the right to privacy.32 Joseph Liu faulted the DMCA for its
"potential of effectively blocking out some of the breathing space that
conventional copyright law made available for more active modes of
consumption. 3 3 Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer discussed
"[t]he challenge . . . to design legal rules that protect information-rich
products against market-destructive cloning while providing enough
breathing room for reverse engineering to enable new entrants to com-
pete and innovate in a competitively healthy way."
34
Some commentators have also underscored the importance of a
regulatory safety valve in our legal system. As Polk Wagner pointed out
recently, "[e]ven under legal schemes that demand little or no interven-
tion on the part of third-party regulatory institutions, such as property-
backed contracts, there nonetheless exist a number of safety valves that
ensure that private arrangements conform to acknowledged boundaries of
Copyright Act Unconstitutional Under Eldred v. Ashcroft?") (suggesting that "the DMCA is consti-
tutionally suspect" under the Eldred logic, because the statute has "altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection").
28. See Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 929-30
(2004) (explaining that it remains unclear whether the Court would find that the DMCA had altered
"the traditional contours of copyright protection").
29. See Farber, supra note 4, at 1322 (observing that the baseline used to determine the ideal
governing regime for the digital domain remains to be "constructed" and cannot be derived from
simple observation); cf THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric J. Hobsbawn & Terence Ranger eds.,
1983) (showing that many of what we consider ancient traditions were actually invented compara-
tively recently).
30. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (stating that "the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared
copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment."' (quoting Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414-
26 (1999) (describing how the DMCA raises First Amendment concerns); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 74-81 (2001) (contend-
ing that the DMCA is vulnerable to First Amendment challenge).
31. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
32. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 578 (2003).
33. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, supra note 16, at 429.
34. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineer-
ing, Ill YALE L.J. 1575, 1580 (2002).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 84:1
social practice." 35 Thus, one can conclude that some leakage is benefi-
cial and can be further justified as the needed "safety valve" in the copy-
right system.36 After all, the Framers of the Constitution intended copy-
right to be the "engine of free expression, 3 7 and jurists and commenta-
tors have underscored the "safety valve" function of the First Amend-
ment.38
C. Are the Existing Technological Measures Sufficiently Effective?
Both camps agree that the arms race between copyright holders and
technology developers on the one hand and hackers--or, more accu-
rately, crackers-on the other hand is wasteful. 39 In fact, society will be
35. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, 42 HOus. L. REv. 1107,1118 (2005). Among
the safety valves he cited are the doctrine of unconscionability in contract law, unfair competition
law, principles of nondiscrimination, and restraint encouraged by public enforcement of contract
law. Id.
36. Cf Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating that "[iut has been viewed by courts as a safety valve that accommodates the exclusive rights
conferred by copyright with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment"). There
is no guarantee, however, in what form this safety valve should take. As stated in a study by the
Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, "the current law already includes a 'safety valve'-
in addition to several exemptions set out in the law, the Copyright Office can create new exemptions
through its rulemaking proceeding." June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A
Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 390
(2004).
37. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
38. As Justice Louis Brandeis recognized in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence ... knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); see also Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Re-
form: Press, Law, and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 742 (1993)
(stating that the press in the United States "has acted as a 'safety valve' for the release and 'domesti-
cation' of popular discontent and frustration" (footnote omitted)); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting
and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141 n. 177 (1993) (stating that "[a]dvocates of a 'safety valve'
theory of the First Amendment can cite Brandeis' [concurrence in Whitney v. California]").
39. I described this endless arms race earlier:
Although copy protection technologies allow copyright holders to lock up creative works,
these technologies lose their protective function when they are decrypted. Even worse,
once the decryption key is disclosed, the copyrighted work will become available not
only to those "techies" who successfully broke the code but also to unsophisticated users
around the world.... To prevent the public from breaking the copy protection technol-
ogy, copyright holders must constantly upgrade their technology. Such upgrading, unfor-
tunately, will further attract the attention of hackers, who are eager to tinker with the lat-
est technology. Eventually, the repeated encryption and decryption will create a vicious
cycle in which the entertainment industry and the hacker community engage in an endless
copy protection arms race.
Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 722-24 (footnotes omitted); see also
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153 (stating that an "arms race wastes creative
resources that might be better directed toward creating original works of authorship, rather than
devices that promote piracy"); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217, 251 (discussing the "wasteful 'arms race' of technological-protection schemes, with
each side increasing its spending to outperform the other's technology"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku,
The Creative Destruction of Copyright. Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 319-20 (2002) (discussing an expensive and unending technological arms race).
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better off if the content industries devote their scarce resources to nurtur-
ing artists and creators and improving products, rather than upgrading the
technology that is used to restrict consumers' access to copyrighted
works.40
Both camps also understand that there are no perfect, hacker-proof
DRM systems.41 As Edward Felten explained, even the best encryption
technology merely serves as "a speed bump that will frustrate people
who want to copy illegally., 42 The goal of DRM systems is not to ensure
that the content will be unavailable to highly sophisticated hackers.
Rather, it is to "help ... keep honest people honest"43-or, as Fred von
Lohmann put it, to help "keep[] technically unsophisticated people hon-
est." 44 By providing "virtual fences," DRM systems also can help signal
40. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 723.
41. See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age. Is the Marketplace
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 89-92 (2002) (testimony of Edward W. Felten, Associate Professor of Computer Sci-
ence, Princeton University) (noting that "strong encryption" techniques that a moderately skilled
person cannot break do not exist in the real world), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?lpaddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=85758.pdf&directory=/diskc/wais/data/I107sena
te hearings; PETER BIDDLE ET AL., THE DARKNET AND THE FUTURE OF CONTENT DISTRIBUTION §
5.1 (2002), http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (noting that digital rights management
systems "are doomed to failure"); Stuart Haber, If Piracy Is the Problem, Is DRM the Answer?, in
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 224 (arguing that "given the current and foresee-
able state of technology the content protection features of DRM are not effective at combating pi-
racy"); Pamela Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 41, 43 (stating
that "no DRM technology is hacker-proof'); see also Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological
Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 635, 638 (2004) ("Proponents of the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions were not naive about the technological infallibility of TPMs. They admit-
ted that no technology would be foolproof against every hacker bent on compromising it.").
42. A "Speed Bump" vs. Music Copying, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 2002 (interview with Professor
Edward Felten of Princeton University), available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/jan2002/nf2002019_7170.htm. Although no encryption technology can protect perfectly,
such technology does not need to be perfectly robust to have a positive effect.
43. As a National Research Council study observed:
Most people are not technically knowledgeable enough to defeat even moderately sophis-
ticated systems and, in any case, are law-abiding citizens rather than determined adver-
saries. TPSs [technical protection services] with what might be called "curb-high deter-
rence"-systems that can be circumvented by a knowledgeable person-are sufficient in
many instances. They can deter the average user from engaging in illegal behavior and
may deter those who may be ignorant about some aspects of the law by causing them to
think carefully about the appropriateness of their copying. Simply put, TPSs can help to
keep honest people honest.
COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
218 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
44. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 639; see also David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 740 (2000) [hereinafter Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use] (stating that "[i]f the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only users whose inter-
ests are truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract
whatever technological measures are placed in their path" (footnote omitted)). Pamela Samuelson,
however, questioned "whether Congress intended for the technologically savvy who could 'do it
themselves' to be the only ones who could engage in privileged acts of circumvention." Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regula-
tions Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 551 (1999) [hereinafter Samuelson, Intellec-
tual Property and the Digital Economy]. But see Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Il1 F. Supp.
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to the outside world the traditionally elusive boundaries of intellectual
property,45 even though these systems sometimes "'fence in' material
that is either not copyrighted or which is already in the public domain.
' 46
Nevertheless, the two camps disagree on whether the encryption
technology currently deployed by the content industries is sufficiently
effective to protect copyrighted works.47 A case in point is the weak
copy-protection technology manufactured by SunnComm for BMG's
CDs.48  In October 2003, SunnComm threatened to sue a computer sci-
ence graduate student under the DMCA after he posted a paper on his
website explaining how to disarm SunnComm's technology by pushing
the shift key when loading a CD into a computer. 49  While there is no
doubt that the student's disclosure of this embarrassing flaw has reduced
the company's market value in the short term, it is unclear how such a
shift-key-disabled technology could be considered effective.5 °
It is important to remember that the anticircumvention provision of
the DMCA, and the WIPO Internet Treaties on which it was based, were
created to promote self-help. 5' To some extent, the provision can be seen
2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declaring that "[the fact that Congress elected to leave technologi-
cally unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the
technical means of doing so is a matter for Congress unless Congress' decision contravenes the
Constitution").
45. See, e.g., Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures. Tilting at Copyright's Wind-
mill, 34 OTTAWA L. REv. 7, 13 (2002) (stating that "TPMs can operate as safeguards or 'virtual
fences' around digitized content, whether or not the content enjoys copyright protection"); Ejan
Mackaay, Intellectual Property and the Internet: The Share of Sharing, in THE COMMODIFICATION
OF INFORMATION 133, 136-38 (Neil Weinstock Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds., 2002) (discussing
the "fencing" aspect of property). But cf Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 53 (2001) (discussing the uneasiness of
using the "fence" metaphor).
46. Thomas Dreier & Georg Nolte, The German Copyright-Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, in
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 479, 496.
47. Effectiveness is actually one of the requirements of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. §
1201 (a)(3)(B) (2004) (stating that "a technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if
the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work"); id. §
1201(b)(2)(B) (stating that "a technological measure 'effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title").
48. BMG seems to have its unfortunate share of bad publicity about its deployment of TPMs.
The most recent embarrassment concerns the unauthorized installation of a "rootkit" onto users'
computers. For a discussion of this controversy in this symposium issue, see Megan M. LaBelle,
The "Rootkit Debacle": The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Recording Industry and the War on
Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 79 (2006).
49. John Borland, Student Faces Suit Over Key to CD Locks, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 9, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5089168.html.
50. SunnComm smartly dropped the lawsuit. See Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won 't Sue
Grad Student, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 10, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html.
51. See, e.g., DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 312 (stating that it is "a perfectly under-
standable goal" when the DMCA is "[i]nterpreted as an incentive for copyright owners to protect
their own property, rather than to rely solely on the police and the courts"); ROBERT S. SCHWARTZ &
MIKE GODWIN, BEYOND GROKSTER: A CRITIQUE OF THE MODELS PROPOSED BY COPYRIGHT AND
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS AUTHORITIES (2005), http://www.publicknowledge.org/news/analysis/
critique-menellet-rss-mg (stating that "Sections 1201(a) and (b) are aimed at strengthening a regime
of licensed technological measures and self-help, as an alternative to copyright litigation");
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as a two-step legislative compromise. The first step commences when
copyright holders introduce technological measures that effectively pro-
tect copyrighted works. If the rights holders complete the first step by
deploying effective measures, the law will then kick in to offer additional
protection, based partly on the premise that some legal protection is
needed to compensate for the lack of perfect, hacker-proof encryption
technology. However, if the copyright holder fails to complete the first
step, there is no need to reach the second step. Thus, the anticircumven-
tion right-if there is one-is not absolute, but conditional, and circum-
vention of technological measures per se is not a violation of the DMCA.
D. Who Should Sacrifice in Early DRM Systems?
Both camps agree that DRM systems are important and can be very
useful, especially during a transitional period when the content industries
are seeking solutions to the extensive unauthorized copying problem
created by the Internet and new media technologies.52 Thus, the question
for the debate is not whether the use of these systems and related laws is
good or bad, but what systems should be deployed, under what circum-
stances they should be deployed, and whether they embody the important
values of our society.53
Although self-help measures and supporting laws are often criti-
cized, DRM systems actually have many benefits.54 Indeed, as Lionel
Sobel observed, these systems "appear[] to be at the foundation of what-
ever business models will actually succeed in the digital age."' 55 If effec-
tively deployed, they can help "facilitate[] the acquisition of rights, re-
duce transaction costs and allow a better price differentiation by permit-
Mackaay, supra note 45, at 137 ("If new technology results in old fences becoming more permeable,
this problem falls to the owner. It is not the mission of state law enforcement to shore up outdated
fences.").
52. For a discussion of this transition, see generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43.
53. See Symposium, Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on the Law & Tech-
nology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697, 741 (2003) [hereinafter DRM
Symposium Transcript] ("The question is not: DRM, yes or no? It can be a helpful tool. It's under
what context it's being developed and how it's being used.") (remarks of Commissioner Mozelle
Thompson of the Federal Trade Commission).
54. For discussions of the needs and benefits of DRM systems, see generally Kenneth W.
Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 405 (1999); Dean S. Marks & Bruce
H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial
Licences, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198 (2000); Barry B. Sookman, "TPMs ": A Perfect Storm for
Consumers: Replies to Professor Geist, 4 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 23 (2005), available at
http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol4 nol/index.html.
55. Lionel S. Sobel, DRMs as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 669 (2003). As elaborated by one commentator:
DRMs enable a wide variety of business models. They are seen as being crucial for the
development of new business models, in which pricing schemes, subscription models,
credit sales and billing schemes could be incorporated. DRMs permit different price-
points for services, such as "A la carte" downloads, subscriptions, or rental and preview.
Business models might also include network downloads, streaming, rights lockers,
broadcasts and super distribution using P2P technologies.
Sookman, supra note 54, at 31.
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ting the rights holder to tailor their products and the prices to the individ-
ual needs of the users. 56 They also foster competition and allow rights
holders to "better exploit the markets for their products" and ultimately
provide greater choices for consumers.57 In addition, as Kenneth Dam
pointed out, such systems "can ... serve purposes akin to moral rights,
first by assuring attribution to the author, artist, or composer, and second
by ensuring the integrity of documents, images, and music.,' 58  If the
copyrighted works are reasonably priced, and the use of DRM systems is
not too burdensome, those systems "will [even] facilitate the change in
public mores that will be required to make paying for information seem
to be the thing to do rather than an encroachment on freedom.,
59
By contrast, if they are improperly deployed, they will intrude upon
the users' individual privacy while stripping away important rights con-
sumers have traditionally enjoyed in the physical space, including the
idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privilege, the first sale doctrine,
and many other lawful personal uses. The next Part will discuss in
greater detail how the misuse of DRMs and anticircumvention laws can
be harmful at both the domestic and intemational levels.6 °
To boost the use of DRM systems and related laws, proponents
have justified their proposals by sfating that consumers sometimes have
to sacrifice, at least in the early stages of development of DRM systems.
As they argue, because digital technologies allow individuals to repro-
duce unlimited copies of copyrighted works in near-perfect quality, ef-
fective protection is essential for the continued development of copy-
righted products.61 Without such protection, new, innovative products
would not appear in the market in the first place. Thus, the proponents
claimed, Congress has recalibrated the balance in the copyright system to
respond to the challenge created by the digital revolution. As Eric Smith
of the International Intellectual Property Alliance declared, "Congress
made a judgment that the danger from unauthorized copying and further
56. Dreier & Nolte, supra note 46, at 501.
57. Id.; Sookman, supra note 54, at 31 ("In contrast to traditional distribution, consumers
could gain wider access to content wherever and whenever they choose. Given their ability to un-
bundle copyright into discrete and custom-made products, DRMs promise a much greater range of
consumer choice and perhaps even a reduction in prices.").
58. Dam, supra note 54, at 405. As Ian Kerr and others explained:
Under a moral rights view, they would say, the creators of original works ought to have
some ability to control the use of those works-not merely because their financial liveli-
hoods depend on it but, also because of the ease with which a digital work can be unbun-
dled. The unbundling of a digital work threatens the integrity of the work and poses seri-
ous challenges for those creators who wish to ensure that elements of their work are
given proper attribution. As such, the personality and reputational rights of authors,
which are so deeply and inextricably tied to the products of their creation, are in jeop-
ardy.
Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 39.
59. Dam, supra note 54, at 409.
60. See discussion Part II.
61. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 48 n.20 (collecting congressional testimonies on this
point).
[Vol. 84:1
2006] ANTICIRCUMVENTION AND ANTI-ANTICIRCUMVENTION 27
distribution of digitally transmitted material was so high, that there could
be some incursions on fair use."6 2 Similarly, the court noted the neces-
sary sacrifice in United States v. Elcom Ltd .63:
[W]hile it is not unlawful to circumvent for the purpose of engaging
in fair use, it is unlawful to traffic in tools that allow fair use circum-
vention. That is part of the sacrifice Congress was willing to make in
order to protect against unlawful piracy and promote the develop-
ment of electronic commerce and the availability of copyrighted ma-
terial on the Intemet.
64
Notably, both the proponents and courts have not denied that the DMCA
has burdened free speech and other legitimate uses. Rather, they believe
that the industries successfully convinced Congress that these burdens
were acceptable because they were necessary to slow piracy and to pro-
mote the development of electronic commerce.
Critics, however, disagree, for good reasons. While the protection
of private property is important, it is not the only right enshrined in the
United States Constitution. There are many other important rights, such
as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of thought, and the
right to privacy. The proponents' argument that property is so important
that we have to give up our other important rights simply does not with-
stand constitutional scrutiny. 65  Indeed, the American people have de-
cided not to set up such a scheme in the physical space, and the propo-
nents have yet to rebut this position or persuasively explain why we need
to change our tradition in the digital environment. As Yochai Benkler
pointed out in the context of self-help measures:
The convenience of using self-help measures rather than the more
ponderous legal process is not an insignificant value. But it is one
that courts and legislators have often decided must yield in the face
of important countervailing interests. Landlords can no longer use
self-help against tenants in most jurisdictions, but instead must resort
62. Symposium, Implications of Enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Case
Study, Focusing on United States v. Sklyarov, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805,
841 (2002) [hereinafter Sklyarov Symposium Transcript] (remarks of Eric Smith of the International
Intellectual Property Alliance); accord Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 142 (stat-
ing that "Congress has independently determined that this scope of protection is necessary to afford
meaningful protection to copyrighted works in the digital environment").
63. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
64. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1125; see also Besek, supra note 36, at 391 ("Section 1201
involves genuine tradeoffs: Congress, recognizing that technological controls might diminish the
convenience of making privileged uses, nonetheless made a judgment that technological protection
would foster innovation in new content delivery mechanisms and provide consumers with a range of
new options for experiencing copyrighted works").
65. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?, 2002
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375 (questioning whether copyright protection should trump the protec-
tion of the right to privacy); Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its
Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 23, 23 (2006) (urging that "policy arguments about property in
the digital environment take explicit cognizance of other policy considerations that tend to bound
propertization: contractual ordering, competition, and freedom of expression").
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to summary process. Life, limb, and the public peace were consid-
ered by courts too important to sacrifice in the name of effective self-
help. The claimed inefficiency of courts at enforcing copyrights
hardly seems an adequate reason to prevent individuals from reading,
criticizing, or mocking the words of others in ways that the law of
copyright privileges them to do.
66
When the issue is projected into the international sphere, the impor-
tance of protection of private property vis-A-vis other rights becomes
even more contestable. The word "private," for example, was deliber-
ately omitted in the right to property provision of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others. '67  The right to
property was also not explicitly recognized in both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights68 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 69 the two legally-binding hu-
man rights instruments drafted after the adoption of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. Unlike anticircumvention laws, these interna-
tional covenants have recognized many potential countervailing interests,
such as the right to freedom of thought, the right to freedom of expres-
sion, the right to education, the right to take part in cultural life, and the
right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.7 °
Moreover, commentators have suggested that there does not have to
be "an all-or-nothing choice between the total control of DRM and ram-
pant copyright infringement.",7 1  While sacrifices may sometimes be
needed, especially in the early stages of development of DRM systems,
consumers may not need to sacrifice as much as the DMCA requires.
66. Benkler, supra note 30, at 426 (footnote omitted).
67. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17(1), G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (emphasis added); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property
Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927335 (discussing the omission of the word "private" in article 17 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182-83 (2001) (dis-
cussing the different conceptions of the right to property among the various delegates to the Human
Rights Commission).
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
69. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
70. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 19(1) (recognizing the right to freedom of thought);
id. art. 19(2) (recognizing the right to freedom of expression); ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 13 (rec-
ognizing the right to education); id. art. 15(l)(a) (recognizing the right to take part in cultural life);
id. art. 15(l)(b) (recognizing the fight to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications).
71. Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's Anti-
Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 697; see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the
Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA 's Anti-Device Provisions, 19
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 111, 113 (2005) [hereinafter Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle] (stating
that "[c]ourts typically take an all-or-nothing approach to circumvention technologies, usually result-
ing in a complete ban on marketing them"); Lunney, supra note 15, at 820 (observing that "decryp-
tion presents something close to an all-or-nothing choice").
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For example, Dan Burk and Julie Cohen proposed a mixed fair use infra-
structure that includes automatic fair use defaults and a key escrow sys-
tem that provides would-be fair users with the needed encryption keys to
obtain access to protected works.72 Drawing on British law, Jacqueline
Lipton offered an administrative complaint mechanism for individuals
who sought to obtain legitimate uses of copyrighted works.7 3 As she
explained, "[a]dministrative approaches tend to be more flexible and less
formal in their procedures than judicial processes and are generally less
costly than judicial hearings. 74 Alfred Yen suggested that "[a] circum-
vention technology control law modeled after federal gun control law
will deter the irresponsible misuse of circumvention technology while
preserving access to such technology for lawful purposes. 75 Professor
Yen's proposal is quite similar to the national verification system intro-
duced in Australia.76
E. How Should Society Respond to the Digital Challenge?
As discussed above, both camps understand the "digital challenge"
confronting the content industries. They also appreciate the need for
transition and the sometimes imperfection of transitional policies. How-
ever, they disagree on whether the law should err on the side of consum-
ers or that of rights holders, especially when supporting empirical evi-
dence is lacking one way or the other.
It is important to remember that creating protection for copyright
holders is a means to an end, not an end itself.77 As the Supreme Court
72. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 45.
73. See Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71. Her proposal draws, but
improves on, the administrative complaint mechanism provided under the British Copyright, De-
signs and Patents Act of 1988. Section 296ZE of the statute provides:
Where the application of any effective technological measure to a copyright work other
than a computer program prevents a person from carrying out a permitted act in relation
to that work then that person or a person being a representative of a class of persons pre-
vented from carrying out a permitted act may issue a notice of complaint to the Secretary
of State.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZE(2) (U.K.) (amended 2003).
74. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 155.
75. Yen, supra note 71, at 697.
76. As Ian Kerr and others described:
In order to make sure that a circumventing device or service is really used for a permitted
purpose, a person wishing to make such a use must provide the supplier of the device or
service with a signed declaration containing information, such as the person's name and
address, the basis of the exemption claimed, the name and address of the supplier, a
statement that the device or service is to be used for a permitted purpose and identifica-
tion of that purpose by reference to a specific section of the Copyright Act.
Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-59.
77. See, e.g., COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] ("Regardless of the term used
for them, we prefer to regard IPRs as instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges
on individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of contributing to the greater public good. The
privilege is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself."), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf; Dan T. Coenen & Paul J.
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reminded us in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,78 and again in
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,7 9 "[t]he
ultimate aim [of copyright] is ... to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. '80 Earlier in Mazer v. Stein,8' the Court also stated
that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.'
8 2
The two camps also disagree on what society should do in the
meantime while the legislature is searching for a better solution.83
Should consumers wait for the content industries to come up with better
protection mechanisms and a viable business plan? Or should the indus-
tries wait for consumers to change their attitudes toward the protection of
artists and creators or for society to develop legal solutions that can
equally protect both consumers and copyright holders?
In congressional testimonies, the content industries stated that they
were unlikely to release works until the market was well protected.84
However, experience on the Internet and in China (as well as in other
major markets in the less developed world) has demonstrated otherwise.
There is no doubt that the industries are very reluctant to release creative
works if no protection whatsoever exists. However, they might be more
willing to do so if some protection exists. In fact, because rights holders
are unlikely to find a marketplace that has zero leakage, economics sug-
gest that they will release their products if the profits they obtain will
exceed their piracy-related losses. Some rights holders may even write
off these early losses as expenses for the experimentation of new busi-
ness plans or for promotion or market development purposes. As Micro-
soft's founder Bill Gates famously declared:
Although about three million computers get sold every year in China,
people don't pay for the software. Someday they will, though. And
Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
99 (2002) (discussing the means-end fit of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
78. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
79. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
80. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 (quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156).
81. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
82. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
83. Cf Peter K. Yu, Innovation Gains Edge in Music, Movie Battle, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 29,
2004, at 15A (stating that "[t]he difficult question in the Grokster case is not whether the court
should exercise caution while waiting for time and market forces to achieve some balance, but whom
the court should ask to wait").
84. Even Jane Ginsburg, a noted advocate of strong authors' rights, conceded that "[t]he
assumption that copyright owners will only make their works available in copy-protected form may
well be overstated." Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153. Nevertheless, she
believes the issue should be left for the U.S. Copyright Office to review during its triennial rulemak-
ing proceeding. Id.
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as long as they're going to steal it, we want them to steal ours.
They'll get sort of addicted, and then we'll somehow figure out how
to collect sometime in the next decade.
85
It remains to be seen whether Mr. Gates has figured out how to collect
these lost software license fees, especially in light of the growing devel-
opment of open source software in China.86
F. Summary
In sum, both camps share sufficient common ground to start a dia-
logue, but their considerable disagreements prevent them from reaching
mutually acceptable conclusions. Because many of their differences
have yet to be proved or disproved by empirical data, the positions they
eventually will take will depend on their perceptions of the market, the
state of technology, and the expectation of consumers, all of which are
susceptible to rapid changes in the digital world. As Daniel Farber
pointed out insightfully, their differing positions may also raise broader
and deeper issues about "how the economy works, how power is distrib-
uted in society, and how individuals can best flourish under contempo-
rary conditions. 87 With the continuous change in the market, technol-
ogy, and social norms, it will be interesting to see whether the two camps
can eventually agree on what the legal regime should be and how to
build the next generation of DRM systems.
Although the divide between these two camps is unlikely to narrow
in the near future, the actual DRM debate is actually more complicated.
As I mentioned in the beginning, the stakeholders in this debate are not
divided nicely into the pro-anticircumvention camp and the anti-
anticircumvention camp. Instead, they accrue different benefits from the
use of DRM systems and have incurred different costs. As a result, their
positions often change according to the market, technologies, and con-
sumer behavior. As a National Research Council study reminds us:
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from
authors and publishers, to consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and
viewing public), to libraries and educational institutions, to govern-
mental and standards bodies. Each of the stakeholders has a variety
of concerns ... that are at times aligned with those of other stake-
holders, and at other times opposed. An individual stakeholder may
also play multiple roles with various concerns. At different times, a
single individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or
shareholder in publishing or entertainment companies; a member of
an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly society that relies on
85. Brent Schlender et al., The Bill & Warren Show, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 48.
86. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode 11): Protecting Intellectual Property
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 982 (2006) (using Microsoft products to illustrate how
piracy losses can be treated as promotional expenses needed to capture an emerging market).
87. Farber, supra note 4, at 1358.
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publishing for revenue. The dominant concern will depend on the
part played at the moment.
88
Thus, the DRM debate is far more complex and dynamic than what the
bipolar debate has suggested. This Part merely emphasizes the debate's
bipolar nature to underscore the importance of finding common ground
between the many stakeholders in the DRM debate.
II. THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION REGIME
Although DRM systems can be traced back to the early days of the
software industry, the international standards for these systems were not
created until the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, which updated
international intellectual property norms to reflect changes in the digital
environment. 89 Entering into effect in 2002, both the WIPO Copyright
Treaty ("WCT") and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
("WPPT") require member states to "provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective tech-
nological measures" that are needed to protect creative works. 90 Al-
though the treaties leave discretion to the member states over how to
discharge their obligations, several countries have chosen to create an
anticircumvention regime. In the United States, for example, Congress
enacted the oft-criticized DMCA.91  Other countries, like Australia,
China, Japan, and various members of the European Union, have since
followed suit to enact anticircumvention laws, or are in the process of
doing so.
92
Although the WIPO Internet Treaties require only adequate protec-
tion and effective remedies, the DMCA went beyond this requirement to
prohibit the circumvention of any technological measure that effectively
controls access to, or use of, a copyrighted work.93 The statute also pro-
hibits the manufacture, importation, or distribution of any technology or
device that is primarily designed, produced, or knowingly marketed for
the purpose of circumventing such a measure or that does not have any
commercially significant purpose other than to circumvent the measure.
94
88. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 51; see also Jeremy F. deBeer, Locks & Levies, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 143, 165-75 (2006) (discussing the impact of locks and levies from the perspec-
tives of three main groups of stakeholders--creators, technology firms, and consumers).
89. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. agenda at the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference,
see generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997)
[hereinafter Samuelson, US. Digital Agenda].
90. See WCT, supra note 7, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 7, art. 18.
91. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2004).
92. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-64 (discussing anticircumvention regimes in
Australia, Japan, and the European Union); Regulations on the Protection of the Right of Communi-
cation Through Information Network, (promulgated by the State Council, May 10, 2006, effective
July 1, 2006) (P.R.C.), available in Chinese at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servlet/servlet.info.
NatLawServlet?action=list&id=529.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
94. See id. §§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b).
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To protect the public interest, the DMCA expressly states that Con-
gress did not intend to alter existing "rights, remedies, limitations, or
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use," the scope of vi-
carious or contributory liability for copyright infringement, or the free
speech and free press guarantees under the First Amendment as they
relate to consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing prod-
ucts.95  In addition, the statute enumerates seven narrow, carefully-
drafted exceptions for nonprofit organizations, law enforcement agen-
cies, reverse engineers, encryption researchers, and security testers, as
well as for the protection of minors and of personally identifying infor-
mation. 96 Finally, the statute includes a triennial rulemaking proceeding
to determine whether users would be, or are likely to be, "adversely af-
fected by the prohibition ... to make noninfringing uses.. . of a particu-
lar class of copyrighted works." 97  Conducted by the Librarian of Con-
gress, this proceeding has led to the creation of a small number of new,
but limited exceptions.9 8
95. Id. § 1201(c).
96. See, e.g., id. § 1201(d) (exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational insti-
tutions); id. § 1201(e) (exemption for law enforcement, intelligence, and other government activi-
ties); id. § 1201(f) (exemption for reverse engineering); id. § 1201(g) (exemption for encryption
research); id. § 1201 (h) (exceptions regarding minors); id. § 1201 (i) (protection of personally identi-
fying information); id. § 1201(j) (exemption for security testing). For a detailed discussion of these
exemptions, see generally Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 148-52.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C); see also id. § 1201(a)(I)(B)-(D) (outlining the triennial rule-
making proceeding). When the statute was first enacted, it also included a two-year moratorium on
enforcement of the anticircumvention provision due to "the strong concerns expressed by librarians
and educators about the potential negative impacts that broad anti-circumvention provisions might
have on fair uses of copyrighted works and on access to information and to public domain works."
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 559.
98. See, e.g., Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumven-
tion of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (2000);
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (2003). These exceptions
are limited because the Librarian of Congress narrowly defined the term "a particular class of copy-
righted works" in the rulemaking proceedings. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C). The current available
exemptions, for example, apply to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of the following four
classes of copyrighted works:
(1) Compilations consisting of lists of Intemet locations blocked by commercially mar-
keted filtering software applications that are intended to prevent access to domains, web-
sites or portions of websites, but not including lists of Intemet locations blocked by soft-
ware applications that operate exclusively to protect against damage to a computer or
computer network or lists of Internet locations blocked by software applications that op-
erate exclusively to prevent receipt of e-mail.
(2) Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or
damage and which are obsolete.
(3) Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have become obso-
lete and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access. A format
shall be considered obsolete if the machine or system necessary to render perceptible a
work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available
in the commercial marketplace.
(4) Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the
work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access
controls that prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that prevent the
enabling of screen readers to render the text into a specialized format.
37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b) (2006).
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Notwithstanding these public interest safeguards, this Article takes
the position that the DMCA was defectively designed and that anticir-
cumvention laws are problematic at both the domestic and international
levels. This Part first discusses the problems with the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA at the domestic level. It then explains why an
international anticircumvention regime modeled after the DMCA would
be even more harmful. If countries are to introduce such a regime, they
need to carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of such protection. They
also need to tailor the contours of protection to their local needs, inter-
ests, and conditions and avoid the wholesale transplant of the DMCA to
their own soil. In addition, in jurisdictions where the WIPO Internet
Treaties are self-executing, 99 courts need to remember that the treaties do
not require anticircumvention protection l°° and that countries can comply
with the treaties without ever introducing such protection.10'
A. The Domestic Regime
As commentators have widely noted, there are four main criticisms
of the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA. First, the DMCA has
made it difficult for users and future creators to exercise legitimate rights
under existing copyright law. 0 2 On its face, the statute seems to be pro-
99. A self-executing treaty is one that can be enforced in courts without prior implementing
legislation. In jurisdictions where the WIPO Internet Treaties are self-executing, courts will directly
apply the treaties as if they are domestic laws.
100. Cf. Michael Geist, Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a
Canadian Way?, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 211,240
(Michael Geist ed., 2005) (stating that, in countries that "have allowed for the WIPO Internet treaties
to take direct effect within their countries. . . , it would be difficult to discern the precise legal rules
since the WCT and WPPT do not contain the specificity typically found in implementing legisla-
tion").
101. See infra discussion Part II.B.I (discussing alternative ways to comply with the WIPO
Internet Treaties).
102. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1138 (2003)
(noting that "[tihe limited exceptions provided under the statute, or under the rulemaking authority
of the Librarian of Congress, lack the breadth and flexibility to fill the equitable role played by fair
use"); Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 54 (claiming that "[clurrently, the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions effectively sanction the use of private code to write the public law of fair
use out of existence"); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH & LEE L. REv. 487, 494-95 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Lipton, Law of Unintended Consequences] (noting that "several recent bills have been introduced
into Congress to remedy the perceived defects of the DMCA in terms of its impact on the fair use
defense"); Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use, supra note 44, at 739 (stating that "[tihe user safeguards so
proudly heralded as securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to
achieve their stated goals"). But cf. Zohar Efroni, Towards a Doctrine of "Fair Access" in Copy-
right: The Federal Circuit's Accord, 46 IDEA 99 (2005) (arguing that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is developing a common law doctrine of "fair access" in Chamber-
lain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc. and Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engi-
neering & Consulting, Inc.); David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History the Sweet and Sour
Spots of the DMCA 's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 979 (2002) (holding a belief that "a
tight reading of Section 1201 ... leaves no room within the statutory orbit for a general Congres-
sionally-sanctioned fair use defense," but that, "to effectuate justice in a concrete case, judges may
go outside the statutory text by doing what common law jurists have done since time immemorial");
Lipton, Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 102, at 495 (observing that judges in Lexmark
and Chamberlain have "suggest[ed] a greater role for the fair use defense, even in the DMCA con-
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tective of these rights. Section 1201(c) states explicitly that "[n]othing in
this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copy-
right infringement, including fair use, under this title." 10 3 As described
above, the statute also includes exceptions and a triennial rulemaking
proceeding. In reality, the exceptions under the DMCA are highly con-
strained, and many of the legitimate rights that exist in copyright law are
unavailable under the anticircumvention regime. As Dan Burk observed:
The separation between the anticircumvention right and copyright
becomes apparent when comparing the limitations on each: ...
[C]opyright contains numerous exceptions and user privileges, such
as statutory provisions allowing unauthorized use of copyrighted
works in classroom instruction, in certain religious services, and
creation of "back-up" copies of computer programs, to name a few.
None of these uses is sanctioned by the anticircumvention provisions.
If a work is protected by technical controls, circumventing those con-
trols to act in a manner privileged under the copyright act is still pro-
hibited. Outside of circumvention for the few exceptions described
above, the only statutorily sanctioned method for gaining access to
technically protected works is with the permission of the content
104
owner.
In addition, "even though copyright law confers on copyright own-
ers the right to control only public performances and displays of these
works, DRM systems can also be used to control private performances
and displays of digital content."' 0 5 The DMCA also threatens the first
sale doctrine and many different lawful private uses, including those
customary ones that may or may not have been codified as exceptions in
the current copyright statute. 0 6  Indeed, when the statute was being
text"); Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 540 (stating
that, "[i]f section 120 1(c)(1)'s preservation of fair use and other defenses to infringement are to be
given their plain meaning, it would seem that this sort of circumvention should be permissible").
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (emphasis added); see also Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy
Puzzle, supra note 71, at 120 (suggesting that, because the treaties did not mention the effect of the
anticircumvention provision on fair use, "the drafters of the treaties may have assumed that the
domestic implementation of the relevant treaty terms would not adversely affect activities that are
permitted by law, such as fair use").
104. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1107. For a discussion of the impact
of the DMCA on the enjoyment and exercise of fair use, see generally Lipton, Solving the Digital
Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 115-16 (describing the various DMCA provisions that sought "to
balance the competing needs of fair use and digital content protection"). See also ANDREW L.
SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW INTERNET Is PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND
CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 18 (1999) (proposing "a rule analogous to fair use that might be
known as 'fair hacking' or 'fair breach'); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1092 (1998) (arguing that "licensees ... should be accorded
rights of electronic self-help when necessary to preserve the balance that the Copyright Act is in-
tended to establish"); Geist, supra note 100, at 248-49 (proposing to amend the anticircumvention
bill "to include a positive user right to circumvent a technological measure for lawful purposes").
105. Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42.
106. For discussions of these lawful personal uses, see generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Per-
sonal Use (Michigan Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 06-004, 2006),
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=926575; Lunney, supra note 15.
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drafted, then-Senator John Ashcroft expressed concern that the anticir-
cumvention provision "would have established a flat prohibition on the
circumvention of technological protection measures to gain access to
works for any purpose, and thus raised the specter of moving our Nation
towards a 'pay-per-use' society."'107 Although this pay-per-use society
has yet to materialize, critics remain justifiably concerned.
In the statute's defense, one has to differentiate between access-
control and use-control technologies, which receive different treatment
under the DMCA.108  As Alan Adler of the Association of American
Publishers testified before Congress, "the fair use doctrine has never
given anyone a right to break other laws for the stated purpose of exer-
cising the fair use privilege. Fair use doesn't allow you to break into a
locked library in order to make 'fair use' copies of the books in it, or
steal newspapers from a vending machine in order to copy articles and
share them with a friend." 10 9 Similarly, museums have the right to re-
strict access to the many public domain works they hold on their prem-
ises-for example, by charging admission fees, prohibiting photography,
and determining which and when works will be displayed. 10 Although
Jessica Litman rightly pointed out that the "breaking and entering" meta-
phor was somewhat misleading because it overlooked the importance of
property rights in the physical establishment,"' there is no doubt that the
107. 144 Cong. Rec. S 11,887 (Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Senator John Ashcroft).
108. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 139 (explaining why the
DMCA affords greater protection to the copyright holders' right to control access); R. Anthony
Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircum-
vention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 621 (2003) (stating that "Congress expressly provided
less protection for rights controls in order to allow consumers to make noninfringing uses of copy-
righted works in protected digital format, just as consumers have for centuries made noninfringing
uses of copyrighted works in unprotected analog copies").
109. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability Limitation
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 208 (1997) (prepared statement of Allan Adler,
Association of American Publishers); see also Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at
140 (stating that "it may be fair use to make nonprofit research photocopies of pages from a lawfully
acquired book; it is not fair use to steal the book in order to make the photocopies").
110. As Michael Landau observed:
Museums have controlled access to public domain works by controlling how and when
people may view the works contained inside. Museums control access by charging ad-
mission to see public domain works. Museums also often prevent photography or other
reproduction of the works inside, many of which are in the public domain. In addition,
museums control access by determining which works will be on display and when. An
enormous number of works owned by museums are in storage at any given time. I have
not heard a public outcry against museums for limiting access.
Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a New Exclusive Right
of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users' and Content Providers' Rights, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 277, 289 (2001); accord Dam, supra note 54, at 408-09 (stating that
"[t]he Louvre has the Mona Lisa, a prototypical public domain painting, but surely the Louvre is not
required to allow students and artists (or even art reviewers and parodists) to set up easels for copy-
ing it or to allow them to take photographs or even to admit them without charge to the museum so
that they can copy covertly").
111. As Jessica Litman explained:
The thing about houses is that property laws give homeowners legal control over who
gets to come in. A homeowner may therefore say: "My painting may be in the public
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metaphor has been effective as part of the overall lobbying efforts.' 12 In
fact, it partly accounts for the differential statutory treatment of access-
control and use-control technologies.
In practice, however, such differential treatment may not be as use-
ful as commentators have suggested. As Anthony Reese observed, copy-
right holders increasingly employ technological measures that incorpo-
rate both access-control and use-control technologies. "[C]ourts [also]
have treated such 'merged' control measures as entitled to the legal pro-
tections of both access- and rights-control measures, even when the sys-
tem was essentially directed only at preventing copying and distribution,
rather than at controlling access." ' 13 By upgrading the protection of use-
control technologies to the level of access-control technologies whenever
merged control mechanisms are deployed, these courts therefore have
"undercut[] the congressional intent in drafting the DMCA expressly to
allow circumvention of rights controls so long as the circumventor does
not engage in copyright infringement."'
' 14
Second, the existing regime has upset the historical balance between
copyright interests and access to information. 115  Some commentators,
notably Jane Ginsburg, have suggested that the DMCA has created a new
access right. 1 6  In addition, the DMCA has brought about many unin-
domain but I don't have to let you into my locked home to see it." Backed up by that le-
gal control, she can use protective devices-locks, burglar alarms, electrified fences, vi-
cious attack dogs-to keep outsiders out of her home and away from her painting. The
property laws about home ownership are what gives the locks and other devices their le-
gitimacy.
Without those property rights, however, the metaphor collapses. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that somebody used a lock or other protection measure (a well-trained attack dog,
say) to prevent strangers from viewing some painting she didn't own in some place she
didn't own. If I were to set my vicious attack dog to keep folks away from the Mona Lisa
in the Louvre Museum, the guards would simply shoot it.
LITMAN, supra note 14, at 133.
112. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 539 (observ-
ing that "[t]he 'breaking and entering' metaphor for circumvention activities swayed some influen-
tial Congressmen in the debate over anti-circumvention regulations").
113. Reese, supra note 108, at 621; see also id. (contending that "[t]he deployment of merged
control measures thus poses a threat to the congressional scheme for balancing protections for copy-
right owners against the public's interest in noninfringing use"); Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy
Puzzle, supra note 71, at 116 n.25 (stating that "[i]t is difficult to think of a circumstance where
circumvention of a copy-control measure would not also be prohibited as circumvention of a com-
mensurate access-control measure").
114. Reese, supra note 108, at 651.
115. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 38 (stating that, because "TPMs could go on work-
ing indefinitely," "the ensuing policy issue is not merely a question of copyright's ability to balance
but also one of technology's power to control"); Lunney, supra note 15, at 814-15 (contending that
the DMCA transformed copyright into a "guild monopoly," similar to the monopoly the Stationers'
Company enjoyed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 285 (2001) (con-
tending that "the DMCA departs sharply from prior practice" in which Congress sought to limit the
impact of the changed information environment on research, education, and on libraries and their
users).
116. See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 140-43 (discussing the right of
access); see also Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1103 (stating that "the DMCA
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tended consequences, chilling innovation and competition while raising
concerns about free speech, privacy, academic freedom, learning, scien-
tific advancement, cultural development, and democratic discourse."
7
Early reports of potential chilling effects and unintended consequences
included the disturbing episodes concerning the cease-and-desist letter
sent to computer science professor Edward Felten, the lawsuit to enjoin
2600: The Hacker Quarterly, the arrest of Russian cryptographer Dmitry
Sklyarov, and the subsequent failed criminal prosecution of Elcom-
Soft.
18
In recent years, the DMCA has also been misused to deter competi-
tion and interoperability in tangible products that only incidentally incor-
porated copyrightable software code." 9 Recent examples include Lex-
mark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 120 which
concerned laser printer toner cartridges, and Chamberlain Group, Inc v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc.,21 which involved universal garage door
openers. One may also add Sony's attempt to suppress distribution of
software tools among owners of its programmable 'Aibo' robot dogs.
22
Although all of these incidents are eventually resolved favorably in the
interests of consumers, it is important not to overlook the potential chill-
ing effect created by threatening cease-and-desist letters invoking the
anticircumvention provision of the DMCA. As Dan Burk reminded us,
"court action is always the exception, rather than the rule, in legal dis-
putes, ' 123 and there is no easy way to find out how often the DMCA has
been invoked in unreported letters.
Third, by protecting DRMs, the DMCA has undermined the protec-
tion of privacy of individual users. As Julie Cohen pointed out, the stat-
ute "threaten[s] to change rather substantially.. . the degree of informa-
tional and spatial privacy to which users of intellectual goods are enti-
as enacted creates a new and unprecedented right to control access to copyrighted works"); cf Tho-
mas Heide, Copyright in the E. U. and United States: What "Access Right"?, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 469 (2001) (contending that "the recent inclusion of the 'access right' within copyright does
not represent an evolution of copyright to extend to new forms of exploitation but rather the incorpo-
ration of a completely new rights structure into copyright law--one closely akin to that underlying
cinemas and theatres"); Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, supra note 35, at 1108-09 ("Congress
did not in fact alter the balance between copyright owners and the public .... Instead, Congress
attempted to alter the balance between law and software to respond to changes in the enforcement
environment by shifting the regulatory equilibrium back towards the law." (footnote omitted)).
117. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 725-26.
118. See id. at 724-25.
119. For excellent discussions of the unintended consequences of the DMCA, see generally
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2006),
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCAunintended-v4.pdf; Lipton, Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, supra note 102. But see Richard Gooch, Requirements for DRM Systems, in DIGITAL
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 16, 23 ("Of course misuse of any technology is possible, but
such issues do not arise more significantly with DRM than with any other technology.").
120. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
121. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
122. See Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1113.
123. ld. at 1112.
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tied."'' 24 By collecting information about an individual's intellectual con-
sumption and exploration, DRM systems intrude upon the "the privacy
interest in (metaphoric) breathing space for thought, exploration, and
personal growth."1 25  In addition, the technologies "dictate the circum-
stances-the when, where, how, and how often-of one's own intellec-
tual consumption, unobserved and unobstructed by others" and therefore
threaten to take away the freedom to explore areas of intellectual interest
that an individual might not feel as free to explore in public. 126 Indeed,
the concern of privacy intrusion was so important that the DMCA in-
cludes a special but limited exception to enable circumvention in the
event that the circumventer needs to protect personally-identifying in-
formation. 127 Nevertheless, because the exception is limited, commenta-
tors have called for more expansive protection of privacy.' 
28
Finally, the expediency of the DMCA has been deeply undercut by
its failure to achieve its stated goals of reducing digital piracy. 29 As of
this writing, the DMCA has yet to reduce the amount of copyright in-
fringement on the Internet, and online file sharing remains widespread.
30
Although the content industries have billed the Content Scramble Sys-
tem131 ("CSS") deployed to protect copyrighted contents in DVDs as a
major success, the technology "was readily compromised, and ... free
124. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 594. For discussions of the impact of anticir-
cumvention laws on privacy, see generally id.; Lee A. Bygrave, Digital Rights Management and
Privacy-Legal Aspects in the European Union, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at
418; Ian R. Kerr, To Observe and Protect?: How Digital Rights Management Systems Threaten
Privacy and What Policy Makers Should Do About It, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Peter K. Yu ed., forthcoming
2006).
125. Cohen, DRMand Privacy, supra note 32, at 578.
126. Id. at 579.
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2004) (creating an exception to protect personally identifying
information).
128. See Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 609 (stating that, compared to both judi-
cial and regulatory sanctions, "[a] far more effective method of ensuring that information users
actually enjoy the privacy to which they are entitled would entail building privacy into the design of
DRM technologies in the first instance"); Kerr, supra note 124 (recommending countermeasures
needed to offset the new powers and protections afforded to TPM and DRM); see also Julie E.
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (discussing how the proposed federal protection for digital copyright
management technologies has failed to protect an individual right to read anonymously).
129. See von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 636 (contending that "the DMCA fails in light of its
stated goal-namely, reducing the threat of copyright infringement in the digital age"). It is impor-
tant to note that, although the reduction of digital piracy is one of the important goals of the DMCA,
it is not the only one.
130. For discussions of illegal file sharing, see generally Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars,
supra note 28; Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8.
131. "CSS, or Content Scramble System, is an access control and copy prevention system for
DVDs developed by the motion picture companies, including plaintiffs. It is an encryption-based
system that requires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a com-
puter DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs."
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (footnote omitted);
see also Marks & Turnbull, supra note 54, at 212-13 (describing the CSS technology and its applica-
tion to DVDs).
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circumvention tools are in wide circulation across the Internet."' 132 It also
remains unclear whether the continued heavy sales of DVDs derive from
the success of the CSS or from the structural differences of the movie
industry and the inherently attractive features of the DVD medium. 1
33
In sum, the benefits created by TPM thus far are largely question-
able. It is problematic enough that the DMCA has many shortcomings
and unintended consequences. It is more disturbing that the statute may
have imposed these costs and burdens on society without bringing sig-
nificant benefits to copyright holders.
B. The International Regime
While the DMCA is problematic at the domestic level, it is even
more harmful at the international level. In general, due to the territorial
nature of intellectual property rights, the DMCA does not have any sig-
nificant extraterritorial effects. As a result, the DMCA is usually not
applicable to foreign nationals unless and until they conduct business in
the United States-a painful lesson Dmitry Sklyarov and his former em-
ployer ElcomSoft have learned.1
34
In recent years, however, the United States has actively pushed for
bilateral and plurilateral treaties that seek to achieve "a standard of pro-
tection similar to that found in United States law."' 135 Thanks to these
agreements, an anticircumvention regime that is modeled after the
DMCA has now been exported to foreign countries. Indeed, the DMCA
has emerged as the international standard for the implementation of the
WIPO Internet Treaties. Article 15.5.7 of the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, for example, transplanted
the DMCA onto the soils of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 36  Similar provisions
132. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 645.
133. See, e.g., id. at 645-46 (discussing the various features that make DVDs successful in the
face of darknet competition); Peter S. Mcneil, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 123-25 (2002) (highlighting the unique structure of the film industry); Peter K.
Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331,426-27 (2003) (discussing how the differences
between the movie and music industries may have impacted on the volume of illegal online file
sharing).
134. The creation of ElcomSoft's software, which removed security protection from Adobe e-
books, was not illegal under Russian Law. However, Sklyarov was arrested in the United States in
July 2001, after giving a presentation at a computer hacker convention. His Moscow-based em-
ployer was subsequently criminally prosecuted. In December 2002, a federal jury acquitted Elcom-
Soft of all charges. For a symposium discussing the criminal lawsuit against Sklyarov, see Sklyarov
Symposium Transcript, supra note 62.
135. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(I)
(2004) (stating that one of the principal negotiating objectives of the free trade agreements is to
"ensur[e] that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual
property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that
found in United States law").
136. Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, art. 15.5.7
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinal Texts/asset uploadfile934_3935.pdf.
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are found in all of the other free trade agreements the United States has
reached in recent years-with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Oman, and Singapore.1
37
Even worse for these countries, the protection under the free trade
agreements is often stronger than what is required under the DMCA.
This type of DMCA-plus legislation is particularly troublesome because
less developed countries actually need to have greater access to informa-
tion and knowledge than their developed counterparts. While the anticir-
cumvention regime required by the agreements still includes many nar-
row exceptions commonly found in the DMCA, it omits other important
ones and has made it more difficult for the signatory countries to intro-
duce new exceptions.138  For example, the Central America-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement allows for exceptions for noninfringing
uses of a copyrighted work only
when an actual or likely adverse impact on those noninfringing uses
is demonstrated in a legislative or administrative proceeding by sub-
stantial evidence; provided that in order for any such exception to
remain in effect for more than four years, a Party must conduct a re-
view before the expiration of the four-year period and at intervals of
at least every four years thereafter, pursuant to which it is demon-
strated in such a proceeding by substantial evidence that there is a
continuing actual or likely adverse impact on the particular nonin-
fringing use.139
To be certain, this "substantial evidence" standard is similar to the
one adopted by the Copyright Office in the first DMCA rulemaking pro-
137. See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., art.
17.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/
FinalText/asset upload file469_5141.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, Sept. 14, 2004, U.S.-Bahrain, art. 14.4.7, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Bahrain-FTA/final-texts/asset-upload-file211 6
293.pdf; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.7.5, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Fina-Texts/asset-upload-
file912_4011 .pdf; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4.13, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, June 15, 2004, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.5.8, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco-FTA/FlnaIText/asset upload-fil
e797_3849.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
emnment of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Jan. 19, 2006, U.S.-
Oman, art. 15.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Oman
FTA/FinalText/assetupload_file715_8809.pdf; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/
Bilateral/Singapore- FTA/FinalTexts/asset_uploadfile708_4036.pdf. For a recent discussion of
some of these agreements, see Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
205, 212-16 (2006).
138. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 136, art. 15.5.7, with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)-1201(j).
139, CAFTA-DR, supra note 136, art. 15.5.7(e)(iii).
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ceeding in 2000.140 However, the standard successfully shifts the burden
of proof governments of less developed countries usually adopt when
determining whether they need to introduce new exceptions and limita-
tions to the copyright system. To some extent, it reminds one of David
McGowan's observation that "the legal endgame [has now become one
that] place[s] the burden of proof on the other side.' 4 1 Because less de-
veloped countries now have to "prove the unprovable facts,"'142 they are
less likely to be able to introduce exceptions to protect noninfringing
uses.
To help understand why an international anticircumvention regime
is more harmful than its domestic counterpart, this Part discusses the
serious mismatch between the regime and the local conditions of less
developed countries, the insufficient empirical evidence needed to dem-
onstrate the need or expediency of such a regime, and the greater unin-
tended consequences created by the regime for less developed countries.
This Part also explains how an international anticircumvention regime
may ultimately backfire on the United States when it forces other coun-
tries to expand their domestic protection without providing significant
benefits in return.
1. Mismatch with Local Conditions
To begin with, the DMCA was designed specifically to deal with
the threat created by digital technologies under conditions specific to the
United States, including the stage of its economic development, the
structure of its content and communications industries, the state of avail-
able technology, the overall market conditions, and the average living
standards of local consumers. Because these conditions are unlikely to
be present in less developed countries, the DMCA serves as an inappro-
priate model for the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties. In
fact, the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights has advised
against the adoption of similar legislation by less developed countries.
As the Commission stated in its final report:
We believe developing countries would probably be unwise to en-
dorse the WIPO Copyright Treaty, unless they have very specific
reasons for doing so, and should retain their freedom to legislate on
technological measures. It follows that developing countries, or in-
deed other developed countries, should not follow the example of the
DMCA in forbidding all circumvention of technological protection.
In particular, we take the view that legislation such as the DMCA
140. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558-59
(2000) (discussing the respective burdens of proponents and opponents of any classes of works to be
exempted from the prohibition on circumvention).
141. McGowan, supra note 5, at 2.
142. Id.
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shifts the balance too far in favour of producers of copyright material
at the expense of the historic rights of users. Its replication globally
could be very harmful to the interests of developing countries in ac-
cessing information and knowledge they require for their develop-
ment. 
143
It is important to remember that the DMCA is not the only way, but
one of the many possible ways, to implement the WIPO Internet Treaties.
As Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat, and Christian Tacit noted:
it is clear that there is no singular correct approach to interpreting ar-
ticles 11 [of the WCT] and 18 [of the WPPT]. The WCT and WPPT
provide WIPO Members with large degrees of latitude as to how a
particular state might choose to fulfill its obligations with respect to
the relevant provisions. Consequently, there is considerable flexibil-
ity as to how [each country] might implement these provisions,
should the Government elect to ratify the two WIPO Treaties.
44
Thus, countries can comply with the treaties without ever introducing an
anticircumvention regime. In the context of the United States, for exam-
ple, Pamela Samuelson contended that "the DMCA was largely unneces-
sary to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty because U.S. law already
complied with all but one minor provision of that treaty [concerning the
protection of the integrity of rights management information]." 145 Dan
Burk cited the common law "doctrine of contributory infringement,
which attributes copyright liability to providers of technical devices that
lack a substantial noninfringing use. 146 Indeed, in light of the substan-
tial overlap between the treaty and then-existing U.S. law, "the Clinton
Administration initially considered whether the WIPO Copyright Treaty
might even be sent to the Senate for ratification 'clean' of implementing
legislation.,
147
Even if anticircumvention protection is needed, the DMCA may not
serve as a good model. As Jessica Litman noted, "[aIll the [WCT] re-
quired, and all that made policy sense, was to give copyright owners
remedies against people who circumvented technological protection in
aid of infringement and redress against others-including device makers
143. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 108.
144. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36; see also Geist, supra note 100, at 214 (arguing that "there
is a fairly diverse array of implementing provisions, demonstrating that the US model found in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, is but one approach open to Canada").
145. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 521 & n. 10;
see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36 (stating that "article II of the WCT does not require anti-
circumvention measures to be integrated into copyright legislation").
146. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1103. But see 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.01 [C] (Perm. ed. 2006) (explaining why
the Sony standard of being "capable of a commercially significant noninfringing use" may not meet
the treaty requirement of providing "adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
circumvention").
147. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 530.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
and sellers-who deliberately facilitated circumvention for an infringing
purpose. ' 148 Likewise, Coenraad Visser reminded us that the treaty "is
much more limited than the wording of the DMCA. It does not strike at
manufacturing devices; it strikes only at the actual circumvention."
' 149
In fact, from Australia to Japan, countries have implemented the
WIPO Internet Treaties differently. 5° Likewise, the EU Information
Society Directive, which sought to implement the treaties, differs from
the DMCA in providing an additional requirement that each member
state
take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make available
to the beneficiary of [the specified] exception or limitation provided
for in national law... the means of benefiting from that exception or
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or
limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected
work or subject-matter concerned.1
5 1
Some commentators even suggested that the treaties can be implemented
by adopting legislation outside the copyright system (and the greater
copyright system that includes paracopyright laws). Ian Kerr and others,
for example, noted that the protection of technological measures "could
be dealt with in other kinds of legislation, such as criminal law or compe-
tition law.'
152
Moreover, although the digital revolution affects both developed
and less developed countries, these countries face different challenges
and obtain different benefits from the opportunities created by the Inter-
net and new media technologies. While the Internet serves mainly as a
communication medium or a commercial marketplace for the United
States and other developed countries, it provides for many less developed
countries an important leapfrogging tool to catch up with their more de-
veloped counterparts. 153 To take advantage of this leapfrogging tool, less
developed countries pushed aggressively for the recognition of the im-
portance of access to information and knowledge in the recent World
Summit on the Information Society. 5 4  In that forum, and elsewhere,
148. LITMAN, supra note 14, at 132.
149. Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 854 (remarks of Professor Coenraad
Visser of the University of South Africa).
150. See Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-60 (discussing anticircumvention regimes in Australia
and Japan).
151. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisa-
tion of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society art. 6(4), 2001
O.J. (L 167) 10.
152. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36-37.
153. See Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (contending that "[t]he information revolution also might
allow the less developed countries to catch up with the developed countries by leapfrogging stages
of technological, industrial, and infrastructural development").
154. See World Summit on the Information Society, Dec. 10-12, 2003, Declaration of Princi-
ples, U.N. Doe. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
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they have also questioned the compatibility of intellectual property pro-
tection with their development goals.' 55 Their position is understandable.
As James Boyle noted in the early days of the Internet, "[t]he intellectual
property regime could make or break the educational, political, scientific,
and cultural promise of the Net."'' 56  Thus, strong intellectual property
protection not only may not be in the interest of less developed countries,
but may take away their rare opportunities to catch up with their more
developed counterparts.
To make matters worse, the DMCA is based on three assumptions
that may be invalid in the less developed world. The first assumption
concerns the claim that most works will exist in both DRM and non-
DRM formats. If consumers are unhappy with the protected format, or if
that format prevents users from enjoying noninfringing uses, they can
always switch to an identical product in an unprotected format. 57  In
United States v. Elcom Ltd. , for example, the court reminded us that
the DMCA "does not 'prevent access to matters in the public domain' or
allow any publisher to remove from the public domain and acquire rights
in any public domain work."'159 Rather, it allows copyright holders to
"gain[] a technological protection against copying that particular elec-
tronic version of the work.'
160
While the Elcom court's assumption that copyrighted works are al-
ways available in both protected and unprotected formats is invalid even
in developed countries, 161 it is particularly problematic in the less devel-
http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/SO3-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf; World Sum-
mit on the Information Society, Nov. 16-18, 2005, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. l)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/
off/6revl.html.
155. For an excellent discussion of how to recalibrate intellectual property protection in light of
the development concept, see generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
156. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87, 89 (1997).
157. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558
(2000) (considering a mitigating factor "when a work as to which the copyright owner has instituted
a technological control is also available in formats that are not subject to technological protections");
Reese, supra note 108, at 653 ("Motion pictures ... are today often available both on DVD, pro-
tected by CSS, and on videocassette, unprotected by CSS, perhaps alleviating some concerns about
the difficulty a consumer might have in circumventing CSS to engage in noninfringing use of a film
that she owns on DVD"); Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 841-44 (discussing
whether consumers can exercise fair use despite strong DRM systems); id. at 841 (observing that "a
lot of these e-books will be published as normal, printed books") (remarks of Eric Smith of the
International Intellectual Property Alliance); id. at 842 (stating that "absolutely nothing under the
law stops you from displaying the text on the screen and sitting there and typing into your own hard
drive whatever portions of the book you want to type in") (remarks of Bruce Lehman, former Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
158. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
159. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558
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oped world,162 which faces an acute shortage of copyrighted works. As
the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights observed:
In the tertiary sector, the evidence indicates that access to books and
other materials for education and research remains a critical problem
in many developing countries, particularly the poorest. Most devel-
oping countries remain heavily dependent on imported textbooks and
reference books, as this sector is often not commercially feasible for
struggling local publishers to enter. The prices of such books are be-
yond the means of most students.
163
Even worse, a copy-protected copy on the Internet sometimes may be the
only available copy. Even materials that are in the public domain of de-
veloped countries may not be available in those countries.
Moreover, although the WIPO Internet Treaties, the DMCA, and
similar anticircumvention laws do not extend to public domain materials,
it is naive to assume that these materials are always freely available.'
64
Today, public domain works are increasingly bundled with copyrighted
materials, such as copyrighted introduction or editorial comments.1 65 As
(2000) (reporting that commenters have submitted a number of databases and indexes "that were
available only in digital form"). But see Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United
States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 363 (2004) [hereinafter Bechtold, Digital Rights Man-
agement] ("DRM systems will never be able to cordon off content completely. File-sharing net-
works will continue to exist, movies and photos can be captured from a computer screen, and music
can be re-recorded from a loudspeaker.").
162. Challenging this position, Jane Ginsburg suggested that the assumption that works will be
available only in encrypted formats "may be more true for some works, such as software, digital
sound recordings, and databases, than for others, such as books and other literary works." Ginsburg,
Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153-54. She also explained that "many documents (fre-
quently composed of noncopyrightable information) have been the objects of limited distribution and
site licenses or shrink-wrap licenses that contractually limit the library's or user's ability to dispose
of the information disclosed in the document." Id. at 153 n.52. Nevertheless, it remains debatable
whether these licenses would hold up in court. In addition, Professor Ginsburg pointed out that
"copyright owners may not choose to restrict access to every copy,... [and that] copies will often
still be available for anonymous consultation (and limited copying) in places such as public libraries
(who, under the analysis offered earlier, are entitled to circumvent access and anti-copying codes,
under appropriate circumstances)." Id. at 154.
163. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 103.
164. Examples that easily come to mind are the public domain materials included in Lexis-
Nexis and Westlaw databases and those public domain movies shown on subscription-based cable
television channels. To these content providers, "what is being sold is not the work itself but rather,
the service of delivering it." MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD 94 (1999).
165. As Alfred Yen described:
Bundling happens all the time. History books contain copies of the Constitution and let-
ters by historical figures that have passed into the public domain. Telephone books con-
tain both copyrightable yellow pages and uncopyrightable white pages. Law school
casebooks combine the copyrightable commentary of authors with public domain cases.
If such works were to be distributed in digital form, then the publishers could implement
DRM schemes that limit the uses a digital reader could make of these works. The DRM
scheme might not allow any printing of the book, or it might not allow any copying of the
book. It might even restrict the number of times a person can read the book.
Yen, supra note 71, at 674; accord NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 146, § 12A.06[B][1] (stating that
"[plublishers are free to take old works that have fallen into the public domain, to add a bit of origi-
nal material to them, and to claim a copyright in the newly released whole" (footnote omitted));
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a result, the bundled materials, including both the copyrighted and public
domain portions, will be protected by technological measures supported
by the anticircumvention regime. 166 Because many less developed coun-
tries lack a choice of materials in both protected and unprotected formats,
sophisticated DRM systems "may exclude access to these materials alto-
gether and impose a heavy burden that will delay the participation of
those countries in the global knowledge-based society."'
167
The second assumption concerns the availability of decryption tools
or technological expertise to perform the needed circumvention as al-
lowed under the narrowly-crafted exceptions. Because of their inevitable
dual-use nature and the continued merger of access-control and use-
control technologies,1 68 decryption tools are unlikely to be widely avail-
able. The limited Internet connectivity in many of these countries has
also reduced access to these tools, although such access will increase as
connectivity improves.
Even if the needed decryption tools are available, it is very likely
that these tools or related services will have to be imported into less de-
veloped countries until they can develop their own technological exper-
tise. Less developed countries are therefore at the mercy of their devel-
oped counterparts. If circumvention technologies are banned in the ex-
porting developed countries, less developed countries may not be able to
obtain access to protected works even if they manage to obtain an excep-
tion in the international intellectual property agreements to prevent the
decryption tools or services from being outlawed in their own countries.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1108 (stating that "copyrightable content is
typically mixed with uncopyrightable content, which will also be under the control of the techno-
logical protection system"); see also Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use, supra note 44, at 712 (stating that
"[p]ublishers are free to take old works that have fallen into the public domain, to add a bit of origi-
nal material to them, and to claim a copyright in the newly released whole" (footnote omitted)).
166. In addition to technological measures, restrictive licenses have also been employed to
protect these works (and other copyrighted works). The adverse impact of these licenses, however,
is likely to be less severe than that of technological measures due to the underdeveloped legal sys-
tems and lax enforcement of laws in many of these countries. The law concerning the enforceability
of shrinkwrap and clickwrap mass market licenses is also unsettled and varies from country to coun-
try.
167. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 106.
168. As Professor Lunney explained:
Dealing with decryption technology is difficult because the same decryption technology
that enables the making of a non-infringing copy of a creative work also enables the mak-
ing of an infringing copy. A decryption tool that enables a teacher to prepare a few spur-
of-the moment copies for the classroom is the same decryption tool that enables a perni-
cious pirate to duplicate the work for resale. Moreover, unless lawful access to decryp-
tion technology is severely restricted, the widespread dissemination of decryption tech-
nology is almost inevitable. Because decryption technology is usually readily portable
and easily duplicated, it will likely prove impossible to contain. If every librarian,
teacher, or researcher with a potential fair use claim is allowed to possess decryption
technology, it will be all but impossible to keep the technology out of the hands of those
who intend unlawful uses.
Lunney, supra note 15, at 820; see also Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1106
(stating that "enacting a sweeping blanket prohibition with discrete exceptions is a foolish approach
to legislation covering multipurpose technologies").
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To some extent, the plight of less developed countries in the cir-
cumvention area is similar to the access-to-medicines problems they cur-
rently experience. Lacking the technical capacity to develop or manufac-
ture drugs, these countries often have to import pharmaceutical products
from abroad-regardless of whether these products are on- or off-patent.
While there is no doubt that the access-to-medicines problem has an im-
mediate and arguably more severe impact, the access-to-circumvention-
tools problem will touch on education and cultural development and will
therefore have a more lasting impact.
To deal with the access-to-medicines problem, the WTO member
states have adopted a proposal to amend the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 69 ("TRIPs Agreement")
to allow member states with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to
import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals. 70 If DRM sys-
tems are widely deployed throughout the world and if they have pre-
vented people in less developed countries from having access to basic
educational and research materials, a similar exception may be needed to
enlarge access to the needed circumvention tools or services. 171 Indeed,
many international intellectual property treaties already contain technol-
ogy transfer and technical assistance provisions that can be easily ex-
tended to these tools. Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement, for example,
requires developed countries to provide technical and financial coopera-
tion to less and least developed countries "on request and on mutually
agreed terms and conditions.
' 172
The final assumption states that the DMCA only creates inconven-
ience. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit de-
clared in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,173 it "kn[e]w of no au-
169. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 1.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
170. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of
Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Proposal for a Deci-
sion on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news05_e/trips decision-e.doc. For a discussion of proposed
article 31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure
Movement, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract-896134.
171. Scholars have advanced proposals to amend domestic circumvention laws to facilitate the
provision of this type of assistance. See, e.g., Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note
71, at 120 (advancing a proposal to develop an administrative complaint mechanism to assist indi-
viduals who seek to obtain legitimate uses of copyrighted works); Tian Yijun, Problems of Anti-
Circumvention Rules in the DMCA & More Heterogeneous Solutions, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749, 785 (2005) (stating that "a future DMCA amendment should provide spe-
cific legal mechanisms to help eligible users obtain necessary circumvention assistance from the
appointed government agency when these users are not capable of circumventing the technological
protection measures by themselves").
172. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 169, art. 67.
173. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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thority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright
Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum
method or in the identical format of the original.' 74 Likewise, in United
States v. Elcom Ltd., 75 the court explained that fair use is still available
even though "[t]he fair user may find it more difficult to engage in cer-
tain fair uses with regard to electronic books.' 7 6  These observations
were similar to the position articulated by Jesse Feder when he was the
Acting Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs of the
United States Copyright Office: "[T]he ability to make a perfect digital
reproduction of something is not something that is inherent in fair use.
Fair use entails copying, but it does not have to be a perfect digital re-
production."1
77
From the perspectives of the proponents, judges, and officials, the
DMCA has adequately preserved the users' ability to obtain legitimate
access through traditional analog means even though it may have re-
duced consumer convenience. 178 Consumers may not be able to make
copies "by the optimum method or in the identical format of the origi-
nal."'179 However, they can always do so by employing analog fixation
devices and techniques-sometimes as simple as the use of pen and pa-
per. As the Second Circuit noted in Corley, the DMCA continues to
allow one
to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as
commenting on their content, quoting excerpts from their screen-
plays, and even recording portions of the video images and sounds on
film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a
monitor as it displays the DVD movie.
180
What the court did not mention is that the use of these analog tools
and techniques "will often be costly or impractical."' 8' As Alfred Yen
174. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 (emphasis added).
175. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
176. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
177. Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 843-44 (remarks of Jesse Feder, former
Acting Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs of the United States Copyright Of-
fice).
178. Jane Ginsburg questioned whether, "[w]hen the public increasingly expects to acquire
works with a click of a mouse, . . .the law should stand back while third-party entrepreneurs en-
deavor to make works available without authorization in the most copy-convenient format (and
without compensation for resulting copies)?" Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at
154. Bruce Lehman went even further to remark that he did not believe that the DMCA has made it
inconvenient for consumers to exercise fair use. As he stated, "It is not more cumbersome at all. It is
just exactly the same as it has always been." Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 844
(remarks of Bruce Lehman, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office).
179. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
180. Id.
181. Yen, supra note 71, at 678; see also Landau, supra note 110, at 298 (stating that
"[a]lthough 'fair use' does not guarantee the making of the most efficient copies, the DMCA should
not mandate the most inefficient").
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pointed out, these alternatives sometimes require the purchase of analog
equipment as well as the technical expertise to set up such equipment.
The inferior results of analog reproduction also raise the question "[w]hy
should the rights holders benefit from the new opportunities of DRM
systems in order to protect their legitimate interests, while the beneficiar-
ies of a copyright limitation have to fall back on an inferior and some-
times outdated version of the work in order to carry out their legitimate
interests?"1
83
Moreover, inconvenience in one nation may be inaccessibility in
another. Due to limited resources and the lack of infrastructure devel-
opment in many less developed countries, inconvenience can become
such a heavy burden that would eliminate access entirely.1 84 As June
Besek noted in the Kemochan Center report, "there is a continuum be-
tween 'inconvenient' and 'impossible.' There may well be circum-
stances in which the exercise of a privilege is so inconvenient as to be
impossible, as a practical matter.'
185
Finally, there is no guarantee that the traditional analog means of
noninfringing uses will always be available in the near future. "[S]ome
copyright owners [already] have expressed a desire to use technology,
perhaps backed by legal requirements, to 'plug the analog hole' and pre-
vent such copying of copyrighted works.' ' 186  If the analog hole is
plugged, or severely shrunk, anticircumvention legislation is more than a
mere inconvenience.
2. Lack of Empirical Evidence
Thus far, there has been insufficient empirical proof to conclusively
demonstrate whether an anticircumvention regime will be expedient, or
even needed, in less developed countries. There has also been limited
evidence about whether the extensive use of DRM systems would benefit
these countries. On the one hand, due to lax enforcement of intellectual
property laws, these systems, along with strong anticircumvention pro-
tection, will provide foreign rights holders with the needed protection to
make the products available in the first place. If they decide to relocate
their manufacturing plants to take advantage of the lower labor, produc-
tion, and distribution costs, such protection will also help bring the des-
perately needed foreign direct investments. In countries that have wide
digital distribution of culture-based materials, DRM systems may even
182. See Yen, supra note 71, at 679 (stating that the use of video camera to make fair use of
DVDs "requires the purchase of an appropriate camera and the effort of setting up the camera so that
a serviceable image can be captured").
183. Bechtold, Digital Rights Management, supra note 161, at 363.
184. Thanks to Mark Schultz for reminding me of this important point.
185. Besek, supra note 36, at 481.
186. Reese, supra note 108, at 653; see also Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast
Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603, 618-21 (2003) (providing an overview of the "analog
hole").
[Vol. 84:1
2006] ANTICIRCUMVENTION AND ANTI-ANTICIRCUMVENTION 51
help protect the integrity of those materials. Such protection therefore
would benefit the local people if it would not make the materials unaf-
fordable.
On the other hand, as pointed out above, the deployment of sophis-
ticated DRM systems will make the products expensive and inaccessible
to a large number of people in these countries. While in theory DRM
systems allow for price discrimination, in reality foreign rights holders
rarely do so, for at least two reasons. First, many of them are concerned
that the discounted products would flow back as parallel imports to their
primary markets in the developed world and emerging economies.
187
Second, because of highly uneven distribution of wealth in these coun-
tries, foreign content providers may choose to price their products based
on the demand of the "more affluent minority," rather than the larger and
poorer majority. 188 Thus, instead of providing greater consumer choices
and cheaper products, the widespread deployment of DRM systems will
generally reduce access to materials that are needed for education, sci-
ence, and cultural development.
One may still argue that the use of DRM systems will encourage
people in less developed countries to consume local products that are not
in copy-protected formats. Although this argument is valid in some
cases, it is unlikely that the benefits accrued from such diversion would
outweigh the costs of reduced access. After all, the high prices of for-
eign products also encourage people in less developed countries to con-
sume the cheaper, local products. However, it would be difficult to ar-
gue that these countries should encourage high prices for foreign prod-
ucts for that particular reason. Moreover, there may not always be local
alternatives for the needed products. Nor may there always be alterna-
tives in unprotected format. With increased globalization and the de-
mand generated by the "more affluent minority" in these countries, many
187. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 133, at 436 (noting the concern of backflow of
discounted products as parallel imports).
188. This reason, indeed, is one of the primary reasons why price discrimination of pharmaceu-
ticals does not occur in many less developed countries. See F.M. SCHERER & JAYASHREE WATAL,
POST-TRIPS OPTIONS FOR ACCESS TO PATENTED MEDICINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45
(Comm'n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. WG4:l, 2001), available at
http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paperl.pdf; Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and
Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 425, 455
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (noting that "pricing in some [developed
countries] is dominated by the demands of small, affluent populations, resulting in prices that are
unaffordable to the majority of poorer people"); Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential
Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563, 566 (2002) (stating that "phar-
maceutical firms and their distributors in poor countries may find it more profitable to sell drugs in
low volumes and high prices to wealthier patients with price-inelastic demand rather than in high
volumes at low prices to poorer patients"); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note
170 (explaining why pharmaceutical companies prefer not to price discriminate their products in less
developed countries).
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of the needed local products may even be copy-protected or manufac-
tured by multinational corporations that seek to sell the products abroad.
In sum, there is no conclusive evidence that the use of DRM sys-
tems would benefit less developed countries. Without such evidence, it
remains unclear whether an anticircumvention regime would be expedi-
ent, or even needed, in these countries. While strong anticircumvention
protection may bring in some benefits-such as a potential increase in
foreign investment and the protection of culture-based materials-it is
likely to result in high prices and restricted access. In my view, the bene-
fits of an anticircumvention regime to less developed countries are
speculative and therefore would not outweigh its costs.
Even worse, such a regime may be a risky gamble that these coun-
tries cannot afford. If the anticircumvention regime does not strike an
appropriate balance between proprietary interests and public access
needs, it is likely to cause more damage to less developed countries than
to their developed counterparts. Many less developed countries have
neither the correction mechanisms nor the expertise or resources to intro-
duce mechanisms to correct the imbalance.1 89  In the developed world,
commentators have proposed to adjust the balance of the anticircumven-
tion regime by using the following correction mechanisms: antitrust or
competition law, 190 the misuse doctrine,' 9' a mixed fair use infrastructure
with automatic fair use defaults and a key escrow system,' 92 an adminis-
trative complaint mechanism and an appeal procedure, 193 a verification
system based on gun control laws, 194 the provision of circumvention ser-
189. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 4 which states that:
[W]e consider that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP system 'wrong' in a developing
country are likely to be far higher than in developed countries. Most developed countries
have sophisticated systems of competition regulation to ensure that abuses of any mo-
nopoly rights cannot unduly affect the public interest.
Id.; KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 237 (2000)
(noting that developed countries "have mature legal systems of corrective interventions" where "the
exercise of IPRs threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
190. See, e.g., Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 619 (stating that antitrust con-
cerns need to be taken into account when analyzing DRM-related developments); Zohar Efroni, A
Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and a Dose of Common Sense, 28
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 249, 266 (2005) (noting that "grounds for constraining the power to
prohibit access might be found in legal sources external to copyright law, for instance, in antitrust
law"); Geist, supra note 100, at 246-48 (proposing to respond to the introduction of anticircumven-
tion protection by making parallel amendments to the Canadian Competition Act "to ensure that the
Competition Bureau is not restricted in its ability to bring actions against abusive behaviour stem-
ming from the application of an anti-circumvention right"); Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puz-
zle, supra note 71, at 491 (stating that "[iut is important that the DMCA does not become a tool for
those engaging in potentially questionable tying practices to distract attention from their possible
antitrust violations by claiming copyright and DMCA infringements against a commercial competi-
tor").
191. See generally Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102; John R. Therien, Com-
ment, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and the
Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1041-42 (2001).
192. See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 45.
193. See generally Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71.
194. See generally Yen, supra note 71.
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vice providers,' 95 and the development of DRM systems that are engi-
neered to protect the process of fair use.' 96 All of these legal doctrines
and infrastructures are likely to be costly and thus unavailable in the less
developed world.
Indeed, many countries lack the needed resources and expertise to
put in place both an anticircumvention regime and a follow-up correction
mechanism. It is important to remember that many of these countries
institute or revamp their intellectual property systems in the first place
mainly because of the TRIPs Agreement or external pressure from the
developed world, such as what they currently experience in their bilateral
and plurilateral trade negotiations.' 97 Oftentimes, they introduce reforms
in the fear of losing trade benefits, export markets, and development
aid. 98 If they had a choice to select the type of innovation systems they
wanted to build, an anticircumvention regime would be very unlikely to
be a top priority. After all, economists have shown empirically that
countries with limited imitative capacity often do not benefit from a
strong intellectual property regime. '99
Even if these countries have the needed expertise to introduce cor-
rection mechanisms after they completed their reforms, they may have
exhausted their resources after strengthening the intellectual property
system. Even worse, local policymakers may have used up their limited
political capital for anticircumvention reforms, especially if the earlier
reforms turn out to be unsuccessful.20 0 Under that scenario, local re-
formers will not only have to deal with resistance in the country and to
justify the short-term economic losses, but they will also have lost credi-
bility to introduce new reforms. After the failure of the earlier reforms,
the resistance to the later reforms is likely to be severe even if the goals
of those follow-up reforms are to correct the imbalance of the earlier
ones.
195. See Besek, supra note 36, at 509-10 (discussing circumvention service providers).
196. See generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair
Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract id=885371.
197. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 373-
75 (2006) (discussing the coercive narrative of the origins of the TRIPs Agreement). But see Ed-
mund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994)
(suggesting that less developed countries agreed to stronger intellectual property protection because
they found such protection in their self-interests). Although I agree with Professor Kitch's argu-
ments about how the TRIPs Agreement can be in the self-interests of less developed countries,
especially those with strong imitative capacities, I have serious doubts that these countries saw the
strengthening of intellectual property standards as pursuits of their own self-interests during the
TRIPs negotiations.
198. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 170; see also Frederick Ab-
bott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 36, 43 (Christophe Bell-
mann et al. eds., 2003) (stating that many less developed countries remain "highly dependent on the
developed countries as the source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World Bank,
or through investment bankers and securities exchanges").
199. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 189, at 116-19.
200. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 170.
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3. Unintended Consequences
An anticircumvention regime may create unintended consequences
that would greatly hurt consumers in less developed countries. For ex-
ample, it may require new supporting technology and equipment that
may be nonexistent or highly unaffordable in less developed countries.
Even in the developed world, consumer advocates have been worried
that the introduction of copy-protected CDs, which may not be playable
on older car stereos, personal computers, and CD players, may force con-
sumers to buy new hardware they do not otherwise need or cannot af-
ford. Indeed, when Sony released Celine Dion's album as an encrypted
CD in 2002, consumer advocates called for record companies to properly
label those CDs to avoid confusion and to allow consumers to choose
away from those products. 201 Two California consumers even filed a
class action lawsuit against the major record labels.2°2
While it is already problematic in developed countries to require
consumers to purchase new devices that support the technological meas-
ures employed, it would be particularly disturbing if the anticircumven-
tion regime required consumers in less developed countries to purchase
new end devices that they could not find or afford. By definition, less
developed countries have few resources, and people there have very lim-
ited disposable income. Some may even have a difficult time meeting
such basic needs as clean drinking water, food, shelter, electricity,
schools, and basic health care. While it is hard, though not impossible,
to explain why people in such circumstances need copyrighted Holly-
wood movies or popular music, technological measures have also been
used to restrict access to basic educational products and research materi-
als. Thus, an anticircumvention regime that renders household products
obsolete is likely to have a very significant impact on less developed
countries-much greater than the impact on its developed counterparts.
4. Backdoor Lawmaking
The anticircumvention regime that the United States exported
abroad may come back to haunt the American people.20 3 The WIPO
Internet Treaties are a good example of what I have called "backdoor
lawmaking"-a process of outsourcing the legislative process to an in-
201. See George Cole, Celine Dion and the Copycats, FIN. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at 11; Kevin
Hunt, Record Industry Opens Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, May 23, 2002, at
21; Peter K. Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing the Copyright War by
Fighting Misdirected Battles, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020815_yu.html (Aug. 15, 2002).
202. See Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2002, 3, at 1 (reporting that "two California consumers... have filed a class-action lawsuit
against the five major record companies, alleging that copy-protected CDs are defective products
that shouldn't be allowed on the market").
203. Anupam Chander recently published an article expressing similar concerns. See Chander,
supra note 137, at 206 (expressing concern that the United States "may be exporting our all-too-
narrow vision of intellectual property to many of our trading partners").
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ternational forum of unelected representatives in an effort to create laws
that the domestic legislature would not have otherwise enacted.2 °4 This
type of lawmaking is rent seeking at its best.
As far as anticircumvention protection is concerned, there are two
different sets of backdoors-or "double backdoors" as I have sometimes
called them. The United States began by going to a multilateral forum-
WIPO in this case205-to create international standards based on laws
that its domestic legislature was reluctant to enact (first backdoor). °6
These resulting standards traveled back to the United States in the form
of international obligations that provided the needed momentum for the
enactment of the DMCA. Then, it used bilateral or plurilateral free trade
agreements to induce other countries that have yet to ratify or implement
the WIPO Internet Treaties to enact laws that implement DMCA-like
standards (second backdoor). Eventually, these bilateral or plurilateral
standards wil return to the United States to further affect its domestic
legislative process. In both scenarios, harmonization and international
legal obligations provided the domestic legislature with politically ac-
ceptable justifications to enact laws that it had originally deemed unap-
pealing from the domestic standpoint. What is particularly disturbing is
204. As I noted earlier:
From the standpoint of democratic governance, these bilateral agreements are particularly
problematic, because they seek to circumvent the political process by using "negotiation
backdoors" through which government officials can achieve what these officials other-
wise could not achieve before Congress. By pushing controversial legislation into inter-
national fora, these officials are more likely to secure international agreements that, in
turn, would convince Congress to enact implementing legislation that would not be
adopted in the first place.
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 323, 397-98 (2004).
205. As Pamela Samuelson noted:
The digital agenda that Clinton administration officials pursued in Geneva was almost
identical to the digital agenda they had put before the U.S. Congress during roughly the
same time period. Notwithstanding the fact that this digital agenda had proven so con-
troversial in the U.S. Congress that the bills to implement it were not even reported out of
committee, Clinton administration officials persisted in promoting these proposals in Ge-
neva and pressing for an early diplomatic conference to adopt them. For a time, it ap-
peared that administration officials might be able to get in Geneva what they could not
get from the U.S. Congress, for the draft treaties published by WIPO in late August 1996
contained language that, if adopted without amendment at the diplomatic conference in
December, would have substantially implemented the U.S. digital agenda, albeit with
some European gloss. Had this effort succeeded in Geneva, Clinton administration offi-
cials would almost certainly have then argued to Congress that ratification of the treaties
was necessary to confirm U.S. leadership in the world intellectual property community
and to promote the interests of U.S. copyright industries in the world market for informa-
tion products and services.
Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 89, at 373-74; see also LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,
supra note 14, at 129 (suggesting that, because of domestic resistance, Commissioner Bruce Lehman
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office "decided to attack the problem the other way
around... [and] focused his attention on getting his agenda adopted by the WIPO member nations,
reasoning that when the United States signed the treaty, Congress would be obliged to adopt imple-
menting legislation in accord with the White Paper's recommendations").
206. WTO would be another possible forum. In the case of members of the European Union,
Brussels would be a usual forum.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that these pressing international standards were unlikely to have existed
in the first place had the initiating country not "outsourced" the legisla-
tive process.
Even if the domestic legislature were able to resist the temptation of
introducing harmonizing legislation, these laws might still enter the
country in the form of customary international law when a sufficient
number of countries have adopted the controversial provisions in their
bilateral or plurilateral agreements and have expressly and consistently
recognized these provisions as legal norms governing their state conduct.
Although Congress may override these customary laws through legisla-
tion, the potential of their influence on the domestic legislative and judi-
cial processes and their ability to shape international discussion are not to
be ignored.
Moreover, the international agreements and the network of bilateral
and plurilateral treaties might affect the country's international obliga-
tions by "form[ing] the context for" the interpretation of treaties the
United States has signed.07 Because of the increasing overlap between
intellectual property and other issue-areas,08 governments and interna-
tional organizations increasingly look to these agreements as part of the
overall framework in an effort to avoid future conflicts in international
obligations. In United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
for example, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel noted the need "to seek
contextual guidance... when developing interpretations that avoid con-
flicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly
contain different obligations.' 20 9 In short, an international anticircum-
vention regime is not only harmful to importing less developed countries,
but also to the developed exporters, like the United States.
If that is not enough, the United States' obligations under the free
trade agreements may make it difficult and costly for the country to re-
duce protection later when it finds that the anticircumvention regime has
overprotected. As Anupam Chander reminded us recently:
FTA [free trade agreements] obligations, it must be remembered,
generally apply equally to the United States. Thus, it is possible that
the United States could run afoul of its own FTAs. The FTAs are not
term-limited, though they do permit withdrawal. Should we con-
207. See Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 585, 602-04 (2001).
208. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law 40
U.C. DAVis L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstractid--914606 (discussing the "intel-
lectual property regime complex"); Symposium, The International Intellectual Property Regime
Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. I (forthcoming).
209. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 6.70,
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000). For discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and
Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
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clude in the future that the DMCA anti-circumvention rules are too
constricting, we will have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the FTA, or
conform to an uncongenial rule. Our FTA partners may often lack
the internal economic incentive to seek to enforce the FTA's strict
anti-circumvention terms (though they may take it as a license to re-
duce their own anti-circumvention excess), yet they may seek to en-
force the FTA once partnered with interested multinational corpora-
tions engaged in rent-seeking.
2 10
III. FOUR OBSERVATIONS
As we plan for the future, it is important that we take heed of the
disagreements described in Part I and the various concerns articulated in
Part II. This Part provides four observations, which I hope will provide
some helpful guidance toward the development of the next generation of
DRM systems and the supporting legal regime. These suggestions also
seek to find more common ground between the many stakeholders in the
DRM debate.
A. Entrenched Laws and Lock-in Effects
Laws can be politically entrenched. Once entrenched, amending
them would be difficult even if they had proven to be ineffective or
harmful. A case in point is the Directive 96/9/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases ("Directive"), 21' which created a sui generis right in the pro-
ducers of nonoriginal, noncreative databases to harmonize protection
throughout the European Community.2 12 The European Commission
recently evaluated the Directive for the first time and found empirically
that the Community benefited very little from the ten-year-old Direc-
tive.21 3 In fact, the Directive might have harmed the publishing and da-
tabase industries in the European Union.2 14
210. Chander, supra note 137, at 207.
211. 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
212. Id.
213. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST EVALUATION OF DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC
ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (2005) [hereinafter DATABASE DIRECTIVE
EVALUATION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/copyright/docs/databases/
evaluation reporten.pdf; see also James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the EU, FT.COM, Jan. 2,
2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-1 1da-ab8e-0000779e2340.html (discussing the
report). For an interesting exchange concerning the EU Database Directive among James Boyle,
Thomas Hazlett, and Richard Epstein, see James Boyle, A Natural Experiment, FT.COM, Nov. 22,
2004, http://www.ft.con.cms/s/4cd4941 e-3cab- 11 d9-bb7b-00000e25 11 c8.html.
214. As the report stated:
According to the Gale Directory of Databases, the number of EU-based database "en-
tries" was 3095 in 2004 as compared to 3092 in 1998 when the first Member States had
implemented the "sui generis" protection into national laws. More significantly, the
number of database "entries" dropped just as most of the EU- 15 Member States had im-
plemented the Directive into national laws in 2001. In 2001, there were 4085 EU-based
"entries" while in 2004 there were only 3095.
DATABASE DIRECTIVE EVALUATION, supra note 213, at 24. Although the Directive aimed to create
a level playing field between U.S. and EU database industries, the report found that "[b]etween 2002
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Notwithstanding these disturbing findings, the Commission pro-
vided three reasons for the retention of the Directive.21 5 First, the Com-
mission "has received strong representations from the European publish-
ing industry that 'sui generis' protection is crucial to the continued suc-
cess of their activities. 216 As the Commission recognized in the report,
"the attachment to the new right is a political reality that seems very true
for Europe., 217 Second, a repeal of the sui generis right "would require
withdrawing, or 'reverse,' legislation and that might reopen the original
debate on the appropriate standard of 'originality.' 2 8  Similarly, a re-
formulation of the scope of the right would "require the Community leg-
islator to revisit the compromise underlying the two-tier protection intro-
duced by the Directive., 219 Third, "[r]emoving the 'sui generis' right and
thereby allowing Member States to revert to prior forms of legal protec-
tion for all forms of 'non-original' databases that do not meet the thresh-
old of 'originality,' might be more costly than keeping it in place. 22°
Troublesomely, these three reasons can also be used to explain the
retention of an ineffective anticircumvention regime. One can hardly
deny that the beneficiaries of the regime-say, developers of DRM sys-
tems-would prefer to retain the status quo. It is also undeniable that
revamping the regime would be costly and would require a reassessment
of where to strike the balance between proprietary interests and public
access needs. While the legislatures of less developed countries might
reason differently from the European Commission and be more protec-
tive of the public interest, it is unlikely that these countries would be in a
better position to resist pressure from the content industries and their
supporting developed countries.
To make things worse, laws that seek to manipulate technology may
create lock-in effects.22' As Dan Burk noted, the DMCA "confers upon
content owners a new exclusive right to control not only access to tech-
and 2004, the European share decreased from 33% to 24% while the US share increased from 62%
to 72%. The ratio of European/US database production, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996, has become
1:3 in 2004." Id. at 22.
215. In addition to maintaining the status quo, the Commission provided three other policy
options: (1) repeal the Directive, (2) withdraw the sui generis right, and (3) amend the sui generis
provisions. See id. at 25-27 (discussing the policy options); see also Boyle, Two Database Cheers
for the EU, supra note 213 (criticizing the fourth policy option of maintaining the status quo).
216. DATABASE DIRECTIVE EVALUATION, supra note 213, at 24.
217. Jd. at 25.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 27.
221. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 568 (2005) [hereinafter Burk, Legal and Technical Stan-
dards] (noting that "like any other interoperable computer technology, DRM will tend toward a
single standard, and simultaneously toward whatever concerns over monopolization or restraint of
trade that come with such network effects"); Wagner, supra note 35, at 1122 (stating that "[t]he
direct manipulation of technology could serve to 'lock-in' an unfortunate set of circumstances, could
forestall developments that might lead to more socially beneficial arrangements or even have more
general unintended spillover effects on technological change.").
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nologically protected works, but also .. .to control ancillary technolo-
gies related to content protection., 22 2 Indeed, the statute grants
broad power to dictate technological format and interoperability. The
very concept of a secure or managed digital environment contem-
plates that only approved or certified interoperation will occur: Un-
approved devices or applications potentially compromise the security
of the system. This type of interoperability control is a version of the
technical standards problem that has been identified in other com-
mentaries of computer technology.
223
If these laws were entrenched, they would harm society more and might
even hinder the modernization efforts of many less developed countries.
In addition, the existing anticircumvention regime has stifled en-
cryption research worldwide by making it difficult for researchers to
conduct and publish their research. As Joseph Liu pointed out, "even
though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and
publish some of their research under the DMCA without significant prac-
tical risk of criminal or civil liability, the DMCA significantly affects the
manner in which that research is conducted., 224 The regime has also had
the unintended effect of reducing incentives to create stronger and better
DRM systems-something copyright holders need to protect their intel-
225 Ntoalectual assets. As a National Research Council study warned us a few
years ago,
[i]t is ... possible that anticircumvention laws will be interpreted by
distributors not as incentives to use effective protection measures but,
rather, as incentives to do just the opposite-use insufficiently tested,
possibly weak protection technology, and increase reliance on the po-
lice and the courts to punish people who hack around it. This would
222. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1132.
223. Id. at 1138; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER, 111, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 172 (2004) (contending that if "[t]he proposal of the record
and movie companies that manufacturers of electronic equipment be obliged to embed encryption
systems in their products [were] ... adopted, it would limit the technological options available to the
manufacturers"); Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 619 ("More and more, manufactur-
ers of hardware and software platforms use DRM components to prevent competitors from develop-
ing and marketing competing platforms. In particular, DRM technologies and anti-circumvention
regulations are used to create proprietary interfaces to the platform, thereby foreclosing entry into
the platform market.").
224. Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 501, 503 (2003) [hereinafter Liu, DMCA and Scientific Research]; see also Peter K. Yu, Is Anti-
Piracy Law Stifling Cybersecurity Innovation?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 20 (discussing how
the DMCA has undermined cryptography and cybersecurity).
225. See, e.g., DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 705 (recalling the following
conversation: "I remember one conversation, 'How good are these solutions?' Answer: 'Pretty
good.' I come back: 'Nine months to break.' 'Mmm, maybe six."') (remarks of Professor David
Farber, who recently retired from the University of Pennsylvania); Wagner, Reconsidering the
DMCA, supra note 35, at 1126-27 (stating that the DMCA "will significantly suppress the incen-
tives to use, develop, and distribute anticircumvention technologies of any kind" and that "the lasting
contribution of the DMCA to the copyright law is as a set of rules that stabilized, moderated, and
encouraged relatively weak forms of DRM").
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result in some cost shifting: Instead of owners and distributors pay-
ing for good technology to protect their property, the public at large
would likely pay for a greater portion of this protection through the
law-enforcement system, although some of the increased costs in en-
forcement may be bome by the antipiracy efforts of the various in-
formation industry associations.
226
While there is no doubt that antitrust and unfair competition laws-
assuming they exist in the relevant countries-may be used to curb mar-
ket abuse by copyright holders and technology developers, commentators
seem to agree that exceptions are still needed if DRM research is to be
improved and if stronger and better DRM systems are to be developed.2 27
Such exceptions may have to be more encompassing and be extended
beyond encryption research "to recognize [other] legitimate reasons for
circumventing technical measures, such as to engage in research about
non-encryption-based watermarking technologies and to analyze com-
puter viruses or worms.' 228
In sum, the the decision to introduce the anticircumvention regime
needs to "be guided not by speculation, but by what is known'"229-
including those lessons from the DMCA experience. As Professor Kerr
and others wrote cautiously about the choice Canada faces:
TPM [technological protection measures] and DRM technologies are
still in relatively early stages of development, and new business
models for the delivery of digital information products are still being
beta-tested. Moreover, state of the art TPMs are still unable to dis-
tinguish between infringing and non-infringing uses. Consequently,
TPMs are currently unable to provide selective access to works in
situations in which such access would not result in copyright in-
fringement.
Given all of the above, it is perhaps too early to predict whether
the legal protection of TPMs is in fact necessary to the success of
mass markets for digital works. It is perhaps also too early to deter-
mine whether the failure to adopt such measures would ultimately
prove to be injurious to such markets. In fact, we do not even know
whether the legal protection of TPMs might actually undermine the
226. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 312. For a discussion of how the cryptology and
security communities work, see generally id. at 313-18.
227. See, e.g., Liu, DMCA and Scientific Research, supra note 224, at 537 (stating that "a
broader exemption under the DMCA for encryption research.., would do a superior job of ensuring
that basic scientific research is left unaffected by the DMCA"); see also Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 524 (arguing that the DMCA "should be
amended to provide a general purpose 'or other legitimate purposes' provision to avert judicial
contortions in interpreting the statute").
228. Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42.
229. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 76; see also id. at 45 (suggesting that "Canada could choose
not to confer additional legal protection to TPMs and simply allow them to flourish or fail in an
unregulated environment until such time as there is more compelling evidence of a need to legis-
late").
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very aim of the TPM strategy by retarding the research and develop-
ment of newer, more secure TPMs and other innovative means of dis-
tributing digital information products, thereby leading to sub-optimal
consumption.
230
What Professor Kerr and his colleagues stated is true not only for
Canada, but for all other countries that have yet to introduce an anticir-
cumvention regime or to ratify the WIPO Internet Treaties. After all,
there has not been a significant reduction of the availability of digital
copyrighted materials in those countries that have not done so-Canada
being a very good example. 23' Nor has there been a significant increase
in the availability of digital copyrighted materials in those countries that
have ratified the treaties or introduced anticircumvention legislation.
B. DRMv. TPM
It is important to distinguish between DRM and TPM--digital
232rights management systems and technological protection measures.
While the latter focuses narrowly on mechanisms used to protect copy-
righted contents, such as passwords, encryption, digital watermarking,
and other protection techniques,233 the former includes a larger set of
technological tools that not only protect the content, but also monitor
consumer behavior and facilitate payment for content usage.2 34 If DRM
systems are to be properly designed, they should not only protect the
copyrighted works from unauthorized access but also accommodate im-
portant interests of users and future creators. After all, as Stefan Bech-
told reminded us, "[n]othing in the 'nature' of DRM requires that DRM
be only used for restricting access to protected content or suppressing
fair use privileges. Properly understood, DRM is a much more neutral
technology than commonly acknowledged.
235
The distinction between DRM and TPM and the reduced emphasis
on protection are important because exceptions and limitations in the
230. Id. at 42.
231. Thanks to Jeremy deBeer for this suggestion.
232. Accord Kerr, supra note 124 (stating that "[ilt is useful to distinguish between TPMs and
DRMs"); see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 26 (describing DRMs that do not utilize TPMs). As
Professor Kerr explained, "[w]hile TPMs are designed to prevent copying, DRMs are designed to
manage copying by using various automation and surveillance technologies to identify content and
technologically enforce certain licensing conditions. More and more, DRMs will be used to manage
all rights reserved by content owners/providers usually on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Kerr, supra
note 124.
233. See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 153-76 (discussing technological
protection); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 13-23 (describing the various TPMs that can be used to
control access to, and use of, copyrighted works).
234. "A trusted system is a system that can be relied on to follow certain rules. In the context
of digital works, a trusted system follows rules governing the terms, conditions and fees for using
digital works." Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 139 (1997).
235. Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 602 (footnote omitted).
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copyright regime are just as important as the rights themselves.236 If we
equate DRM with TPM and consider DRM systems as "copyright
boxes, ''237 we are likely to lose sight of the important interests of users
and future creators as well as the legitimate rights they have traditionally
enjoyed. In doing so, we will also privilege the protection of rights over
the maintenance of exceptions and limitations. An overemphasis on
TPM may even backfire on content providers, because products that in-
clude many restrictions-or, as Hal Varian put it, "cripple-ware" 238-are
unlikely to be attractive.
In a symposium at Boalt Hall, Lawrence Lessig noted the additional
distinction between DRM and DRE (digital rights expression).23 9 To
Professor Lessig, the ability to express what rights the author chooses is
just as important as a system that manages those rights. What he did not
mention (but is likely to agree with2 40) is that, if we are to ensure that
DRM systems truly reflect the historical bargain struck in the copyright
system, we need to build into them not just holder rights, but also con-
sumer rights.24' Otherwise, as Pamela Samuelson put it, a DRM system
would become a "digital restrictions management" system that focuses
on permissions alone.242
236. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996) (noting that exceptions and limitations are "just as important as
the grant of the right itself').
237. STEFIK, supra note 164, at 55 (1999) (describing trusted systems as "copyright boxes").
238. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 707 (terming this type of technological
protection measures as "cripple-ware" because "[i]t inherently reduces the value of the product")
(remarks of Professor Hal Varian of the School of Information Management and Systems at the
University of California at Berkeley); see also Marc Fetscherin, Evaluating Consumer Acceptance
for Protected Digital Content, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 301, 315 (stating
that the consumers' frustrations over "the restrictions placed on how they can use content they
own... are enough to encourage piracy").
239. See DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 728 (stating that "[t]he Creative Com-
mons believes that we need to distinguish between this idea, DRM, and this idea, DRE") (remarks of
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford Law School).
240. Cf LESSIG, CODE, supra note 22, at 127 (introducing the concept of "copy-duty---the duty
of owners of protected property to make that property accessible").
241. See STEFIK, supra note 164, at 101 (stating that "[p]ublishers and consumers alike will be
better served if publishers use trusted systems in a way that recognizes and responds to legitimate
consumer expectations-for example, by creating digital contracts that preserve traditional notions
of fair use"); Armstrong, supra note 196 (observing that "the efficacy of any DRM system for pro-
tecting fair use depends in large measure on the extent to which the system grants parties other than
the copyright holder.., a say in whether any individual use, or category of uses, will be permitted");
Bechtold, Digital Rights Management, supra note 161, at 363 (stating that "[f]or an emerging infor-
mation society, the goal should not be a DRM environment which protects the legitimate interests of
rights holders only, but a symmetric DRM environment which protects the legitimate interests of
both rights holders and users"); Dam, supra note 54, at 411 (contending that, "[flor content provid-
ers, workable technological arrangements to accommodate fair users would be a win-win solution");
Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42 (stating that "[i]f DRM systems were
about digital management of rights, they would need to be designed so users could express their
rights under copyright, too").
242. See id. (noting that DRM "technologies are not really about the management of digital
'rights' but rather about management of certain 'permissions' to do X, Y, or Z with digital informa-
tion"); id. (stating that "[a]n alternative phrase for DRM is 'digital restrictions management,' given
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In the past few years, the content, computer, and home electronics
industries devoted a considerable amount of effort in developing TPM.
It is high time that they start thinking about the next generation of DRM
systems that would include digital rights language to facilitate the ex-
pression of both consumer rights and holder rights.243
C. Machine-Interpretable Noninfringing Uses
It is important to distinguish between machine-interpretable and
machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses. The fact that the scope and
boundaries of these uses, such as the fair use privilege, are uncertain and
that software code at the current state of technology may not be able to
capture the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright sys-
tem does not mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the
244
DRM systems.
Consider, for example, the fair use privilege, "an elusive legal doc-
trine" that Judge Learned Hand has described as "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright., 245 So far, commentators have pointed out
the considerable mismatch between technology and this legal doctrine.
As Edward Felten noted, "[f]air use is one of the starkest examples of the
mismatch between what the law requires and what technology can do.
Accurate, technological enforcement of the law of fair use is far beyond
its use by copyright industries to restrict user rights"). As Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia ob-
served:
Current digital rights management (DRM) systems take a very limited view of the set of
rights they need to manage. Typically, they make decisions using a closed-world as-
sumption: Only actions explicitly authorized by content owners or their delegate(s) are
allowed, and the only "rights" are those explicitly granted by them and presented to the
DRM system. Most DRM systems do not even acknowledge the possible existence of
rights other than the content owner's to license a particular work.
Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM Systems,
COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 61.
243. See Susanne Guth, Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT,
supra note 2, at 101-12 (discussing digital rights expression language); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at
27-28 (discussing Extensible Rights Mark-up Language (XrML)); Stefik, supra note 234, at 140-41
(discussing digital rights language).
244. See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 45 (proposing a mixed fair use infrastructure that
includes automatic fair use defaults and key escrow elements); Bygrave, supra note 124, at 446
(explaining the need to "build[] mechanisms into the systems' architecture which preserve, where
possible, consumer anonymity, and which allow for pseudonymity as a fall-back option where ano-
nymity is not feasible for legal or technical reasons"); Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at
609-16 (discussing how to build intellectual privacy into the design of DRM technologies); cf.
Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 853 (stating that "[the] idea that tools are not able
to distinguish between what is a fair use and what is not a fair use, and therefore we just have to
outlaw fair use altogether, somehow gets short shrift") (remarks of Robin Gross, former attorney
with the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
245. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 552 (1939) (Hand, J.); MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.02, at 470 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that the fair use
privilege is "an elusive legal doctrine, reputed to be the most troublesome in copyright law"); see
also Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 121 ("Fair use has always been a
problematic concept within copyright law. Although it is an important defense against a claim of
copyright infringement, its precise boundaries have never been clear.").
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today's state of the art and may well remain so permanently. 246 Indeed,
as he described colorfully, "[a] DRM system that gets all fair use judg-
ments right would in effect be a 'judge on a chip' predicting with high
accuracy how a real judge would decide a lawsuit challenging a particu-
lar use. Clearly, this is infeasible with today's technology.
247
While Professor Felten is right that software codes may not be able
to fully capture the fair use privilege-at least with the current state of
technology-his concerns will be greatly alleviated if we assume that
software codes can capture only some of its benefits under the fair use
privilege. Put differently, instead of looking at the glass as half empty,
we can consider it half full. As Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia, both
software architects from Microsoft, maintained:
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair use, as it is
understood today,] should not stop us from attempting to identify a
useful subset we might approximate in code. That is, we can take a
purely pragmatic engineering approach to what is on its face an "irre-
sistible force meets immovable object" paradox: Focus first on de-
fining and modeling a useful subset of fair use rights in some policy
language, then add these expressions to the policy evaluators of
DRM systems.
248
Congress, thus far, has been satisfied with intermediate technologi-
cal fixes. For example, although the DMCA mandates automatic gain
control copy technology for analog videocassette recorders, it includes
restrictions on the use of encoding to prevent or limit consumer copy-
ing.249 Likewise, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 requires that
246. Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at
57, 59. Similarly, Professor Samuelson noted:
Thus far, digital rights expression languages (RELs) lack semantics to allow the expres-
sion of concepts like fair use. DRM cannot accommodate user rights without REL vo-
cabularies capable of expressing them. Even if RELs developed semantics to express
user rights, content owners may abjure expressing them unless forced to do so by law or
competition.
Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42 (footnote omitted); see also Burk &
Cohen, supra note 45, at 56 (stating that "[a]t least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights
management code that approximates both the individual results of judicial determinations and the
overall dynamism of fair use jurisprudence"); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 31 (stating that "the
technologies employed by DRMs are not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright
because TPMs themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing and non-infringing
uses of digital works"); Reese, supra note 108, at 629 (stating that "[tiechnological protection meas-
ures that control reproduction or performance of a work, however, are unlikely to be well calibrated
to the actual contours of, for example, copyright owners' reproduction or public performance
rights").
247. Felten, supra note 246, at 58; see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 55 (expressing
their pessimism over the ability of "system designers ... to anticipate the types of uses that would be
considered fair by a court"); id. at 59 (stating that "[a]t present, only human intelligence, reviewing
the unique circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair").
248. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 242, at 62. For a recent comparative assessment of the
existing and proposed DRM systems in relation to its ability to protect fair use, see Armstrong, supra
note 196.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2004).
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digital audio recording machines be equipped with a Serial Copy Man-
agement System to provide copyright and generation status information
and to prevent the recording devices from producing a chain of perfect
digital copies through "serial copying. ' '250 None of these provisions is
close to replicating the fair use privilege, but they at least strike some
balance between proprietary interests and public access needs in the digi-
tal environment.
The limited scope of this Article does not allow me to fully describe
how I would build noninfringing uses into the DRM systems. However,
this section offers a brief sketch of what a more balanced DRM system
would look like. As I mentioned earlier, it is important to distinguish
between machine-interpretable and machine-uninterpretable noninfring-
ing uses. Under this proposal, software code would be used to accom-
modate machine-interpretable noninfringing uses, while the determina-
tion of the machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses would remain in
the province of courts. As technology advanced and computer pro-
gramming became more sophisticated, DRM systems would be able to
accommodate more noninfringing uses. The domain of machine-
interpretable noninfringing uses would therefore expand, leaving fewer
and fewer copyright matters to courts.
One may compare this proposal to prior efforts in developing fair
use guidelines in the United States, which have thus far been largely un-
successful.25 1 Unlike those efforts, however, this proposal seeks to create
a continuous process that may alleviate some of their shortcomings. To
better understand my proposal, consider the core minimum approach
advocated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
the human rights area. That approach, which inspired the proposal here,
was set up primarily to help countries fulfill their obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
times of resource constraints.252 In General Comment No. 3, the Coi-
250. Id. § 1002.
251. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Pho-
tocopy Freely, 60 U. PiTT. L. REv. 149, 160 (1998) (noting that, "[tihough Congress specifically
declined to incorporate these Guidelines into the Copyright statute, courts have generally held (and
publishers have gleefully conceded) that educational photocopying that meets the Guidelines consti-
tutes fair use of copyrighted works"); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of
Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 701 (2001) ("One can only find failure in guidelines that
have missed their constructive goals and served destructive ends. The vast range of parties with an
interest in proper application of fair use have been poorly served by existing guidelines, and they
would be better served had the guidelines never existed."). For a comprehensive discussion of the
development of fair use guidelines, see id.
252. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights pro-
vides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, in-
cluding particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mittee stated that "a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is
incumbent upon every State party., 253 The interpretive comment did not
stop there, however. It continued to state that, once countries have satis-
fied this core minimum obligation, they have to take "deliberate, con-
crete and targeted" steps towards the full realization of the rights in the
Covenant.254
While the Committee was concerned with physical and economic
resource constraints concerning the implementation of international hu-
man rights obligations, we are struggling with technical resource con-
straints regarding our ability to design DRM systems that capture the full
range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system as well as the
dynamic nature of many copyright doctrines.25 5  A core minimum ap-
proach therefore will allow us to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of noninfringing uses. For example, we
can begin by "allowing users to extract a certain number of bits, or dis-
play the work for certain periods of time, or partially perform the work a
certain number of times., 256 As technology improves-and more techni-
cal resources become available, just like the availability of more physical
resources in the human rights context-we can strive to achieve full re-
alization of these exceptions and limitations. By developing DRM sys-
tems to accommodate as many noninfringing uses as technology allows,
this process will help approximate the rights consumers have tradition-
ally enjoyed in the physical space.
One concern with the core minimum approach, as Dan Burk and
Julie Cohen suggested, is that such an approach would encourage mini-
malist interpretation of important safeguards and the creation of a right
ceiling. As they explained:
We are ... skeptical ... about the ability of negotiated defaults to
capture the full range of social benefit that more flexible legal stan-
dards allow. While these defaults sometimes might allow access that
ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 2(1) (emphasis added); see also UDHR, supra note 67, art. 22 (stipulat-
ing that "the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for [one's] dignity and the free de-
velopment of his [or her] personality" are to be realized "in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State").
253. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of
States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Par. 1) 1 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c 12563 ed0052b664?Opendocument.
254. Id. 2; see also ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 2(1) (requiring each state party "to take
steps,... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures").
255. See, e.g., Besek, supra note 36, at 493 (stating that '"[f]air use by design' techniques...
[do not] reflect the dynamic nature of the doctrine"); Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 56 ("[Flair
use is a dynamic, equitable doctrine designed to respond to changing conditions of use. Pro-
grammed fair use functionality, in contrast, is relatively static.").
256. Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 55.
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would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the "safe har-
bor" concept is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair
use. We suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute
fair use-indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guide-
lines by rights holders that led to the collapse of the CONFU [Con-
ference on Fair Use] discussions. Moreover, in the case of the 1976
"safe harbor" guidelines for educational copying, rights holders, con-
tent users, and even courts have shown a deplorable tendency to act
as though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair use. To the
contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair use minima:
a floor rather than a ceiling. We are consequently reluctant to rec-
ommend an infrastructure based solely on the design of similar de-
faults into self-enforcing "lock-out" systems for fear that the "ceil-
ing" effect could be even more pernicious.
257
Professors Burk and Cohen are rightly concerned about minimalist
interpretation and the ceiling effect. Indeed, those issues have continued
to dominate discussion in the human rights context. In regards to the
core minimum approach, human rights activists have been particularly
concerned that "the identification of minimum core content will reveal to
State parties how little they have to do in order to be in compliance with
their obligations, and that States will do that minimum and nothing
more. ' 25s However, it is important to remember that Professors Burk and
Cohen did not reject the use of technology defaults. Rather, they were
skeptical that such use alone would give the necessary protection and
therefore added a key escrow system to complement those defaults in
their proposed mixed fair use infrastructure. As Professor Burk pointed
out later, their concern was mainly that "technological controls tend to be
relatively blunt instruments for control of digital content, unable to ac-
commodate copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human dis-
cretion. ', 259  Because courts under my proposal will still provide the
needed human discretion when they make determination of machine-
uninterpretable noninfringing uses, their concern will be greatly reduced.
Nevertheless, there still remains their concern about minimalist in-
terpretation and a broader question of how to build machine-interpretable
noninfringing uses into DRM systems. To alleviate their concern, we
need to be particularly cautious about the process through which we
build noninfringing uses into DRM systems. The fact that the process
may create an unwanted ceiling does not mean that we should not create
the process at all. Rather, it means that we need to be careful about the
design of the building process.
257. Id. at 57.
258. Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction to CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A
FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 1, 9 (Audrey Chapman & Sage
Russell eds., 2002).
259. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards, supra note 221, at 551.
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To do so, we need to develop a process that brings together copy-
right holders, technology developers, consumer advocates, civil libertari-
ans and other stakeholders. To some extent, this process reminds one of
Mark Stefik's proposed Digital Property Trust, which "would be gov-
erned by representatives of the various stakeholders-including publish-
ers, trusted system vendors, financial institutions, lawmakers, librarians,
and consumers-and would interact in an appropriate and organized way
with governing bodies and law enforcement agencies in different coun-
tries.,, 26 0 The integrity of this process is particularly important in light of
the historical lack of direct consumer representation in the copyright
lawmaking process. Even today, "[n]ot all standards processes include
end user representation, and even in those that do, there is no assurance
that end user grievances, once aired, will prospectively shape the stan-
dards that are brought to market. 261
Representation, however, is not the only major concern regarding
the design of my proposed process. Although public choice scholarship
has widely criticized the lack of representation, there is surprisingly very
limited discussion about how legislatures have made laws without fully
understanding technological development. Indeed, laws tend to be
drafted by lawyers and lobbyists through a lengthy deliberative process
with only limited advice from technology developers in the form of
comments, congressional testimonies, and commissioned studies.262 As a
result, the drafters may not know exactly what can and cannot be done
technically. As Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a lawyer by train-
ing, recalled humorously, "I looked at the [DMCA] bill and I saw some
problems, but the bigger problem in retrospect that I see was, on the
260. Stefik, supra note 234, at 156. This proposal was later refined in STEFIK, supra note 164,
at 100-01. As he explained, "[iun DPT, fair use is treated as a licensed privilege analogous to a
driver's license, rather than as a legal defense. From a legal perspective, this is a substantial refram-
ing of the fair-use concept that takes into account the greater risks of misappropriation in the digital
arena." Id. at 100.
261. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 616. Indeed, "[m]any other DRM standards
projects utilize neither open standards nor open membership. These include the motion picture
industry's DVD Content Control Association, Microsoft's Next Generation Secure Content Base
project, Intel's LaGrande project, and a host of smaller private efforts to develop proprietary DRM
technologies." Id. at 616 n. 113.
262. In the past, Congress benefited from the assistance of the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, which was abolished in 1995. Among the studies conducted in the intellectual property area
were those concerning computer software, home copying, and intellectual property in the digital age.
See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal "for Copyright in the Information Age, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 1488, 1499 n.48 (2002) (reviewing LITMAN, supra note 14) (listing intellectual property-
related studies conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment). In fact, Pamela Samuelson
suggested that Congress could promote public interest by "establish[ing] something akin to the
Office of Technology Assessment to provide it with independent advice about policy options when
legislating on intellectual property and other issues responding to challenges presented by new
technologies." Id. at 1499.
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committee, I was the tech expert. I mean we're in trouble when that oc-
curs. I'm a lawyer, not a techie.
263
To make matters worse, laws tend to be reactive and therefore lag
behind technological development. Even the DMCA, which David
Nimmer has characterized as "proleptic, 264 failed to anticipate the latest
technological developments. For example, in its first DMCA rulemaking
proceeding in 2000, the Copyright Office noted "[t]he merger of techno-
logical measures that protect access and copying does not appear to have
been anticipated by Congress. '265 As Part II described, Congress's in-
ability to anticipate these technologies and the courts' failure to uphold
the congressional intent has rendered the statutory distinction between
access-control and use-control technologies virtually meaningless. That
distinction has also created a difficult situation concerning region codes
used in DVDs and video games, because regional encoding, as Nimmer
pointed out, "constitutes neither an access control (inasmuch as buyers of
the disc obtain the lawful right to access it, at least under certain circum-
stances) nor a copying control (inasmuch as disabling the regional coding
does not implicate the copyright owner's rights as defined in the Copy-
right Act). 266
Likewise, even though one of the stated goals of the DMCA is to
reduce digital piracy, the drafters of the DMCA failed to anticipate the
extensive unauthorized copying problem created by file-sharing tech-
nologies. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reminded us in Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica v. Verizon Internet Services,2 67 "P2P software was 'not even a glim-
mer in anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted.'
268
In light of these deficiencies, the process needs to include technol-
ogy developers-not just as experts for their testimonies, but as partici-
pants who will help distinguish machine-interpretable noninfringing uses
from their uninterpretable counterparts and then build them into DRM
systems. As Fox and LaMacchia noted:
The two open issues in establishing a safe harbor are: how to create
machine-interpretable expressions that adequately model a set (or
subset) of fair use rights; and how to get the stakeholders (content
owners, DRM system builders, and Congress, as the representative of
263. Zoe Lofgren, Edited Transcript of the David Nelson Memorial Keynote Address: A Voice
from Congress on DRM, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 498-99 (2003).
264. David Nimmer, Back From the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 (2001).
265. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558 (2000).
266. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 146, § 12A.06[D][2].
267. 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
268. Recording Indus. Ass n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1238 (quoting In re Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003)).
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the people's interest in the social bargain of copyright) to work to-
gether on defining the boundaries of a subset of fair use rights that
would be safe to implement.
269
While the first issue is important and remains a vital project for
270technology developers, my proposal focuses mainly on the latter-
how to get the stakeholders to work together on defining the boundaries
of a subset of noninfringing uses. To do so, one needs to have a dynamic
process. First, we need to allow technology developers to explain what
machines can and cannot interpret. While it is undoubtedly important for
technology developers to continue to improve the recognition of nonin-
fringing uses, my proposal uses the core minimum approach and relies
on existing technology.
The next step is for stakeholders to come to an agreement on the
minimum essential levels of noninfringing uses. As demonstrated by the
collapse of CONFU271 and other similar efforts and the continued rent-
seeking copyright lawmaking process, this part of the process is probably
the most difficult. While copyright holders will no doubt have a strong
interest in developing the next generation of DRM systems that consum-
ers will embrace, as well as in the migration of illegal downloaders to
DRM-compliant systems, it is na'fve to assume that they will easily come
to agreement with communications providers, consumer advocates, and
civil libertarians on the boundaries of noninfringing uses. Thus, the par-
ticipation of Congress or courts-either as a mediator or an adjudica-
tor-may be necessary. Under that scenario, noninfringing uses will be
built into the system using both the "by design" approach and the "by
mandate" approach.27 2
To make the process manageable, it is important that the discussion
is restricted to existing laws, including interpretation of statutes, case
law, and treaty obligations. Such discussion is already difficult enough,
even without introducing issues that have not been anticipated by Con-
gress and courts. In examining the exceptions and limitations, it is also
269. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 242, at 63.
270. The vitality of this project is obvious. As Stefan Bechtold noted: "Whether a DRM
system respects fair use or not depends, in particular, on the design of the rights expression language
[REL]. If fair use privileges and the other legitimate interests of information users cannot be ex-
pressed in the REL, such interests simply do not exist with the DRM system." Bechtold, Present
and Future, supra note 3, at 608.
271. For discussions of CONFU, see Crews, supra note 251, at 626-35; Gregory K. Klings-
porn, Note, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use Guidelines, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 101 (1999).
272. Cf Besek, supra note 36, at 491-94 (discussing both the "fair use by design" and "fair use
by mandate" approaches). As June Besek defined, "'[flair use by design' refers to situations in
which the design of a technical solution builds in some ability to take advantage of copyright exemp-
tions." Id. at 491. In contrast, "'[flair use by mandate' describes circumstances in which righthold-
ers are directed to enable non-infringing uses but not necessarily given specific instructions as to
how that should be done." Id. at 492.
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important that the participants explore customary usage in addition to
exceptions that have already been codified in the copyright statute.
273
Once the stakeholders have agreed on the minimum essential levels
of noninfringing uses, it is important for technology developers to recog-
nize these uses in software code. Should they encounter any problems,
the process will allow them to ask the stakeholders for clarification or to
explain the technological limitation so that the participants can recon-
sider the coding request. This step is not completed until the agreed-
upon noninfringing uses have been built into DRM systems. Then the
cycle repeats itself, and more noninfringing uses will be built into the
system as technology advances.
There are at least two potential objections to this approach, in addi-
tion to the usual criticism that the approach is unable to capture the full
spectrum of noninfringing uses, to which I responded earlier, as well as
the argument that the stakeholders can never reach a mutually acceptable
agreement. First, as Joseph Liu has noted with respect to the fair use
privilege,
if we actually tried to spell out, in the law, in a detailed manner, in-
stead of the four factors, what exactly copyright and fair use would
look like, I think you would soon find a statute that would begin to
resemble the tax code in its complexity because it would be volumes
and volumes and volumes of very detailed regulations depending on
who you are, why you're using it, which context, and all the rest.
274
When this criticism is combined with Jessica Litman's criticism of
the incomprehensible nature of current copyright law, a tax-code version
of the fair use privilege seems very unappealing, even if it is interpret-
able by machines. 275 As Professor Litman noted, "We can continue to
write copyright laws that only copyright lawyers can decipher, and ac-
cept that only commercial and institutional actors will have good reason
to comply with them, or we can contrive a legal structure that ordinary
individuals can learn, understand and even regard as fair., 27 6 However,
Professor Liu only highlighted the complexity of the fair use privilege,
273. See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 106 (explaining that some lawful personal
uses may not have been codified as exceptions in the copyright statute); see also Lunney, supra note
15 (discussing private copying in relation to the DMCA); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525 (2004) (advancing a pattern-oriented ap-
proach to fair use decisions).
274. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 731-32 (remarks of Professor Joseph Liu
of Boston College Law School); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1637-38 (2003) (stating that "industry-specific rules and exceptions [in
the copyright model] have led to a bloated, impenetrable statute that reads like the tax code").
275. See LITMAN, supra note 14, at 145 (stating that "[t]he DMCA is long, internally inconsis-
tent, difficult even for copyright experts to parse and harder still to explain"); see also FISHER, supra
note 223, at 93 (describing the DMCA as "[a]n enormous, gangling, and poorly edited piece of
legislation").
276. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 39
(1996).
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which is true with or without this proposal, while Professor Litman was
mainly concerned about whether humans could read and understand
copyright laws. Her concern, I suspect, would be considerably alleviated
if computers are to read and execute the "code." After all, computers
have handled far more complex application programs, and the Wide-
spread usage of tax preparation software strongly suggests the techno-
logical feasibility of this approach.
The second objection is that, even if we are able to build into the
system a subset of noninfringing uses under the copyright system, the
system will not work, because there is no guarantee that there will be
zero leakage in the system. As Richard Epstein noted, it is hard to find
an intermediate fix in the digital world, "because once one pristine copy
gets out, then there are a billion pristine copies that are out there., 277 As
far as DRM systems are concerned, "all it takes is 'one leak' to neutralize
a TPM entirely, '278 and this leak can come from anyone from anywhere
in the world.
Admittedly, this proposal would not address this problem. Al-
though it may take seventeen hours to reproduce the latest Harry Potter
novel 279-and significantly less if more perpetrators are involved-the
publisher's revenue stream can be significantly reduced as soon as that
reproduction becomes available on the computer. However, we have to
question whether it is realistic to expect perfect protection, just like we
have to question whether it is realistic, or even possible, to find perfect,
hacker-proof encryption technology. With more than six billion Internet
users in the world, 280 and many more in the future, there is always the
possibility of having "one pristine copy" being leaked to the public. 28' If
we are going to aim for a system that guarantees zero leakage, that sys-
tem may never be found.
Thus, the question cannot be whether we can prevent that copy from
being leaked to the public, but whether we can contain the leakage to
ensure reasonable compensation for copyright holders. This alternative
question makes a lot of sense, because copyright holders do not need to
capture the full social value of their creation and completely prevent free
277. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 755 (remarks of Professor Richard Epstein
of University of Chicago Law School).
278. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 641.
279. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 755 (remarks of Jerry Berman of the
Center for Democracy and Technology).
280. Internet Usage Statistics-The Big Picture: World Internet Users and Population Stats,
http://www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
281. See BIDDLE ET AL., supra note 41 (holding the belief that "at least for some classes of
user, and possibly for the population at large, efficient darknets will exist"); Yen, supra note 71, at
691 ("[N]o law-not even a complete ban on circumvention technology-can guarantee the security
of copyright. Piracy has always existed, yet copyright-based industries have flourished."). But see
Besek, supra note 36, at 477 (noting that "[s]ome piracy has always been a cost of doing business,
but there comes a point at which it is realistic-and unfair-to expect paying customers to subsidize
widespread free use").
[Vol. 84:1
2006] ANTICIRCUMVENTION AND ANTI-ANTICIRCUMVENTION 73
riding.282 Indeed, zero leakage has never been a goal of copyright law,
which was introduced primarily "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good" by allowing authors to obtain a reasonable return
on their investment.283
In sum, a two-step approach-technology first, then courts-seems
to be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth considering
developing such a system as we explore the next generation of DRM
systems. As Charles Clark titled his well-cited chapter, "the answer to
the machine is in the machine. 284 As long as we do not need to give up
exceptions and limitations of the copyright system, using computers as
the first step seems to be very appealing.
From the standpoint of less developed countries, this approach is
even more attractive because it avoids the costly correction mechanisms
involved in other proposals, especially if the multistakeholder process is
set up as part of the legislative process (which already exists) and if the
software code used in DRM systems, or at least the specific portion con-
cerning the machine-interpretable noninfringing uses, is revealed. The
different laws and institutions that are involved in this process may also
help these countries tailor protection to their own needs, interests, and
goals.
Unfortunately, this proposal would not address my earlier concern
that a new anticircumvention regime might require consumers to pur-
chase end devices that support the technological measures employed. 285
Thus, the best option for many less developed countries is not to intro-
duce any anticircumvention laws at all, unless they have concrete evi-
dence that those laws would benefit the countries. However, if they have
no choice but to do so, either because of changing international norms,
external pressure, or benefits in other trade areas, this proposal-coupled
with technical assistance in circumvention tools and economic assistance
in purchasing new end devices-may provide an acceptable solution.
D. Market Responsiveness
Consumer interests are important, and the success of DRM systems
will depend on the satisfactory accommodation of these interests. It is
therefore no surprise that this Summit was entitled "From Creator to
Consumer: Working Together in the Digital World." When the old Nap-
ster was discussed in the file-sharing context, the service was often criti-
282. See discussion Part I.B.
283. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
284. Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996).
285. Thanks to Michael Mireles for pointing this out.
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cized for its illegality and its unresponsiveness to the plight of artists and
consumers. As jazz artist Herbie Hancock noted:
So far, [Napster]'s even worse than the labels. On the way to making
millions for its owners and investors, Napster has yet to give any-
thing to artists other than the chance to spread their music, for free,
and whether they like it or not. Its supporters hide behind claims that
labels misuse artists and consumers, as if that entitled them to take
everything they want absolutely free. Excuse me, but just because
record executives give artists a bad deal doesn't mean that everyone
else can then go and do worse.
286
Regardless of what impression one has of the old Napster, one can
hardly deny that the service was appealing to consumers because it gave
them what they wanted. Apart from free (and often illegal) music
downloads, Napster also allowed consumers to find obscure music and
special remixes that were unavailable in the market.28 7 As I noted else-
where, "Napster succeeded because it supplied a market solution to an
emerging demand.... Shawn Fanning was inspired to create Napster by
his college roommate's frustration in searching for MP3s on the Web.
Napster responded to the market instead of chasing it."
288
The same can be said of DRM systems. Indeed, technology devel-
opers constantly have to deal with their systems' market responsiveness.
As Emery Simon, an attorney with the Business Software Alliance, re-
called:
The software industry has used DRMs for twenty-five years. It goes
through a cycle. The software industry tightens up the DRMs and
consumers scream, because they can't do very much with the soft-
ware when it fails, or they want to reload it. Companies loosen up on
the DRM, and the piracy goes way up, and then they tighten up on it.
That has been the cycle, and that continues to be the cycle, and we're
reconciled to that cycle. What we do in that cycle is we abandon
technologies that consumers hated the worst. I'll give you an exam-
ple. There is something called a dongle, a little piece of hardware
that people attach to the back of the PC with which the PC has to
shake hands in order to run the software. People hated it. Nobody
uses a dongle anymore. So yes, there are DRMs that are hated by the
marketplace, and are taken out of the marketplace in response to the
market.
289
286. Herbie Hancock, Preface to JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE
NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC, at xvii, xviii (2001).
287. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 699-701 (explaining why
record companies may not have the rights to release all of the content consumers found on the old
Napster and other file-sharing engines).
288. Id. at 742.
289. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 750 (remarks of Emery Simon of the
Business Software Alliance); see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 31 (recalling that "in the early
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Indeed, technology developers, and those who incorporate DRM
systems into their products, are constantly struggling with the trade-offs
between cost and effectiveness and between protection and inconven-
290ience. If the systems are too complicated and restrictive, they would
jeopardize the user experience and make content inaccessible. The
costly technology also would raise product prices, thereby reducing con-
sumer demand. However, if the systems are too simple and easy to
break, they do not provide sufficient protection for copyright holders.
Consider region codes used in DVDs and video games. Designed to
direct machines to allow access to the protected content only if the prod-
uct was coded to be played in the authorized geographic area, these spe-
cial codes are important to copyright holders, because they allow movie
producers to segment the international market. In doing so, they enable
the scheduling of DVD releases based on the timing of the theatrical re-
lease or the progress of the relevant promotional campaign.291 They also
facilitate price discrimination and allow rights holders to respond to dif-
ferent licensing arrangements and local censorship regulations.
From the standpoint of consumers, however, region codes can be
annoying, especially to frequent travelers or foreign film or anime afi-
cionados, whose interests have yet to generate a big enough market to
facilitate domestic distribution. When these consumers make a purchas-
ing decision, they not only have to decide whether they want the prod-
ucts, but also where they want to enjoy the products and whether they
have the needed playback device to do so. After all, products that are
purchased in Asia (with a region code of 2, 3, 5, or 6) are very unlikely
to be playable in machines purchased in the United States (with a region
code of 1).292 Indeed, the use of region codes has led the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission to investigate whether such
usage would breach the Trade Practices Act.293
1980s many companies that sold software applications employed a form of copy protection to pre-
vent the floppy disks on which their applications were sold from being copied" and that "[m]assive
consumer resistance to this approach led to the abandonment of this TPM and yet software compa-
nies subsequently found the risk of illegal copying to be within acceptable limits").
290. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 153 (noting "inherent trade-offs between the
engineering design and implementation quality of a system on the one hand and the cost of building
and deploying it on the other"); id. at 164 (stating that "[a] good mechanism is one that provides the
degree of disincentive desired to discourage theft but remains inexpensive enough so that it doesn't
greatly reduce consumer demand for the product"); von Lohmann, supra note 4 1, at 643 (noting that
"[w]here alternative channels exist, customers of legitimate services will respond to restrictions
imposed by TPMs by seeking out darknet channels").
291. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management 15 (U. Chicago
Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper Series, No. 291, 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract-id=899155.
292. The six region codes are: "1. USA and Canada; 2. Europe, Middle East, South Africa and
Japan; 3. Southeast Asia and East Asia; 4. Central and South America, Mexico, Australia and New
Zealand; 5. Eastern Europe, Indian subcontinent, Africa, North Korea and Mongolia; and 6. China."
Besek, supra note 36, at 457 n.284.
293. Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Restricting DVDs 'Illegal' Warns ACCC, AUSTRALIAN IT, Mar. 27,
2001, at 33; see also Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 615 (noting that "[t]he more deeply
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Today, it is common for the content industries to describe how digi-
tal technologies have greatly reduced their market. While this claim may
be true to some extent, one question they rarely raise is whether consum-
ers are, in fact, purchasing the same products-with the same usage
terms and conditions. If they do not, one may have to question whether
the market demand was reduced because of the digital challenge or be-
cause of the increased usage restrictions that have made the product less
appealing. Indeed, the adverse impact of these restrictions on consumers
has been so severe that Representative Rick Boucher (D-Va.) introduced
the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005 to amend the Federal
Trade Commission Act to ensure proper labeling of copy-protected com-
pact discs.
294
As DRM systems become increasingly deployed to protect copy-
righted works, rights holders need to be conscious of the trade-offs be-
tween cost and effectiveness and between protection and inconvenience.
They need to be careful about what usage restrictions or protection
mechanisms they put on the products, especially if such mechanisms
could harm the users' computers (think Sony rootkit!). They also need to
be mindful of laws that are introduced to protect consumers. If they fail
to do so, the new technologies not only will harm their markets by reduc-
ing customer satisfaction, but will bring them legal troubles outside the
intellectual property area.
Interestingly, if the content industries and technology developers
begin to take market-related concerns more seriously, they are also less
likely to adopt draconian technological protection measures that would
severely limit consumer access to the product. As Douglas Lichtman
reminded us, "a point [that is] often missed in discussions of DRM [is
that] content owners do not necessarily want airtight control over their
work, and so there is no reason to expect that they will use extreme
forms of DRM even if extreme forms were feasible. 295 Moreover, if
some content providers find that greater access would be in their own
interest, they may want to encourage other content providers to do so
through industry standards.296 To compete for customers, some content
embedded in software and hardware DRM functionality becomes, the harder it will be to avoid by
purchasing noncompliant equipment"); see also Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 629
(noting that "[b]oth the European and the Australian competition authorities have investigated
whether the regional code management system in DVD players is used to overcharge European and
Australian customers for DVD discs compared to U.S. customers"); see also Cohen, DRM and
Privacy, supra note 32, at 615 (noting that "[t]he more deeply embedded in software and hardware
DRM functionality becomes, the harder it will be to avoid by purchasing noncompliant equipment").
294. H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005). For a brief discussion of similar legislation in the 108th
Congress, see Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative
Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 317, 319-20 (2005).
295. Doug Lichtman, Defusing DRM, IP L. & Bus., Feb. 2006, at 24.
296. As Kenneth Dam explained:
[S]ome content providers may find that fair use buttons or related devices are in their
own interest and therefore may want to encourage other content providers to use similar
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providers may also find it worthwhile to reduce user restrictions in their
products or to facilitate greater transformative uses.297
CONCLUSION
In the future, DRM systems are likely to be used in products that are
important to us in our digital life. They will appear in not only an Adobe
e-book or an Apple iPod, but also in our car, our school, our kitchen, and
298our living room. There is a growing tendency for the content indus-
tries to invoke copyright liability whenever their works were used with-
out authorization. There is also an increasing trend for manufacturers of
household products that incorporated software code to use anticircum-
vention laws to protect their products from competition. If we do not
have balanced DRM-related laws and good DRM systems that accom-
modate consumer interests and if we allow rights holders to invoke intel-
lectual property principles in every instance of unauthorized circumven-
tion of DRM systems, we are creating a recipe for disaster. Intellectual
property protection is important, but not more important than how we
live our daily life. As a senior official from the Department of Homeland
Security reportedly reminded the entertainment industries following
Sony's recent rootkit debacle, "[i]t's very important to remember that it's
your intellectual property, it's not your computer.,
299
devices. If so, the development of industry standards is likely to be a preferable and more
flexible approach, allowing different kinds of content providers to approach the fair use
issue in quite different ways, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of a one-kind-fits-all leg-
islative or rule-making approach.
Dam, supra note 54, at 405.
297. Id. at 411 (stating that "it is probable that some kinds of content providers, at least in the
realm of ideas, will want to facilitate transformative uses so long as acknowledgment of their own
work is made").
298. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 137, at 208 (stating that, "in an environment in which
silicon chips are embedded in more and more of our most ordinary products, potentially copyright-
able material can be found in the most unexpected places"); Lipton, Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, supra note 102, at 512 (observing that "more and more digital technology is now being
incorporated into physical items from large scale industrial machinery, to car motors, to basic house-
hold appliances ranging from digital pianos, to stereo systems, to the humble toaster").
299. Carrie Kirby, Sony Halts Anti-Piracy Software, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 2005, at C 1.

THE "ROOTKIT DEBACLE":
THE LATEST CHAPTER IN THE STORY OF THE RECORDING
INDUSTRY AND THE WAR ON MUSIC PIRACY
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ABSTRACT
In the age of digital music, illicit copying or burning of CDs is a rampant
problem that undermines the rights of copyright holders, record labels,
and artists alike. The recording industry has attempted to address this
problem by manufacturing and releasing CDs with various types of digi-
tal rights management (DRM) technologies. Most recently, Sony BMG
introduced CDs containing DRM software that was intended, among
other things, to limit the number of copies of the CD the user could make,
and prevent the user from sharing the content of the CD on peer-to-peer
networks. However, the manner in which this software operated was
highly controversial, for example because it collected information from
the user's computer and installed a "rootkit" on the user's hard drive
that made the computer susceptible to viruses. This latest effort to copy-
protect CDs, which has come to be known as the "rootkit debacle," has
raised numerous legal issues that are examined in this article, including
Sony BMG's potential liability under certain federal and state laws, as
well as the potential liability of consumers and security researchers un-
der the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The article also proposes a
solution for striking a balance between the recording industry's right to
protect its intellectual property and music fans' right to enjoy their CDs.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the recording industry's war on piracy has fo-
cused on music downloaded from the Internet and file sharing. As a re-
sult of recent court victories, the recording industry now appears to have
the upper hand in the on-line file sharing battle. While this battle cer-
tainly is not over, this respite has given the record labels an opportunity
to focus on another alleged culprit in the struggles of the music business:
the copying or "burning" of compact discs (CDs).
The recording industry is well aware of the impact that burned CDs
have had on its business. As one industry leader said, "[m]usic copied
onto blank recordable CDs is becoming a bigger threat to the bottom line
of record stores and music labels than online file-sharing."' Indeed, for
several years now, the major music labels have been experimenting with
digital rights management (DRM) and other anti-piracy technologies
that, among other things, would prevent consumers from converting their
CDs into computer files, limit the number of copies of a CD a consumer
could make, and/or render CDs unplayable on certain types of audio
equipment.
Nevertheless, until recently, discussions about whether CDs in-
cluded DRM were reserved for Internet bloggers, outspoken consumer
groups, and serious music fans. In 2005, that all changed when Sony
BMG (Sony) released dozens of albums by popular artists with DRM
software installed on the CD.2  The purpose of this software was to
thwart music piracy and protect Sony's intellectual property, while at the
same time providing customers with flexibility in playing their music.
Specifically, the software allowed customers to make up to three copies
of the CD and play the content on multiple platforms, while attempting
to prevent excessive copying and sharing of music on peer-to-peer web-
sites.3
1. Copying Music Now Threatens Business Like File-Sharing Did, ASSOCIATED PRESS (New
York), Aug. 15, 2005, at 12.
2. See Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, REUTERS, June 1, 2005,
http://news.cnet.co.uk/digitalmusic/0,39029666,39189658,00.htm; see also Wikipedia, 2005 Sony
CD Copy Protection Scandal § 1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_SonyCDcopy_




Although Sony claims its copy-protected CDs contained warnings,
most consumers did not become aware of the software until after they
had purchased the CDs. To exacerbate matters, the software worked by
secretly installing a "rootkit" on a purchaser's hard drive when the pur-
chaser first loaded the CD on a drive connected to a computer. These
rootkits exposed the users' computers to hackers who could introduce
viruses and then exploit those viruses to their advantage. Moreover, the
software, which opponents claim is spyware, kept track of what consum-
ers did with the purchased music and then communicated that informa-
tion back to Sony.4
In early November 2005, the news of Sony's DRM software ex-
ploded on the Internet and, soon thereafter, Sony pulled approximately
fifty titles from retail stores.5 Though some people find DRM inherently
objectionable, the widespread outrage may have had more to do with the
manner in which the software operated than with the purposes it served.
In any event, Sony's use of this specific DRM tool has disillusioned con-
sumers, lawmakers, and artists alike. Consequently, several consumer
class action lawsuits and one law enforcement action have been filed
against Sony.6 Settlements have now been reached in many of these
cases, and Sony has agreed, among other things, to replace CDs contain-
ing DRM software with unprotected versions and to stop using the spe-
cific type of DRM software at issue in these lawsuits.
7
But this is not the end of the story. The "rootkit debacle" has raised
numerous legal questions that remain unanswered. These questions are
sure to rear their heads again, especially given that Sony and the other
record labels have made clear that they are not abandoning future efforts
to protect CDs from unfair copying. This article attempts to resolve
these unanswered questions.
Part I of this article provides a background of the recording indus-
try's war against music piracy over the past several years. Part II de-
scribes Sony's latest effort to copy-protect CDs, which has become
4. Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
SYSINTERNALS BLOG, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/10/sony-rootkits-and-
digital-rights.html; Mark Ward, Sony's Music Arm Has Been Accused of Using the Tactics of Virus
Writers to Stop its CDs Being Illegally Copied, BBC.com, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/4400148.stm; Matthew Fordahl, Sony to Offer Patch To Reveal Hidden Copy-protection
Software, ASSOCIATED PRESS (San Jose, Calif.), Nov. 12, 2005.
5. Sony-BMG Flushes DRM Down the Toilet, SILICON VALLEY SLEUTH, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://www.siliconvalleysleuth.com/2005/11/sonybmgflushes.html.
6. Sony Sued Over Copy-protected CDs, BBC.com, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4424254.stm; Sony BMG CD Technologies Settlement, Apr.
7, 2006 (last updated), http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com.
7. See Sony BMG, Important Legal Notices/Software Update Notice,
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). "If You Bought, Received or Used a SONY
BMG Music Entertainment CD Containing Either XCP or Media Max Content Protection Software,
Your Rights May Be Affected By a Class Action Settlement, And You Should Download Updates
For That Software." Id.
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known as the "rootkit debacle." Part III analyzes the legal questions
raised by the Sony rootkit debacle, including whether: (i) Sony violated
certain anti-fraud and spyware-related laws by distributing CDs with
copy-prevention software; (ii) Sony's copy-protected CDs comported
with copyright law, namely the fair use doctrine; and (iii) consumers'
removal of the copy-prevention software or distribution of information
about how to remove such software violated the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution that attempts to
strike a balance between the recording industry's right to protect its intel-
lectual property and a consumer's right to enjoy purchased music.
I. BACKGROUND: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY'S WAR ON PIRACY
Less than ten years ago the music business was booming. In 1999,
CD sales totaled $14.6 billion with approximately 1.5 billion units
shipped worldwide. 8 The business grew at an annual rate of greater than
6 %, and everyone involved made a lot of money. 9
Since 1999, the recording industry has experienced a serious
downward trend. By 2003 the number of units shipped was down
31 %,10 and CD sales had fallen to $11.2 billion.1' Consequently, in an
effort to save money, record labels have laid off employees, ditched art-
ists, cut tour and video budgets, and reissued old albums rather than pro-
duce and promote new ones. 12 While numerous factors have contributed
to this decline, the major culprit is music piracy-both in the form of file
sharing and CD burning. 13  Thus, over the past several years, the re-
cording industry has invested significant time and resources waging war
against these pirates in an attempt to regain the success it once enjoyed.
8. Jefferson Graham et al., Hammering Away at Piracy, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at I D;
NARM Consumer Research Initiative Phase One: Consumer Profiles & Retail Experience, Prepared




9. Graham et al., supra note 8, at 1D.
10. NARM, supra note 8, at 11.
11. Kristina Groennings, Costs & Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation Against
Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005).
12. Hillary M. Kowalski, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing & Technological Sabotage Tactics: No
Legislation Required, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 297, 301 (2004); David Segal, A New Tactic
in the Download War: Online "Spoofing' Turns the Tables on Music Pirates, WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 2002, at Al.
13. Some have blamed the decline in record sales on the nation's economic downturn. See
Peter K. Yu, P2P & the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 765 n.15 (2005).
Others contend that people are buying less music because they have so many other entertainment
options. See NARM, supra note 8, at 16.
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A. The First Phase: On-Line File Sharing
1. The Battle Against Indirect Infringers
Thus far, the recording industry's war on piracy has focused primar-
ily on indirect infringers, i.e., companies whose products facilitate the
downloading and file sharing of copyrighted music. The most well
known of these alleged indirect infringers was Napster, a peer-to-peer
file sharing service that utilized a centralized index of music files and
allowed those files to be transferred from one Napster user's computer to
another.14  Napster's emergence in late 1999 coincided with the sharp
decline in CD sales. The Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") responded on behalf of its members by suing Napster on the
grounds of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.15 After
years of protracted litigation, the RIAA defeated Napster, ultimately
forcing it into bankruptcy.
1 6
Although the Napster litigation was a success for the recording in-
dustry, it did not put an end to on-line file sharing. Instead, Napster us-
ers migrated to decentralized file sharing services such as Grokster.
17
Such services did not have a centralized index like Napster, but rather,
distributed software that allowed users to share electronic files through
peer-to-peer networks.' 8 In 2001, the RIAA filed suit against Grokster
and StreamCast Networks, another software distributor, asserting the
same theories as in the Napster case. 19 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the software companies because (i) their soft-
ware was capable of substantial non-infringing use, and (ii) they had no
actual knowledge of infringement by their customers.20  The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed.2 '
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Grokster
case and reversed.22  In so doing, the Court found that close to 90% of
14. Mark F. Radcliffe & Jill Sazama, Napster & Hollywood: Controlling Intellectual Property
in an Age of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Digital Video Recorders, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
CLE, 2002 WL 32152238, at *2 (Nov. 14-15, 2002).
15. See Complaint for Contributory and Vicious Copyright Infringement at 2, A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affirmed by 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) available at http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/napster/NapsterComplaint.pdf. Soon after
it sued Napster, the recording industry also brought a lawsuit against MP3.com, which had launched
"myMP3.com," a service that allowed users to play songs that the users "owned" from MP3.com's
servers. Radcliffe & Sazama, supra note 14, at *2. However, MP3.com did not have the consent of
the copyright owners to make these copies or provide this service. Id. The record labels and other
copyright owners were granted injunctive relief against MP3.com and the cases were quickly settled.
Id.; see generally RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/mp3com.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
16. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 899. In 2003, Napster was re-launched as a legal, sub-
scription-based on-line music store. See Yu, supra note 13, at 669-70.
17. Groennings, supra note l1, at 573.
18. Id.
19. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
20. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43.
21. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004).
22. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2270 (2005).
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the files downloaded with defendants' software were copyrighted.23 The
Court further found that defendants promoted their software as an alter-
native to Napster, and thus, encouraged users to engage in infringing
activity. 24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the software com-
panies were liable for their customers' infringement, reversed the sum-
mary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.25 As a result of
the Supreme Court's decision, the parties settled the case and Grokster
was shut down.26
2. The Battle Against Direct Infringers
In August 2003, the music industry made the bold and controversial
decision to bring copyright suits against direct infringers, i.e., individuals
who engage in music downloading and file sharing. For the most part,
the RIAA filed these suits against individuals who were heavy users,
meaning they had distributed more than a thousand music files on peer-
to-peer networks.27 As of February 2006, approximately 17,765 of these
individual copyright infringement lawsuits had been filed.28
The media, public, and legal commentators have been highly critical
of this litigation strategy, for example because the RIAA has sued col-
lege students, deceased persons, and a family that did not own a com-
puter.29 It is clear, however, that these lawsuits have raised public
awareness of the illegality of music downloading and file sharing.
Moreover, studies indicate that the user bases of those services that have
been targets of the litigation (e.g., KaZaa and Morpheus) have decreased
dramatically since the RIAA started its campaign in 2003.30
3. Technological Measures
In addition to filing lawsuits, the recording industry has utilized
various technological measures to battle individual downloaders and file
sharers. The most effective, and perhaps most controversial, of these is
23. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
24. Id. at 2773.
25. Id. at 2782-83.
26. See RJAA, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/I 10705_2.asp (last visited Sept. 15,
2006). The settlement includes a permanent injunction against the software companies prohibiting
direct or indirect infiingement of any copyrighted works. The injunction also requires the software
companies to cease distributing their products and operating their systems. Id.
27. Yu, supra note 13, at 666.
28. RIAA site, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/default.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
29. Groennings, supra note 11, at 590-91; Yu, supra note 13, at 660-61; RIAA website,
http://www.riaa.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-Less Fam-
ily, 234 Others, for File-Sharing, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060424-6662.html.
30. NARM, supra note 8, at 14. However, some studies show that "though litigation caused a
decrease in the use of networks ... targeted by the lawsuits, overall file-sharing has remained un-
changed, as users of those sites simply migrated to more secure and anonymous file-sharing sys-
tems." Groennings, supra note 11, at 587; see also Thomas Karagiannis et al., Is P2P Dying or Just
Hiding?, GLOBAL INTERNET AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKs, Nov. 2004, at I, 6,
http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2004/p2p-dying/.
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"spoofing." Spoofing is a technique whereby the record industry inserts
decoy music files into peer-to-peer networks, thus forcing file sharers to
differentiate between the genuine and "fake" files.31 Some of these
"fake" files contain high-pitched screeching sounds, long silences, or
repeated loops of the song's chorus. Others contain a message from the
artist reminding the file sharer that unauthorized downloading is illegal
and harms, not only the record companies, but the artists as well.33
Another tactic that reportedly has been used is interdiction.34 Music
companies flood peer-to-peer networks with false requests in order to
clog up the network, thereby denying other users the ability to access and
download music files. 35  The hope is that peer-to-peer users ultimately
will get frustrated enough to stop using these services, and will switch to
a legitimate site like iTunes or will purchase the CD at a retail outlet.36
B. The Second Phase: CD Copying or "Burning"
1. Identifying the Problem
Unlike the on-line file sharing battle, the recording industry has not
engaged in any sort of litigation campaign, either against indirect or di-
rect infringers, to stop individuals from copying CDs from friends or
acquaintances. The reasons for this are simple. There are no secondary
infringers like Napster or Grokster assisting these individuals in copying
CDs; all these individuals need is a borrowed CD and a computer. 37 Fur-
31. Sue Zeidler, Music Labels Plant Online Decoys, Mull Lawsuits, ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN,
July 5, 2002, http://emusician.com/news/emusic_music_labelsplant/index.html; Katie Dean, Aca-
demics Patent P2P Spoofing, WIRED NEWS, May 8, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0,1412,63384,00.html.
32. Groennings, supra note 11, at 593.
33. Id.; Yu, supra note 13, at 726-27.
34. Kowalski, supra note 12, at 303; Dean, supra note 31; Karagiannis et al., supra note 30, at
6.
35. Kowalski, supra note 12, at 303; Dean, supra note 3 1.
36. Other technological measures that have been contemplated include a program called a
"freeze" and a program called a "silence." Kowalski, supra note 12, at 302-03.
37. Because of the digital format, copying CDs, unlike records or cassettes, can be accom-
plished quickly and easily and result in a very high quality duplicate. See, e.g., Amy K. Jensen,
Copy Protection of CDs: The Recording Industry's Latest Attempt at Preventing the Unauthorized
Digital Distribution of Music, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 241, 244 (2003). CDs can
be copied on any computer with a CD-ROM or on a digital audio recording device, i.e., a CD burner
or CDR. In 1992, however, Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub.
L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2006)), which "prohib-
its legal actions for copyright infringement based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of
digital audio equipment or media for private, noncommercial recording." Yu, supra note 13, at 706;
see also Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 380 (2003). The AHRA also prohibits infringement actions against the
consumers of these products as long as they are being used for a noncommercial purpose. 17
U.S.C.A. § 1008. In exchange, the AHRA requires manufacturers of these products to pay compen-
satory royalties to copyright holders, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1003(a), and mandates that all such products
include a Serial Copy Management System, which limits copying. 17 U.S.C.A § 1002(c).
In light of the AHRA, it would be particularly difficult for the recording industry to bring a lawsuit
against the manufacturers and users of CD burners unless it could show that the equipment was not
being used for private or noncommercial purposes. In any event, most people today copy CDs on
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thermore, based on past experience, the recording industry has realized
that suing the manufacturers of computers for contributory infringement
is unlikely to advance their cause.38
Nor has the RIAA launched a litigation campaign against individu-
als who copy CDs as it has against on-line file sharers because it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify these people. The
RIAA tracks on-line infringers by their numerical IP address, files a
"Doe" lawsuit using that IP address, and then subpoenas the internet ser-
vice provider (ISP) to obtain the subscriber's identifying information.3
By contrast, the RIAA has no way of knowing when someone borrows a
CD from his friend, copies it onto his hard drive, and then downloads it
onto a blank CD or MP3 player.
Yet the recording industry is well aware of the danger posed by
these CD burners. 40  Record executives have long argued that CD bum-
ing has become so widespread in Europe that it is a bigger threat than
unauthorized online file sharing.41  And a recent study prepared for the
National Association of Recording Merchandisers (NARM), a trade or-
ganization that represents the interests of major music retailers, indicates
that this also may be true in the United States.42 The study shows that, in
2004, only 43% of fans acquired their music by purchasing a physical
CD, while 29% copied a CD, 22% used an illegal peer-to-peer network,
their computers, not with a CD burner, and it has been determined that the AHRA does not apply to
computers. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
38. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that, even though defendants were aware VCRs were being used to commit
infringement, the sale of VCRs could not give rise to contributory infringement because the VCR
was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses, namely time-shifting. Here, manufac-
turers of computers and CDRs could similarly prove that their products are capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses, and thus, any lawsuit against them is likely to fail. See id.
39. Groennings, supra note 11, at 574. This is a much more tedious process than the RIAA
initially used. Id. at 573. When the RIAA first started filing these individual lawsuits, it relied on
the subpoena power of § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Id. at 574.
Under § 512(h), before filing the lawsuit, the RIAA could provide the ISP with "$35, a copy of
notification, the proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the information sought was for the
sole purpose of protecting copyright," and the ISP was compelled to disclose the subscriber's identi-
fying information. Id. However, in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1237
(D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that ISPs like Verizon are not subject to the
subpoena power of § 512(h) because the statute "does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an
ISP acting as a mere conduit for the transmission of information sent by others." Id. Thus, ISPs fall
under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA, and copyright holders cannot force them to provide
subscriber information without first filing a lawsuit. Id. at 1236.
40. Copying Music Now Threatens Business Like File-Sharing Did, supra note I, at 12.
41. Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2002, 3, at I; see also Sony's 'Copy-Proof CD Fails to Silence Hackers, USA TODAY, May 20,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/tech/2002-05-20-copyproof-cd.htm (stating that
Germany is "rife with illegal CD burning").
42. NARM, supra note 8, at 12. This study was prepared by the NPD group, a research
organization based in New York that is concerned with the digital music market. See Thomas Men-





and 6% used legitimate on-line music sites.43 Therefore, the recording
industry has taken a different approach to try to stop illegal copying of
CDs: digital rights management.
2. Digital Rights Management: The Solution to CD Burning?
Digital rights management (DRM) is a technology used to protect
ownership of digital content by restricting the actions an authorized re-
cipient may take with respect to that content.44  In other words, DRM
systems include "secure packaging and delivery software designed to
prevent purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized uses of
digital works. ' '4
For years, the recording industry has been attempting to prevent or
limit unauthorized copying by producing CDs with an effective DRM
system. So far, however, those attempts have been unsuccessful.46 In
2000, for example, the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), an inter-
national organization of record labels, hardware manufacturers, and
software manufacturers, challenged computer programmers and re-
searchers to break the digital audio watermark technologies they had
developed to prevent the unauthorized copying of CDs.4 7 "Digital wa-
termarks contain data, such as copyright information, that identifies a
work and is incorporated into the work itself; watermarking allows the
content owner to track the use of his work and ensure payment.,
48
Edward Felten, a professor of computer science and public affairs at
Princeton University, participated in the contest. 49  Professor Felten's
team was able to remove the watermark within just a few weeks, which
proved embarrassing for the recording industry. 50 To make matters
worse, when Professor Felten attempted to present his findings about the
watermark at a conference in 2001, the RIAA and SDMI threatened to
43. NARM, supra note 8, at 12.
44. Austin Russ, Digital Rights Management Overview, SECURITY ESSENTIALS, VOL. 1.2e
(July 2001), available at http://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/basics/434.php.
45. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001).
46. The film industry, too, has experienced problems with its use of DRM on digital video
discs (DVDs). In the 1990s, it developed the Content Scrambling System (CSS) to encrypt and
prevent illegal copying of DVDs. However, Jon Lech Johansen, a Norwegian teenager, cracked the
CSS code and posted his findings on the Internet. See Norwegian Teen Raided by Police in DVD
Suit, Jan. 25, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/ptech/01/25/dvd.charge/index.html. Crimi-
nal charges were brought against Johansen, but he was ultimately acquitted. See lain Thomson,
Norwegian Court Clears 'DVD Jon,' Jan. 8, 2003, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2121179/
norwegian-court-clears-dvd-jon.
47. Robin D. Gross, Digital Millennium Dark Ages, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
Nov. 7, 2001, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20011107_eff felten article.html;
Brad King, Real Progress in Secure Music, WIRED NEWS, June 7, 2001, at 2,
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,44365-I .html?tw=wnstory_pagenextl.
48. Terri Branstetter Cohen, Anti-Circumvention: Has Technology's Child Turned Against Its
Mother?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 961, 973-74 (2003).
49. Gross, supra note 47.
50. Id.; Groennings, supra note 11, at 592.
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sue him under the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, which prohibits "circumvent[ing] a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under" the
copyright statute.5
No lawsuit was ever brought against Professor Felten; instead, Pro-
fessor Felten sued for a declaratory judgment that publication of his pa-
per would not violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.5 2 In re-
sponse to the lawsuit, the RIAA and SDMI assured Professor Felten that
they would not bring a lawsuit against him. 53 Ultimately, the case was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Professor Felten
subsequently published and presented his paper without any further resis-
tance from the RIAA or SDMI. 4 Needless to say, the recording industry
decided against distributing CDs with the watermarking technology.
In 2001, record labels began releasing CDs that included copy-
protection technology intended to prevent consumers from listening to
the CD on a computer and/or copying its contents onto the computer's
hard drive. 55 Specifically, these CDs included a decoy data track on the
outer edge of the CD.56 Because of the way hard drives are programmed,
a computer will continuously attempt to read this data track first before
moving on to the audio tracks. 57 Thus, these copy-protected CDs could
be played on standard CD players, but not on computers, certain portable
devices, DVD players, and even some car stereos. 8
The problems created by these copy-protected CDs resulted in more
negative publicity for the record companies. Many consumers returned
the CDs and demanded replacements without the anti-copying technol-
ogy.59  Others chose to fix it themselves-and all they needed was a
magic marker or some tape.
51. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a); Gross, supra note 47; Andrea L. Foster, Princeton Cryptogra-
pher's Challenge to Music Industry Draws Computer Scientists' Support, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, Aug. 16, 2001, http://chronicle.com/free/2001/08/2001081602t.htm; Letter
from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Esq., Senior Vice President, Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica, to Professor Edward Felton [sic], Princeton University (Apr. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20010409_riaa sdmi-letter.html.
52. Gross, supra note 47,
53. Foster, supra note 51.
54. Gross, supra note 47; Transcript of Final Hearing at 48, Felten v. RIAA, No. 01 CV 2669,
(D. N.J. 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/1P/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_
transcript.pdf.
55. See Simple Crack Revealed for CD Copy Protection, MEDIALINE, May 22, 2002,
http://www.medialinenews.com/issues/2002/may/news0522-7.shtrnl.
56. Id.
57. Sony's 'Copy-Proof CD Fails to Silence Hackers, supra note 41.
58. Id; CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, WIRED NEWS, May 20, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,52665,00.html; Healey & Leeds, supra note 41, at 2.
59. John Borland, Customers Put Kibosh on Anti-Copy CD, CNET NEWS, (Nov. 19, 2001),
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276036.html; Universal to Protect U.S. Album Release, REUTERS,
Nov. 28, 2001, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276341.html.
[Vol. 84:1
THE "ROOTKITDEBACLE"
When the additional track is hidden from the computer's laser by ink
from a marker, a piece of electrical tape, or a piece of a self-stick
memo, the computer does not attempt to read the additional track and
moves on to the tracks that store the actual content, as if the CD were
an ordinary audio disc.
60
News of this "easy fix" quickly spread on the Internet, once again embar-
rassing the music companies that had invested significant time and re-
sources developing this technology.
6 1
II. THE STORY OF THE SONY ROOTKIT




Despite the previous failed attempts, the recording industry did not
give up on finding a marketable and secure anti-copying technology. To
that end, the record labels, including Sony, sent their engineers back to
the drawing board to try to find a solution to the threat posed by CD
burning.64 As a result, in the fall of 2003, Sony began releasing CDs
with a new anti-copying technology called "MediaMax. 6 5
Sony released CDs with two versions of the MediaMax software,
3.0 and 5.0, both of which were developed by SunnComm Technologies
("SunnComm").66 MediaMax was like the previous generation of copy-
prevention DRM in that it was intended to prevent consumers from using
personal computers for unauthorized CD burning.67 Unlike earlier DRM,
however, MediaMax did not completely prohibit playing CDs on a com-
60. Cohen, supra note 48, at 995 n.7.
61. See CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, supra note 58.
62. See generally J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM
Episode (Feb. 14, 2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf (providing a more de-
tailed technical analysis).
63. There are two versions of the MediaMax software: 3.0 and 5.0. Settlement Agreement
I.A-B, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., No. l:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/pdfs/SettlementAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement]. For the most part, these versions are the same and will be discussed together. Where
necessary, this article will distinguish between the two versions.
64. See Healey & Leeds, supra note 4 1, at 2.
65. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, L.A-B; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Me-
diaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, (Oct. 6, 2003), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3/.
Sony distributed a total of 37 titles with the MediaMax 3.0 software and 27 titles with the 5.0 ver-
sion, including albums by popular artists such as the Dave Matthews Band, the Foo Fighters, Dido,
Alicia Keys, and Sarah McLachlan. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
66. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, l.A-B. SunnComm is "a leader in digital content
security and enhancement for optical media." Press Release, SunnComm International,
SunnComm's MediaMax CD-3 Technology Passes International Test With "Flying Colors," (Aug.
27, 2003), available at http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?prid=20030827630 [here-
inafter SunnComm Press Release].
67. See Halderman, supra note 65.
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puter, but instead, limited the number of copies a user could make. 68
Specifically, it permitted users to do the following: (i) copy tracks onto
the user's hard drive that could be played back without the original CD;
(ii) bum tracks onto a blank CD up to three times; (iii) download tracks
to certain portable devices;69 and (iv) email tracks to friends who could
listen to them for ten days.70
While the purpose and goal of the MediaMax DRM appear fair, the
methods used to implement it, arguably, were not. When a CD contain-
ing the MediaMax program was inserted in a computer, an End User
License Agreement (EULA) automatically appeared on the screen.71 The
EULA stated:
As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions
of the EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary
software program (the "SOFTWARE") onto your computer. The
SOFTWARE is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the
CD, and it may also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL CONTENT.
Once installed, the SOFTWARE will reside on YOUR COMPUTER
until removed or deleted .... [T]he SOFTWARE will not be used at
any time to collect any personal information from you, whether
stored on your computer or otherwise.
72
68. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 1 24, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig.,
No. 1:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/
pdfs/ConsolidatedAmendedComplaint.pdf [hereinafter Sony Complaint].
69. CDs containing the MediaMax software are only compatible with Sony and Microsoft
products and software, so those are the only portable devices that the tracks can be loaded onto. Id.
70. Halderman, supra note 65; Mike Snider, Anti-Swap CD Hits the Racks, U.S.A. TODAY,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 6D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2003-09-22-
copycd x.htm. The MediaMax EULA describes the function of the DRM as follows:
This CD contains technology that is designed to prevent users from making certain, unau-
thorized uses of the DIGITAL CONTENT, including, without limitation, the following:
(1) making and storing more than one (1) copy of the DIGITAL CONTENT in each
available file format on the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER; (2) accessing the
DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER (once you have installed a copy of it on
the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER) using a media player that is not an APPROVED
MEDIA PLAYER; (3) transferring copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT that reside on the
hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER on to portable devices that are not APPROVED
PORTABLE DEVICES; (4) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL
CONTENT stored on YOUR COMPUTER (ATRAC OpenMG file format only) onto
AtracCDs; (5) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT onto re-
cordable compact discs in the so-called "Red Book"-compliant audio file format; and (6)
burning more than three (3) backup copies of this CD (using the burning application pro-
vided on the CD) onto recordable CDs and burning or otherwise making additional cop-
ies from the resulting backup copies.
Melcon v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. C 05 5084 MHP (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2005), Ex. A at 2-3,
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/ND cal-complaint.pdf [hereinafter Melcon
Complaint].
71. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G. The copy-prevention software only installs if
the Windows "Autorun" feature is enabled, which it generally is because that is the default setting.
Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 5.
72. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 1 21 & Ex. A.
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In fact, however, the MediaMax software files (which consisted of more
than a dozen files at approximately 15 MB) are loaded onto the computer
before the user is given the opportunity to accept the EULA.7 3
MediaMax employs a temporary protection measure in order to pre-
vent the user from copying music when the EULA is being displayed
(i.e., when the CD is first inserted in the computer).74 This "temporary"
protection measure installs and activates the anti-copying software before
the EULA is even presented to the user. 75 The software, therefore, is
installed without obtaining the user's consent.
Even worse, if the user rejects the EULA, the MediaMax software
remains on the hard drive.76 Although rejecting the EULA is supposed to
deactivate the software, that is not always the case. 77 In certain situa-
tions, the software remains permanently active.78 For example, if the
user inserts a MediaMax 3.0 CD and then later inserts a MediaMax 5.0
CD (or vice versa), the software will be active despite the user's prior
decision to decline the EULA.79 Similarly, inserting a 5.0 CD, rebooting
your computer, and then inserting the same album or another CD with
the 5.0 software will lead to the same result.
80
The MediaMax software also loads a type of device driver onto the
computer's hard drive to prevent copying.81 With respect to the 3.0 ver-
sion, "[t]he driver examines each CD placed in the machine, and when it
recognizes the protected title, it actively interferes with read operations
on the audio content., 82 Similarly, the 5.0 version causes a "kernel-level
driver" to be installed on the computer, the purpose of which is "to block
CD ripping and copying applications from reading the audio tracks on
MediaMax CDs. 83
In addition to the obvious problems with the manner in which it was
installed, the MediaMax software caused other concerns, namely, that it
exchanged information between the user's computer and Sony.84 More
specifically, the MediaMax program collects personal information, in-
cluding (i) the user's IP address, (ii) the type of operating system on the
user's computer, (iii) the version of Internet Explorer installed on the
user's computer, and (iv) the title of the MediaMax CD that the user cur-
73. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
74. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
75. Id.; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.





81. Halderman, supra note 65.
82. Id.
83. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 18.
84. Id. 25; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
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rently has loaded on his computer.85 In light of this evidence, the state-
ment in the EULA that "the software will not be used at any time to col-
lect any personal information from you, whether stored on YOUR
COMPUTER or otherwise, 86 appears inaccurate.
2. XCP
In January 2005, Sony began releasing CDs with a different DRM
system known as Extended Copy Protection or XCP. 87 Various versions
of XCP were designed and licensed to Sony by First 4 Internet Ltd.
("F4i"), 88 a developer of content management technology based in the
United Kingdom.89 Like MediaMax, the purpose of the XCP technology
was to limit, but not preclude, the use of personal computers to copy
CDs.90 For instance, XCP allowed users to make up to three copies of
the CD, but tracks could only be played with the media player that was
included with the CD and could only be downloaded to certain types of
portable players. 91
Also like MediaMax, the way that XCP installed itself and operated
was fraught with complications. When an XCP CD was inserted in a
computer, a EULA automatically appeared on the screen.92 Among other
things, the EULA provided:
Before you can play the audio files on YOUR COMPUTER or create
and/or transfer the DIGITAL CONTENT to YOUR COMPUTER,
you will need to review and agree to be bound by an end user license
agreement or "EULA" .... [I]f you do not agree to be bound by
these terms and conditions, you will not be able to utilize the audio
files or the DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER.
93
85. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 25; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27. The Me-
diaMax software also allegedly contains an advertising program called "Perfect Placement."
SunnComm described this program in a 2005 press release:
This unique feature centrally serves up dynamic promotional content controlled by the
record label to reserved spaces located throughout MediaMax interface while a user is en-
joying their CD on the computer .... Imagine an artist's album is coming out and the re-
cord company has the ability to announce this event to all those playing the artist's previ-
ously released album on their computer.
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 32.
86. See Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 22 & Ex. A.
87. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 23. Sony released a total of 52 albums with XCP soft-
ware. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
88. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.B.
89. F4i Company Page, http://www.first4intemet.co.uk/company.aspx (last visited Sept. 15,
2006).
90. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 24.
91. Russinovich, supra note 4; Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
SYSINTERNALS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/10/sony-rootkits-and-
digital-rights.html; see also Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 24. The XCP EJLA explaining what
the user could and could not do with the CD was exactly the same as on the MediaMax EULA. See
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B, Art. 2-3.
92. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
93. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B at 2.
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Hence, if the user wanted to play the CD on a computer, he had no
choice but to accept the EULA. Once the user accepted the EULA, it
would not be displayed again when another CD with XCP software was
loaded onto that user's computer.94 So the user was given just one op-
portunity to read the following language:
As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions
of the EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary
software program... onto YOUR COMPUTER. The SOFTWARE
is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the CD, and it may
also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL CONTENT. Once installed,
the SOFTWARE will reside on YOUR COMPUTER until removed
or deleted. However, the SOFTWARE will not be used at any time
to collect any personal information from you, whether stored on
YOUR COMPUTER or otherwise.
95
Unlike MediaMax, XCP did not use a temporary protection measure
that installed software before the EULA was accepted by the user. In-
stead, XCP prevented copying during the installation process by monitor-
ing the list of applications that were running on the user's computer at
the time the EULA was being displayed in order to determine if the user
was running a "blacklisted" ripping and copying application.96 If such an
application was found, the EULA was replaced with a warning instruct-
ing the user to close the offending application within 30 seconds or the
XCP installation would terminate and the CD would be ejected.97
Once installed, however, the XCP software was far more dangerous
than the MediaMax program because it "contains a potentially harmful
'rootkit' which renders the user's computer more vulnerable to 'mal-
ware' promulgated by third parties, including 'viruses,' 'Trojan Horses'
and 'spyware,' than the computers would have been had the XCP Soft-
ware not been installed., 98 The XCP EULA says nothing about this
rootkit.99
A rootkit is "a set of software tools frequently used by a third party
(usually an intruder) after gaining access to a computer system. These
tools are intended to conceal running processes, files or system data,
which helps an intruder maintain access to a system without the user's
94. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 128.
95. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B 3.
96. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, § 4.2.1.
97. Id The warning stated:
The installation cannot continue because there are applications running which need to be
closed. Please manually close all programs shown in the list below, or click "Close Ap-
plications Now" to do it automatically. If you do not close these down within the al-
lowed period then the installation will terminate until you next insert the disc.
Id.
98. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.E.
99. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B.
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knowledge."' 00  Rootkits are not visible to a computer's operating
system, nor can they be detected by antivirus and security software.' 0'
Here, the Sony rootkit functioned by integrating itself in the com-
puter's operating system and then concealing all files that began with
"$sys$," which included the XCP copy-prevention software. 0 2 The dan-
ger of this "cloaking mechanism" is that any file can be made invisible to
the user by assigning it a name that begins with "$sys$.', 0 3  Conse-
quently, users who have played Sony CDs containing XCP software on
their computers are left vulnerable to hackers. 104
Not only did the XCP software install this rootkit, but, contrary to
the EULA, it also gathered personal information from the user's com-
puter. 10 5 Like the MediaMax software, the XCP program communicated
the user's IP address and the title of the CD the user was currently play-
ing to Sony. 106 Additionally, when Sony's server received the informa-
tion about what CD was being played, it "automatically check[ed] for
updates to the album art and lyrics for that album,... [which] uses the
bandwidth that would otherwise be available to the user's computer for
other tasks.' ' 7  Thus, both the MediaMax and XCP systems "phone
home" with personal information regarding Sony's consumers.1
08
B. The Discovery of Sony's Copy Protection Technology
1. Alex Halderman and the MediaMax Software
When CDs with the MediaMax copy-prevention system were re-
leased in September 2003, it was not a secret. SunnComm issued a press
release lauding its new technology, 09 and numerous newspaper articles
100. Security Reference Guide, The Sony Rootkit: What It Is and How to Remove It,
INFORMIT.COM, para. 4 (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.informit.com/guides/content.asp?g=security&
seqNum-192&rl=l (citation omitted).
101. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, T 52.
102. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 35; Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 9 51-53.
103. Sony Complaint, supra note 68,1 35.
104. Id. 36; Nancy Lang-Feldman, Sony's Rootkit Is All Evil, COMPUTER SHOPPER, 4 (Mar.
2006), http://shopper.cnet.com/4002-7409_9-6457527.html.
105. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, T I.E; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
106. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 97 59-60; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
107. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 59.
108. Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED NEWS, (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,69601,00.html.
109. SunnComm Press Release, supra note 66, 7 2-4. The press release stated:
MediaMax CD3 products passed all tests and met the toughest standards.... It achieved
a very high level of playability combined with an incredible level of security for the mu-
sic .... [T]he functionality and security level offered by the MediaMax technology was
pushed to the limit. The testing results were able to verify playability on consumer elec-
tronic devices, stability of the product on computers and robustness of the security fea-
tures to protect content against unauthorized copying when used with CD ripper pro-
grams [sic].
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were written on the topic. 10 Moreover, the MediaMax CDs contained
warnings. For example, the album cover stated: "This CD is protected
against unauthorized duplication. It is designed to play on standard
playback devices and an appropriately configured computer (see system
requirements on back). If you have questions or concerns visit
http://www.sunncomm.com/support/bmg..'I And the face of the CD
itself stated: "This disc is protected against unauthorized duplication."
' 12
However, consumers were not warned about the manner in which
the MediaMax program operated (i.e., that the software files were in-
stalled even if the EULA was declined), nor were they aware the soft-
ware was communicating personal information to Sony. 13 That changed
in October 2003 when J. Alex Halderman, a Ph.D. student in computer
science at Princeton University, published a paper analyzing the Media-
Max software."14 Not only did Halderman describe how the MediaMax
software worked, he explained that a user can easily bypass the software
by holding down the shift key for a few seconds while loading a CD onto
the computer. 115
Once again, the record industry's hopes for a marketable and secure
copy-protection system were quickly dashed. Mr. Halderman's publica-
110. U.S. Firm Hopes Anti-Piracy CD Will Rock Blackmarket, BUS. TIMES, I (Sept. 26,
2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20031024232303/http:/it.asial .com.sg/newsdaily/news006_2003
0926.html (reporting "SunnComm Technologies Inc. said on Wednesday it has designed a revolu-
tionary CD with embedded anti-piracy technology that it hopes will rock the black-market trade in
pirated music"); Frank Ahrens, BMG Offers Legal Song Sharing, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at
El; Jon Healey, BMG is Releasing Copy-Protected CDs, LA TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at C3.
111. Halderman, supra note 65, § 2. The "systems requirements" on the back of the CD pro-
vided:
THIS CD IS ENHANCED WITH MEDIAMAX SOFTWARE. Windows Compatible
Instructions: Insert disc into CD-ROM drive. Software will automatically install. If it
doesn't, click on 'LaunchCd.exe.' MacOS Instructions: Insert disc into CD-ROM drive.
Click on "Start." Usage of the CD on your computer requires your acceptance of the End
User License Agreement and installation of specific software contained on the CD. Win-
dows System Requirements: Windows 98/2000/XP, Intemet Explorer 5.5 or later, Win-
dows Media Player 7.1 or compatible player. Mac System Requirements: Mac OSX 10.1,
Power Mac G3/G4, iMac, eMac, Powerbook G3/G4, iBook with 128 Mb of RAM, Win-
dows Media Player for Mac OSX, Internet Explorer 5.2, Monitor capable of displaying
800x600 screen resolution & 256 colors (64K colors recommended), 12x or faster multi-
session-enabled CD-ROM drive, Flash Player 6. Digital files on this CD will also play on
portable devices supporting secure WMA files. Certain computers may not be able to ac-
cess the enhanced portion of this disc. None of the manufacturers, developers, or distribu-
tor make any representation or warranty, or assumes any responsibility, with respect to
the enhanced portion of this disc.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, §§ 4.2.2, 6.
114. Halderman, supra note 65. Mr. Halderman is a student of Professor Felten's and was part
of the team that removed the digital watermark in response to the SDMI challenge in 2000. See
supra Part I.B.2; see also http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhaldermi/.
115. Halderman, supra note 65, § 3. Halderman also reported that, only four days after the
release of Comin'From Where I'm From by Anthony Hamilton (Arista Records/BMG), a CD con-
taining the MediaMax DRM, he searched peer-to-peer networks and discovered that every song from
that album was available to be downloaded. Id.
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tion was particularly devastating for SunnComm, whose stock fell nearly
25% within forty-eight hours of the paper hitting the Internet."
16
SunnComm responded by threatening to sue Halderman for violation of
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. 117  Ultimately, however, SunnComm decided against filing suit
against Mr. Halderman, presumably because doing so would turn an al-
ready bad situation into a complete public relations nightmare.l"
8
2. Mark Russinovich and the XCP Software
In late October 2005, Mark Russinovich, a computer security ana-
lyst, discovered a hidden software program on his computer that he be-
lieved was a rootkit.1 9 Mr. Russinovich was able to trace the software
program to a Sony CD he had recently played on his computer. 2 ° Mr.
Russinovich then attempted to remove the rootkit, but realized he could
not do that without compromising his computer system. 121
After further investigation, Mr. Russinovich also discovered that the
XCP software "engage[ed] in 'phone home' behavior.' ' 122  Specifically,
the software connected to Sony's servers and provided the customer's IP
address, 123 as well as a code associated with the CD that the customer
was listening to on his computer124
On October 31 and November 4, 2005, Mr. Russinovich published
his findings about the Sony rootkit in great detail on his weblog.125 News
of Sony's potentially dangerous software program spread quickly on the
116. SunnComm Says Pointing to Shift Key "Possible Felony, " Oct. 9, 2003, available at
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/10/09/2211259&mode=nested&tid = l 23&tid= 126&tid=141
&tid=172&tid= 188&tid=93&tid=99; SunnComm Threatens Suit Over Shift Key Circumvention, Oct.
10, 2006, available at http://grep.law.harvard.edu/article.pl?sid=03/10/10/0917244; Kevin Maney,
Debate Heats Up As Student Spots Hole In CD Protection, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2003- 10-26-princeton-cover-x.htm.
117. Tony Smith, SunnComm to Sue "Shift Key" Student for $10 Million, THE REGISTER, Oct.
9, 2003, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/09/sunncomm to sue shift key.
118. Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won't Sue Grad Student, CNET NEWS, Oct. 10, 2005,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html ("SunnComm's threats had drawn enormous
attention in a short time, with some legal analysts saying a lawsuit would represent an egregious
abuse of the DMCA."); SunnComm Technologies Reverses Decision to Bring Legal Action Against
Princeton Researcher, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?
prid=200310101150.
119. Affidavit of Mark Russinovich in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement 7, at 2; In re Sony BMG CD Tech. Litig., Case No. 1:05-cv-09575-NRB,
7 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Russinovich Affidavit], available at http://www.sonybmgcdtech
settlement.com/pdfs/RussinovichAfflSOFinalApp-4-5-06.pdf; see also Nate Mook, Lawsuit Fights
Back Against Sony DRM, BETANEWS, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.betanews.com/
article/LawsuitFights Back Against SonyDRM/I 131635264 ("Russinovich first reported on the
software after his company's security tool recognized a "rootkit" on his machine.").
120. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 7 7-8, at 2.
121. Id. 11; Andrew Kantor, Sony: The Rootkit of All Evil?, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2005-11-17-sony-rootkitx.htm.
122. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14, at 4-5.
123. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.E.
124. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14, at 4-5.
125. Id. 7,14 & Exs. B & C.
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Internet, and ultimately to the mainstream media. 26  On November 10,
2005, Symantec Corporation, a computer security company, announced
that it had discovered the first XCP-related virus, which "tears down
firewalls and gives hackers access to personal computers.' 27 The public
was outraged and demanded a response from Sony.1
28
C. Sony's Response to Discovery of the Rootkit
Sony's initial response to Mr. Russinovich's discovery was to deny
any wrongdoing and defend its software.' 29 During an interview on Na-
tional Public Radio, Thomas Hesse, President of Sony's Global Digital
Business, said: "Most people I think don't even know what a rootkit is,
so why should they care about it?' 30  Mr. Hesse further indicated that
the software was only included on about twenty titles, when in fact, the
number was closer to fifty.' 3' He also admitted that the software was
cloaked "so would-be pirates can't find it and remove it."' 32 Finally, Mr.
Hesse said that "no information ever gets gathered about the user's be-
havior. No information ever gets communicated back.... This is purely
about restricting the ability to burn MP3 files in an unprotected man-
ner."
, 13 3
After further media exposure and numerous customer complaints,
Sony released a program that was supposed to remove the XCP "cloak-
ing mechanism," as well as uninstall tools for both the MediaMax and
126. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 34; Mook, supra note 119.
127. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 38; Gregg Keizer, Sony Issues Patch As Hackers
Pounce on Rootkit, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 3, 2005, http://informationweek.comn/
shared/printableArticleSrc.jhtml?articlelD= 73402819.
128. See Nate Mook, Sony to Help Remove Its DRM Rootkit, BETANEWS, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.betanews.com/article/SonytoHelp Remove itsDRMRootkit/l 130965475.
The comments to this news story demonstrate the outrage felt by many members of the public. Id.
Some swore off purchasing CDs, others vowed never to buy another Sony product, and some viewed
Sony's conduct as an excuse to download music illegally. As one person explained, "This is now a
reason for me to only download music illegally. They are shooting their own feet off with this crap."
Id.
129. Interview with Thomas Hesse, National Public Radio, Nov. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=4989260 [hereinafter NPR Interview]. There
is evidence that Sony learned about the rootkit and the potential problems it could cause about a
month before Mr. Russinovich published his findings on the Internet. See Steve Hamm, Sony
BMG's Costly Silence, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/nov2005/tc20051129_938966.htm. John Guarino, owner of a small PC repair
shop in New York, had been removing a mysterious rootkit from his clients' hard drives for months.
Id. He investigated the problem using a rootkit detector software manufactured by a Finnish com-
pany called F-Secure. Id. Using that software, he was able to confirm on September 30, 2005, that
the rootkit was caused by Sony copy-protected CDs. Id. Mr. Guarino notified F-Secure who con-
ducted its own investigation. Id. On October 4, F-Secure told Sony about the rootkit, and Sony, in
turn, asked F4i to investigate. Within approximately two weeks, F-Secure provided a full report to
Sony regarding the rootkit, and described XCP as a "major security risk." Id. Nevertheless, it was
Mark Russinovich, not Sony, who informed the public about the rootkit problem on October 31,
2005. Id.
130. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
131. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
132. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
133. Id.
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XCP copy-prevention software. 34  However, as Mr. Russinovich and
others discovered, these software patches actually created additional
risks to users' computers.' 35  Consequently, on or about November 15,
2005, Sony announced that it would recall all CDs containing the XCP
software and would instate a consumer exchange program for those who
had already bought the copy-protected CDs.' 36  There was no similar
recall or exchange program with respect to MediaMax CDs.
D. Sony Rootkit Litigation
1. Consumer Class Action Suits
On November 1, 2005, the day after Mr. Russinovich published his
findings about the rootkit on the Internet, the first of many class action
lawsuits was filed against Sony and the manufacturers of the MediaMax
and XCP software. 137 These lawsuits alleged that Sony's "manufacture,
sale and distribution of DRM-enhanced music CDs, especially in the
absence of appropriate warnings and disclosure," 138 violated the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the consumer fraud, false
advertising, and/or deceptive trade practices laws of several states, and
state and federal common law. 139 Because several of these lawsuits were
134. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 1 16-17; Sony Complaint, supra note 68 39-
40. However, Sony made it difficult to obtain the XCP uninstall tool. Russinovich Affidavit, supra
note 119, 17-18.
135. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 16; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 47-49;
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Does Not Recommend Patch at This Time (Dec. 6, 2005)
available at http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_12.php; see also Halderman & Felten, supra
note 63, at 22-23.
136. Tom Sanders, Sony Backs Out of Rootkit Anti-Piracy Scheme, VNUNET.COM, Nov. 15,
2005, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2146053/sony-backs-root-kit-anti-piracy; Russinovich
Affidavit, supra note 119, T 20. As of late November, however, CDs containing XCP software were
still available in stores. See Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG's Case, New York Attorney
General has turned his attention to Sony BMG's copyright fiasco, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Nov.
29, 2005, http://businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051128_573560.htm.
On November 29, 2005 the New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer found through his
investigators that despite the recall of November 15 Sony BMG CDs with XCP were still
for sale in New York City music retail outlets. Spitzer said 'It is unacceptable that more
than three weeks after this serious vulnerability was revealed, these same CDs are still on
shelves, during the busiest shopping days of the year,' 'I strongly urge all retailers to
heed the warnings issued about these products, pull them from distribution immediately,
and ship them back to Sony.' On November 30, 2005, Massachusetts Attorney General
Tom Reilly issued a statement saying that Sony BMG CDs with XCP were still available
in Boston despite the Sony BMG recall of November 15. Attorney General Reilly
advised consumers not to purchase the Sony BMG CDs with XCP and said that he was
conducting an investigation of Sony BMG.
Wikipedia, Sony CD Copy Protection Controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Sony_
CD copyprotectioncontroversy; see also Hesseldahl, supra note 136.
137. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, 9 I.C., I.D. (listing lawsuits filed to date against
Sony).
138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 6, In re: Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., Case No. 1:05-cv-09575 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y.
2006), available at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.compdfs/MEMOOFLAWISOFINAL
APPROVAL4-6-06.pdf [hereinafter Final App. Motion].
139. Id; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, T 1.1. Many of the lawsuits that were filed in
California also asserted California's Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, Cal. Bus.
THE "ROOTKIT DEBACLE"
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, on December 1, 2005, those actions were consolidated and lead
counsel was appointed (hereinafter "Consolidated Action"). 1
40
In late December, the parties in the Consolidated Action reached a
settlement. On December 28, 2005, the Settlement Agreement was filed
with the court in conjunction with the parties' request for preliminary
approval of the settlement.14  In exchange for a release of all claims re-
lated to the MediaMax or XCP software, defendants agreed, among other
things, to:
(i) Recall all XCP CDs;
(ii) Maintain an ongoing exchange program so customers could receive
the CD they purchased without the copy-protection software;
(iii) Distribute a free, effective uninstall tool for both the MediaMax and
XCP software programs;
(iv) Provide cash awards and free music downloads to class members;
(v) Agree not to use DRM software to collect personal information;
142
(vi) Improve disclosures on future copy-protected CDs; and
(vii) Have an independent third party test any future copy-protection
software for security risks. 
143
The settlement benefits for customers affected by the XCP software
are clearly better than for those customers who purchased MediaMax
CDs. For example, XCP customers can elect to receive cash where Me-
diaMax customers are limited to free downloaded music. 144 Moreover,
Sony did not agree to recall MediaMax CDs as it did with XCP CDs.
The apparent reason for this is because plaintiffs believe that "Media-
Max, while harmful, does not pose the same level of danger to end users
and their computer systems as XCP, because MediaMax does not contain
& Prof. Code § 22947-22947.6. See, e.g., Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 160 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
8, 2005).
140. Final App. Motion, supra note 138, at 7.
141. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, at 1; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) ("The
court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class.").
142. However, "Personal Data" as defined in the Settlement Agreement "does not include the
IP address of the computer's Internet connection or any information with respect to an album title,
artists and tracks, or other non-personally identifiable information, that is routinely logged by SONY
BMG in connection with enhanced or connected CDs." Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, II.H
(emphasis added). Cf infra Part III.B.2. (arguing that such data does constitute personally identifi-
able information).
143. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, III.B-C, K, M, S, IV.B.3.f, h; Final App. Motion,
supra note 138, at 9-10. Sony recently settled class action suits in Canada on terms substantially
identical to those in the U.S. settlement. See Sony BMG Settles Canadian 'Rootkit' Cases; Tex. Suit
Continues, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, Sept. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15459519
[hereinafter Sony BMG Settles Candian 'Rootkit' Cases].
144. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, 1 IlI.C, E-F.
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a rootkit that installs hidden files on an end user's system and evades
detection from firewalls, anti-spyware and anti-virus software."'
' 45
On January 6, 2006, the Court conditionally certified the class and
granted preliminary approval. 146 As of April 6, 2006, only two objec-
tions had been filed. 141 On May 22, 2006, the court held a fairness hear-
ing, and subsequently granted final approval of the settlement. 148 Class
members have until the end of 2006 to file claims, 149 so it is unclear at
this point what the total cost of this settlement will be for defendants.
2. Government Inquiries
The rootkit incident not only caught the attention of the plaintiffs'
class action bar, it spurred numerous government inquires as well. Since
December 2005, Sony has been the subject of an inquiry by the Federal
Trade Commission and has been investigated by numerous state attorney
generals and other governmental authorities throughout the United
States.'50 Indeed, Stewart Baker, the assistant secretary for policy in the
Department of Homeland Security, directed the following comments at
Sony in response to the rootkit incident: "It is very important to remem-
ber that it's your intellectual property-it's not your computer. And in
pursuit of protection of intellectual property, it's important not to defeat
or undermine the security measures that people need to adopt in these
days."15'
To date, however, only one law enforcement action has actually
been filed against Sony. On November 21, 2005, the Texas Attorney
General, Greg Abbott, sued Sony under that state's Consumer Protection
against Computer Spyware Act of 2005, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §
48.001 et seq.152 This is the first suit that has ever been brought under
the recently enacted spyware law. 153 The Texas action, which concerns
145. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, T 23.
146. Final App. Motion, supra note 138, at 10.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Anne Broache, Sony Rootkit Settlement Gets Final Nod, CNET NEWS, May 22, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Sony+rootkit+settlement+gets+final+nod/2100-1030_3-6075370.html; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(C) ("The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or com-
promise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable and adequate.").
149. Welcome to the Information Web Site for the Sony BMG CD Technologies Settlement,
http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/ImportantDates.htm (last visited September 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Welcome to the Information Website].
150. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.M; see, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, Florida AG's Office
Enters Sony BMG DRM Fray, DEEP LINKS NOTEWORTHY NEWS FROM AROUND THE INTERNET, Jan.
3, 2006, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004292.php; Sony BMG Settles Canadian 'Rootkit'
Cases, supra note 143.
151. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 9 19.
152. Plaintiff's Original Petition, TT 14-16, State of Texas v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, LLC,
No. GV505065 (126th Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
newspubs/releases/2005/112105sonypop.pdf [hereinafter Texas Petition]; Texas Sues Sony BMG
for Spyware, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 31.
153. Texas Sues Sony BMG for Spyware, supra note 152, at 31.
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only the XCP software, makes claims similar to those asserted in the
consumer class action lawsuits discussed in the previous section.
5 4
Sony is currently in negotiations with Attorney General Abbott and
other law enforcement agents to try to settle these matters. In fact, the
Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Action provides that: "The
Parties expect that, by the date of the Fairness Hearing, SONY BMG will
have entered into an enforceable, nationwide agreement resolving one or
more of the Government Inquiries."' 55 But the fairness hearing has come
and gone and yet no settlement has been reached and the Texas action
continues to proceed. 
56
Sony has been able to resolve the litigation resulting from the root-
kit debacle rather quickly. But this is not the end of the story. The root-
kit debacle has disillusioned consumers, lawmakers, and artists alike.
Moreover, it has raised numerous legal questions that are sure to arise the
next time Sony or another record label releases copy-protected CDs.
III. LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SONY ROOTKIT DEBACLE
The Sony rootkit debacle has raised numerous legal issues, and this
section focuses on those at the heart of the controversy surrounding the
recording industry's use of digital rights management (DRM) to protect
its intellectual property. First, it analyzes Sony's potential liability for
manufacturing and distributing CDs containing MediaMax and XCP
software, including (i) whether it violated the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and the Texas Consumer Spyware Act of 2005,157 and (ii)
whether Sony's copy-prevention software comported with copyright law,
specifically the fair use doctrine. Second, this section examines the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which prohibits the circumven-
tion of DRM technology, and the potential legal exposure created by that
statute for Sony customers and security researchers.
154. Compare Texas Petition, supra note 152, 7-13 and Sony Complaint, supra note 68,
1-4.
155. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, W.A.
156. Welcome to the Information Website, supra note 149; Sony BMG Settles Candian 'Root-
kit' Cases, supra note 143.
157. There are numerous state law claims that were or potentially could have been asserted
against Sony, such as trespass to chattels, unfair business practices, and fraud. See Sony Complaint,
supra note 68, 68-99 (alleging non-disclosure, deceptive acts and practices, false advertising,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, trespass to chattels, common law fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation); Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 99 90-114 (alleging material
misrepresentations and omissions of fact, unconscionability and unreasonableness, and computer
contamination in violation of California Penal Code § 502). Because evaluating every potential
cause of action against Sony is beyond the scope of this article, it focuses on the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, the only federal statute asserted against Sony, and the Texas Consumer Spyware
Act, the only law that a government agency has alleged was violated by Sony's conduct. Texas
Petition, supra note 152, 14-16; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 58-67.
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A. Sony's Potential Liability158
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which was enacted in
1984, was the first comprehensive federal computer crime statute.' 59 The
CFAA outlaws seven types of conduct: (1) knowingly accessing a com-
puter without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain
national security information; 160 (2) intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain informa-
tion; 16 1 (3) intentionally accessing without authorization a computer used
by the federal government;' 62 (4) knowingly accessing a "protected com-
puter" without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, with intent
to defraud;163 (5) intentionally accessing a "protected computer" without
authorization and causing damage; 164 (6) knowing fraudulent trafficking
of computer passwords; 165 and (7) transmitting communications that
threaten to damage a "protected computer" with intent to extort. 66
The CFAA is a criminal statute that also provides for a civil cause
of action.167 Pursuant to section 1030(g), a civil lawsuit can be brought if
(i) plaintiff suffered damage or loss due to a violation of the statute, and
(ii) the conduct at issue involved one of the five factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).168  The first factor-"loss to 1 or more persons
during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecu-
tion, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting
from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected
computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value"-is the one that liti-
gants generally rely upon. 1
69
158. Sony likely would argue it was unaware of how the copy-prevention software operated,
and therefore, should not be held liable for any damage it may have caused. This article presumes
that Sony's attempt to make such an argument would fail.
159. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2006); Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act









168. Southwest Airlines v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("A
careful reading of the statute shows that a civil plaintiff is not required to state a cause of action
pursuant to subsection (a)(5), but merely to allege one of the factors enunciated in subsection
(a)(5)(B).").
169. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i). The other four factors are:
(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medi-
cal examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (iii) physical in-
jury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or safety; or (v) damage affecting a com-
puter system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of




a. Is there a cause of action under § 1030(a)(5)(B)?
In the Consolidated Action, plaintiffs asserted that Sony violated
section 1030(a)(5)(B) of the CFAA by intentionally accessing customers'
computers without authorization and, as a result of such conduct, causing
damage-namely the "loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value."' 70 To prevail on this
claim, plaintiffs would have been faced with two potential stumbling
blocks: the $5,000 damage provision and the unauthorized access re-
quirement. 
1 7'
i. CFAA's $5,000 Damage Provision
Under section 1030(a)(B)(5) of the CFAA, plaintiffs must prove
"damage" or "loss" of at least $5,000.172 This is often an insurmountable
barrier to the individual computer user because "[e]ven the most expen-
sive personal computer costs much less than this."1 73 Moreover, it is not
clear what type of damage or loss is sufficient to meet the CFAA's
$5,000 requirement. Some courts have held that the damage or loss must
be related to investigating or remedying damage to a computer. 74 Others
have concluded that damage to reputation or goodwill counts toward the
damage threshold.17 5  "The question this raises for the individual con-
170. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, In 59-67.
171. The statute also provides that the defendant access a "protected computer," which is
limited to computers used by a financial institutions, the United States Government, or in interstate
commerce or communication. See § 1030(e)(2). In the past, this requirement posed an additional
hurdle because most computers were not used in these capacities. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Patterson,
Spyware Covertly Infringing on Your Internet Privacy While Circumventing the Federal Legislation
Radar, 54 DRAKE E. REv. 233, 249-50 (2005). However, ifa computer is connected to the Internet,
it more than likely is used in interstate commerce or communication. Although a significant number
of Americans still do not use the Internet, most of those people do not have a computer. See Jim
Downing, Americans Who Use the Internet, SMART MOBS, Oct. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.smartmobs.com/archive/2005/10/06/americans who u.html; Nearly 150 Million Adult
Americans Use the Internet, Survey Says, FOX.COM, Apr. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193417,00.html. Thus, while there may be some computers
that are not connected to the Internet and, therefore, would not meet the "protected computer" re-
quirement, they are a small minority. Downing, supra note 171; § 1030(e)(2). This is particularly
true with respect to those individuals harmed by the Sony rootkit, because the vast majority of peo-
ple who listen to music on their computers are also Internet users.
172. Whether a plaintiff claims "damages" or "losses" under the CFAA, courts have held that
plaintiff is subject to the $5,000 threshold. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp.
2d 497, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
173. Alan F. Blakley et al., Coddling Spies: Why the Law Doesn't Adequately Address Com-
puter Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 25, 33.
174. See, e.g., Nexans Wires S.A.. v. SARK-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (stating that costs unrelated to computer repair, such as travel costs for business that could
have been conducted by telephone, do not constitute "loss" within the meaning of the CFAA); Res-
Dev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, 6:04 cv_1374 Orl_3IDAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099, at *9-
12 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ("The CFAA's 'loss' definition ... list[s] costs that are similar in that they are
all directly associated with, or with addressing, an unauthorized-computer-access event.").
175. America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,451 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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sumer is whether litigation and the necessity of experts to show the ex-
tent of loss are worth the chance of recovery.'
176
Even where, as here, a class action has arisen, the damage provision
can still pose a problem because courts are divided on whether plaintiffs'
claims can be aggregated to meet the $5,000 minimum. 77 In Thurmond
v. Compaq Computer Corporation,178 the court held that aggregation is
not permitted under the CFAA because the statute requires damage to "a
protected computer," i.e., a single computer.179 The court explained that
"no one can bring a cause of action unless the defendant causes an ag-
gregate of $5,000 'damage' to a protected computer. If defendant causes
such damage, then any injured person may bring a claim even if, his or
her own 'damage,' is less than $5,000. ''180
In In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation,181 the court analyzed
the CFAA's legislative history and held that plaintiffs could only aggre-
gate damages and losses across victims and time for a single act by the
defendant. 182 In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the fact that
"damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of
data, a program, a system, or information."'183 That Congress used the
singular form of these words rather than the plural (i.e., programs, sys-
tems) indicates that the statute should apply only to single acts.
184
By contrast, in In re: America Online, Inc. (AOL), 185 the court held
that the $5,000 threshold applies to all computers that the defendant's
unlawful conduct affected. 86  The court specifically considered, and
rejected, the decisions in Thurmond and DoubleClick on the grounds that
they were not binding precedent, they misread the statute, and they mis-
interpreted the legislative history. 8 7  The court further explained that
interpreting the CFAA as Thurmond and DoubleClick courts did,
would lead to the absurd result that a party who accesses one com-
puter without authorization, and thereby causes $5,000 worth of
damage to that one computer, would be guilty of violating the CFAA
and, therefore, civilly liable. On the other hand, a party who accesses
176. Blakley et al., supra note 173, at 33.
177. Luke J. Albrecht, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies & Remedies for Internet Users,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 431-33 (2003).
178. 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
179. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
180. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
181. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
182. Double Click, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523-24.
183. § 1030(e)(8) (emphasis added).
184. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
185. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
186. In re America Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
187. The AOL court also distinguished these cases on another ground: "Moreover, their prece-
dent did not allow them to aggregate damages until the classes had been certified. In the Eleventh




millions of computers and causes only $100 worth of damage to each
computer would not be guilty of violating the CFAA.'
88
In light of this split among district courts, it is unclear to what ex-
tent plaintiffs may aggregate their damages in alleging a CFAA viola-
tion. Nevertheless, in a lawsuit against Sony for damage caused by its
copy-protection software, plaintiffs would be able to satisfy the $5,000
minimum regardless of whether the court applied the Thurmond, Dou-
bleClick, or AOL rule.
Under Thurmond, as long as plaintiffs can demonstrate that at least
one class member suffered $5,000 in "damage" or "loss" the threshold is
met. 1 89 This includes "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior
to the offense .. .190 Given the extreme difficulty customers experi-
enced trying to remove (or have someone else remove) the software from
their computer systems, it is highly likely that at least one individual
suffered $5,000 in damages.191
Plaintiffs also would have been able to demonstrate a "single act" as
required by the court in DoubleClick.1 92 As alleged in the complaint:
"SONY BMG's act of producing its master encoded tapes through which
DRM CDs were made, was a single act that proximately resulted in dam-
ages greater than $5,000. ' ' 193 At the very least, even if the production of
MediaMax CDs was separate from the production of XCP CDs, each of
these acts alone caused more than $5,000 in damage to Sony custom-
ers. 194 Thus, plaintiffs would have satisfied the DoubleClick test.
Finally, there is no doubt that plaintiffs easily would have met the
$5,000 damage threshold under AOL, which allows the aggregation of all
damage caused by defendants to any victim.1 95 Sony manufactured more
than 20 million CDs with MediaMax software, and more than 5 million
with XCP software.1 96 These CDs were installed on tens of thousands of
188. Id. at 1374.
189. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
190. § 1030(e)(1 1).
191. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 11. Section 1030(e)(1 1) also provides for the
recovery of consequential damages, including, but not limited to, lost revenue. § 1030(e)(l 1). How-
ever, section 1030(g) - the provision that grants plaintiffs the right to bring a civil action - says that
"[d]amages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to
economic damages." Id. § 1030(g) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this provision to mean
that "compensatory damages for such conduct will be awarded only for economic harm." P.C.
Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 511 (3d Cir.
2005).
192. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
193. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 66.
194. See id.
195. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
196. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 33, 44.
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computers throughout the United States, and damages far exceeded the
$5,000 minimum. 97
ii. CFAA's Unauthorized Access Provision
Section 1030(a)(5)(B) additionally requires plaintiffs to demonstrate
that defendant accessed a computer without authority. 198 More specifi-
cally, the subsection of the CFAA asserted against Sony provides that
"[w]hoever ... intentionally accesses a protected computer without au-
thorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and ... by
[such] conduct.., caused... loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-
year period... aggregating at least $5,000 in value. . . shall be punished
... ,,199 In other words, the applicability of the CFAA depends on
whether the owner of the CD consented to the installation of the Media-
Max and/or XCP software on his computer.2 00
In cases like this one involving the installation of software, the
question of consent generally turns on the End User License Agreement
(EULA). A EULA is an agreement "between a producer and a user of
computer software, which grants the user a software license. ' '20' The
EULA is usually presented to the user electronically, and installation of
the software is conditioned upon the user accepting the EULA.2 °2 These
types of agreements are often referred to as "shrinkwrap licenses."
20 3
The use of EULAs in connection with computer software has been
the subject of great debate. Because EULAs are lengthy, contain overly
restrictive, non-negotiable terms, and frequently are not read by users,
many commentators have criticized the use of these agreements.2z 4 In
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation,20 5 the Second Circuit
held that a EULA was unenforceable because "a consumer's clicking on
197. See id. 60, 66.
198. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
199. § 1030(a)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also asserted claims under § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)
("[w]hoever... knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command,
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected
computer") and § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) ("[wihoever ... intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage"). Sony Complaint,
supra note 68, 59(b), (c). For present purposes, however, it is only necessary to analyze subsection
(iii) since that burden is the lowest for plaintiffs to overcome.
200. See Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1545, 1565 (2006) ("[Tjhe fact that the
CFAA only penalized 'unauthorized' computer access presupposes that any consent or authorization
which has been given to the accessing entity will create a defense to liability under the CFAA.").
201. Wikipedia, Software License Agreement (2006),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/softwarelicenseagreement.
202. Id.
203. F. Lawrence Street & Mark P. Grant, The Law of the Internet, § 103[1] (Brian Elias et al.
eds., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., Release No. 9 2005) (1997).
204. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cy-
bercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1562-63 (2005); see also Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I
Shrink- Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink- Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO
L. REv. 319 (1999); Barnes, supra note 200, at 1547.
205. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if
the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the
download button would signify assent to those terms. 20 6
By contrast, other courts have upheld these agreements regardless
of how unfair they may seem. In i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service
207Level Corporation,° for example, the court held that clicking on the "I
Agree" box was sufficient consent to form a contract.20 8 Similarly, in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,2 °9 the Seventh Circuit held that shrinkwrap
licenses are enforceable because, in many common transactions, con-
tracts are considered valid even though the consumer purchases the
product before being presented with the detailed terms of the contract.210
Here, the question whether acceptance of Sony's EULA provides
the necessary "consent" or "authorization" under the CFAA depends not
only on the terms of the EULA, but also on the manner in which the anti-
copying software was installed and how it operated. Although the terms
of the MediaMax and XCP EULA were essentially identical, as de-
scribed above, there were differences in the installation and operation of
the two software programs. Accordingly, MediaMax and XCP must be
analyzed separately under the CFAA.
a.) MediaMax Was Installed "Without Authorization"
MediaMax attempted to protect the content on the CD from being
ripped and copied while the EULA was being displayed by immediately
installing, and at least temporarily activating, the anti-copying soft-
ware.211 In other words, the MediaMax software was installed before the
user accepted the EULA and, thus, "without authorization. 212  Even if
the user ultimately rejected the EULA, the software remained on his
computer, and, in some cases, remained permanently active.23
The facts of this case are far more egregious than in Specht v. Net-
scape214 where the court determined there was no informed consent be-
206. Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30; see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d
91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991); SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1088 (C.D.
Cal. 2001); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993);
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998).
207. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass 2002).
208. i.Lan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338; see also M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Co.,
998 P.2d 305, 311-14 (Wash. 2000); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
209. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
210. ProCD, 83 F.3d at 1452; see also Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
387 F.3d 522, 563 n.10 (6th Cir. 2004); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir.
1997); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Construction Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D.
Cal. 2006).
211. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.; Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
212. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.; Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
213. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
214. Specht, 306 F.3d at 21-25.
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cause the EULA did not make clear that clicking on the download button
constituted acceptance of the contract. 2 5  Here, the user did not even
have a chance to view the EULA, much less accept it, before the soft-
ware was installed.21 6 Thus, this case is similar to Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc.217 and Sofiman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.
218
In Register.com, the plaintiff was a registrar of domain names,
meaning it issued domain names to persons and entities preparing to es-
tablish web sites on the Internet.2 19 In applying for a domain name appli-
cants were required to submit certain information to Register.com ("Reg-
ister"), including name, address, telephone number, and email address. 2
This identifying information was referred to as "WHOIS information."
2 21
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a private non-profit corporation established by U.S. govern-
ment agencies to administer domain names, requires companies like Reg-
ister to update the WHOIS information daily and to make such informa-
tion publicly available. 222 An entity submitting a "WHOIS query" to
Register would receive the requested information together with the fol-
lowing message: "By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you
will use this data only for lawful purposes and that under no circum-
stances will you use this data to support the transmission of mass unso-
licited, commercial advertising or solicitation via email.
2 23
The defendant, Verio, Inc. ("Verio"), sells web site design, devel-
opment, and operation services.224 In order to attract customers, Verio
obtained daily updates from the WHOIS information, and then sent those
individuals marketing information by email, telemarketing, and direct
mail.225 As noted above, the terms and conditions that were included in
Register's query responses prohibited the use of WHOIS information to
solicit by email.226 Accordingly, Register sued Verio for violation of the
CFAA and trespass to chattels.2 27
In defense Verio argued that it was not bound by Register's terms
and conditions "because, in the case of each query Verio made, the
[terms and conditions] did not appear until after Verio had submitted the
215. Id. at 29-30.
216. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
217. 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
218. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).




223. Id. at 397.
224. Id. at 396.
225. Id. at 396-97.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 397.
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query and received the WHOIS data. 228  In other words, Verio con-
tended it never received legally enforceable notice of Register's terms
and conditions. 229 Although the court ultimately rejected this argument,
before doing so it explained: "If Verio had submitted only one query, or
even if it had submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give
considerable force to its contention that it obtained the WHOIS data
without being conscious that Register intended to impose conditions, and
without being deemed to have accepted Register's conditions., 230 Along
those same lines, the dissenting judge concluded:
By the time Register.com presents its proposed terms, it has already
given away that which it "owns" - access to its WHOIS database...
Thus, in the single submission scenario, an end-user would have
had no opportunity to reject Register.com's terms and would be
bound to comply with them irrespective of actual assent .... [Tihe
submission of a WHOIS query prior to the presentation of Regis-
ter.com's proposed terms [is] insufficient to constitute a manifesta-
tion of assent.
23 1
Register.com, therefore, stands for the proposition that a party cannot
assent to a contract before having the opportunity to review the terms and
conditions of that contract.
232
Similarly, in Sofiman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,233Adobe
Systems Inc. ("Adobe"), a developer and publisher of software, sued
SoftMan Products Co. ("SoftMan"), a company that distributed computer
software programs through its website www.buycheapsoftware.com,
claiming that SoftMan was infringing Abode's copyright and trademark
as well as violating terms of its license by distributing Adobe's software
234in an unauthorized manner. There was no direct contractual relation-
ship between Adobe and SoftMan, instead, Adobe claimed that Soft-
Man's distribution of the software violated the EULA that end-users are
asked to assent to when they attempt to install Adobe software.235
Among other things, SoftMan contended that it was not bound by
the terms of the EULA because it never assented to that agreement.236
The court agreed with SoftMan, holding that
there is only assent on the part of the consumer, if at all, when the
consumer loads the Adobe program and begins the installation proc-
ess. It is undisputed that SoftMan has never attempted to load the
228. Id. at 401.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 431 (Parker, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 430-31 & n.43 (Parker, J., dissenting).
233. SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075.
234. Id. at 1079-80.
235. Id. at 1080.
236. Id. at 1087.
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software that it sells. Consequently, the Court finds that SoftMan is
not subject to the Adobe EULA.23 7
The holdings of Register.com and SofiMan make clear that Sony
had no right to install the MediaMax software before the end-user even
had an opportunity to view the EULA's terms and conditions. As such,
Sony accessed its customers' computers without authority in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
b.) XCP Was Not Installed "Without Authorization"
The XCP software used a different tool to prevent ripping and copy-
ing during the installation process. As described in greater detail above,
it searched for "blacklisted" ripping and copying applications, and pre-
cluded users who were running such applications from downloading the
software and listening to the music on the CD. Consequently, the XCP
software was not installed onto a user's computer until the EULA was
accepted.
Nor did the XCP EULA suffer from the defects identified in Specht
v. Netscape.238 The XCP EULA stated:
This End-User License Agreement ("EULA") is a legal agreement
between you and SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT
("SONY BMG"), a general partnership established under Delaware
law. By clicking on the "AGREE" button below, you will indicate
your acceptance of these terms and conditions, at which point this
EULA will become a legally binding agreement between you and
SONY BMG.
239
Because the EULA made clear that the user was assenting to the terms
the rationale of Netscape does not apply.
Moreover, while it is true that the XCP EULAs did not fully dis-
close the nature of the software being installed,24° that alone is not
enough to prove that Sony accessed the computers "without authoriza-
tion." The decision in In re. America Online241 is instructive on this
point.242 There, computer users sued AOL under section 1030(a)(5) of
the CFAA (the same provision asserted against Sony) claiming that AOL
5.0, a software program that had been recently released, damaged com-
puters and prohibited utilization of competitors' software.243 AOL
moved to dismiss this claim on the grounds that its access was not "with-
237. Id.
238. Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30.
239. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 28.
240. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the details of the MediaMax and XCP EULAs and soft-
ware features).
241. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359.
242. Id. at 1359.
243. Id. at 1363-64.
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out authorization" since "the consumers expressly authorized installation
of AOL 5.0 on their computers.",244 At most, AOL argued "it exceeded
the scope of its authority by distributing defective software, but exceed-
ing the scope of authorization is not a situation that is covered by 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the only provision under which the consumers have
brought suit.
245
After examining the plain language of the statute, the court agreed
with AOL.24 6  Section 1030(a)(5) requires that the access be "without
authorization"; it says nothing about the access "exceeding authoriza-
tion.,, 24 7 By contrast, several provisions of the CFAA - namely, sections
1030(a)(1), 248 (2),249 and (4),250 - specifically state that a violation occurs
if defendant accesses a computer without authorization or if it exceeds
authorized access. 25 ' The CFAA further provides that "exceeds author-
ized access" means "to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the acces-
sor is not entitled to so obtain or alter., 252 Hence, the AOL court decided
Congress clearly intended to distinguish between "without authorization"
and "exceeds authorized access. 253
If Congress wanted section 1030(a)(5) to apply to defendants who
exceed authorized access it would have included that term within the
scope of section 1030(a)(5) as it did with the other subsections of
1030(a). "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion., 254 Thus, even though Sony and/or F4i may have
"exceeded authorized access" by installing XCP software on customers'
computers, the plain language of the statute and the cases interpreting it
would likely preclude plaintiffs from recovering under section 1030(a)(5)
of the CFAA.255
244. Id. at 1368.
245. Id. at 1368-69.
246. Id. at 1369-70.
247. § 1030(a)(5).
248. § 1030(a)(1) ("having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access ....") (emphasis added).
249. § 1030(a)(2) ("intentionally access a computer without authorization or exceeds author-
ized access .. ") (emphasis added).
250. § 1030(a)(4) ("knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer with-
out authorization, or exceeds authorized access ....") (emphasis added).
251. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4).
252. § 1030(e)(6).
253. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.
254. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (quoting Russello v. United
States 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
255. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The differ-
ence between 'without authorization' and 'exceeding authorized access' is paper thin, but not quite
invisible." (citations omitted)).
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b. Is there a cause of action under other provisions of the
CFAA?
Although the CFAA claims asserted against Sony in the Consoli-
dated Action relied solely upon section 1030(a)(5)(B), Sony may also
have violated other provisions of the CFAA. Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C),
for example, prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without au-
thorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain "information from
any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication."
256
The MediaMax and XCP EULA stated that "the SOFTWARE will
not be used at any time to collect any personal information from you,
whether stored on YOUR COMPUTER or otherwise. 257 Yet, in truth,
both MediaMax and XCP contained "phone home" capabilities, meaning
these software programs gathered information from users' computers,
including IP addresses and the title of the CD being played on the user's
computer, and communicated that information back to Sony.258 Under
these circumstances, even if customers accepted the EULA, they clearly
did not consent to Sony's use of the software to collect personal informa-
tion. Accordingly, Sony was accessing its customers' computers without
authorization or, at the very least, exceeding authorized access.
Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) also requires the "conduct," i.e., the act of
"accessing a computer," to involve an interstate or foreign communica-
tion.259 Here, Sony accessed its customers' computers with software that
was included on CDs, which are products sold in interstate commerce,
and then used that software to communicate information from the cus-
tomer's computer back to Sony and/or the software manufacturer. 6 °
Such conduct plainly involves interstate communications, and, therefore,
this requirement is satisfied. Hence, a cause of action should lie pursuant
to section 1030(a)(2)(C).
Nevertheless, a question remains as to who can bring a lawsuit un-
der section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA. While the government undoubt-
edly could bring a criminal action under this provision of the CFAA, it is
not as clear whether a civil claim could be asserted as well. Section
1030(g) of the CFAA provides for a civil lawsuit where (i) the plaintiff
suffered damage or loss due to a violation of the statute, and (ii) the con-
256. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
257. Sony EULA, http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/sony-eula.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
258. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
259. § 1030(a)(2)(C). See C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command Transp., LLC, No. 05
C 3401, 2005 WL 3077998, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2005); Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, No. 04
C 7071, 2005 WL 2369815, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005).
260. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 30, 64.
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duct at issue involved one of the five factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(5)(B). 26 1
Many litigants, including plaintiffs in the Consolidated Action, ap-
parently interpret this language to mean that a civil action under the
CFAA can only be brought under section 1030(a)(5)(B).262 And, in fact,
at least one court has come to the same conclusion.263 In recent years,
however, several courts have considered the issue and now the weight of
authority leans heavily in the other direction.
In P.C. Yonkers v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore,264
for example, the court held that a civil action could be stated under any
provision of the CFAA as long as the plaintiff alleges one of the five
factors enumerated in subsection (a)(5)(B), which includes a loss in ex-
cess of $5,000.265 Moreover, in LM.S. Inquiry Management Systems,
Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Systems, Inc. ,266 the defendant argued that
plaintiff could not state a claim under section 1030(a)(2)(C) on the
grounds that section 1030(g) does not provide a civil cause of action for
violations of this subsection.267 The court rejected this argument, finding
that:
The plain text of § 1030(g) does not provide or imply, and defendant
offers no supporting case law for, such a restriction. Section 1030(g)
affords a civil action for any CFAA violation, but requires an allega-
tion of one of five enumerated factors in § 1030(a)(5)(B). Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint satisfies § 1030(g) by elsewhere alleging the
consequence described in § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (loss aggregating to at
least $5,000).268
Like the defendant in LMS.,269 (i) Sony exceeded authority in ac-
cessing its customers' computers, (ii) it obtained information from its
customers by such conduct, (iii) that conduct involved interstate commu-
nications, and (iv) as a result of such conduct, Sony caused at least
$5,000 in loss or damage to its customers. Consequently, Sony, too,
would be subject to civil suit under section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA
for its conduct with respect to both the MediaMax and XCP software.
261. § 1030(g).
262. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, M 59, 62.
263. McLean v. Mortgage One & Fin. Corp., No. 04-1158, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7279, at *5
(D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2004) (holding that section 1030(g)'s reference to subsection (a)(5)(B) limits civil
relief to claims under subsection (a)(5)(B)).
264. 428 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 2005).
265. Yonkers, 428 F.3d at 512.
266. 307 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
267. LM.S., 307 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26.
268. Id at 526.
269. Other courts similarly have determined that a civil cause of action lies under §
1030(a)(2)(C). See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2003); Chance v.
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1272, 1279-80 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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2. Texas Spyware Act
Spyware is software that is covertly installed onto a computer, for
example by bundling it with other software that the user downloads.27 °
Once installed, spyware transmits information from the user's computer
to the servers of the entity responsible for installing the spyware.27'
"Spyware can monitor everything users do with their machines, not only
their activities on the web, and transmit that information to an outside
i,272entity. The use of spyware has grown dramatically in recent years.
In fact, one study shows that more than 80% of personal computers in the
United States are infected by spyware, although most users are unaware
of it.
273
Consequently, federal and state legislators have been working to
enact laws to address this very serious threat. In 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed two spyware-related bills: (1) the Securely Pro-
tect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act,27 4 and (2) the Internet Spy-
ware (I-Spy) Prevention Act of 2005.275 The Senate also is considering a
spyware bill called the Spy Block Act,276 which was approved by the
Senate Commerce Committee in 2005, but was not voted on by the full
Senate.27 7 To date, however, no further action has been taken by Con-
gress on any of these bills. According to one commentator, Congress
may be revising the bills "in view of issues raised late in 2005 by Sony's
Rootkit copy-protection software and the associated end-user-license-
agreement. 27 8
In the absence of federal legislation, some states, including Texas,
have taken it upon themselves to outlaw spyware.2 79 The Texas Con-
sumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act ("Texas Spyware
Act"), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 48.001 et seq., came into effect on Sep-
tember 1, 2005.280 Generally, the statute prohibits the following conduct:
(1) unauthorized collection or culling of personally identifiable informa-
270. Laurel L. Poe, Comment, The SPY Act: A Bandage for an Ever-Festering Sore or an
Efficient Safeguard for the American Consumer?, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 329, 331 (2005).
271. Id. at 335.
272. Blakley, supra note 173, at 28. See also Erica Pines, Note, Spyware Regulation: National
Legislation Should Prompt Industry Self-Policing, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 2219, 2219 (2005) ("Spy-
ware can change individual computer settings, track personal information numbers, store credit card
numbers, and access all personal data stored on a computer's hard drive, thereby shredding away
every bit of privacy personal computer users think they have.").
273. Poe, supra note 270, at 329-30.
274. H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
275. H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
276. S. 687, 109th Cong. § 1(a) (2005).
277. Britt L. Anderson, Is Anti-Spyware Legislation Congress's Killer App in 2006?, 4 No. 2
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY 1,4 (Feb. 2006).
278. Id.
279. Michael L. Baroni, Spyware Beware, 47 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 36, 38 (Apr. 2005)
(stating that Utah and California have also enacted spyware-related laws).
280. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.001 (West 2006).
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tion; 28s (2) unauthorized access to or modifications of computer set-
tings; 282 (3) unauthorized interference with installation or disabling of
computer software; 283 (4) inducement of computer user to install unnec-
essary software; 284 and (5) copying and execution of software to a com-
puter with deceptive intent. 285 The Texas Spyware Act also provides for
a civil right of action, which applies to users of personal and business
computers, and permits private parties to obtain damages of $100,000 for
each violation.286
On November 21, 2005, the Texas Attorney General sued Sony for
violation of the Texas Spyware Act - the first lawsuit under the new
statute.287 Specifically, Texas asserts that, by marketing, distributing,
and selling CDs with XCP software, Sony has violated section 48.053 of
the Texas Spyware Act.288 That section, which concerns the unauthor-
ized interference with installation or disabling of computer software,
provides:
If a person is not the owner or operator of the computer, the person
may not knowingly cause computer software to be copied to a com-
puter in this state and use the software to:
(1) prevent, through intentionally deceptive means, reasonable efforts
of the owner or operator of the computer to block the installation or
execution of or to disable computer software by causing computer
software that the owner or operator has properly removed or disabled
to automatically reinstall or reactivate on the computer;
(2) intentionally misrepresent to another that computer software will
be uninstalled or disabled by the actions of the owner or operator of
the computer;
(3) remove, disable, or render inoperative, through intentionally de-
ceptive means, security, antispyware, or antivirus computer software
installed on the computer;
(4) prevent the owner's or operator's reasonable efforts to block the






286. § 48.10 1(a), (b)(2)(B).
287. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 2; Texas Sues Sony BMGfor Spyware, supra note 152,
at 3 1; News Release, Attorney General Abbott Brings First Enforcement Action in Nation Against
Sony BMG for Spyware Violations (Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
oagNews/release.php?id=1266.
288. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 14-16. Unlike the civil lawsuits discussed above, this
case involves XCP only, not MediaMax. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 7.
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(A) presenting the owner or operator with an option to decline the in-
stallation of software knowing that, when the option is selected, the
installation process will continue to proceed; or
(B) misrepresenting that software has been disabled;
(5) change the name, location, or other designation of computer soft-
ware to prevent the owner from locating and removing the software;
or
(6) create randomized or intentionally deceptive file names or ran-
dom or intentionally deceptive directory folders, formats, or registry
entries to avoid detection and prevent the owner from removing
computer software.
289
Of particular importance to the case against Sony are the last two
clauses. Subsection (5) prohibits a person from changing the name or
location of software to prevent the computer user from finding and re-
moving the software.290 Similarly, subsection (6) prohibits the creation
of randomized or deceptive file names or folders to prevent removal of
the software.2 9 ' As discussed above, this is exactly what the rootkit in-
stalled by the XCP did: it concealed all files that began with "$sys$,"
including the copy-prevention software, so that the files could not be
located and removed. Indeed, Thomas Hesse, President of Sony's
Global Digital Business, admitted this during his NPR interview when he
explained that the software was cloaked "so would be pirates can't find it
and remove it."' 29 2 It thus appears, based on the plain language of the
statute, that Sony violated the Texas Spyware Law.293
3. Does Sony's Copy-Prevention Software Violate Copyright Law?
Most people were outraged by the Sony rootkit incident because the
software created security risks to and collected information from the
user's computer, not because Sony was limiting the number of copies of
the CD the customer could make. Allegations that Sony was using spy-
ware and causing serious damage to customers' computers overshad-
owed the question whether Sony's copy-protection software impinged on
customers' rights under copyright law, in particular the fair use doctrine.
However, this is an important question to examine given Sony and the
289. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.053 (West 2006).
290. § 48.053(5).
291. § 48.053(6).
292. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
293. It is important to note, however, that the Texas Spyware Act has never been "tested" in
the courts, and therefore, Sony could assert certain defenses to invalidate the statute. In particular,
Sony may argue that the Texas Spyware Act is unconstitutional because it violates the dormant
commerce clause, which limits states' authority to enact laws that unduly burden interstate com-
merce. Cf Pines, supra note 272, at 2230-39 (analyzing California's spyware act and concluding that
it violates the dormant commerce clause).
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other record labels are certain to continue to use DRM technology to
copy-protect CDs.
294
a. Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright law grants copyright owners the exclusive right to
copy and distribute copyrighted works.295 "Fair use" is an excep-
tion to this exclusive right that allows copying for certain limited
purposes, including commenting on, criticizing, reporting about, or
parodying a copyrighted work.296 It is the fair use doctrine, for example,
that allows a book critic to quote from the novel she is reviewing without
obtaining permission from the copyright owner.297 Thus, fair use pro-
tects the public interest in a free exchange of ideas and discourse.298
Fair use is a deliberately imprecise and flexible doctrine. It "per-
mits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright stat-
ute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law
is designed to foster., 299  There are no bright line rules for deciding
whether certain conduct constitutes fair use.3 °° Instead, courts make that
decision on a case-by-case basis by considering at least the following
four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
294. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B (setting forth guidelines that Sony must
follow in the future when developing DRM technology). As an RIAA Spokesperson recently ex-
plained:
DRM and copy protection are important parts of the creative process, serving to protect
the work of musicians and labels and promote responsible personal use by fans. They are
no silver bullet, nor were they ever intended to be. They are one component of a larger
effort to protect our works from theft .... DRM is a key piece of the digital future, not
just for music companies but also for movie studios, software companies and countless
other intellectual property industries.)
Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies' Next Flop?, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://forum.ecoustics.com/bbs/messages/34579/192800.html; Richard Gooch, Setting the Record
Straight on DRM, Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20060203.htn-l ("DRM is the
key to our successful digital music business. It enables consumers to get exactly what they pay for,
and to pay for exactly for what they get. But to work in the future DRM will need support from our
technology partners and from governments.").
295. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(l), (3) (West 2006).
296. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
297. See id.
298. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (stating that the fair
use doctrine is necessary "to fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts').
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and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
30 1
Because fair use has been left ambiguous so it can evolve over time,
the doctrine is often misunderstood. By way of example, many people
believe that "personal" or non-commercial use (e.g., copying lawfully
acquired copyrighted materials for one's personal use) is always fair
use.302 This is not true.303 While courts have found that the fair use doc-
trine protects certain personal uses of copyrighted materials, there is no
304blanket statutory or common law rule protecting this behavior.
The most well-known case addressing the question whether per-
sonal use falls within the fair use exception is Sony Corporation ofAmer-
ica v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 305 In that case, Universal and other
copyright owners sued Sony for copyright infringement based on its
manufacture of the video cassette recorder ("VCR"), a novel product at
the time.30 6 Plaintiffs argued that Sony should be held liable because it
knew or should have known that its customers would engage in infring-
301. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
302. See Fair Use, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairuse
(last modified Sep. 1, 2006) (discussing the doctrine of fair use in the United States). See also The
Big Picture, DRM Crippled CD: A Bizarre Tale in 4 Parts, Oct. 31, 2005, http://bigpicture.
typepad.com/comments/2005/10/drm-crippledcd.html. As one music fan explained their under-
standing of fair use:
I am a buyer of CDs, and only rarelydo [sic] I download tracks from Apple's iTunes Mu-
sic Store due to sound quality. I didn't spend an obscene amount of money on a home au-
dio system to listen to the mediocre audio quality of MP3s. The not-even-remotely-as-
lossless-as-advertised-compression algorithms are hardly any better. MP3s and iPod
quality music is fine for the beach or my commute on a train, but its something else en-
tirely in my living room. My fair use: When I get a new CD, I rip it to iTunes, then trans-
fer the music to my iPods; I make a backup copy (in case of loss). If I really like a disc, I
make a copy for the car or the weekend house. If the disc is 'youth-friendly,' I'll make a
copy for my wife's classroom. She teaches art, and I refuse to let her take any more
original discs to school-they have all gotten destroyed. Incidentally, I am what the
marketing people like to call an 'influencer' (i.e., think ofNetflix, TiVo or Macintosh). I
do not copy entire CDs for people, but I like to expose friends to news [sic] music-I will
give them a song or two, with the recommendation that if they like it, they purchase the
artist's disc. I use P2P to check out stuff not available elsewhere, or to see if I want to
purchase a full CD. I also like to make mixed playlists, which get burned for the car or
for friends who are looking to hear new music, now that radio is dead. I believe all of the
above is well within my rights as a consumer of the CDs that I legally purchased; If
someone wants to try to convince me otherwise, please take your best shot.
Id.
Even worse, some people apparently believe that it is fair use to let your friends make pirated copies
of CD's. See id ("[P]irating the album is the [sic] now the sole *best* way to get this album, be-
cause you can get a 100% compatible, full quality copy that you can't even buy in the store.").
303. See JOINT REPLY COMMENTS OF AAP: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, ET AL.,
EXEMPTION TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR
ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES, at 39 (2006) [hereinafter JOINT REPLY], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/ ImetalitzAAP.pdf.
304. See id. at 31-33, 39.
305. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
306. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 420.
THE "ROOTKIT DEBACLE"
ing activity, i.e., the taping of copyrighted television programs and
films.3 07
At trial, however, the evidence demonstrated that Sony's customers
used their VCRs primarily to "time-shift," i.e., to tape a program so that
it could be viewed at a later, more convenient time, which the Court de-
termined was a non-infringing fair use.30 8 The evidence further showed
that Sony did not manufacture the VCR explicitly to encourage or cause
its customers to tape copyrighted programs, nor did Sony take active
steps to increase its profits from illegal taping.30 9 Thus, there was no
basis to hold Sony liable for inducement of infringement, and the only
theory available to plaintiffs was contributory infringement. 3'0  The
Court went on to hold that, because the VCR is "capable of commer-
cially significant noninfringing use" (i.e., time-shifting programs), Sony
could not be held liable for infringement based solely on distribution of
the product.31'
Another important case regarding "personal use" of copyrighted
materials is Recording Industry Association ofAmerica v. Diamond Mul-
timedia Systems, Inc.312 There, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) sought a preliminary injunction against the manufac-
turer of the Rio, a portable MP3 player, on the grounds that the Rio did
not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).313 AHRA "prohibits legal
actions for copyright infringement based on the manufacture, importa-
tion, or distribution of digital audio equipment or media for private, non-
commercial recording., 314 AHRA also prohibits infringement actions
against the consumers of these products as long as they are being used
for a noncommercial purpose.315
In return, AHRA requires manufacturers of these products to pay
compensatory royalties to copyright holders,316 and mandates that all
such products include a Serial Copy Management System ("SCMS").
3 17
The SCMS "sends, receives, and acts upon information about the genera-
tion and copyright status of the files that it plays.' 3 18 More specifically,
the SCMS prevents digital audio equipment from making a chain of high
307. Id.
308. Id. at 423, 425.
309. Id. at 438.
310. Id. at 439-40.
311. Id. at 442.
312. 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
313. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075.
314. Yu, supra note 13, at 706; see also Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording
Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 380 (2003).
315. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008 (West 2006).
316. § 1003(a).
317. § 1002(a).
318. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075.
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quality digital copies; in other words, the user can make as many copies
of an original recording as he wishes, but cannot make copies of cop-
ies.
3 19
The district court agreed that the Rio failed to comply with the
AHRA because it did not include the SCMS, but denied RIAA's request
for a preliminary injunction.32 ° On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the
lower court erred in finding that the Rio was covered by AHRA because,
in order to be a "digital audio recording device," the Rio must be able to
reproduce a "digital music recording" either "directly" or "from a trans-
mission.', 32 1 The court further found that computer hard drives are not
digital audio recording devices subject to the AHRA.322
Relying on Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. ,323 the court then went on to hold that, under the fair use doctrine, the
Rio was not an infringing device.324 "The Rio merely makes copies in
order to render portable, or "space-shift," those files that already reside
on a user's hard drive. Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial
personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the [Copyright]
Act.1
3 25
In sum, there is no bright-line test for determining what constitutes
fair use, nor is there a blanket rule that all personal use is fair. But on a
case-by-case basis, courts have decided that certain personal uses, in-
cluding time-shifting and space-shifting, constitute fair and non-
infringing use.
b. Did Sony's Copy-Prevention Software Allow Fair Use?
Up to this point, the DRM used by record labels has been "largely
skewed in favor of the content owner at the expense of the consumer.,
326
Critics have called these systems "too draconian" because of the limita-
tions they place on consumers' ability to play music. 327 In other words,
the recording industry has "los[t] sight of the fact that 'both ... [the
copyright owner and the consumer] have rights that need to be pro-
tected. '"9328
With its copy-prevention software, Sony was attempting to strike
this balance between protecting its intellectual property and allowing
319. Yu, supra note 13, at 707.
320. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1081.
321. Id. at 1081; See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1), (3).
322. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
323. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
324. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
325. Id. (citation omitted).
326. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies' Next Flop?, supra note 294.
327. Id.
328. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Kendall Whitehouse, Senior Director of Ad-
vanced Technology Development at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania).
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"responsible personal use by fans., 329 Generally, the software allowed a
consumer to do the following with his purchased music: (i) save one
copy of the CD on his hard drive; (ii) play the CD on his computer using
certain media players; (iii) download the CD to certain portable devices;
and (iv) burn three backup copies of the CD.33° In addition, the Media-
Max software allowed consumers to email tracks to friends who could
listen to them for ten days.33' Thus, the copy-prevention software was
intended to allow users to space-shift their music for personal use (i.e.,
listen to it on a computer, CD, or portable player), and to share music
with friends, but not "'giv[e] it away forever.'
' 332
While this may have been Sony's intention, it was not the reality.
The content on the copy-protected CDs could only be transferred to cer-
tain media players and portable devices (i.e., those using Sony or Micro-
soft products), and could not be transferred to an iPod device or iTunes
media player.333 Given that the iPod is the dominant portable device and
that iTunes is one of the most popular media players,334 many purchasers
of Sony's copy-protected CDs were denied the right to "space-shift" their
music.
As discussed above, in Recording Industry Association of America
v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., the court specifically held that
space-shifting legally purchased music to a portable MP3 player is per-
mitted under the fair use doctrine.335 It is true that "there is no unquali-
fied right to access works on any particular machine or device of the
329. Id.
330. The exact parameters of what activity was prohibited by the software were spelled out in
the EULA. It said:
This CD contains technology that is designed to prevent users from making certain, unau-
thorized uses of the DIGITAL CONTENT, including, without limitation, the following:
(1) making and storing more that one (1) copy of the DIGITAL CONTENT in each
available file format on the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER; (2) accessing the
DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER (once you have installed a copy of it on
the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER) using a media player that is not an APPROVED
MEDIA PLAYER; (3) transferring copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT that reside on the
hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER on to portable devices that are not APPROVED
PORTABLE DEVICES; (4) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL
CONTENT stored on YOUR COMPUTER (ATRAC OpenMG file format only) onto
AtracCDs; (5) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT onto re-
cordable compact discs in the so-called "Red Book"-compliant audio file format; and (6)
burning more than three (3) backup copies of this CD (using the burning application pro-
vided on the CD) onto recordable CDs and burning or otherwise making additional cop-
ies form the resulting backup copies.
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B.
33 I. Snider, supra note 70; Halderman, supra note 65, at 6.
332. Snider, supra note 70 (quoting William Whitmore of SunnComm).
333. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 2, 24.
334. Id. 24; Daniel Greenberg, Chasing Apple's Dominant iPod, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004,
at F06; WebSiteOptimization.com, Apple's iTunes Player Climbs Streaming Media Charts, Mar. 15,
2006, http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0603/.
335. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
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user's choosing. 336 However, as Dr. Richard Gooch, the Deputy Direc-
tor of Technology for IFPI,337 recently said: "[u]sers should be free to
select among a wide range of devices and services from different suppli-
ers while being safe in the knowledge that these will work properly to-
gether. ,
338
Here, users were denied the right to choose from a wide variety of
devices and were instead forced to listen to their copy-protected CDs on
a portable device that was compatible with Sony or Microsoft products.
For the significant number of customers whose portable device was an
iPod, this meant they either had to go out and spend a few hundred dol-
lars to purchase a new MP3 player or they had to accept that the content
on their copy-protected CD could not be space-shifted. 339 This was not
an acceptable choice. Accordingly, Sony went too far in attempting to
protect its copyrighted works, and as a result, impinged on its customers'
right to fair use.
B. Potential Liability Under DMCA
Another issue raised by the Sony rootkit debacle concerns the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),340 a federal statute that
broadly prohibits the circumvention of DRM technology.34' More spe-
cifically, the question is whether (i) Sony customers who attempted to
remove the copy-protection software from their computers, and (ii) indi-
viduals who provided information as to how to remove the copy-
protection software to the public, are potentially liable under the DMCA.
1. The Background of the DMCA
In December, 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) held a conference in Geneva, which led to the adoption of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty.342 "[T]he WIPO Copyright Treaty was created
336. JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 34 (quoting the 2000 recommendations of the Register of
Copyrights, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556, 64569 (Oct. 27, 2000)).
337. The IFPI is the International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers.
338. Gooch, supra note 294.
339. Cf JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 34 (arguing that the fact that DVDs cannot be played
on Linux operating systems is not a violation of fair use because "[c]opyright owners have never
been legally required to enable access to their products from a multiplicity of platforms . .. . Over
eighty million U.S. households now own a DVD player. DVD players can be purchased for less
than fifty dollars and portable DVD players can be purchased for less than one hundred dollars.").
The media companies are arguing that they should not have to make DVDs compatible with Linux
systems because (i) most people do not have a Linux operated computer, and (ii) most people have a
DVD player or could easily purchase one. See id. at 34-35. These arguments do not apply here: (i)
most people have an iPod, not a Sony/Microsoft compatible MP3 player; (ii) most people do not
have more than one MP3 player; and (iii) MP3 players are still relatively expensive. See Sony
Complaint, supra note 68, 24 (describing iPod as "the dominant portable" MP3 player); Green-
berg, supra note 334 (discussing the popularity of iPod and prices of rival MP3 players).
340. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.A., 17 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A., and 35 U.S.C.A.).
341. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201.
342. Cohen, supra note 48, at 972.
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to address the changing needs of copyright protection in a digital age,"
including digital rights management.343 More specifically, the Treaty
required contracting states to "provide adequate legal protection and ef-
fective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technologi-
cal measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention."
344
On October 12, 1998, Congress passed the DMCA, and President
Clinton signed it into law.345 Among other things, the DMCA is de-
signed to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty.346 To that end, at the
heart of the DMCA lies 17 U.S.C.A. section 1201(a)(1)(A), the anti-
circumvention provision, which prohibits a person from "circum-
vent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under" the copyright statute.347 This includes activity to
"descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or other-
wise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner." 348 In addition,
sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA, sometimes referred to
as the "anti-trafficking provisions," preclude the designing, manufactur-
ing, importing, offering to the public, or trafficking of any technology,
service, or device produced to circumvent such technological meas-
ures. 34 9 Hence, a violation of the DMCA can occur even in the absence
of copyright infringement.35 °
There are, however, seven narrow exemptions to the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA, including for: (1) nonprofit li-
braries, archives, and educational institutions to gain access to copy-
righted works to decide whether to acquire a copy of the work;351 (2) law
enforcement, intelligence, and other governmental entities to engages in
any lawful investigative activities; 352 (3) reverse engineering of computer
programs; 353 (4) encryption research; 354 (5) prevention of minors from
accessing material on the Internet;355 (6) protection of personally identi-
fying information;356 and (7) security testing.357 The DMCA further pro-
343. Id.
344. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65.
345. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. at 2860 (enacting the DMCA); Statement by
President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671 (Oct. 28, 1998) (sign-
ing the DMCA into law).
346. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. at 2860.
347. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(l)(A).
348. § 1201 (a)(3)(A).
349. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (3)(A).
350. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 976.
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vides that "the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the
Register of Copyrights," is required to promulgate regulations every
three years, exempting from the anti-circumvention provision, individu-
als who would otherwise be "adversely affected" in "their ability to make
noninfringing uses. '358 The current regulations, which were adopted by
the Librarian in 2003, carve out exceptions for the following four classes
of works: (1) compilations of lists of web sites that are blocked by filter-
ing software; (2) computer programs protected by dongles that cannot be
accessed due to damage, malfunction, or obsolescence; (3) computer
programs and video games in obsolete formats; and (4) literary works in
eBook format that are unavailable to disabled persons.359
In rulemaking years, like 2006, the Copyright Office solicits com-
ments from interested parties regarding proposed exemptions.3 60  This
year, the Copyright Office received close to one hundred comments,
some of which addressed the Sony rootkit incident.36' In the spring of
2006, the Copyright Office held hearings regarding the proposed exemp-
tions,362 and it is scheduled to publish its final recommendation in Octo-
ber 2006.363
2. Did Sony Customers Violate the Anti-Circumvention Provisions
of the DMCA By Removing the Copy-Prevention Software
From Their Computers?
Once the news of the rootkit broke on the Internet, many Sony cus-
tomers attempted to uninstall the copy-prevention software themselves or
hired someone to do it for them.3 4 Some expressed concern that, by
doing so, these customers may have been violating the DMCA, namely
the anti-circumvention provision set forth in 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(1)(A). 365 While these concerns are understandable, an analysis
358. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(I)(B)-(C). In making this determination, the Librarian shall con-
sider:
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for
nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohi-
bition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect
of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted
works; and (v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
§ 1201 (a)(l)(C)(i)-(v).
359. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40; Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 124 & n.
252 (2004).
360. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS ON ANTICIRCUMVENTION EXEMPTIONS,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
361. Id. (follow "Comment" hyperlinks).
362. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING HEARINGS SCHEDULE,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
363. Id.
364. See Mook, supra note 128.
365. MFC-in-the-box, Sony's XCP Rootkit and the DMCA, Nov. 22, 2005,
http://mhc.insidestretch.com/2005/l 1/22/sonys-xcp-drm-rootkit-and-the-dmca/; Declan McCullagh,




of the DMCA indicates that the current exemptions to section 1201(a)(1)
most likely would have shielded these customers from liability.
First, section 1201(j) provides an exemption for any "act of security
testing," which means "accessing a computer, computer system, or com-
puter network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating,
or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of
the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or computer
network. 3 66 This exemption applies to Sony customers who, after learn-
ing about the security risks posed by the copy-prevention software, re-
moved the files from their hard drives.
Second, individuals whose computers were affected by the Media-
Max or XCP software also may have been able to invoke section 1201 (i),
the exemption relating to the protection of personally identifiable infor-
mation. That exemption provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a
violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title, if-
(A) the technological measure, or the work it protects, contains the
capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying in-
formation reflecting the online activities of a natural person who
seeks to gain access to the work protected.
367
Both the MediaMax and XCP software had "phone home" capabilities,
meaning it communicated certain information from the user's computer
to Sony's servers.368 The information communicated to Sony included,
among other things, the user's IP address.369
Computer users are assigned an IP address by their intemet service
provider or system administrator. No two IP addresses are the same.
Although some users have dynamic IP addresses, many have static ad-
dresses that do not change over time. Thus, an IP address can be used to
determine information about the computer user, including his name, ad-
dress, etc.37° In fact, this is exactly how the record companies have iden-
tified "John Doe" defendants in their litigation campaign against individ-
ual file-sharers. 37' Because an IP address constitutes "personally identify-
ing information" (or, at the very least, is an avenue to personally identifi-
Russinovich, Sony's Rootkit First 4 Internet Responds, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/1 1/sonys-rootkit-first-4-intemet.html (see replies).
366. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(j)(1), (2).
367. § 1201(i)(l)(A).
368. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, E.
369. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, E.
370. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 31.
371. See supra Part I.A.2.
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able information), section 1201(i) should have protected Sony's custom-
ers from liability under the DMCA.
In sum, section 1201(i) and (j) almost certainly would have shielded
from liability Sony customers who uninstalled the copy-prevention soft-
ware from their hard drives. Yet, as explained in the next section, the
current exemptions to the DMCA may not be broad enough to protect
everyone involved in the Sony rootkit debacle from liability.
3. Did Security Researchers Violate the Anti-Trafficking Provi-
sions of the DMCA by Informing the Public About Sony's
Copy-Prevention Software?
When Mark Russinovich published his findings about the Sony
rootkit on the Internet, he apparently was not concerned about or not
aware of the potential legal exposure created by the DMCA. Others
were, however. Professor Felten and Alex Halderman, both of whom
had previously been threatened with DMCA suits, said that they had un-
covered the problem with Sony's copy-prevention software about a
month before Mr. Russinovich broke the news, but did not disclose it
because they were worried about a lawsuit.372 Those fears appear to have
been well-founded.
a. Liability Under the Anti-Trafficking Provisions of the
DMCA
In addition to prohibiting the circumvention of DRM and other
technological measures aimed at protecting copyrighted material, certain
provisions of the DMCA also make it illegal to traffic in a technology,
service, or device intended to circumvent such technological measures.
Subsection 1201(a)(2) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, compo-
nent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title; (B) has only lim-
ited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or (C) is marketed by that person or another
acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for
use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under this title.
373
Similarly, subsection 1201(b)(1) provides:
372. Comment of Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman, Dec. 1, 2005, at 7 [hereinafter
Felten Comment], available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/mulligan felten.pdf.
373. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2).
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No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, compo-
nent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only limited commer-
cially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right
of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protec-
tion afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof.
374
Although both subsections prohibit trafficking in a circumvention tech-
nology, the focus of section 1201(a)(2) is circumvention of technologies
designed to prevent access to a work, and the focus of section 1201(b)(1)
is circumvention of technologies designed to permit access to a work but
prevent copying of the work or some other act that infringes a copy-
right.
375
Since the DMCA was enacted in 1998, a few courts have inter-
preted the anti-trafficking provisions of that statute. One of the earliest
decisions was Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.376 In that case, sev-
eral movie studios filed a lawsuit against two website owners who,
among other things, posted links to other websites that offered for
download a computer software program called DeCSS.377 One of the
purposes of DeCSS was to circumvent CSS, an encryption system used
to prevent illegal copying of DVDs.37 8 "CSS-protected motion pictures
on DVDs may be viewed only on players and computer drives equipped
with licensed technology that permits the devices to decrypt and play-
but not to copy-the films. 379
The lower court found that by posting links to DeCSS on their web-
sites, defendants had violated section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA because
they offered and provided to the public a technology, i.e., DeCSS, that is
"primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure," i.e., CSS.38° Accordingly, the court entered a
374. § 1201(b)(I).
375. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11-12 (1998).
376. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). The lower court decision is reported at 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
377. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36.
378. Id. at 436-37.
379. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
380. § 1201(a)(2)(A); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
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permanent injunction against defendants, which the Second Circuit up-
held.38
More recently, in Davidson & Associates v. Jung,38 2 the Eighth Cir-
cuit faced the question whether the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA had been violated in connection with certain computer game
software. In that case, plaintiff Blizzard Entertainment ("Blizzard"), the
owner of copyrights in computer game software, launched Battle.net, a
24-hour online gaming service available only to people who purchase
Blizzard's computer games. 38 3 The Battle.net service facilitates multiple-
player games, meaning users can "create and join multi-player games
that can be accessed across the Internet, . . . chat with other potential
players,.., record wins and losses and save advancements in an individ-
ual password-protected game account, and ... participate with others in
tournament play featuring elimination rounds. 38 4
Defendants were software programmers who formed a group called
the "bnetd project. 38 5 The bnetd project established a website and of-
fered an alternative service to Battle.net, which also "allow[ed] gainers
unable or unwilling to connect to Battle.net to experience the multi-
player features of Blizzard's games. 386 In order for bnetd.org to work
with Blizzard games, defendants had to reverse engineer the game soft-
ware, including the technological measures intended to prevent illicit
387copying.
Blizzard sued defendants alleging, among other things, violations of
the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. The
court held that, by reverse engineering the Blizzard game software, de-
fendants violated section 1201 (a)(1)'s circumvention proscription, and
that no exemption applied.38 9 The court also determined that defendants
were in violation of section 1201 (a)(2) because they provided to the pub-
lic a service whose primary purpose "was to avoid the anti-
circumvention restrictions of the game and to avoid the restricted access
to Battle.net. ' 0 90 Accordingly, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Blizzard on these claims, and the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed.3 '
381. Corley, 273 F.3d at 434, 459-60.
382. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
383. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 635.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 636.
388. ld at 637.
389. Id. at 640-41.
390. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1186 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
391. 422 F.3d at 640-41, aff'g 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
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Although security researchers like Messrs. Russinovich, Felten, and
Halderman have not manufactured any sort of product or device to cir-
cumvent Sony's copy-prevention software, all three have provided the
public with information about the manner in which this software oper-
ates, the dangers it poses, and how it can be removed from one's hard
drive. In light of the decisions in Corley and Davidson, such conduct
arguably falls within the purview of the DMCA's anti-trafficking provi-
sions because it is a service that is being provided or offered to the public
primarily for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that
prevents access to a copyrighted work. Indeed, Professor Felten and
Alex Halderman themselves are concerned about the legality of their
conduct. Not only did they choose not to disclose their research about
Sony's copy-prevention software, but they also have asked the Copyright
Office to promulgate a regulatory exemption to the DMCA to protect
their activities in the future.
b. Proposed Exemptions to the DMCA
As mentioned above, 2006 is a rulemaking year under the DMCA,
which means the Copyright Office is considering various proposed ex-
emptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the statute. Among the
numerous submissions received by the Copyright Office were two that
addressed, at least in part, the situation raised by the Sony rootkit deba-
cle: (1) the Comments of Edward Felten and J. Alex Halderman, submit-
ted by their legal representatives from the Samuelson Law, Technology
and Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall; and (2) the Comments of the
Computer and Communications Industry Association and Open Source
and Industry Alliance (collectively "CCIA").
392
Generally, these two groups requested "an exemption to §
1201 (a)(1)(A) for sound recordings and audiovisual works distributed in
compact disc format and protected by technological measures that im-
pede access to lawfully purchased works by creating or exploiting secu-
rity vulnerabilities that compromise the security of personal com-
puters. 393 They contend that such an exemption is necessary to allow
consumers to enjoy their purchased music without threatening the secu-
rity of their computers, and so that individuals like Messrs. Felten and
Halderman can engage in security research.394
392. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS ON ANTICIRCUMVENTION EXEMPTIONS,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/index.html.
393. Felten Comment, supra note 372, at 1. The exemptions proposed by the two groups are
essentially identical and, thus, will be discussed together.
394. Id. at 6-7; see also Public Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, U.S. Copyright Office, Mar. 31,
2006, at 130-33, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-mar31 .pdf.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
Numerous organizations, including the RIAA, submitted a joint re-
sponse to the comments proposing new exemptions to the DMCA.395
The joint response asserted that the exemption proposed by the Felten
and CCIA groups was unnecessary because, inter alia, the conduct about
which they were concerned was already exempted under sections 1201(i)
and 0).396 As discussed previously, this most likely is true with respect
to Sony customers who removed the copy-prevention software from their
computers.397
As currently drafted, however, the 12010) and (i) exemptions
probably would not protect security researchers who provide information
to the public from liability under the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA. Section 1201(j) provides, for example, that
[i]n determining whether a person qualifies for the exemption under
paragraph (2), the factors to be considered shall include-(A)
whether the information derived from the security testing was used
solely to promote the security of the owner or operator of such com-
puter, computer system or computer network, or shared directly with
the developer of such computer, computer system, or computer net-
work; and (B) whether the information derived from the security test-
ing was used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate in-
fringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than
this section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security.
398
Here, the information that Messrs. Felten, Halderman, and Russino-
vich derived from security testing was not used solely to promote the
security of their own computers, but also was used to promote the secu-
rity of other Sony customers' computers. Moreover, although the pur-
pose of disseminating such information is to promote the security of per-
sonal computers, there is no guarantee that such information will not be
used to facilitate infringement. Thus, as discussed in Part IV of this Ar-
ticle, the Copyright Office should adopt a narrowly-tailored exemption to
protect those engaged in security research from liability under the
DMCA.
IV. RECORD COMPANIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE DRM, BUT NOT
AT THE EXPENSE OF SECURITY RESEARCHERS OR CONSUMERS
Despite the complications caused by the Sony rootkit debacle, the
recording industry should continue to pursue DRM technology to prevent
the illicit copying of CDs. The recording industry has a right to protect
its intellectual property. Unlike the on-line file sharing battle, there are
no secondary infringers like Napster or Grokster that could be targeted,
395. JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 1.
396. Id. at 20-21.




and suing direct infringers is not practical because it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to identify individual CD burners. DRM,
therefore, is still the industry's best option. In order for future attempts
at DRM to succeed, however, lawmakers and record companies alike
must strive to balance the interest of copyright owners against the rights
of consumers.
A. What Should the Lawmakers Do?
This article has analyzed many legal issues raised by the rootkit in-
cident, including Sony's potential liability, as well as the potential liabil-
ity of consumers and researchers under the DMCA. As to the former,
there are federal and state laws available to address and remedy Sony's
conduct.399 With respect to the latter, the current exemptions to the
DMCA are not sufficient to protect security researchers from liability
and, thus, the Copyright Office should adopt a new exemption.
However, the exemption proposed by the Felten and CCIA
groups--"for sound recordings . . .distributed in compact disc format
and protected by technological measures that impede access ... by creat-
ing or exploiting security vulnerabilities that compromise . . .personal
computers"4°-is far too broad. First and foremost, it is not limited in
any way to security researchers, so it would permit anyone who believed
a copy-protected CD posed some type of security risk to circumvent the
technology. Nor does the proposed exemption attempt to define "secu-
rity vulnerabilities," so some people might interpret that term very
broadly to justify the circumvention of access controls. Undoubtedly, a
vague and overly broad exemption like this would facilitate copyright
infringement and seriously undermine the purpose served by section
1201 (a)(1)(A).
Instead, the Copyright Office should adopt a narrowly-tailored Se-
curity Research Exemption that tracks the language of section 1201(g)'s
exemption for encryption research. Section 1201(g), for example, pro-
vides a relatively straightforward definition of "encryption research" that
puts the public on notice of what activities fall within the exemption. 40 1
Section 1201(g) further provides that it is not a violation of section
120 1(a)(1)(A) "for a person to circumvent a technological measure... in
the course of an act of good faith encryption research if... such an act is
necessary to conduct such encryption research ... ,402 This type of
399. See supra Part IIL.A (discussing Sony's liability under the CFAA and Texas Spyware
Statute). This is not to suggest that Congress should not enact a federal spyware statute. While such
legislation probably is unnecessary in this case, it apparently is critical to address other serious
problems facing consumers and businesses today. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 171, at 256-57;
Blakley, supra note 173, at 40.
400. Felten Comment, supra note 372, at 1. The exemptions proposed by the two groups are
essentially identical, and thus, will be discussed together.
401. § 1201(g)(l)(A).
402. § 1201(g)(2) (emphasis added).
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limiting language, which is not found in the current security testing ex-
emption, should be included in the proposed Security Research Exemp-
tion, so that the underlying copyrighted works can be accessed if neces-
sary for the research.
Additionally, section 1201(g)'s "Factors in Determining Exemp-
tion" would be equally applicable to a Security Research Exemption.
The first asks "whether the information derived from the encryption re-
search was disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a
manner reasonably calculated to advance the state of knowledge or de-
velopment of encryption technology, versus whether it was disseminated
in a manner that facilitates infringement under this title. . .. ,40' Before
applying the Security Research Exemption, this type of inquiry would be
appropriate to ensure that information was being disseminated to the
members of the public to notify them of a valid security risk, and not
simply to educate them on how to circumvent certain access controls.4°
Similarly, section 1201(g) asks "whether the person is engaged in a
legitimate course of study, is employed, or is appropriately trained or
experienced, in the field of encryption technology. ' '4°5 A factor like this
would ensure that only legitimate security researchers would be shielded
by the exemption. Section 1201(g) finally considers "whether the person
provides the copyright owner of the work to which the technological
measure is applied with notice of the findings and documentation of the
research .... Again, a notice provision should also be included in
the proposed Security Research Exemption, thus giving the copyright
owner an opportunity to address the problem itself instead of having it
revealed by a third party as occurred in the Sony incident.
The proposed exemption outlined above would ensure that legiti-
mate security researchers could devote their time to protecting our na-
tion's computing systems and the people who use those systems, rather
than worrying about whether disseminating important security informa-
tion might expose them to a lawsuit under the DMCA. Moreover, this
exemption is sufficiently narrow to minimize the risk that individuals
could improperly invoke it in order to circumvent DRM systems for il-
licit purposes. While adoption of the proposed Security Research Ex-
emption is recommended at this time in light of recent events, the ulti-
mate goal is for record companies to adjust their approach and attitude
403. § 1201(g)(3)(A).
404. While Felten and Halderman's work is primarily focused on exposing security vulner-
abilities created by various DRM systems, there are some instances where they seem simply to be
instructing the public on circumvention techniques. See, e.g., Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at
6 (explaining how to bypass XCP's temporary protection measure by "kill[ing] the installer process"
or "us[ing] a ripping or copying program that locks the CD tray," even though there is no indication





toward copy-protecting CDs, so as to avoid another Sony rootkit debacle
in the future.
B. What Should the Record Companies Do?
Record companies need to take a different approach to copy-
protecting CDs. First, they need to invest the time and resources neces-
sary to ensure their copy-prevention systems do not pose any sort of se-
curity threat to their customers. The record labels and the software de-
signers must make security a priority so consumers can feel confident
that playing copy-protected CDs on their computers will not pose a risk
to their operating systems. Moreover, before releasing CDs with copy-
protection software, all record companies should do what Sony is re-
quired to do by the Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Action:
have the software analyzed by an independent, third-party and get an
opinion that installation and use of the software would create no security
vulnerabilities for users.4 °7
Second, it is vital that record companies provide consumers with
sufficient notice that CDs contain anti-piracy technology. Record labels
not only should include conspicuous warnings on the CDs, but they
should widely publicize the fact that certain copy-protected CDs are go-
ing to be released. Additionally, consumers must be fully informed
about the nature of the DRM (i.e., what it does, how it operates, etc.).
That information, of course, should be included in the EULA, but also
should be made easily available to customers, for example by posting it
on the label's website. Indeed, one reason Apple has been successful
with its use of DRM in iTunes music is because "Apple is above the
board .... .40'
Third, while it would be impossible to ensure that copy-protected
CDs can be listened to on any device, record companies must develop
DRM systems that take into account the reality of today's technological
landscape. Specifically, a significant number of customers use portable
music players, and Apple's iPod is by far the most popular of these de-
vices. The bottom line is that if record companies release copy-protected
CDs that are not compatible with iPods, and consumers are not aware of
that at the time of purchase, music fans with be angry and/or will attempt
to circumvent the DRM. While it is understandable that Sony would
prefer its customers to listen to Sony CDs on a Sony MP3 player, that is
simply not the reality of today's society. In other words, the record
companies cannot use copy-protection as a means to promote their own
portable devices. If record labels want to copy-protect CDs, they must
accept that most customers will want to listen to those CDs on an iPod.
407. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B.3(f).
408. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies" Next Flop?, supra note 294.
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Finally, the sole purpose of any successful DRM system must be to
prevent illicit copying, not to collect personal information or advertise.
This is addressed in the Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Ac-
tion, but it does not go far enough. There, Sony agreed that, before re-
leasing CDs with copy-prevention software, it will ensure that such soft-
ware "make[s] a record only of the associated album title, artist, IP ad-
dress from which the [Internet] connection was made, and certain non-
personally identifiable information .... ,409 As discussed above, how-
ever, IP addresses are personally identifiable information. There is no
reason record labels should be able to collect this information from indi-
viduals who are simply listening to CDs on their computers (as opposed
to people who are illegally downloading music from the Internet). If
record companies continue to gather such data, it will further erode cus-
tomer confidence and undermine the chance of finding an approach to
DRM that is acceptable to the entertainment industry and consumers.
CONCLUSION
This latest chapter in the saga of the war on music piracy has forced
the recording industry, lawmakers, and consumers to take a hard look at
the issues surrounding the use of digital rights management to protect
copyright owners. In this case, Sony clearly went too far in attempting to
defend its intellectual property rights. As a result, it violated numerous
laws and has subjected itself to very serious consequences, including
several class action lawsuits, a criminal case in Texas, numerous gov-
ernment inquiries, and a public relations disaster.
The record companies nonetheless have a right to prevent illicit
copying of their music, and, at least for the time being, digital rights
management is the best way to accomplish that. In designing future
DRM systems, the recording industry should take a lesson from Apple,
who has made its iTunes DRM work by "think[ing] seriously about bal-
ancing the needs of content owners with those of consumers," and "at-
tempt[ing] to satisfy both sides of the equation."4 10 If the recording in-
dustry can do that and can develop DRM that satisfies the requirements
outlined in this article, consumers would learn to accept the copy-
protection technology and would adapt their music consumption habits
accordingly.
409. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B.3(g).
410. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies 'Next Flop?, supra note 294.
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INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in communication technology over the past decade
have resulted in the previously unimaginable ability to seamlessly ex-
change ideas and data on a global basis. Yet, despite this undeniable
progress, access to information is becoming increasingly difficult. The
carefully balanced provisions of copyright law are gradually becoming
displaced by contractual,' technological,2 and legislative3 constraints that
4permit tight control of access to and use of knowledge resources. As a
result, material that belongs in the public domain 5 is being transformed
into private property. Such a state of affairs has potentially serious con-
sequences, as the ability to access and make use of ideas and information
is critically important to creativity, competition, innovation, and a de-
mocratic culture.6
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S., University of
Illinois; J.D., University of Illinois. Many thanks to David Cluchey, Colleen Khoury, Lois Lupica,
Martin Rogoff, and Jeffrey Maine for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
Additionally, I would like thank the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for inviting me to
participate in the Summit on Intellectual Property & Digital Media and present many of the ideas
expressed in this paper.
1. See discussion infra Part II (reviewing the various types of contractual methods often
utilized, including contracts in the form of shrinkwrap, clickwrap, or browsewrap licenses).
2. See discussion infra Part 11 (noting the increasing use of digital rights management sys-
tems (DRMs) by copyright proprietors).
3. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)).
4. See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geog-
raphy ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1996).
5. Attempts to define the term "public domain" have been the topic of considerable aca-
demic debate, as well as the subject of numerous scholarly articles. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free
as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 361-62 (1999) ("The public domain is the range of uses of information that any
person is privileged to make absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular
person unprivileged."); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38-63 (2003); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (defining the public domain as "a commons that includes those
aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect... "); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 256 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Map-
ping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148-
154 (2003). The term "public domain" as used in this article consists of all non-copyrightable in-
formation, as well as the unprotected components of copyrighted works. Such a definition would
necessarily comprise specific limitations articulated in the Copyright Act, in addition to uses that
would qualify as fair use.
6. Samuelson, supra note 5, at 170; see also, White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Creativity is impossible without a rich public
domain .... Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on
the works of those who came before."); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FLTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 250 (2001) ("[C]reation is always the building upon some-
thing else."); William Patty, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Immi-
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW As A BASELINE
Until recently, copyright law served as the baseline from which is-
sues relating to the use and ownership of creative works were decided.
The Copyright Act provides protection only to "original works of author-
ship."7  Originality is not a statutory requirement, but a constitutional
prerequisite for the benefits of the Act to attach to a given work.8 To be
original, a work must be "independently created," in other words, not
copied from another work, and possess "at least some minimal degree of
creativity." 9 Such conditions do not generally pose a significant hurdle,
particularly since a relatively low level of creativity will usually suf-
fice.' o
Nonetheless, facts do not meet this modest threshold." One of the
"most fundamental axiom[s] of copyright law" is that "[n]o author may
copyright ... the facts he [or she] narrates."' 2 This is because one who
reports a particular fact has not created it, but merely discovered its exis-
tence.13 Since factual data is not "original" in the constitutional sense, it
is not entitled to protection but may instead be copied at will.' 4 As the
Supreme Court has explained "[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortu-
nate," but "is the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art."' 5
Similarly, ideas also are not subject to copyright protection.' 6 A ba-
sic principle of copyright law, the "idea/expression" dichotomy, allows
copyright protection to attach to the expression of an idea, but not the
idea itself. '7 Consequently, one may utilize the ideas contained within
another's copyrighted work without seeking the creator's permission.'
8
This provides "authors the right to their original expression, but encour-
nent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 381 (1999) ("With unfettered access to
facts, the public may gain valuable information necessary for an enlightened citizenry, while later
authors are free to create subsequent works utilizing those facts."); Margaret Jane Radin, Property
Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 510 (1996) ("[W]e cannot be creators without a robust
public domain, a rich tradition and culture to draw upon freely.").
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2006).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to secure "for limited Times to Authors
... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings... "); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (declaring that "[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement").
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], [B]
(1990)).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 344-45.
12. Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
13. Id. at 347-48 ("'No one may claim originality as to facts' . .. because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship") (quoting I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 2.11 [A]
(1990)).
14. Id. at 350.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 349-50.
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ages others to build freely upon the ideas . . . conveyed by a work."' 9
This balance of rights between authors and the public is rooted in the
belief that society is best served by the unrestricted flow of information
and ideas.2 °
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, all or part of the pro-
tected portions of a copyrighted work may be used without the consent of
the copyright holder.21 The Copyright Act contains a number of provi-
sions that expressly restrict the exclusive rights granted by statute to the
owner of the copyright.22 Many of these pertain only to particular types
of uses by certain categories of individuals in specific situations,23 how-
ever, not all of the exceptions are so specialized. For example, the doc-
trine of fair use is much more far-reaching, often allowing for the use of
excerpts from a work for purposes such as teaching, news reporting, and
criticism without compensation to or the permission of the copyright
holder.2 4
These carefully considered constitutional and statutory limitations
are designed to balance the rights of creators with the interests of the
public. By providing adequate protection for authors so they have an
incentive to create, but precluding a copyright owner's ability to control
all uses of such works, the public domain is intended to be a rich re-
source for future creators, innovators, and participants in democratic
culture. The ability to access and use such materials is essential since
creativity and social progress clearly do not take place in a vacuum, but
are cumulative in nature. In fact, "[n]othing today, likely nothing since
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who
came before. 2 5 Unfortunately, this traditional development process is
being threatened as a result of drastic responses to technological innova-
tion.
II. THE NEW PROPRIETARY LANDSCAPE
Recent advances have made it possible to quickly, inexpensively,
and effortlessly produce perfect copies of many different types of crea-
tive works. As a result, copyright holders have sought to prevent uncon-
trolled duplication from occurring.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 350-51.
22. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-122 (West 2006).
23. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § I 10 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the follow-
ing are not infringements of copyright: . . . (6) performance of a nondramatic musical work by a
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course of an
annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by such body or organization ... .
24. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
25. White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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While some fine-tuning of established doctrines may be necessary
to account for these changes, the amount of control copyright holders
have attempted to exert can arguably be characterized as extreme. Al-
though in limited circumstances generally unrestricted power to limit
access and use may seem reasonable, in most situations, this is not the
case.
26
Increasingly, copyright proprietors have turned to technological
measures, such as digital rights management systems (DRMs), to strictly
regulate access to their works.27 These efforts have been bolstered by the
passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,28 which proscribes
technologies that could be used to defeat DRMs and imposes liability for
acts of circumvention. 29 This legislation is somewhat radical since tradi-
tionally "Congress has achieved the objectives of the Constitution's
Copyright Clause 'by regulating the use of information-not the devices
or means by which the information is [obtained]."' 30 Such developments
are particularly troublesome in light of the fact that "preventing access is
now often tantamount to preventing use.''
To the extent all hurdles to access are overcome, further restrictions
on use are frequently present, as copyright holders attempt to prevent all
uncompensated and unauthorized uses of their works.32 In an effort to
attain this goal, standard form contracts, often in the form of shrink-
wrap, 33 clickwrap, 34 or browsewrap 35 licenses are frequently utilized.
26. Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 323, 360-61 (2004).
27. Stephen M. Kramarsky, Copyright Enforcement in the Internet Age: The Law and Tech-
nology of Digital Rights Management, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2001);
Symposium: The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697,
736-37 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 161-62, 183 (1997); Bechtold, supra note
26, at 323-24.
28. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
29. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1203-1204 (West 2006). For further discussion of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, see generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999);
David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA "s Com-
mentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 163 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002); Craig Allen Nard, The
DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions: Impeding the Progress of the Useful Arts?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 19 (2002); Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: The DMCA 's Push to
Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607 (2001).
30. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 673, 683 (2000) (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998)).
31. Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. REV. 695,
762 (2003).
32. Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a
Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 661 (2000).
33. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A shrink-
wrap license typically involves (1) notice of a license agreement on product packaging (i.e., the
shrinkwrap), (2) presentation of the full license on documents inside the package, and (3) prohibited
access to the product without an express indication of acceptance. Generally, in the shrinkwrap
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These "agreements" 36 often contain harsh provisions that seek to prohibit
actions that are clearly allowed under the Copyright Act, such as conduct
that would undoubtedly qualify as fair use. Additionally, the use of facts
and ideas contained in copyrighted works is often heavily regulated, as
they are increasingly viewed as mere commodities in the marketplace-
even though they constitute the building blocks of knowledge and are
supposed to remain within the public domain.37
Lawmakers and judges have been quick to support these techno-
logical and contractual restraints implemented by copyright proprietors
despite the fact that they undeniably alter the delicate balance struck by
the Copyright Act to the detriment of the public. Increasingly, all unre-
munerated uses of information are perceived as unacceptable assaults on
the rights of copyright holders. 38 This is due in large part to the fact that
legislators promulgating statutes and adjudicators resolving disputes
concerning data have failed to adequately take into account the multi-
dimensional problems involved in disputes concerning access to informa-
tion. The focus is often inappropriately centered on the tangible property
within which information is contained, for example in a software pro-
gram or a computer server. Additionally, once an owner of such prop-
erty is ascertained, all of the conventional attributes of ownership are
context, the consumer does not manifest assent to the shrinkwrap terms at the time of purchase;
instead, the consumer manifests assent to the terms by later actions." (citations omitted)).
34. See Registercom, Inc., 356 F.3d at 429 (defining a "clickwrap license" as one which
presents "the potential licensee (i.e., the end-user) 'with a message on his or her computer screen,
requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on
an icon."') (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
35. See, e.g., Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756,
782 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (defining a "browsewrap license" as a license that is "typically part of a web
site-its terms may be posted on the site's home page or may otherwise be accessible via a hyper-
link" and explaining that "[in contrast to clickwrap licenses, a user may download software under a
browsewrap license prior to manifesting assent to its terms." (citations omitted)).
36. The validity of these agreements has been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion.
See generally Benkler, supra note 5, at 429-40 (discussing copyright law and the scope of the public
domain); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875,
906 (1999) (examining the practice of contracting around federal intellectual property law); Ray-
mond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 827, 877-78 (1998) (exploring the relationship between contract and
copyright law); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 57, 71 (1997) (discussing the competing interests
involved in freedom of contract and preservation of the public domain); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copy-
right Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 106 (1997) (dis-
cussing whether parties should be allowed to contract around copyright).
37. Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 187
(1992); Ryan, supra note 32, at 661, 669-70. Patry, supra note 6, at 368-69. ("Copying such mate-
rial promotes the progress of science by keeping the basic building blocks of knowledge free for all
to use .... "); see also Lipton, supra note 31, at 738; Jessica Litman, Information Privacyl
Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1294-95 (2000).
38. Litman, supra note 37, at 206 ("Courts increasingly see uncompensated uses of copy-
righted works as invasions of the rights in the copyright bundle."); see also Ryan, supra note 32, at
661.
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normally granted, including the right to exclude. 39 As a result, almost
insurmountable obstacles are faced by any other party whose interests
might be affected by a lack of access or an inability to utilize the re-
source, as the burden almost always falls on these other parties to explain
why the previously identified owner's rights should be limited.4°
Such a myopic view of property rights allows for the tight control of
access to and use of information contained within the tangible property.
This problem is often most pronounced in the Internet context where
lawmakers and judges have not only treated cyberspace as though it were
virtually equivalent to a place in the physical world, but seem to believe
that all of its constituent parts must be privately owned by someone or
something that has absolute power over the property.4' Ubiquitous in
legislation affecting and judicial opinions concerning cyberspace is the
granting of rights to private parties, thereby providing them with the abil-
ity to exclude whomever or whatever they choose.42
Illustrative of this presumption toward privatization is the case of
eBay v. Bidder's Edge.43 Plaintiff eBay brought suit against Bidder's
Edge for using a software robot to access and gather factual data con-
tained on eBay's publicly accessible Internet site, despite the fact that its
computer system had not been harmed by Bidder's Edge's robotic activ-
ity. 44 In granting the preliminary injunction against Bidder's Edge, the
court held that eBay had a "fundamental property right to exclude others
from its computer system. 'A5 Determinations such as these allow website
owners to restrict who and what may enter, and consequently make use
of, the information contained on even a publicly accessible website.
Furthermore, these decisions generally fail to recognize the benefits that
inure from a diverse, open network. The end results of such judgments
are considerable impediments to public access to ideas and information.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that judges and policy makers give more compre-
hensive attention to all of the interests implicated in controversies involv-
39. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 692.
40. See JOSEPH WILILAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 10 (2000).
41. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 532-33 (2003).
Courts have assumed not only that cyberspace is a place akin to the physical world, but
further that any such place must be privately owned by someone who has total control
over the property. This is a common assumption these days; it sometimes seems as
though our legal system is obsessed with the idea that anything with value must be owned
by someone.
Id.
42. Ryan, supra note 32, at 692; see also Morton J. Horwitz, Technology, Values, and the
Justice System: Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REv. 105, 116
(2004).
43. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
44. See eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-63.
45. Id. at 1067.
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ing materials which arguably belong in the public domain. This must
include acknowledgment of the fact that the ability to access and make
use of a robust, ever-expanding public domain is essential to the progress
of society.46 Such resources allow the public to gain valuable informa-
tion necessary for an "enlightened citizenry. ' ' 7 A prodigious public do-
main advances learning, knowledge, and creativity by permitting later
authors and innovators to build on prior works and discoveries. Ulti-
mately, we must recognize the way the structure of intellectual property
rights reflects the values we find important and the type of society we
wish to create.48
46. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2004).
47. Patry, supra note 6, at 3 81.
48. Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033,
1046 (1996) ("Questions about the kind of society that we are, and the kind of society that we wish
to become, must be inherent parts of the interpretation of [property rights]."); SINGER, supra note 40,
at 155; Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135,
173-74 (2004) ("Property ownership, like information property ownership, has powerful social
consequences."); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE
OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 90-91 (2000); see also STEVEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY
149 (1990) ("Property discloses much about societies and persons .... First for all societies, if one
describes the institution of property as it exists in a society, the description reveals something impor-
tant about that society."); Ryan, supra note 32, at 647 ("[l]t is important to identify the values we are
promoting when resolving current issues regarding information as property."); JEDEDIAH PURDY,
FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICA TODAY 131 (1999) ("Every
law and each political choice is in part a judgment about the sort of country we will inhabit and the






This paper explores two ways that law can influence the creation and
distribution of digital content. Specifically, it looks at the relationship
between (1) prohibitions against circumventing technological protection
measures (TPMs) and (2) levies on products or services used to repro-
duce or transmit digital materials. The relationship between digital
locks and levies is analyzed through a comparative study of develop-
ments in Canada and the United States.
Canada has created a broad levy (compared to the United States) to ad-
dress the issue of private copying. Canada has not, so far, enacted spe-
cific anti-circumvention legislation like the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (DMCA). The United States, on the other hand, has enacted, in
the DMCA, relatively strong prohibitions against circumventing TPMs.
At the same time, a very narrow levy exists in the United States under the
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA). In short, the legal situation in Can-
ada is basically the inverse of that in the United States. However, there
have been proposals in the United States to expand the role of levies.
There have also been proposals to introduce anti-circumvention provi-
sions in Canada.
In this paper, alternative approaches are examined from the perspective
of various stakeholders--creators, technology firms and consumers.
Different types of copyright-holders generally prefer different ap-
proaches. Individual authors and performers and their representative
societies have favorable attitudes towards levies, while major producers
and distributors tend to prefer the control digital locks provide. Tech-
nology firms and communications intermediaries might be affected by
both locks and levies, but are typically against expansive levy schemes.
When considering the costs and benefits of locks or levies to consumers,
it is important to distinguish between consumers of entertainment and
consumers of electronics, who are impacted differently.
Because these stakeholders hold different preferences, compromises are
likely to be made in Canada and the United States. If locks and levies
are used simultaneously in the market, consumers risk being caught in
t Jeremy deBeer, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law
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the middle of a regime that prohibits the circumvention of digital rights
management (DRM) systems in order to access or copy digital content,
but at the same time mandates levy payments to compensate for copying
that either cannot occur, is already licensed, or is or should be fair deal-
ing/use. Without careful study, lawmakers in either country could acci-
dentally create a scheme including conceptually and practically incom-
patible legal regulations. An overview of various stakeholders' experi-
ences in Canada, the United States and Europe provides valuable in-
sights for North American law and policy makers.
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As consumers continue to embrace new technologies for listening to
and sharing music, movies and other forms of entertainment, content
creators and distributors must adapt to the rapidly evolving business en-
vironment. There is no need to rehash modem technological, economic
and cultural challenges in great detail. By now, everyone reading this
paper is aware that tens of millions of people use peer-to-peer distribu-
tion networks to share music, movies and other digital content. Enter-
tainment industry incumbents are threatened by this activity. There are
several possible responses.
One is to use digital locks to control access to or use of digital con-
tent. Where legal protections are perceived to be inadequate, firms use
technological protection measures (TPMs) to control what consumers are
and are not able to do with entertainment products. TPMs are a key
component of many digital rights management (DRM) strategies. Be-
cause digital locks can be picked, content owners have successfully lob-
bied international and some domestic lawmakers for specific legal prohi-
bitions against circumventing TPMs.
Another response is to employ levies that generate revenues to in-
centivize content creation. Creators sacrifice a degree of control over
LOCKS & LEVIES
their works in exchange for remuneration intended to compensate for
private or non-commercial copying. This approach is similar to compul-
sory licensing, except that licence fees are paid not by users of copy-
righted materials, but by manufacturers or providers of certain goods or
services.
There is an abundance of scholarship exploring TPMs and anti-
circumvention provisions. There is also a growing body of literature
discussing theoretical alternative compensation models. My goal is to
juxtapose these issues by looking at recent real-world developments in
Canada and the United States, and to some extent, Europe. I want to ex-
plore a worldwide trend toward the simultaneous presence of both locks
and levies in digital entertainment markets.
Canada and the United States have much in common. In addition to
sharing a border nearly 9000 kilometres long, there are remarkable eco-
nomic, cultural and technological similarities between the two countries.
Cultural industries are an important part of the economy in both Canada1
and the United States.2 Perhaps more importantly, consumers in both
jurisdictions share similar tastes for entertainment products. Although
Americans import less Canadian music than visa versa, a substantial
number of Canadian artists are popular south of the border, demonstrat-
ing consumers' shared preferences. Canadians and Americans have ac-
cess to much of the same technology for listening to and sharing music,
movies, video games and other entertainment products. Both countries
have above-average levels of broadband internet access. 3 Since the for-
mation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadians and
Americans find themselves in an increasingly similar technological, cul-
tural and economic environment.
Despite these similarities, North America is not yet as tightly inte-
grated as, for instance, the European Union. There are important differ-
ences between Canada and the United States, from distinct regulatory
regimes to particular political preferences. There are also rather different
legal climates affecting the creation and distribution of digital entertain-
ment products. In particular, these two countries have created distinct
1. In Canada, copyright-based industries account for 9.3% of the 2005 GDP. Copyright-
based industries include the following three sectors as measured by Statistics Canada: information
and cultural; professional, scientific, and technical; and arts, entertainment, and recreation. See
Statistics Canada, http://www.statcan.ca/101/cst0l/econ4l.htm?sdi=gross%20domestic%20product
%20all%20industries.
2. In the United States, the figure was a comparable 12.4% for 2005. Copyright-based indus-
tries include the following three sectors as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis: informa-
tion; professional, scientific and technical services; and arts, entertainment and recreation. See Tho-
mas F. Howells Ill and Kevin B. Barefoot, Annual Industry Accounts: Advance Estimates for 2005 at
18, (May 2006), http://www.bea.gov/bea/ARTlCLES/2006/05May/0506_lndyAccts.pdf.
3. Although broadband penetration in 2004 was slightly higher in Canada (17%) than it was
in the U.S. (13%), both countries are above the 10% average for OECD countries. See Dr. Sacha
Wunsch-Vincent and Dr. Graham Vickery, Working Party on the Information Economy - Digital
Broadband Content: Music at 85 (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/2/34995041 .pdf.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
legal rules for creators and online entrepreneurs by, so far, adopting dif-
ferent policies on the issues of locks and levies.
In Part One of this paper, I explain that in Canada there is a rela-
tively broad levy to compensate for private copying. There are not yet
specific Canadian anti-circumvention provisions, although TPMs are
apparently utilized nonetheless extensively. In Part Two, I look at the
American situation, which is nearly the exact inverse. In the United
States, there is a relatively narrow levy to deal with audio home re-
cording, while there are fairly broad anti-circumvention provisions.
However, there has been pressure to enact anti-circumvention provisions
in Canada, and there have been numerous proposals to adopt a broader
levy scheme in the United States.
Part Three of this paper explores some of the consequences of
locks, levies and proposals for change, from the perspective of creators
and distributors, technology firms and intermediaries and consumers of
electronics and digital content. Locks and levies affect each of these
stakeholders differently. In Part Four, I conclude that the diversity of
perspectives between and within interested stakeholder groups is likely
to lead to compromise solutions, combining aspects of multiple ap-
proaches. It is possible, therefore, that policymakers in Canada and/or
the United States will create a system involving both locks and levies.
This is problematic. Consumers risk being caught in the middle of a
regime that prohibits the circumvention of DRM systems in order to ac-
cess or copy digital content, but at the same time mandates levy pay-
ments to compensate for copying that either cannot occur, is already li-
censed or constitutes fair use/dealing. This has already happened in
Europe, nearly happened in Canada and could easily occur in the United
States. Policymakers should be aware of these concerns in order to
minimize incompatibilities within a system that simultaneously incorpo-
rates both locks and levies.
I. CANADA
Canadian copyright law includes an exemption/levy scheme to ad-
dress the private copying of music. The law also allows for the use of
TPMs, which many content creators and distributors successfully utilize
in Canada. At present, however, the Copyright Act does not directly
prohibit the circumvention of TPMs. The following section describes
these various aspects of Canadian copyright law in more detail.
A. The Private Copying Levy
In Canada, after more than a decade of lobbying, the music industry
convinced Parliament that private copying onto blank tapes was causing
[Vol. 84:1
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significant losses.4 So, in 1998, Part VIII was added to the Copyright
Act to legalize private copying onto some types of blank media, and as a
corollary to allow certain authors, performers and sound recording mak-
ers to propose to the Copyright Board a levy payable by manufacturers
and importers of those media.5 In short, the regime substitutes exclusive
copyrights with a unique right to collect remuneration from third parties.
The object of Canada's private copying levy was to provide com-
pensation to certain music creators, whose exclusive copyrights were
believed to be practically unenforceable at the time the regime was en-
acted. According to Linden J.A., in A VS Technologies: "The purpose of
Part VIII of the Act is mainly an economic one - that is, to fairly com-
pensate artists and the other creative people for their work by establish-
ing fair and equitable levies."6 Although the rationale that private copy-
ing cannot be mostly addressed by legal or technological means is no
longer applicable,7 a levy does still alleviate problems with allowing
copyright owners to monitor and control people's private activities.
8
There are misunderstandings and disagreements, however, about exactly
what sort of private copying the Canadian levy scheme covers.
According to transcripts of meetings preceding the enactment of the
levy, the matter to be addressed was actually quite specific-the use of
4. According to then Minister of Canadian Heritage, Sheila Copps, a majority of the 44
million blank tapes sold in Canada in 1994 were used to copy music. See A Study of Bill C-32, An
Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Par-
liament (Oct. 3, 1996) (statement of Shelia Copps, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minster of
Canadian Heritage), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/
21_96-10-03/heri-21-cover-e.html. See also Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Music Indus-
try, http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pades-srdp/pubs/f-sum-e.htm; Government
of Canada, Parliamentary Sub-committee on the Revision of Copyright, Charter of Rights for Crea-
tors (1985) [hereinafter Charter].
5. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, §§ 80, 82; Jeremy F. deBeer, The Role of
Levies in Canada's Digital Music Market, 4:3 CAN. J. L. TECH. 153 (2005); Jeremy F. deBeer,
Copyrights, Federalism and the Constitutionality of Canada's Private Copying Levy, 51 MCGILL
L.J. (forthcoming 2006); Copyright Board of Canada, Private Copying 1999-2000, at 32-39 (Dec.
17, 1999), available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c 17121999-b.pdf [hereinafter Copyright
Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000]; Copyright Board of Canada, Private Copying 2001-2002,
at 3-4 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c22012001reasons-b.pdf
[hereinafter Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2001-2002]; Copyright Board of Canada, Pri-
vate Copying 2003-2004, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003-b.pdf [hereinafter Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-
2004]; Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance, [2004] F.C.A.
424, 3 [hereinafter CPCC v. CSMA].
6. AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency, 7 C.P.R.
(4th) 68, 5 (2000) [hereinafter A VS Technologies].
7. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment, at 42,
(March 2003), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&Ievies-report.pdf.
8. See Katerina Gaita & Andrew F. Christie, Principle or Compromise?: Understanding the
Original Thinking Behind Statutory Licence and Levy Schemes for Private Copying, at 6-10 (May
2004), http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/2004/lPRIA%2 WP%20
04.04.pdf.
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blank tapes to copy music for private use.9 Although blank CDs and
other digital technologies were envisioned at the time, they were not in
1997 the matter of immediate concern. The "jukebox or record store in
the sky" was foreseen, but recording industry lobbyists stressed that a
levy could not replace the revenues that might be generated by a market
for digital downloads.' °
On the other hand, the Copyright Act defines media subject to the
levy in a way that could hardly be more broadly drafted. The breadth of
Canada's levy turns on the definition of an "audio recording medium" in
section 79.11 It is legal to copy privately using "a recording medium,
regardless of its material form, onto which a sound recording may be
reproduced and that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers
for that purpose."' 2 Certain rights-holders may propose a levy payable
by manufacturers and/or importers of the same.13
After its first hearings on the matter, the Copyright Board adopted a
flexible and relaxed interpretation of "ordinarily used" in order to ensure
that blank CDs, a relatively new technology at the time, would be cap-
tured.' 4 It held the standard to mean that media are leviable so long as
their use for copying music is "non-negligible."' 15 In effect, according to
the Board, ordinarily means not extraordinarily. The Federal Court of
Appeal affirmed that this view was "not patently unreasonable" but
stopped short of holding that the Board's interpretation was correct.
16
Such a low threshold makes Canada's levy much broader than the
American scheme to deal with home audio recording, which captures
only products that have a "primary purpose" of recording digital audio. 17
Another key phrase in section 79 is "regardless of its material
form." A strong argument can be made that this clause shows an inten-
tion to make the levy as technology-neutral as possible. Some govern-
ment reports predating the levy support such an interpretation. 8 Follow-
ing its third hearings on private copying, the Copyright Board interpreted
9. A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Commit-
tee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Oct. 3, 1996), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/21_96-10-03/heri-2 1-cover-e.html.
10. See A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing
Committee on Canadian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Oct. 22, 1996), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/26_96-10-22/heri-26-cover-e.html;
A Study of Bill C-32, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act Before the Standing Committee on Cana-
dian Heritage, 35th Parliament (Nov. 7, 1996), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
35/Archives/committees352/heri/evidence/37 96-11-07/heri-37-cover-e.html.
11. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 79.
12. Id.
13. Id. at § 81.
14. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 28-32.
15. Id. at32.
16. A VS Technologies, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 68, 9-13; see also BLAIS ET AL., STANDARDS OF
REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 141-42 (2d ed. 2005).
17. See infra Part lI.B. (discussing the Audio Home Recording Act).
18. Charter, supra note 4.
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the definition broadly to include digital audio recorders, such as the Ap-
ple iPod.19 The Federal Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Board's
decision on this point. The Court of Appeal held that memory is not a
leviable medium if it is embedded into a device.20 The Court felt the
decision to extend the levy to iPods was for the legislator, not the Board
or the courts, to make. 2' Because Canada's levy excludes devices, it is
not as broad as some European schemes.22 In theory, it is also unlike the
American Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in this respect, although
in practice that is a minor point of distinction.23
One interpretation of the Court's decision leaves open the possibil-
ity that removable digital memory, or a computer hard drive that has not
yet been incorporated into a device, could be subject to a levy in the fu-
ture. It may, however, be splitting hairs to call an iPod a device and re-
movable or raw digital memory a medium. More importantly such a
medium may not be in a form "ordinarily used" by individuals to copy
music. In fact, the Copyright Board expressly held that products such as
IBM MicroDrive hard drives or CompactFlash digital memory cards are
overwhelmingly used for digital photography or other applications, not
copying music.
24
As a corollary to the liabilities imposed on manufacturers and im-
porters of blank audio recording media, consumers are exempted under
section 80 of the Copyright Act from liability for private copying using
such media.25 The private copying exemption only applies to a narrow
genre of truly private copying onto certain types of media. The copy
must be made "for the private use of the person making the copy ' 26-
making a copy for a friend or family member is not permitted within the
scope of this exception.27
However, Canadian courts and administrative decision-makers have
downplayed the nexus between an approved tariff, actual levy payments
and the legality of private copying. The Copyright Board of Canada has
stated that "simply because the Board has not been asked to certify a
tariff on hard disks in personal computers, it does not follow that private
copies made onto such media infringe copyright., 28 Thus, some private
copying activities might be legal under Part VIII of Canada's Copyright
19. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 10, 38.
20. CPCCv. CSM, F.C.A. 424, In 153-164 (2004).
21. Id.
22. See Hugenholtz, supra note 7, at 13.
23. See infra Part 11.B. (discussing the Audio Home Recording Act).
24. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 44, 46-47.
25. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 80.
26. Id.
27. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 20.
28. Id. at21.
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Act, 29 despite the fact that the relevant media/devices are not actually the
subject of a proposed or effective tariff.
This has led some to believe that Canada's private copying regime
legalizes downloading from peer-to-peer (p2p) networks onto hard drives
in personal computers. 30 A careful analysis reveals that is not likely true.
The Copyright Board did lay down series of propositions that, if correct,
could have led to the conclusion that downloading is legal in Canada: a)
electronic and hard disk memory is leviable just as 'traditional' media
like CDs and cassettes; 3' b) hard disk memory in personal computers is
technically identical to other hard disk memory; 32 c) the "legitimacy" of
an activity such as private copying depends not on the presence of a tariff
on a particular kind or unit of a medium, but on whether the kind of me-
dium is ordinarily used by individual consumers to copy music; 33 and d)
personal computers are being widely used by individual consumers to
copy music. 34 Because the Copyright Board had held that "digital audio
recorders" (e.g. iPods) were a kind of "audio recording medium" subject
to a levy, and iPods are technically indistinguishable from hard drives in
personal computers,35 an inference could have been drawn that it is legal
to make private copies using personal computers.
Justice Von Finckenstein embraced this reasoning in his decision in
BMG Canada v. Doe36 to dismiss an interim motion brought as part of
the Canadian recording industry's lawsuits against individual peer-to-
peer network users, alleged to be copyright infringers.37 However, in its
judicial review of the Copyright Board's decision, the Federal Court of
Appeal subsequently overruled the first of the Board's key propositions
that could have rendered downloading legal.38 As mentioned, the Court
of Appeal overruled the iPod levy because it held that memory embed-
ded in a device is not an audio recording medium.39 The corollary is that
private copying using iPods is not permitted (at least not under section
80), and inferentially, private copying using hard drives in personal com-
puters is not permitted. Therefore, in the words of the Court of Appeal,
"copyright infringement could result from the use of such devices to pri-
vate copy. '4° Meanwhile, all of Justice Von Finckenstein's findings re-
29. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, §§ 79-88.
30. E.g., BMG Can. Inc. v. Doe, [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 9 25, vacated, [2005] F.C.A. 193.
31. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 2.
32. Id. at44.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 38-39.
36. [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, vacated, [2005] F.C.A. 193.
37. BMG Can. Inc., [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 25.
38. CPCC v. CSMA, [2004] F.C.A. 424, 99 153-164.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1147 (emphasis added).
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garding the state of Canadian copyright law were vacated by the Federal
Court of Appeal in BMG Canada v. Doe.
4
1
In short, the legality of downloading in Canada depends on whether
hard drives in personal computers are an "audio recording medium" ac-
cording to the statutory definition. The Federal Court of Appeal's ruling
in respect of digital audio recorders such as iPods implies that they are
not.
The revenues generated by the levy are nevertheless substantial.
The Canadian levy currently generates roughly $30-35 million per year
for rights-holders. Total Canadian levy revenues collected since 2000
have reached over $162 million (Canadian).4 a That may not seem like
much, but extrapolated on a per capita basis and accounting for currency
exchange rates, this would be roughly the equivalent of $1 billion (U.S.),
or $250 million (U.S.) per annum. 44 Remember, the figures account only
for the value of private copying onto blank CDs, audiotapes and mini-
discs, and do not include compensation for p2p file sharing. In that light,
Canada's levy generates a lot of money.
The Government has identified Canada's private copying regime as
a timely issue, and has committed to engage in study and public consul-
tations on the matter.45  Among the most pressing questions will be
whether, and if so how, the scheme should apply in the digital age. One
possibility is to expand Canada's private copying levy to encompass
iPods and similar digital music devices, solid-state removable digital
memory products like CompactFlash cards, hard disc drives in desktop
and laptop computers, and/or mobile phones, personal digital assistants
and other convergence devices onto which music may be copied. An-
other possibility is to narrow or eliminate the levy altogether, instead
promoting a combination of locks, licenses and litigation to control Ca-
41. BMG Can. Inc., [2005] F.C.A. 193, 47-52.
42. Canadian Private Copying Collective, Financial Highlights, http://cpcc.ca/english/fin
Highlights.htm.
43. Id. (on average, the Canadian levy has generated approximately $27 million (Canadian) a
year in revenue, with royalty collections increasing dramatically over recent years).
44. The population of Canada was 32,270,500 in 2005. Statistics Canada,
http://www40.statcan.ca/l0l/cstOl/demoO2.htm. In 2005, the U.S. population was 297,599,080. U.S.
Census Bureau, Monthly National Population Estimates,
http://www.census.gov/popest/national/NA-EST2004-0 .html. In order to arrive at $1 billion (U.S.),
I applied the ratio of Canada to U.S. population to the $162 million (Canadian) in levy revenues.
Then, I adjusted the product for an average exchange rate of 0.70436771 between January 2000 and
December 2005 as calculated by the Bank of Canada. Bank of Canada,
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/exchange-avg.html.
45. Government of Canada, Supporting Culture and Innovation: Report on the Provisions and
Operation of the Copyright Act 2 (2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemetfincrp-
prda.nsf/en/rp00863e.html; Government of Canada, Government Statement on Proposals for Copy-
right Reform, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/reforn/statemente.cfm.
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nadians' music copying practices. At the present time, however, both the
scope of the levy and the levy rate appear to have stabilized.46
B. Digital Rights Management Systems
Canada has not yet included prohibitions against circumventing
digital rights management (DRM) systems in its copyright legislation.
Regardless, DRM systems are used widely in Canada for distributing
music and other digital content. The following section examines more
closely the sorts of copy-controls that are presently used in Canada.
In 2002, Professor Kerr and a team of co-authors prepared a two-
part report for the Department of Canadian Heritage on the subject of
technological protection measures (TPMs).47 In Part I, among other
things, they describe various types of DRM systems, including TPMs.
TPMs include access-control measures, such as cryptography,
where access to content is restricted in one way or another.48 One of the
most widely known TPMs they discuss is the Content Scramble System
(CSS), which controls playback and recording of DVDs.49 Simply put,
most DVDs are region-coded to, among other things, limit unlicensed
geographic redistribution of films.5 0 For example, consumers who law-
fully purchase a DVD in Europe may be frustrated to discover it will not
play on their North American DVD player.
Other TPMs control not access to, but use of digital content.5 Kerr
and his co-authors describe Macrovision, the Secure Digital Music Initia-
tive (SDMI) and other "copy-control" TPMs that allow a rights-holder to
control copying, transmission and other uses of a work 2.5  Another ex-
ample of a widely used DRM tool is Adobe Systems PDF file format.
Real Networks, Microsoft and Apple all use DRM systems, including
TPMs, in one form or another to manage the distribution and playback of
audio and/or multimedia files.
The Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) is a particularly in-
teresting TPM given its connection with the Audio Home Recording
46. The Board has approved substantially the same private copying tariff for the past several
years. See Copyright Bd. of Can., http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/tariffs/certified/copying-e.html.
47. lan Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Part I -
Trends in Technical Protection Measures and Circumvention Technologies (2002),
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/protection/protectione.pdf [hereinafter Kerr
et al., TPMs: Part /]; Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Meas-
ures: Part II - The Legal Protection of TPMs (2002), http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-
cpb/pubs/protectionlI/protection-e.pdf [hereinafter Kerr et al., TPMs: Part 11].
48. Kerr et al., TPMs: Part I, supra note 47, at 2.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id. at 9, 15.
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Act53 in the United States, discussed below. 54 This technology, with the
aid of a digitally encoded watermark, allows unlimited copying from
original recordings but not from second-generation copies. It prevents
serial copying.55
TPMs recently made headlines in Canada (and the United States) in
connection with their use by Sony BMG Music on CDs. 56 Tens of mil-
lions of discs included software that was designed to control consumers'
uses of music, but which in fact installed on their computers a "rootkit"
or another program that interfered with normal system operations, caused
serious security vulnerabilities, was practically impossible to uninstall
and surreptitiously reported information about users' computers and lis-
tening activities.57 Numerous lawsuits were commenced in response to
Sony BMG's actions. In the United States, the private actions were con-
solidated and settled, although there are still individual and government-
led complaints or investigations pending. 58 Parallel class actions in Can-
ada are also ongoing. 9
For law and policy makers, and for consumers, these lawsuits are a
clear reminder that TPMs are prevalent in the Canadian digital market-
place. In fact, all or most of the aforementioned DRM systems are ap-
parently used as extensively and effectively in Canada as they are in
other jurisdictions, despite the lack of circumvention prohibitions in the
Canadian Copyright Act.
53. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2006)).
54. See infra Part lI.B.
55. Kerr et al., TPMs: Part 1, supra note 47, at 13; see also Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio
Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311,325 (1994).
56. See Jeremy F. deBeer, How Restrictive Terms and Technologies Backfired on Sony BMG
Music (Part 1), 6 INTERNET & E-CoM. L. IN CAN. 93 (2006); Jeremy F. deBeer, How Restrictive
Terms and Technologies Backfired on Sony BMG Music (Part 2), 7 INTERNET & E-COM. L. IN CAN.
1 (2006); Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode,
http://itpolicy.cs.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm.pdf.
57. Furthermore, consumers who had purchased one of these CDs could not use it on a com-
puter without clicking to agree with misleading, not to mention ridiculous, terms and conditions. See
Halderman & Felten, supra note 56.
58. See In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litigation, Case No 1:05-cv-09575, (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Complaint, Mark Lyon v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, County Court of Hinds County, Mississippi,
First Judicial District (Jan. 5, 2006) (consolidated into In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litigation); see
also Texas v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, Dist. Ct., Travis Co, Texas; Office of the Attorney General
of Florida, Case No. L05-3-1157; Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG's Case,
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/nov2005/tc20051128 573560.htm.
59. Jacques v. Sony, 06-044 S.C.B.C. (2006); Cheneyl v. Sony, 06-CV-033329 Ont. Sup. Ct.
Jus. (2006); Palmer. v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 06-CV-304178CP Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus. (2006).
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C. Paracopyright Proposals
Because prohibitions on the circumvention of DRM systems offer
legal protection beyond that provided by traditional copyright law, they
are sometimes referred to as "paracopyright" laws.60
Provisions addressing the circumvention of TPMs and tampering
with rights management information (RMI) had their genesis in the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty
(WCT)6!  and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT).62 These are collectively known as the WIPO Internet Treaties.
Article 11 of the WCT requires that:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effec-
tive legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technologi-
cal measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty or the Beme Convention and that re-
strict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the
authors concerned or permitted by law.
63
Because "adequate legal protection" can be provided through di-
verse areas of law,64 it would be inaccurate to suggest that Canadian law
does not contain any anti-circumvention laws. But the government's
own studies have concluded that "[a]t the moment, it is far from certain
that new legislation designed to protect the legitimate use of TPMs is
necessary to meet the TPM-related requirements of the WCT and
WPPT. 65 Although Canadian law does not include specific prohibitions
against circumventing TPMs, like the DMCA does, Canada's Copyright
60. See, e.g., Jeremy F. deBeer, Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Paracopyright Laws, in IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 89, 89-90 (Michael Geist ed.,
2005) (citing David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
SOc'Y U.S.A. 401, 405 (1998-1999)); Michael J. Remington, The Ever-Whirling Cycle of Change:
Copyright and Cyberspace, 3 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 213, 238-41 (2002); Dan L. Burk, Anti-
Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2003); Kimberlee Weatherall, Before the
High Court: On Technology Locks and the Proper Scope of Digital Copyright Laws - Sony in the
High Court, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 613, 615 (2004). Peter Jaszi has also used the terms "pseudocopy-
right" and "metacopyright" to describe similarly new rights. See Peter Jaszi, Professor, Is This the
End of Copyright As We Know It?, Address at Nordinfo Conference in Stockholm, Sweden (Oct. 9-
10, 1997), at 58-67.
61. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11-12, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wctl
pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf.
62. World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograph Treaty art. 18-19,
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
wppt/pdf/trtdocs-wo034.pdf
63. WCT, supra note 61, at 71; WPPT art. 18, supra note 62, at 86 (using similar language in
respect of the rights of performers and record producers).
64. deBeer, supra note 60, at 94-95.
65. Kerr et al., TPMs: Part 11, supra note 47, § 8.0; see also Ian R. Kerr, Alana Maunrushat &
Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright's Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L.
REV. 7, 76-77 (2002-2003).
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Act provides some protection. 66 Specifically, TPMs involving computer
programs may be protected as literary works. Canada's Criminal Code
also protects TPMs in various ways.67
Nevertheless, there has been pressure on Canada to strengthen its
laws in this respect. Canada was even on the Special 301 Watch List
maintained by the Office of the United States Trade Representative.68
In May 2004, the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage rec-
ommended immediate ratification of the WCT and WPPT.69 To accom-
plish this, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-60 in the summer
of 2005.70 Bill C-60 would have prohibited the act of circumvention, or
the provision of services to circumvent, but only if it were "for the pur-
pose of an act that is an infringement of the copyright." 71 This legisla-
tion never made it past its first reading in the House of Commons. The
minority government that introduced the Bill was defeated on a vote of
non-confidence (over issues unrelated to copyright reform) before Bill C-
60 made it to committee review.
As a result, Canadian law and policy makers went back to the draw-
ing board. Just when it seemed the new government was picking up
where the old one left off,72 important stakeholders publicly expressed
disapproval of the expected reforms.73 Canada, it seems, is back to
square one on the issue of prohibitions against the circumvention of
DRM systems.
II. UNITED STATES
The United States' Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
74
includes strong prohibitions against circumventing TPMs and/or devices
that facilitate circumvention. There is a relatively narrow levy on very
66. See Christian S. Tacit & Nelligan O'Brien Payne, The Current Status of Legal Protection
for Technology Protection Measures in Canada § 3.2 (2003), available at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/uridique/indexe.cfm.
67. Id. at §§ 3.3, 3.4.
68. Special 301 Watch List (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
Reports Publications/2003/2003_Special 301 Report/Special_301 WatchList.html?ht-=.
69. Parliament of Canada, Interim Report on Copyright Reform: Report of the Standing
Committee on Canadian Heritage, (Ottawa: Communication Canada, May 2004).
http://www.parl.gc.ca/nfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/herirpO I -e.htm
[hereinafter Interim Report].
70. Bill C-60, Parliament of Canada (2005) (First Reading), http://www.parl.gc.ca/
38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/1 19_2005-06-20/tocl 19-E.htm (scroll down the schedule index
to the "1510" time and click on the "Copyright Act" hyperlink).
71. Id. at § 34.02(1), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/38/l/parlbus/chambus/
house/bills/government/C-60 1 .PDF.
72. See Conservative Government to Introduce Copyright Bill: Bev Oda, THE HILL TIMES
(Ottawa, ON), Apr. 10, 2006, Politics Page, available at http://www.thehilltimes.ca/html/
index.php?display=story&full_path=/2006/april/10/politics/&c=1.
73. See, e.g., Canadian Music Creators Coalition, http://www.musiccreators.ca; Intellectual
Privacy, http://www.intellectualprivacy.ca; Appropriation Art, http://www.appropriationart.ca.
74. 17 U.S.C.A. §§1201-1205, 1301-1332 (West 2006).
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limited types of products established under the AHRA. Several com-
mentators have, however, suggested expanding the role of levies in the
United States. The following section explores these topics in more de-
tail.
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
American lawmakers were early adopters of the WIPO Internet
Treaties' anti-circumvention provisions. In 1998, the DMCA 75 was
adopted into law, marking perhaps the most significant amendment to the
Copyright Act of 1976 to date.76
The DMCA prohibits acts of circumvention. 77 Recall that the Ca-
nadian proposal would have prohibited circumvention only if done for
the purpose of facilitating copyright infringement. The DMCA instead
enumerates several specific exceptions. The United States Copyright
Office conducts triennial reviews of these exceptions, and has certain
rulemaking powers in this respect.78  These reviews have allowed for
certain exceptions, 79 but they are rather narrow and obscure. American
courts have not been willing to expand or broadly interpret the list of
enumerated exceptions .80 For instance, circumvention for fair use has
not been permitted.
In addition to prohibiting circumvention of TPMs, the DMCA also
prevents trafficking in technologies designed to circumvent encryption
measures. 81 It is largely for this reason that the DMCA has led to heavy
75. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(1).
76. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37 (2001).
77. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201.
78. Exemptions are granted for a period of three years with the possibility of extensions after
the following triennial review. See generally Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A
Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings (2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=844544. To date, two triennial reviews have
been completed by the U.S. Copyright Office: one in 2000 and the second in 2003. For information
on the classes of exemptions requested by the public during the third triennial review currently under
way, please see Comments on Anticircumvention Exemptions (2006) http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2006/comments/index.html.
79. Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights (2003), http://www.copyright.gov/
1201/2003/index.html.
80. See, e.g., 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcom-
soft, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
81. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l).
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criticism from many commentators.8 2 Several United States cases illus-
trate the breadth of the DMCA's possible effects.83
In some contexts, the threat of liability under the DMCA has lead to
self-censorship by technology researchers. 84 Professor Felten of Prince-
ton University, his research team, employer and organizers of an aca-
demic conference were formally threatened with legal consequences if
findings regarding vulnerabilities with the Secure Digital Music Initiative
(SMDI) copy protection scheme would have been presented.85 The fol-
lowing year, Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian programmer, was actually ar-
rested and prosecuted (although not convicted) in the United States for
working on a program that may have been used to circumvent techno-
logical restrictions in Adobe e-books.
86
In other contexts, the DMCA has had anti-competitive effects. In
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,87 the
plaintiff used the DMCA to prevent the production of aftermarket toner
cartridges.88 Similarly, in Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies,89
the plaintiff attempted to use the DMCA to impede the production of
universal garage door openers by one of its competitors. 90 Even though
the defendants in both cases were ultimately successful, 9' their legal vic-
tories were not without costly litigation.
The DMCA has, of course, stifled technologies used to circumvent
copyright-related TPMs. In 2000, major movie studios stopped a maga-
zine from posting the code to circumvent access and copy controls on
DVDs, and from knowingly linking to websites where the code was
available.92 Also in 2000, RealNetworks employed the DMCA to obtain
an injunction against Streambox, designers of a digital VCR that allowed
82. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 520, 527 (1999);
Burk, supra note 60; Simon Fitzpatrick, Copyright Imbalances: U.S. and Australian Responses to
the WIPO Digital Copyright Treaty, 5 E.I.P.R. 214, 223 (2000); Kamiel J. Koelman, Address at the
ALAI Congress: The Protection of Technological Measures vs. the Copyright Limitations (June
2001), http://www.alai-usa.org/200I_conference/lprogram en.htm (scroll down to "Subpart 2"and
click on the "text" link next to author's name to download document).
83. For more DMCA casualties, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Conse-
quences: Seven Years Under the DMCA (Apr. 2006), http://www.eff.org/1P/DMCA/unintended_




87. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Recent Development: Control of the Aftermarket
through Copyright, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 307 (2003) (criticizing Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003)).
88. Lexmark Int 7, 387 F.3d at 529.
89. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 1183.
91. Lexmarklnt'l, 387 F.3d at 553; Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204.
92. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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media streamed on-line to be time-shifted.93 In 2004, commercial manu-
facturers of DVD back-up software were barred from distributing their
software to consumers.
94
In practice, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions transcend
the physical boundaries of the United States' borders. Although a Nor-
wegian teenager created the code at issue in Reimerdes, the DMCA ap-
plied when the code was distributed in the United States.95 Similarly,
Skylarov, the Russian programmer, was arrested as soon as he travelled
to the United States.96 In another copyright-related example, an Ameri-
can judge forced icraveTV, a Canadian company retransmitting televi-
sion via the web, to shut down by ordering it to block its signal from
reaching the United States.97 In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada has
noted several instances where American courts have held that United
States copyright laws can apply extra-territorially. 98 Popular circumven-
tion tools will be caught by the DMCA when either the technology or its
creator enters the United States, demonstrating how broad the effects of
this legislation can be.
B. The Audio Home Recording Act
In theory, the AHRA sets up a scheme not dramatically different
from Canada's private copying levy. Rights-holders are entitled to col-
lect royalties from manufacturers of certain digital audio recording de-
vices, who must incorporate specific technological measures to prevent
serial copying. As a corollary, the AHRA prohibits infringement suits in
respect of certain private copying activities. 99 In practice, however, the
levy scheme under the AHRA is much narrower than Canada's private
copying levy. There are important technological, historical, legal and
economic distinctions between these two schemes.
The AHRA arose out of uncertainty surrounding the introduction of
the digital audio tape (DAT), which some music industry stakeholders
saw as a highly disruptive technology. 00 Prior to the enactment of the
93. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at * 1 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
94. 321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
95. Reimerdes, I llF. Supp. at311,316.
96. EFF, Unintended Consequences, supra note 83.
97. Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831, 1833 (W.D.
Pa. 2000).
98. See Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass'n of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427,459-60.
99. See Alex Allemann, Note, Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The Uncertain Status
of MP3 under Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 79
TEx. L. REv. 189, 195-96 (2000); Christine C. Carlisle, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 335, 336, 338 (1994); Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 - Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 145, 174-75 (1992); McKuin, supra note 55, at 325-28.
100. Saba Elkman & Andrew F. Christie, Regulating Private Copying of Musical Works:
Lessons from the U.S. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 4 (The Intellectual Prop. Research Inst. of
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AHRA, there was debate about whether private copying constituted an
infringement of copyright or an allowable "fair use," and whether DAT
device manufacturers could consequently be held liable for contributory
infringement.1 ' 1 In the famous Sony Betamax case, 10 2 the United States
Supreme Court held that recording television programs for later viewing
("time shifting") was a fair use of copyright-protected works, and there-
fore manufacturers of videocassette recorders could not be held liable for
contributing to the infringement of copyright. 10 3 Although it is arguable
that the same reasoning applies to the transfer of music from one device
or medium to another ("format shifting"), there are differences between
analogue video recording and digital audio recording, including the ease
with which multiple perfect copies can be made and distributed.
10
4
Manufacturers of audio recording devices were reluctant to engage
in prolonged and expensive litigation to find out whether they would be
protected by the Betamax doctrine. Moreover, DAT manufacturers
needed the recording industry to support the new technology by distribut-
ing music in this format.105 Therefore, building on a series of negotiated
agreements, 10 6 both sides lobbied Congress to codify their private com-
promise solution.
The resulting AHRA reflected agreements between device manufac-
turers and the recording industry concerning royalty payments and tech-
nological safeguards against serial copying. It also conferred a right
upon consumers to make non-commercial audio home recordings, and
prevented manufacturers, distributors, and importers of digital audio re-
cording devices from being sued for facilitating the production of these
private copies.
10 7
In the AHRA, "digital audio recording device" is defined as:
[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individu-
als for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of
Austl., Working Paper No. 12/04, 2004), available at http://www.ipria.org/publications/
workingpapers/2004/IPRIA WP 12.04.pdf.
101. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2006).
102. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony
Betamax].
103. Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 421.
104. See Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 4 (citing Allemann, supra note 99, at 194).
105. Id. at 5.
106. The "Athens agreement," so-named for the city in which the meetings took place, ensured
that DAT manufacturers would equip all DAT recorders with Serial Copy Management System
(SCMS) thereby allowing unlimited copying from original sources and preventing serial copying,
but failed to provide music creators with any compensation for home copying. Id. at 10; McKuin,
supra note 55, at 322. The "Cahn agreement", named for the litigation that produced the settlement,
provided for a royalty scheme to address this shortcoming. See Elkman & Christie, supra note 100,
at 5-6. Notably absent from the parties' negotiated agreements was a consumer right to produce
audio home recordings in the first place. Without such a right, manufacturers, distributors, and
importers of digital audio recorders could not clearly escape legal liability.
107. Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 8, 13-14.
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some other machine or device, the digital recording function of
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is
capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use..
108
To be caught by the AHRA, the device must be capable of produc-
ing a "digital audio copied recording." 10 9 That is defined in the AHRA
as "a reproduction.., of a digital musical recording, whether that repro-
duction is made directly from another digital musical recording or indi-
rectly from a transmission."110 A "digital musical recording" is a mate-
rial object in which are fixed only sounds and things incidental to those
sounds. 11 Importantly, this latter definition excludes objects "in which
one or more computer programs are fixed."
'1 12
The AHRA enabled the introduction of new technologies, such as
the DAT and the MiniDisc, into the marketplace, although perhaps after
too long a delay. Consumers have never adopted DAT en masse. Also,
the narrow definition of "digital audio recording device" ensured that
courts limited the scheme's application to new technologies. 1
3
So, the AHRA has certainly not been a panacea on the issue of au-
dio home recording in the United States. The American recording indus-
try has not always been successful obtaining injunctive relief against
manufacturers of devices that are sometimes used to record digital au-
dio.1 14 At the same time, manufacturers lack the certainty they would
like to introduce new technologies. Consumers are often caught in the
middle of these battles. Several recent and ongoing cases demonstrate the
point.
In Diamond Multimedia Systems,' 1 5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a computer is not a "digital audio recording de-
vice" as outlined in the AHRA, because its "primary purpose" is not to
produce digital audio copied recordings. 1 6  Further, computer hard
drives are excluded from the ambit of the AHRA since hard drives con-
tain computer programs that are "not incidental to any sound files that
may be stored on the hard drive.""l l7 In other words, computers fail the
"primary purpose" test and satisfy the "material object exception.' 1 18
108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(3).
109. See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001); Elkman &
Christie, supra note 100, at 11.
110. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1).
111. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(5)(A)(i).
112. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(5)(B)(ii).
113. Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 13.
114. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
115. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1072.
116. Id. at 1078.
117. Id. at 1076.
118. Elkman & Christie, supra note 100, at 12.
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Because portable MP3 players copy music from computers, they also do
not fall within AHRA.
Based on this reasoning most other multi-purpose convergence de-
vices, such as mobile phones, handheld PDAs, flash cards and other re-
movable digital memory, might also fall outside the scope of the AHRA.
The flexibility of the AHRA to deal with new technologies may, how-
ever, be tested in court again soon. The recording industry has recently
filed suit against manufacturers of devices capable of recording and re-
playing music transmitted by satellite. In Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
XMSatellite Radio' 19 it has been alleged that the defendants are liable for
direct, contributory and vicarious infringement of copyright. 20 Although
the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of the AHRA, the defen-
dants have argued that the allegedly infringing device conforms to the
AHRA's definition of a 'digital audio recording device' thereby granting
XM and their subscribers "absolute immunity" from the plaintiffs. 121 On
the one hand, the devices at issue in the XM Satellite litigation are distin-
guishable from the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, the iPod, and
other devices because the former record "indirectly from a transmission"
not "directly from another digital musical recording. 1 22  Therefore,
unlike the issues in Diamond Multimedia, issues related to the fixation of
other sounds on computers are irrelevant. On the other hand, the AHRA
only provides a defense against actions based on the manufacture, impor-
tation or distribution of devices, or on the non-commercial use of such
devices by consumers. 23 Some of the claims in the XM Satellite are
based upon other allegedly infringing activities, such as delivering digital
phonorecords.124 Although the service of delivering content is closely
tied to the product being distributed, it remains to be seen how the rela-
tionship will be interpreted under the AHRA.
In Canada, the Copyright Board has tried to expand the levy in a
technology-neutral manner by including new media and devices ordinar-
ily used for copying music. 25 However, given the Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal's ruling overturning the Copyright Board's levy on
iPods and similar devices and the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Diamond Multimedia dismissing a claim
with respect to the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, the Canadian and
119. Complaint, At. Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio Inc., No. 06-CV-3733 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2006), available at http://eff.org/IP/digitalradio/XM-complaint.pdf.
120. Id. at 15, 25, 27.
121. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Atl. Re-
cording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., No. 06-CV-3733, 2006 WL 2429415 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2006).
122. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1).
123. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008.
124. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 115(a)(1), (b)(l)-(2), 501(a) (West 2006).
125. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 29-32.
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American positions are similar in some respects. 126 Unlike some Euro-
pean nations, neither Canada nor the United States levies many digital
devices. 127 There are, however, still some major differences between the
Canadian and American levy schemes.
The main difference is that the Canadian levy applies to media that
are "ordinarily used" for private copying while the American scheme
adopts a "primary purpose" test with an exception for objects used to
copy computer programs. 128 This means CD burners incorporated into
personal computers and, consequently, blank CDs are not levied in the
United States. Canada, on the other hand, imposes a levy on blank CDs
despite the fact that only one third of these media are used to copy mu-
sic. 129
That is the reason that Canada's levy generated roughly $35 million
(Canadian) in 2005, and total revenues collected since 2000 equal about
$162 million (Canadian). 130  As explained above, a levy of equivalent
scope in the United States would have generated about $1 billion (U.S.),
factoring in currency conversions and extrapolating for population dif-
ferences. 131 By comparison, between 1992 and 2001, the net revenues
from the levies collected under the relevant provisions of the United
States Copyright Act total a little over $17.9 million (U.S.) (an average
of under $2 million (U.S.) per annum). '
32
C. Exemption/Levy Proposals
Although the AHRA imposes only a very narrow levy, some Ameri-
can commentators have considered whether to expand the role of levies
to compensate creators of digital content. 133 The appropriate scope of
126. Compare Canadian Private Copying Collective v. Canadian Storage Media Alliance,
[2004] 247 D.L.R. 193 at 234 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refised, [2005] 3 F.C.R. i, with
Diamond Multimedia 180 F.3d at 1081 (indicating that both courts viewed MP3 players, such as the
Apple iPod and the Diamond Rio portable MP3 player, as devices that should not be subject to
restrictions).
127. See Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at 13.
128. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 11; Diamond
Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
129. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
130. Canadian Private Copying Collective, supra notes 42-43.
131. Statistics Canada, supra note 44; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
132. See Exhibit Retailers-16, filed as evidence in Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying
2003-2004, supra note 5; WILLIAM W. FISHER 111, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT at 282 n. 10 (2004).
133. See generally Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653, 763-64 (2005); FISHER, supra note 132, at 7-8; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruc-
tion of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263,
269 (2002); S. J. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory Li-
cence, at 11 (2003), http://www.serci.org/2003/liebowitz2.pdf; Jessica Litman, Sharing & Stealing,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV.
813, 855-58 (2001); Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three "Golden Oldies" Prop-
erty Rights, Contracts, and Markets, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 508, at 12 (2004),
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levies in the digital era is a hot topic for Canadian, 134 Australian 135 and
European 136 experts as well. The following section describes the gist of
some of the recent proposals.
Professor Netanel, for example, delineated a comprehensive model
that would permit private copying, remixes, adaptations, modifications,
and dissemination of all kinds of communicative expressions in both
digital and non-digital forms.' 137 To provide sufficient compensation to
creators, a levy would be imposed on a broad range of goods and ser-
vices, the value of which is substantially enhanced by peer-to-peer file
sharing.1 38 Professor Ku also advocated for levies on the sale of internet
services and electronic equipment, but his model would apply to digital
cultural products only. 139  Professor Fisher proposed to allow various
uses of audio and video recordings in exchange for a system likely
funded through taxation of digital recording and storage devices. 140 Eck-
ersley has similarly discussed the concept of a virtual market-a decen-
tralized, software-mediated, publicly funded mechanism to reward digital
authorship without restricting flows of information.
14 1
Although different in details, all of the aforementioned models are
based on the same underlying idea: broad dissemination of music, mov-
ies and/or other forms of entertainment should be encouraged and the
present copyright system is a hindrance. Therefore, a new system is
needed to generate financial incentives for creators. The solution is a
variant of compulsory licensing. However-and this is the key point-
the license fees are to be paid not by actual users of copyrighted content
but by third-party proxies, such as manufacturers of electronic hardware
and software or network providers and other intermediaries.
http://www.catoinstitute.org/pubs/pas/pa508.pdf; Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy
to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003).
134. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for
File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 72-73 (2004); John Davidson, Rethinking Private Copying
in the Digital Age: An Analysis of the Canadian Approach to Music (2001) (unpublished L.L.M.
thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law); Cathy Allison, The Challenges and Opportunities of
Online Music: Technology Measures, Business Models, Stakeholder Impact and Emerging Trends,
DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE (2004), http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/ac-
ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/onlinemusic/online music e.pdf.
135. See, e.g., Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital
Copyright?, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 106-11 (2004); Andrew F. Christie, Private Copying Li-
cence and Levy Schemes: Resolving the Paradox of Civilian and Common Law Approaches,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA 1 (2004),
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/ipria/publications/workingpapers/Occasional %20paper/ 22.04.pdf;
Gaita & Christie, supra note 8, at 1-3; Kimberlee Weatherall, A Comment on the Copyright Excep-
tions Review and Private Copying 1, 20-21 (Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia,
Working Paper No. 14/05, 2005), available at http://www.ipria.org/publications/workingpapers/
WP14.05.pdf.
136. See Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at ii.
137. Netanel, supra note 133, at 35.
138. Id.
139. See Ku, supra note 133, at 313, 321-22.
140. FISHER, supra note 132, at 202-03, 216-17.
141. Eckersley, supra note 135, at 92-93.
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It is important to distinguish these proposals from ostensibly similar
ideas discussed, for example, by Professor Gervais,142 the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF),143 and from emerging licensed p2p services.
Professor Litman noted that there are two models for collecting fees to be
distributed among creators: (1) a direct blanket licensing fee or (2) a tax
on the sale of goods or services.'4 Professor Gervais's model essentially
proposed p2p user-fees, which are simply brokered by intermediaries and
backed-up by enforceable exclusivity. 145 This type of scheme would be
voluntary rather than compulsory.146  Voluntary licensing proposals,
unlike exemption/levy schemes, are still built on a framework of exclu-
sive proprietary copyrights. 47 Professor Gervais advocated for a system
whereby copyright is used to normatively coerce consumers into pay-
ment of licensing fees 48 but is in practice rarely or never actually liti-
gated.149 Generally, Professor Gervais, like the EFF, proposed to build
new business models upon slight modifications to the existing para-
digm. 150 These types of proposals are calls for more business reforms
rather than legal reforms.
Other scholars also believe that market responses to p2p and private
copying will eventually be found, so an expanded levy scheme is not the
way of the future.' 5' Professor Merges, for instance, has urged us to stick
with the three "golden oldies"-property rights, contracts, and mar-
kets.15 2  Likewise, Professor Leibowitz has emphasized that we should
not "throw out the baby with the bathwater" but should instead investi-
gate more carefully arguments surrounding a shift away from an unfet-
tered market.
53
Had the United States Supreme Court decided the Grokster case'
54
differently, it is conceivable that Congress would be considering a com-
142. See generally Gervais, supra note 134, at 73 (discussing the idea of enforcing a voluntary
compulsory licensing scheme).
143. See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collec-
tive Licensing of Music File Sharing 1 (2004), http://www.eff.org/share/collective lic_wp.pdf [here-
inafter EFF, A Better Way Forward] (discussing the idea of enforcing a voluntary compulsory li-
censing scheme).
144. Litman, supra note 133, at 44.
145. Gervais, supra note 134, at 73.
146. See FISHER, supra note 132, at 46-52. Professor Fisher prefers a compulsory regime, but
would be willing to accept a voluntary scheme, outside of governmental control. Id.
147. See EFF, A Better Way Forward, supra note 143 (discussing the benefits of voluntary
licensing proposals to copyright owners and how these copyright owners are able to maintain pro-
prietary rights to their works under this model).
148. See Gervais, supra note 134, at 56-58.
149. See id. at 59.
150. Compare Gervais, supra note 134, at 73, with EFF, A Better Way Forward, supra note
142, at 1-2 (suggesting alterations to the already existing p2p networks).
151. See Merges, supra note 133, at 10.
152. See id. at 5 ("Maintaining the traditional legal pairing of property rights and contracts,
which usually leads to market formation, seems like a safer course than mandates or new market
intervention to correct for past market intervention.").
153. Liebowitz, supra note 133, at 20.
154. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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pulsory licensing scheme right now. In fact, that is precisely what hap-
pened when the Supreme Court held that manufacturers of player piano
rolls were not liable to pay royalties to music composers. 55 As things
stand, dramatic changes of the sort proposed under Professor Netanel's
"Non-Commercial Use Levy," (NUL) or Professor Fisher's "Alternative
Compensation Scheme" (ACS) are unlikely.1 56  That does not mean,
however, that more moderate changes are out of the question. Although
there may be problems implementing the types of reforms advocated by
proponents of broader levy schemes, it would be unwise to dismiss out-
right the calls for change. Because of the strength of some of the argu-
ments in favor of proposals for change, law and policy makers might be
persuaded to adopt some of these suggestions.
III. STAKEHOLDERS
North American law and policy makers seem right now to be stand-
ing at a crossroads with levies to the left and locks to the right. Canadi-
ans and Americans are approaching this crossroads from opposite direc-
tions. Canada already has a relatively broad levy (compared to the
United States), and is now considering introducing legal protections for
TPMs. 157 The United States already has anti-circumvention provisions,
and there are now suggestions to adopt a broad levy system. 1
58
This section looks at the impact of locks and levies from the per-
spective of three main groups of stakeholders: creators, technology firms,
and consumers. Analysis reveals conflicting views about the appropriate
policy measures between and within these groups. The diversity of per-
spectives may lead to compromise solutions where aspects of multiple
proposals are implemented.
A. Creators
Different creators and distributors benefit differently from locks and
levies. Generally speaking, multinational movie studios, record labels,
and other large-scale producers would prefer to rely upon locks to con-
trol the distribution of digital content. Authors, performers and small-
scale producers are not usually adverse to the idea of sacrificing some
control in exchange for the steady revenue streams provided by levies.
Conflicts within the music industry itself significantly complicate policy
debates surrounding these issues.
155. See White-Smith Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
156. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
157. House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-60, An Act to amend the Copyright Act ch. 27,
(June 20, 2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemmentlC-60/C-
60_1/C-60_cover-E.html. (proposing penalties for the circumvention of TPMs).
158. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2006) (establishing
anti-circumvention provisions); FISHER, supra note 132, at 202 (proposing a tax-based reward sys-
tem); Eckersley, supra note 135, at 92-93 (proposing a publicly-funded remuneration system);
Netanel, supra note 133, at 83 (proposing levies for non-commercial use).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Major corporate rights-holders seem to prefer TPMs to levies. 59
TPMs offer greater control over consumers' use of digital content, and
therefore they facilitate new business models. 60 TPMs also help to fa-
cilitate price discrimination, which means charging different prices for
different products, or even better, different prices for the same product,
based upon a consumer's willingness to pay. This is an important profit-
maximizing strategy.
Levies, on the other hand are perceived by this group as problematic
for several reasons. For one, they complicate international copyright
enforcement and licensing practices. 61  Also, although existing levy
schemes are intended to cover only truly private copying and not peer-to-
peer (p2p) file sharing, many consumers might get the impression that
levies legitimize and compensate for unlimited copying and sharing. As
mentioned, some judges have adopted this view, which proved to be
highly problematic when Canadian copyright-holders attempted to sue
users of p2p networks in Canada. 62 The major record labels are strug-
gling to keep the issues of file sharing and private copying distinct from
each other. In fact, concerns of these sorts have led the Canadian Re-
cording Industry Association president, Graham Henderson, to argue that
Canada's private copying levy should be abolished. 1
63
However, many creators like levies. Individual authors, performers
and collecting societies, for example, often argue in favor of the contin-
ued use of levies to remunerate for consumers' non-commercial or pri-
vate copying activities. 164 Levies can help offset some of the power im-
balances that exist between artists and music companies because statutes,
regulations or administrative decisions may require equitable distribution
patterns.
Some creators feel that TPMs primarily benefit major corporate
producers by enhancing their already concentrated control over the dis-
tribution of digital content.1 65 Moreover, these groups reject digital locks
as "risky and counterproductive."' 166  Incidents like the one described
159. Jorg Reinbothe, Private Copying, Levies and DRMs against the Background of the EU
Copyright Framework, Address at the DRM Levies Conference in Brussels (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/copyright/documents/2003-speech-reinbotheen.htm.
160. Id.
161. See Reinbothe, supra note 159.
162. BMG Can. Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C.J. No. 525, 18-19.
163. Larry Leblanc, CRIA Calls for End of Blank-Media Levy, BILLBOARD 18, Apr. 8, 2006,
http://www.ccfda.ca/Downloadsresources/CRIA CCFDA Billboard.doc.
164. Reinbothe, supra note 159. See, e.g., AEPO-ARTS, FIA and FIM Express Their Deep
Concern and Clear Opposition to any Restrictions of the Remuneration System for Private Copying,
Music BUSINESS, May 31, 2006, http://www.labellife.com/2006/05/31/aepo-artis-fia-and-fim-
express-their-deep-concem-and-clear-opposition-to-any-restrictions-of-the-remuneration-system-for-
private-copying.
165. Press Release, Canadian Music Creators Coalition, Launch of a New Voice: The Canadian





above involving Sony-BMG generate hostility toward the music industry
in general, not just those who employ TPMs. Some creators are there-
fore skeptical of anti-circumvention provisions. For example, a group of
high-profile Canadian artists including the Barenaked Ladies, Avril
Lavigne, Sarah McLachlan and others have agreed that both artists and
consumers need protectionfrom TPMs.
167
Studies suggest that legal protection for digital locks seems to influ-
ence what sort of content is created and by whom, but not the amount of
content created. For example, a recent economic analysis of Canadian
copyright-based industries concluded that the Canadian music scene is
thriving.1 68 On the one hand, there was consolidation among the major
multinational record labels, and their record sales fell. 169 At the same
time, however, a number of mid-sized Canadian-based firms leveraged
their success in production and music publishing to establish a secure
footing in the Canadian marketplace.170 Despite the lack of specific anti-
circumvention provisions in Canadian law, the Canadian sound recording
industry experienced steady growth between 1999 and 2004.17 I The
GDP contribution consistently outperformed overall Canadian GDP
while growing from $243 million to $387 million (Canadian) .
72
To summarize, major producers and distributors tend to favor locks
over levies while many artists and their representatives in collective so-
cieties would prefer levies to deal with issues like private copying, and
perhaps even p2p file sharing.
B. Technology Firms
This group of stakeholders is also diverse. It includes manufactur-
ers of media and devices related, in varying degrees, to the use of copy-
right-protected content. Such firms may produce blank analogue or digi-
tal audiotapes, CDs and digital memory, portable music and video de-
vices, computer hardware and software, as well as other consumer elec-
tronic equipment. The group also includes retailers and other distributors
of these media and devices, who are often overlooked as stakeholders.
Internet service providers and other communications intermediaries may
fall within this group too, as they could be the targets of levies in the
future.
167. Id.
168. CONNECTUS CONSULTING INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
INDUSTRIES-SECTORAL ANALYSIS 13 (2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-
ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubscopyright/EconomiclmpactofCanadian e.pdf. The final report was submitted
to the Copyright Policy Branch, Department of Canadian Heritage. Id at 1.
169. Id. at 75.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 76.
172. Id. at 76-77.
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Generally speaking, these firms argue against the imposition of lev-
ies on their products and services. 173 They claim that levy schemes put
the onus on innovative technology and communications enterprises to
subsidize the music industry. 174 One might argue this is justified on three
possible grounds: causation, enrichment or convenience. Manufacturers
and intermediaries would respond that profiting directly or indirectly
from private copying is not a sufficient reason to impose a levy on their
goods or services. Nor is simple convenience. It is much too simplistic
to suggest that suppliers of blank media or Internet connectivity, for ex-
ample, cause private copying.
In fact, many firms that would be targeted by levies can make a
convincing argument that their obligation to provide remuneration to
music creators and distributors runs contrary to fundamental principles
established in cases like Grokster175 and Sony Betamax17 6 in the United
States, and CCH v. LSUC177 and SOCAN v. CAIPiv8 in Canada.
Here, it is important to distinguish the legal situations in Canada
and the United States. It is often unclear whether, in the United States,
an electronics manufacturer can be held contributorily liable for consum-
ers' copying activities. For example, although VCR manufacturers were
absolved of responsibility in the Sony Betamax case, the Court in Grok-
ster was divided as to whether or not p2p networks had substantial non-
infringing uses. 179 As explained above, the uncertainty in American law
was one of the key factors leading to the negotiated compromise embod-
ied in the AHRA. In this respect, levies do offer a palpable benefit to
entities that might otherwise face legal liability, or at least uncertainty.
By contrast, in Canada, it is clearer that most targets of a levy would
not otherwise be held liable for consumers' copying. The Canadian
equivalent of the American doctrine of contributory liability is found
within the rules governing authorization of infringing activities. In the
United States, simply providing the means to facilitate or benefit from
copyright infringement is unobjectionable. To be held liable the alleged
authorizer must have a degree of knowledge of and control over the ac-
tions of actual copyright infringers18 0 But, in Canada, there exists a rule
173. Reinbothe, supra note 159.
174. See Press Release, Canadian Coalition for Fair Digital Access, Hidden Levy on Record-
able Storage Media is "Obsolete" and Should be Repealed (Nov. 4, 2003),
http://www.ccfda.ca/Downloads-resources/ccfda releaseNov4_eng.doc.pdf.
175. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
176. SonyCorp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony
Betamax].
177. See CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 68 [hereinafter
CCH v. LSUC].
178. See Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 467 [hereinafter SOCAN v. CAIP].
179. Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783-84 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) with Grokster, 125 S.
Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 2782.
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that even if one could be said to authorize the copying or communication
of music, courts must presume that the authorization is only to act in
accordance with the law. 181 The general rule is that liability for authori-
zation only exists where an entity explicitly or implicitly "sanctions,
countenances or approves" copyright infringement. 182  Unlike in the
United States, therefore, a levy in Canada offers little or no benefit in
terms of copyright immunity for firms that manufacture or distribute
electronics media or devices.
Communications intermediaries in both Canada and the United
States have little to gain in return for a levy. In both countries, there are
already "safe harbour" provisions that protect these entities from liabil-
ity. In the United States, these rules are found in 17 U.S.C. § 512.183 In
Canada, a simpler but nonetheless effective provision is found in §
2.4(l)(b) of the Copyright Act. 1
84
It might be suggested that third party targets of levies actually bene-
fit from the existence of exemption/levy schemes. The argument that
legalizing private copying increases sales of copying hardware and soft-
ware is difficult to refute or verify. 185 It assumes first that legalizing an
activity will make it more prevalent. Peer-to-peer activities, however,
may be influenced more by social than legal norms. 186 Second, it as-
sumes that music copying and blank media are complementary, so that if
the cost of copying music (in terms of legal risk and/or social stigma)
declines, demand for blank media will rise. Third, it assumes that the
increased demand resulting from legalization will be sufficient to off-set
the decreased demand resulting from higher prices caused by a levy.
Notice the contradictory assumptions regarding elasticity of demand that
would be required to support this argument.
And furthermore, even if there were some financial benefit to these
third parties, levies entail a substantial administrative burden.'87 Tech-
nology and communications firms are simply not in the business of col-
lecting, accounting for and remitting levies.
88
Levies can also result in significant market distortions by encourag-
ing grey or black markets for levied products. This is a serious concern
181. CCHv. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 39.
182. See CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 38; SOCAN v. CAIP, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 at 84-85.
183. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2006).
184. See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42 (1985); SOCAN v. CAJP, [2004] 2 S.C.R. at
446.
185. See, e.g., Can. Private Copying Collective v. Can. Storage Media Alliance, [2004] F.C.A.
424, 685-687; Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 38; see also
FISHER, supra note 132, at 4.
186. Gervais, supra note 134, at 73.
187. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 25, 56.
188. See id.
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for all parties affected by Canada's existing private copying levy.189 The
net effect of levies on providers of levied goods and services is unlikely
to be positive.
Of course, TPMs can also affect technology firms and intermediar-
ies in various ways. For example, the AHRA includes obligations relat-
ing to both locks and levies in the context of digital audio recording de-
vices and media.' 90 Not only are digital audio recording devices and
media manufacturers required to pay royalties, they must design their
products to include Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) copy-
controls. 191 Another example of the effect of TPMs on consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers was the proposed "broadcast flag." Under this
proposal, device manufacturers would have been obligated to make their
products compliant with a standard digital rights management (DRM)
system designed to control consumers' copying behaviour. 192 Initiatives
such as these are usually unpopular. Like levies, they impose additional
administrative, design, manufacturing and other unnecessary costs on
equipment manufacturers.
Nevertheless, manufacturers and providers of consumer goods and
services generally object to the idea of levies. These firms would typi-
cally prefer that content creators and distributors utilize TPMs.
C. Consumers
Just as different sorts of creators and copyright owners, as well as
electronics firms and communications intermediaries, may have different
preferences regarding locks and levies, consumers' reactions to these
issues are likely to be mixed. To understand the attitudes of the general
population toward locks and levies, it is necessary to differentiate be-
tween consumers of entertainment and consumers of electronics.
Many entertainment consumers, especially consumers of popular
music and films, are also electronics consumers who buy products such
as iPods and blank CDs. The inverse is also true for some electronics
consumers. For example, iPod consumers are also music consumers.
However, other types of electronics consumers may not be entertainment
189. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 58; Copyright Bd. of
Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 24-25.
190. See McKuin, supra note 55, at 325-26.
191. Id. at 325.
192. See Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), http://www.eff.org/IP/broadcastflag/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2006). A broadcast flag is a digital lock placed on digital media that prevents its
unauthorized reproduction by consumers using recording devices like VCRs, TiVo, DVD recorders,
mp3, satellite radio, and the like. Essentially, the broadcast flag places control over copyrighted
works and devices used to record those works in the hands of Hollywood. Unless Hollywood ap-
proves the device, consumers will be unable to make legitimate copies of flagged materials. EFF
offers a brief video highlighting the dangers posed by the broadcast flag. See id. at
http://www.eff.org/corrupt/ (follow Corruptibles video link) (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
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consumers. Many consumers purchase blank media for data storage or
digital photography. Many consumers use computers and the Internet for
research, finance, communication or a long list of things other than enter-
tainment. Furthermore, many purchasers of blank media, computers and
Internet access are not consumers at all but businesses, governments and
other institutions. Again, diversity within consumers as a group makes it
difficult to implement universal policies on locks and levies.
Proponents of digital locks might argue that TPMs and anti-
circumvention provisions can offer entertainment consumers more
choices for enjoying existing products and, eventually, more products to
choose from. 19 3 The reasoning is that creators and distributors can earn
greater profits if they are able to more precisely control the market for
their products. Greater profitability increases the motivation to create
and willingness to disseminate entertainment products. Not only is this
good for creators and distributors, whose profits increase, but, it might be
argued, this is also good for consumers, who can choose to enjoy the
products created. Also, with TPMs, the market could determine prices
that enable more consumers to purchase entertainment products, and
could do so more efficiently than was traditionally possible.
1 94
Digital locks do have a downside for entertainment and electronics
consumers. For one, consumers must tolerate some inconveniences, such
as interoperability issues. Sometimes, digital locks present security or
privacy issues. The Sony BMG "rootkit" incident was a vivid reminder
of the dangers associated with TPMs. 195 Interoperability, security and
privacy concerns are clearly matters to be taken seriously, but they are
also ones that presumably can and should be addressed with adequate
consumer protection laws.
96
Some critics of digital locks would argue that they do not increase
but rather decrease the breadth of content from which consumers may
choose. 97 This is because they help to concentrate control over the pro-
duction of cultural goods and services among a small group of large en-
terprises. Competition laws may be not be effective to address this issue.
The more problematic aspect of digital locks, however, is the effect
they can have on semiotic democracy1 98 and a participatory, free cul-
193. See, e.g., Barry B. Sookman, "TPMs ": A Perfect Storm for Consumers: Replies to Profes-
sor Geist, 4 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 23, 29-31 (2005); Michael A. Einhorn, Commentary, Canadian
Quandary: Digital Rights Management, Access Protection, and Free Markets, Progress on Point 13,
THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION (2006) at 5, available at http://www.pff.orgissues-
pubs/pops/pop 13.12can_quan.pdf.
194. See FISHER, supra note 132, at 163-69.
195. See deBeer, supra note 60, at 95-99.
196. See id. at 5-6, 95-97.
197. See Sookman, supra note 193, at 31.
198. See FISHER, supra note 132, at 270 (tracing the origin of this phrase to John Fiske).
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ture.' 99 As Professor Fisher describes it, this is "the ability of 'consum-
ers' to re-shape cultural artifacts and ... to participate more actively in
the creation of the cloud of cultural meanings through which they
move.'2°°  Therefore, for many consumers who are proponents of
levy/exemption schemes, the attractiveness lies mainly in the exemption
aspect of the quidpro quo.
The value of such an exemption, however, depends greatly on its
scope. To American consumers, a levy that covers only truly private
copying-something just like Canada's private copying levy-would
offer few if any benefits. Time or format shifting, archiving backups and
personalizing compilations are all likely examples of "fair use" in the
United States.20 1 Even for Canadians, the value of an exemption for pri-
vate copying is questionable. A decade ago, when Canada's private
copying levy was being considered, the weight of opinion at that time
was that distinctions between the American concept of "fair use" and the
Canadian law of "fair dealing" meant private copying was clearly illegal
in Canada.20 2 Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Canada issued a
series of landmark decisions about balance in copyright law.203 A credi-
ble argument can now be made that some private non-commercial uses
of music are "fair dealing" for the purposes of research or private
study.2°4 This would render the private copying exemption in section 80
of the Copyright Act redundant in some cases, 20 5 and call into question
the value of a broader exemption/levy scheme for consumers.
On the other hand, a broader levy that covers not just private copy-
ing, but also p2p file sharing, would offer some palpable benefits to en-
tertainment consumers. The trouble is that such an exemption would be
nearly impossible to obtain in practice. For an exemption/levy scheme to
succeed, fundamental and wholesale changes in the existing copyright
system would be necessary.
199. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
200. See FISHER, supra note 132, at 28-31, 184.
201. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (Mat-
thew Bender 1997) (1963); Sony Betamax, 464 U.S. at 432-33; Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at
1079.
202. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2001, supra note 5, at 59.
203. SOCAN v. CAIP, [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 448-49; CCH, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 23-24; Thrberge v.
Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 355-56.
204. In CCH, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed that systematic for-profit legal
research carried out by tens of thousands of Ontario lawyers is fair dealing. CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1
S.C.R. at 88-90. An individual's downloading activities for the purpose of consumer research, to
evaluate a potential music purchase for example, would seem far less objectionable than that. Id.
205. The Supreme Court held that reference to specific exemptions is unnecessary if an activity
falls within the more general fair dealing provisions. See CCH v. LSUC, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 48-49.
The Copyright Board, in contrast, held that the section 80 exemption for private copying relegates
the general fair dealing exemption to a second-order enquiry. See Copyright Bd. of Can., Private
Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 20-21. At worst, therefore, if the section 80 exemption does not
apply (because, for example, the medium is not an "audio recording medium"), the fair dealing
provisions may be engaged.
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Even then, not all consumers would be pleased with a
levy/exemption scheme. Although there would be significant benefits to
entertainment consumers, we must be careful to distinguish consumers of
electronics and communications services. In Canada, the Federal Court
of Appeal has acknowledged: "Such a scheme cannot be perfect; it is a
rough estimate, involving possible overcharging of some and under-
charging of others. '' 20 6 Although some users of the product or service in
question-blank media, electronics devices, personal computers or Inter-
net access-will engage in the copying or communication activities at
the root of the scheme, a great number of others will not.
Some suggest that concerns about cross-subsidization are over-
blown.20 7  But take the following concrete example: All blank CDs
manufactured in or imported to Canada are subject to a levy to compen-
sate for the fact that some blank CDs are used for copying music. 20 8 The
Copyright Board found that "80 [to] 90 percent of individual consumers
who buy blank CDs do so in some measure for the specific purpose of
copying pre-recorded music. Moreover, it appears that over 40 percent
of individuals use recordable CDs for no other purpose.', 20 9 However,
the highest estimates suggest that of all blank CDs bought in Canada, the
proportion of blank CDs used by consumers to copy music (as compared
to those used by businesses, or for copying data or photographs, for ex-
ample) is roughly one third.210 The levy rate is discounted to reflect this
fact, but the point remains that purchasers of two thirds of all blank CDs
subsidize the few consumers who use these media heavily for copying
music. Simply put, the levy has a much larger effect on persons who do
not engage in private copying than on persons who do.
The over-breadth of Canada's private copying levy is more than just
an unfortunate side effect for consumer technophiles. It is a very serious
issue for thousands of Canadian manufacturers, retailers and commercial
purchasers of goods and services that are or would be levied. Imagine
the effect that a levy on Internet access would have on e-commerce or
educational uses of the Web. It would be inconsistent with a policy of
reducing internet access costs to increase broadband penetration.
If a levy were imposed on digital memory generally, without
amending the meaning of "ordinarily" as interpreted by the Copyright
Board, the same problem could easily arise with respect to memory
206. Canada's private copying regime was described as such by the Federal Court of Appeal.
AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency, 7 C.P.R. (4th) 68, 7
(2000) [hereinafter A VS Technologies].
207. Netanel, supra note 133, at 67-74.
208. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 15, 22.
209. Id. at 14.
210. Id. The data is insanely confusing, because there are different proportions to consider
(including "consumer vs. business purchasers" and within that "music vs. non-music uses") and
different statistics for different formats, not to mention conflicting evidence on the accuracy of
different figures submitted by different parties.
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cards, personal computers, mobile telephones, personal digital assistants
or a range of other digital devices. Remember, even the iPod is also a
personal agenda, portable data storage device, digital photo album, video
player and, perhaps soon, a mobile phone. There is no way to distinguish
customers who fill these devices with music from those who do other
things. As technological advances lead to increasing product conver-
gence, this problem will only be exacerbated.
The perceived unfairness might be alleviated through carefully tai-
lored exceptions, which can, in theory, turn levies from blunt instruments
into precise tools. However, separating the wheat from the chaff is not
easy. If Canada's current private copying regime is any indication,
things do not bode well for broader levy. The Federal Court of Appeal,
affirming the Copyright Board of Canada on this point, recently noted
that Part VIII of the Copyright Act contains no legitimate exemptions for
the vast numbers of consumers and businesses who purchase blank me-
dia for purposes other than private copying. 211 The Court agreed with the
Board's insights that there are fundamental problems with the ad hoc
waiver program that has developed, which is administered unilaterally by
the beneficiaries of the levy.2t2
When Canada's levy was first introduced, business and institutional
purchasers of blank media, including churches, educators and broadcast-
ers, were upset at the prospect of having to pay substantial levies.21 3 To
defray possible legal challenges to the scheme from these groups, the
Canadian Private Copying Collective (CPCC) created an ad hoc scheme
where it would consider applications from some purchasers to be "zero-
rated., 21 4 In other words, if a purchaser agrees to certain restrictions, as
well as auditing provisions, the CPCC might be willing to waive its right
to collect levies from that purchaser. The program is only open to busi-
nesses or institutions, not individual consumers.1 5 Even for the former,
media must be purchased only from authorized distributors, not through
ordinary retailers, which has created significant distortions in the chain
of distribution for blank media.21 6 So far, the private program has not
been subjected to any supervision by the courts or the Copyright Board
to ensure it is administered fairly and equitably.
In sum, it might be true that some consumers of entertainment
products would benefit from DRM systems, if the result is more content
and greater choice. Many however, are rightly more concerned about
matters such as security, privacy, interoperability, convenience and the
concentration of control over production. For these consumers, levies
211. Id. at 33-36.
212. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 24-27.
213. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 5, at 3.
214. Id. at 57.
215. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2000-2001, supra note 5, at 16.
216. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 25.
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represent a preferable alternative. However, many purchasers of multi-
functional electronics devices or communications services would prefer
not to pay levies on account of entertainment products which they never
or seldom consume.
IV. COMPROMISES
It is evident that various stakeholders have diverging views on locks
and levies. There is even considerable disagreement within stereotypical
"groups" of stakeholders, such as "creators" or "consumers." Because of
the diversity of perspectives no stakeholder is likely to see his/her ideal
solution implemented. The polycentric nature of these issues requires
trade-offs and compromises.
In fact, Professor Netanel characterizes his Non-Commercial Use
Levy (NUL) as a middle ground between "digital lock-up" and "digital
abandon. 21 7  Similarly, Eckersley proposes a virtual market between
"information feudalism" and "information anarchism." 218  Professor
Fisher suggests his Alternative Compensation Scheme (ACS) as a fair
alternative to full propertization or other forms of regulation. 21 9 Propos-
als by Ku, Lunney, Litman and others could also be described as com-
promise solutions.
I would predict, however, that if lawmakers were to give serious
consideration to these alternatives, the middle ground would not be these
proposals themselves, but a point between these proposals and a scenario
even more favorable to major content producers than the status quo.
Professor Litman is, in my opinion, absolutely correct in stating:
As consensus builds around the idea of paid peer-to-peer, it seems in-
creasingly plausible that some legislation will emerge with enough
support from the music, recording, computer, and consumer elec-
tronic industries to have a fair chance of enactment. I expect that that
legislation will include both consumer downloads of music and col-
lective licenses to pay for them. Such a bill is less likely to resemble
the proposals advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Lunney, Ku, Gervais, or
Lessig, however, than it is to be designed to maintain the current re-
cording and music industry distributors in their market dominant po-
sition.
220
Historical trends support this impression.22' Often, the pressures of
multiparty negotiations yielded rights for one group at the expense of
another. 2  However, many times congressional pressure has prompted a
217. Netanel, supra note 133, at 83.
218. Eckersley, supra note 135, at 92-93.
219. FISHER, supra note 132, at 8-10.
220. Litman, supra note 133, at 39.
221. LITMAN, supra note 76, at 151.
222. Id. at 46.
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flurry of compromises between the parties at the bargaining table, gener-
ating a law with something for everyone.223
Professor Netanel suggests that TPMs are incompatible with his
NUL.224 He states that digital content providers would not be permitted
to use DRM systems or otherwise sabotage peer-to-peer (p2p) file shar-
ing networks. 225 At least, he argues, consumers would have to be permit-
ted to circumvent TPMs and circulate the tools needed to do so.22 6 Eck-
ersley's "virtual market" and Ku's "Digital Recording Act" alternatives
are seemingly envisioned as a complete replacement for DRM systems,
not a complementary option.
227
But because of the tremendous difficulties of getting industry in-
cumbents to embrace proposals for radical change, some proponents of
broader levy schemes in the United States recognize the possible need to
allow individual rights-holders to choose either locks or a levy. Under
Professor Fisher's proposal, rights-holders would be free to opt-out of an
alternative compensation scheme, and instead continue to distribute
copyright-protected content and enforce their exclusive copyrights.228
Those particular copyrights-holders would, of course, be ineligible to
receive revenues generated under the alternative scheme. Presumably,
aggregate levy rates may be reduced accordingly, and consumers' rights
might depend on whether the work was included within the scheme or
not. Professor Lessig likewise contemplates an alternative scheme com-
plementing the existing system.2 2 9 He specifically mentions how Profes-
sor Fisher's plan need not interfere with innovative businesses like Ap-
ple's iTunes Music Store.230 As long as there are few limitations on what
one is allowed to do with the content, he suggests that these alternatives
can co-exist. 1 Similarly, Professor Lunney suggests that private copy-
ing could be addressed through a combination of weak encryption tech-
nologies, an honors system and a limited tax on copying devices and
storage media.232 Professor Litman also contemplates the simultaneous
use of locks and levies. She would allow rights-holders to use TPMs to
restrict access and copying, but would require that such files be uni-
formly identified, for example by a ".drm" extension. 3
223. Id. at 46-47.
224. Netanel, supra note 133, at 40-4 1.
225. Id. at 34-35, 40.
226. Id. at 40.
227. Eckersley, supra note 135 at 92-93; Ku, supra note 133, at 312-13.
228. FISHER, supra note 132, at 247-48.
229. LESSIG, supra note 199, at 301.
230. Id. at 302.
231. Id. He does not mention, however, the fact that Apple's business model relies heavily on
TPMs restricting copying, remixing and, most importantly for Apple, interoperability. Id.
232. Lunney, supra note 133, at 910. If he had to choose, however, he would choose levies
over locks. Id. at 911-12.
233. Litman, supra note 133, at 47.
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Professor Yu notes that because different models have both benefits
and limitations, "[t]he best system for policymakers to adopt may there-
fore involve a combination of these proposals. 234 He also notes that
"the industry must be prepared to migrate from one regime to another, or
even to adjust to living with many different regimes at the same time.
2 35
No doubt it is correct that the best solution might be a hybrid of
various possibilities. After all, copyright law already contains a mix of
different rules providing for exclusive rights, protections for TPMs,
compulsory and voluntary collective licensing regimes and levy
schemes. The applicable framework may depend on the type of work at
issue, for example a literary work or a sound recording, or the particular
use being regulated such as a public performance or private copying.
However, the number of different copyright rules is one thing that
makes the present copyright system so problematic. Canada already has
too many copyright collectives.236 In the United States (and elsewhere) it
is extraordinarily difficult to understand, let alone navigate, the rights-
clearance process for making music available online.237 This over-
whelming complexity stifles innovation. It is economically inefficient.
Indeed, it is one of the reasons scholars have called for a new model.
While some in the United States have called for the phasing in of
levies as an alternative to locks, valuable lessons can be learned from
European and Canadian attempts to phase them out. There is a real dan-
ger that alternative compensation schemes will in practice become addi-
tional compensation schemes. This leads to a troubling problem of dou-
ble-billing consumers.
Consumers can easily find themselves caught in the middle of a
copyright regime that prohibits the circumvention of DRM systems in
order to access or copy digital content, but at the same time mandates
levy payments to compensate for copying that either cannot occur or is
already licensed. Consumers can pay for the same activity two or even
three times over. For example, someone who purchases a song from
Apple's iTunes Music Store contractually acquires the right to make cer-
tain private copies of the track. They are expressly entitled to "burn" and
"export" tracks "for personal, non-commercial use. 238 Even aside from
these contractual terms, this activity may be fair use or fair dealing. Yet
this consumer would pay for the same activity through a TPM-enforced
234. Yu, supra note 133, at 739.
235. Id. at 740.
236. See Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Manage-
ment: Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 CANADIAN J.L. & TECH. 15, 18 (2003), avail-
able at http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol2_no 1/index.html.
237. Lydia Pallas Loren, Reflections on Tasini and Beyond: Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 700-01 (2003).
238. See iTunes Terms of Sale (Oct. 10, 2005), http://www.apple.com/lega/itunes/ca/
sales.html.
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license and through a private copying levy. Furthermore, there is a dan-
ger this consumer could still infringe copyright laws by engaging in cer-
tain ancillary activities. We've seen from the Canadian experience that
this can be a problem even if the levy is ostensibly technology-neutral.
Double-dipping in this manner is likely to cause resentment
amongst consumers. This may ultimately jeopardize the viability of the
levy scheme. Consumer hostility toward industry tactics could also un-
dermine the implementation of creative new business models. In other
words, locks and levies undermine each other.
The European Community's Copyright Directive tries to have it
both ways-simultaneously encouraging the adoption of DRM systems
and levy schemes to deal with private copying. The Copyright Directive
expressly references the need for levies to take "account of the applica-
tion or non-application of technological measures., 239 The Copyright
Directive, however, contains few clues as to how exactly member states
are to implement this instruction.
A team of experts led by Professor Bernt Hugenholtz has studied
this aspect of the Copyright Directive closely.240 They concluded that it
would be most appropriate to phase out levies as TPMs become avail-
able, as opposed to actually applied. 241 The availability of TPMs would
be based upon an assessment of whether they can be both realistically
and legally applied in the marketplace.
However, despite the fact that TPMs are prevalent in the market-
place-take most online music stores for example-no member state has
yet taken account of this. Although music sold through Apple's iTunes
Store is protected with the FairPlay DRM system, many European coun-
tries nevertheless impose a levy on iPods.242 Likewise, the levies on
blank media such as CDs have been calculated without regard to the ex-
tent to which TPMs either license private copying or make it impossible.
A similar situation nearly materialized in Canada, without study or
any public consultation on the issue. As explained above, in 2005 the
Government of Canada tabled Bill C-60, which would have put specific
anti-circumvention provisions into Canadian copyright law.243 Recall
that Bill C-60 would have prohibited circumvention only for the purposes
239. COPYRIGHT DIRECTORATE, THE PATENT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, EC DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 48 (2002).
240. Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at 46.
241. Id.
242. Josiane Morel, Gov't Affairs Manager, Address at Government Affairs: DRM and Copy-
right Levies (Apr. 6, 2005).




of infringing copyright.244 Recall also that, under Canadian law, private
copying of sound recordings is not an infringement.245 One might think,
therefore, that circumventing TPMs for the purpose of private copying
would have been permitted.
But Bill C-60 would have allowed circumvention for all non-
infringing purposes except private copying under section 80.246 This
reservation-that one cannot circumvent to copy for private use-was
somewhat mysterious. It would have prohibited consumers from making
private copies even though they paid for the right to do so through the
levy. In effect, this would have allowed the music industry to be remu-
nerated for copies that individuals cannot make or have already paid for.
The only possible explanation is that the government was depending
on the Copyright Board to factor this into consideration when setting the
levy rate. Unfortunately, given the lack of consultation or explanation,
we can only speculate as to the Canadian Government's intention. Al-
though Europe's Copyright Directive has its problems, at least it contains
some direction on this issue.247
Prior to Bill C-60, the Copyright Board of Canada had, in fact,
demonstrated its own intention to phase out Canada's existing private
copying levy.248 The formula adopted by the Board for setting the levy
rate contains a calculation recognizing that technological measures allow
some consumers to pay directly for private copying rights.249 As the
practice of using TPMs becomes more widespread, the Board may be
willing to reduce levy rates accordingly, perhaps eventually approaching
zero. To be clear, however, there is no guarantee that this will happen.
Furthermore, unlike the Copyright Directive, the Board's calcula-
tion only takes account of the extent to which TPMs are actually used,
not merely available. Hugenholtz and his team predicted that this under-
taking "will prove to be a fruitless and frustrating exercise, in view of the
non-linear relationship between content, technical protection measure,
media, equipment and levy, and absent any baseline to measure the 'de-
gree of use' against it."'250 According to them, it would have been better
244. Parliament of Canada, Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act § 27, (June 20,
2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-60/C-60_l/C-60-
cover-E.html.
245. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-42, § 80.
246. Can. H. Commons Bill C-60 at § 27. It would have been permissible to circumvent TPMs
to exercise private copying rights granted by other sections of the Act, such as the fair dealing provi-
sions in section 29.
247. Hugenholtz et al., supra note 7, at ii.
248. House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-60 An Act to amend the Copyright Act § 27, (June
20, 2005), http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/l/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-60/C-60_1/C-
60_cover-E.html.
249. Copyright Bd. of Can., Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note 5, at 62.
250. Hugenholtz et al., supra note 8, at iv.
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to adopt "a more sensible and workable interpretation, which is inspired
by economical and practical considerations. 25'
In general it seems as if the Government, through Bill C-60, and the
Copyright Board, in its recent decisions, have created a hierarchy
whereby protection for technological measures is more important than
the conceptual or practical integrity of the private copying scheme. In
doing so, Canadian policy makers have apparently expressed a prefer-
ence for technological measures over private copying levies as a solution
to some of the problems of the digital music market.
The compromises concerning locks and levies struck under the
European Copyright Directive are unfortunately typical in an era of
copyright compromises. The failure of the Canadian Government to
engage in a coordinated study of the relationship between locks and lev-
ies is also symptomatic of attempts to broker deals on particular issues.
There is a risk that American lawmakers attempting to implement law
reform proposals to deal with private copying and p2p will fall into a
similar trap. Simultaneously using locks and levies to address these is-
sues most seriously affects consumers, who can easily find themselves
paying levies to compensate for copying that either cannot occur, is al-
ready licensed or is or ought to be fair use/dealing. Policymakers should
be aware of this concern in order to minimize inconsistencies and in-





MANAGING INFORMATION RIGHTS WITH DRM
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGERt
INTRODUCTION
For the first 150 years of United States copyright law the legal pro-
hibition of unauthorized copying was aided by the technical limitations
consumers faced when wanting to duplicate content. The Xerox machine
made copying of paper-based content faster and less costly; so did the
widespread availability of audiocassette and videotape recorders. Yet, as
long as information remained stored in analog form, copying tended to
result in a loss of quality. The copy of the copy of a music cassette lacks
the fidelity of the original. To be sure, piracy existed even then, but it
did not happen primarily at the consumer end of the value chain. Pirates
generally required sophisticated and costly equipment and a functioning
distribution channel. Over time, rights holders improved their ability to
interdict pirates around the world.
Digital technology changed the historical status quo. Duplication
technology enabled consumers to make perfect copies for a fraction of
the cost and time. The Internet added a cheap and fast distribution chan-
nel with peer-to-peer software providing an unprecedented level of ease-
of-use in downloading copyrighted content. Rapidly, illegal copying
became much cheaper than doing so legally, leading to the widespread
"sharing" of copyrighted information among consumers without rights
holders' consent, thus-as rights holders contend-reducing market de-
mand for the informational goods they offer.'
Rights holders see digital rights management (DRM) as a tool to
rectify this situation using a double strategy. First, and much reported in
the media, DRM aims at making illegal copying harder and more costly.
2
Second, often overlooked but at least of equal importance, DRM is in-
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I. See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Music Industry Unveils New
Business Strategies and Combats Piracy During 2002 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/022803.asp (citing online piracy as a major cause of the 9%
decline in CD shipments in 2002); see also Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law-Ignore
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Technology Unite to Deter File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at C 1.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
tended to lower costs for obtaining content legally. The goal of DRM is
to enable and facilitate legal licensing of digital information by reducing
the transactional costs for consumers to find, access, and use the digital
information they demand. Ease of use has propelled Apple's iTunes
Music Store to become the preeminent legal music download site on the
Internet, causing customers more than a billion times to say "yes" to
"DRMed" music.
3
Much of the debate over DRM so far has focused on these contested
intellectual property issues, in particular on copyright. 4 However, copy-
right is not the only legal claim over information. Privacy rights, for
example, entitle individuals to some control over their personal informa-
tion.5 DRM is generally agnostic as to what kinds of rights over infor-
mation it protects and the transactions of what rights it facilitates, as long
as such rights can be technically incorporated. This, in turn, requires
one, at least at some level, to find common conceptual ground among
such information rights.
This Article argues that DRM may prove useful beyond the narrow
confines of copyright. Part I briefly describes DRM and why and how
DRM can be used to manage rights over information more generally.
Part II maps the elements of DRM systems, with a specific focus on the
meta-data that defines specific usage rights of the DRMed information it
accompanies. Part III looks at non-copyright claims over information, in
particular informational privacy, and evaluates how such claims could be
represented in DRM systems. I put forward a list of advantages such
DRM-based management of informational privacy claims would offer
and lay out three significant challenges and how they could be addressed
for such a DRM system to be successful.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF DRM SYSTEMS
Digital rights management aims to control access to information
content. 6 It does so by covering all phases of access control, from de-
scribing access rights to a certain piece of information, to facilitating
transactions of such rights, to enforcing access control. While DRM
comes in many different kinds and shapes, it needs to be comprehen-
sive-covering all stages of the dissemination and usage process-to
prevent content from being extracted from its protective realm by unau-
thorized parties.
3. Press Release, Apple Computer Inc., iTunes Music Store Downloads Top One Billion
Songs (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/feb/23itms.html.
4. See generally Symposium, Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697 (2003); Nicola Lucchi, Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Media, 53
BUFF. L. REv. 1111 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Julie Tuan, Customer Information: U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 353, 368-69 (2000) (discussing the right to privacy as it relates to personal information).
6. Access control is limited to preventing unauthorized users from access. It also entails
enabling access for those that are authorized. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Movies stored on DVDs are a good example. Movie data is already
encrypted when it is transferred on DVD. DVDs are sold with the in-
formation on it encrypted and thus only playable through specific hard-
ware. These DVD players, in turn, must be able to decrypt the movie
information. DVD production, DVDs and DVD players all have to con-
form to the same technical rules on how digital information is being in-
terpreted for DRM to work, and all parties must adhere to these rules for
the system to function.7
Such DRM requires a complex system of technical, organizational
and societal elements. Neither technology nor market incentives alone
will be sufficient, for at least two reasons.
First, many but not necessarily all commercial entities involved in
the dissemination of DRMed content have a strong economic interest to
ensure that the DRM system remains in place. Take the manufacturers
of DVD players, for example. If they were to sell a DVD player that
could "break" the DRM system and permit its users easy duplication of
encrypted data-much like dual-deck music cassette recorders used to
offer-consumers might buy more of these units, creating an economic
incentive for manufacturers of DVD players to defect from the DRM
system.8
Second, consumers will desire to "free ride," that is, to gain access
to DRMed content without paying the appropriate usage fee. To that
end, consumers will want to collect information and methods as well as
tools to break the access control mechanisms of DRM unless societal
rules prevent them from doing so.9
For DRM to work, therefore, the legal system has to stop defections
by commercial entities as well as prevent consumers from gaining and
sharing information about how to break usage restrictions, while ena-
bling and facilitating authorized transactions of usage rights. What usage
7. The most important DRM standard for video DVDs is the "Content Scrambling System"
(CSS), an authentication and encryption system designed to prevent unauthorized copying of DVDs.
See JIM TAYLOR, DVD DEMYSTIFIED 481-85 (2d ed. 2001). This system was hacked in 1999 by
software called DeCSS. See Rob Pegoraro, Hollywood to Home Viewer: We Own You, WASH. POST,
Aug. 25, 2000, at EO 1. For the elaborate next generation of content protection systems, see, for
example, the High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), an industry-supported standard to
connect any compatible digital audio or video source like a Sony Playstation and a video recorder,
and the respective DRM standard High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP), a lack of
which may lead to video quality and resolution being artificially downgraded. See generally Digital
Content Protection, LLC, http://www.digital-cp.com/home (last visited Sept. 14, 2006). Another
example is Apple's DRM technology FairPlay, which restricts access to digital content on Apple's
products, such as iTunes or the iPod. See Hiawatha Bray, Apple's Music Operation Hits a Sour
Note, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2004, at C2.
8. See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 481 (citing the corollary proposition that DVD producers
are not willing to publish DVDs without protection from DRM defecting practices).
9. See Pegoraro, supra note 7, at EO I (citing at least one instance where users have illegally
hacked a DVD encryption system); see also Bill Rosenblatt, iTunes DRM Hacked, Then Hacked
Again, DRM WATCH, Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.drmwatch.com/drntech/article.php/3492676
(discussing hacking of Apple, Inc.'s FairPlay DRM).
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rights, however, are being granted through DRM, no longer need to be a
simple reflection of the legal system. In fact, one can imagine a DRM
system granting its users a very different set of rights than current intel-
lectual property law-especially when compared with fair use rights.1°
As Lawrence Lessig predicted, the authority to delimit these usage
rights shifts from the existing lawmaking and adjudicating institutions in
our society to those in control of the DRM system." The law's task in
such a context is to ensure that such private ordering is not being under-
mined by "leakage" and circumvention. 12 Thus, intellectual property law
turns into an enforcement mechanism for whatever access control ar-
rangements are contained in DRM.
Critics have contended that every DRM system to date has been
broken relatively swiftly, eroding the very foundation on which the entire
idea of access control rests. 13 However, enforcement does not need to be
perfect-it is sufficient if it deters enough to shape the behavior of many
consumers.14 Apple's DRM is a case in point: The use of music bought
through the iTunes Music Store online and downloaded onto one's com-
puter is constrained by a system called FairPlay. 15 It restricts the com-
puter on which the music can be played, the iPod onto which it can be
copied, and how often it can be burnt on a CD. To break out of this
straight-jacket, many tools have been developed and remain available on
the Internet to either strip the music from FairPlay restriction data, or to
otherwise enable the unauthorized sharing of DRMed music content.
10. For an early comparison between intellectual property law and the DRM system envi-
sioned by Ted Nelson's famous System Xanadu, see Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intel-
lectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
237, 239, 247-52 (1993).
11. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS IN CYBERSPACE (1999); see
also Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, In Search of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 11, para. 36-40 (2005); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553, 591-92 (1998); VIKTOR
MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DAS RECHT AM INFO-HIGHWAY 41 (1997).
12. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); see also Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2078 (2000); Lawrence Friedman, Essay: Digital Communi-
cations Technology and New Possibilities for Private Ordering, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57,
61-62 (2003); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Medita-
tion on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62,
81-90 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Discovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295
(1998).
13. See, e.g., John Black, The Impossibility of Technology-Based DRM and a Modest Sugges-
tion, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 387, 396 (2005) (arguing that "the media companies'
reliance on a technological solution is almost certainly doomed, and that a variety of motives will
continue to drive people to circumvent any such technology. The best solution to the problem is not
a technological one, but instead one of education.").
14. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Inter-
net Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605, 614-16 (2003); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Regulation of the
Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1998); Lawrence Lessig,
The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996).
15. See Bray, supra note 7, at C2.
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Creating, disseminating and using such tools may be potentially illegal,
but nevertheless continues to take place. This has not doomed Apple's
DRM system. Despite the widespread availability of such tools at low
transactional costs and the persistence of music sharing peer-to-peer
networks, consumers buy DRMed music from the iTunes Music Store at
a rate of about four million usage restricted songs per week. 16 Consum-
ers are obviously willing to pay a relatively small amount in return for
ease of use, speed of search and download, and assurance of quality.
Less than perfect DRM systems will continue to thrive as long as
content owners deem the revenue generated more important than the
leakages of content that are occurring. Of course, any change in the
value proposition to the consumer-for example by raising prices or
making pricing less transparent-may have an effect on consumer be-
havior, potentially increasing leakage and undermining the DRM system.
This is one reason Apple has a strong incentive to keep iTunes Music
Store's pricing model simple and transparent.
17
DRM is more than a technical fix to prevent unauthorized copying.
As a system, it depends not just on technology, but on institutions and
market incentives, and presupposes law to prevent too much leakage
from happening. While not perfect, DRM systems have been relatively
successful in controlling access and will remain so as long as their value
propositions are attractive. Insofar as DRM systems prescribe acceptable
usage behavior, they replace the legal system as the dominant normative
framework.
II. ELEMENTS OF DRM SYSTEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
In abstract terms, a DRM system consists of both mechanisms for
facilitating authorized transactions and mechanisms for enforcing access
control. The former covers functions like the publishing of DRMed con-
tent, the easy searching for content by consumers, and the processing of
the transaction itself. This may include the creation and management of
online directory services as well as electronic payment. 18 The latter en-
16. Press Release, Apple Computers Inc., iTunes Music Store Downloads Top 150 Million
Songs (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.apple.conpr/library/2004/oct/14itunes.html.
17. The recent clash between Apple and the big music labels over pricing strategies can be
seen against the backdrop of this conflict. See Scott Morrison, Labels Demand a Bite as Apple Calls
the Tune, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2005, at 11 (citing the music labels' concerns that wholesale
prices should be raised to capture a larger share of the market in which they believe Apple has be-
come too powerful).
18. See Niels Rump, Definition, Aspects, and Overview, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 3-4 (Eberhard Becker et al. eds.,
2003); see also Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi & Markus Schneider, Electronic Payment Systems, in DIGITAL
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 113-115
(Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003).
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tails mostly technical means to restrict usage of content to certain users,
times, and modes.' 9
Both facilitating transactions and enforcing access control require
the DRM system to authenticate users as well as content, and to incorpo-
rate and respect usage data associated with the specific content users
have acquired.20 The need for authentication has been well documented
and linked to debates on electronic signatures and similar methods of
authenticating messages. 2' The role of usage data-information about
how a particular content may be used-has received less attention al-
though such meta-data is a fundamental element of DRM.22
To perform its role of controlling access, any DRM system must
"know" what kind of usage is permissible by whom, and what usage
attempts must be prevented. This is done through meta-data associated
with content that describes authorized usage.23 If a consumer attempts to
use content in a way that contradicts the usage rights expressed in the
meta-data, the DRM system will attempt to stop her. Consequently, a
DRM system needs to know how to locate such meta-data for any
DRMed content it manages, and most current DRM systems rely on con-
tent to contain or be combined with the relevant meta-data.
Meta-data has to lay out permissible use in a standardized and un-
ambiguous way, so that it can be used by all technical elements of a
DRM system. In recent years, two major attempts got under way to sys-
tematically define meta-data for a very wide spectrum of digital content.
The first one is eXtensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) developed
and owned by commercial entity ContentGuard and based on the "exten-
sible markup language" (XML).2 4 Microsoft employs a version of XrML
in the DRM it uses. 5
19. See Rump, supra note 18, at 30-42.
20. There is significant philosophical debate among DRM providers whether to authenticate
users or usage devices. Most DRM systems discussed in this paper focus on user authentication, but
the Digital Media Project (DMP) instead focuses on device authentication. See Bill Rosenblatt, 2005
Year in Review: DRM Standards, DRM WATCH, Jan. 2, 2006, http://www.drmwatch.com/standards/
article.php/357451 1.
21. See generally LESSIG, supra note 11, at 30-42; L. JEAN CAMP, TRUST AND RISK 1N
INTERNET COMMERCE 36-40 (2000) (pointing to the difficulties of evaluating the reliability of in-
formation online); DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 179-81, 333-35 (1998) (arguing that in
view of modem surveillance technologies, we should focus more on ensuring accountability, i.e.
reciprocal transparency, than protecting privacy by fostering secrecy).
22. See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM.
J. COMP. L. 323,326-29 (2004).
23. Already more than a decade ago and way ahead of the time, Pam Samuelson and Bob
Glushko wrote eloquently about the need for such meta-data and its implications. See Samuelson &
Glushko, supra note 10, at 252-53.
24. Andrew Conry-Murray, XrML: Defining Digital Rights, IT ARCHITECT, Apr. 5, 2004
http://www.itarchitect.com/shared/article/showArticle.jhtml?articleld=1 8900094.
25. See Stacy Cowley & Paul Roberts, Microsoft Details Rights Management Policy,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 21, 2003, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2003/0221microdetai2.html
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Another derivative of XrML is REL, a "rights expression language"
that is part of the MPEG-2 1 standard.26 By adopting REL, the Moving
Picture Experts Group (MPEG) hopes that it will aid in the creation of a
comprehensive DRM for multimedia content. 27 REL in turn uses stan-
dardized terms in describing the usage rights for specific content. These
terms are defined in what is called the Rights Data Dictionary (RDD)
that is being developed under guidance of the International Standardiza-
tion Organization (ISO).28
The RDD, developed by UK-based firm Rightscom Ltd,29 defines
the terms rights holders can use when creating usage meta-data that de-
fines who can do what, with which resource, in what context, at what
time, and in what location. Accordingly, RDD contains semantics for
defining agents, resource, time, place and context (in RDD parlance the
"context model"). 30
While impressive in its structured approach, XrML's long-term sus-
tainability in the market place is an open question. After years of use
Microsoft's version of XrML remains incompatible with MPEG's REL;
and the software giant has no apparent plans to change this. REL on the
other hand has not seen a single implementation by any of the many in-
dustry players that initially praised it, prompting experts to call it "irrele-
vant."
3
The second attempt to standardize meta-data is the Open Digital
Rights Language (ODRL) Initiative, orchestrated by its founder Renato
Iannella.32  ODRL covers the same ground as XrML. Unlike XrML,
however, ODRL stems from an open process and is offered license-free.
It is the open-source pendant to commercial XrML. Not surprisingly,
ODRL has collaborated with Creative Commons (CC) 33 to map CC's
semantics in ODRL.34
(citing John Manferdelli, general manager of the Windows Trusted Platform Technologies group:
"Despite being new, XrML is the richest and best developed of the rights management languages.").
26. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
27. See Rightscom Ltd, The MPEG-21 Rights Expression Language 5 (July 14, 2003) (White
Paper), available at, http://www.interactivemusicnetwork.org/documenti/viewdocument.php?
file id=809.
28. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
29. Rightscom, http://www.rightscom.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1076 (last visited Sept. 14,
2006).
30. See Susanne Guth, Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 101, 103-105 (Eberhard Becker et al.
eds., 2003).
31. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
32. The Open Digital Rights Language Initiative, http://odrl.net (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
33. Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that offers flexible copyright licenses for
creative works. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
34. See ODRL Creative Commons Profile, July 6, 2005, http://odrl.net/Profiles/CC/SPEC-
20050706.html.
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ODRL has been successfully used in the area of mobile devices,
where the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) has adopted it for its DRM,
leading to widespread use in mobile devices in Europe. 35 North Ameri-
can operators on the other hand have so far chosen mostly to use their
own proprietary DRM systems.
36
ODRL's biggest immediate challenge is not technical or economic,
but legal. In what can only be described as a second-order intellectual
property war, ContentGuard, the company that developed XrML, main-
tains that its patents cover any implementation of a rights expression
language and has threatened open, royalty-free ODRL.37 ODRL's pro-
ponents maintain that ContentGuard's wide-reaching patent claims are
baseless.38 Yet, the legal question of who holds intellectual property
rights over the way by which we may semantically describe intellectual
property claims in DRM remains unresolved, thus clouding considerably
ODRL's future.
39
Neither XrML nor ODRL are likely to become the accepted stan-
dard for expressing usage rights in DRM systems any time soon. Not
only does each of them have their own problems, they also have to con-
tend with a growing plethora of proprietary DRM systems advocated by
commercial competitors as well as industry consortia.40 The lack of in-
teroperability between these systems, the high economic stakes involved,
and the entrenchment of leading players-rights holders, consumer elec-
tronics corporations, telecommunication companies and software pro-
ducers-will continue to work against widespread consolidation. 4,
To sum up, DRM systems consist of a number of important ele-
ments to perform two main functions-the facilitation of usage rights
transactions, and the interdiction of unauthorized use. A central element
is the representation of usage rights in the DRM system. It is often
achieved by specifying such rights through a distinct rights expression
35. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20; Open Mobile Alliance, Digital Rights Management 4 (Dec.
2003) (Short Paper), available at http://www.openmobilealliance.org/docs/DRM%20Short%20
Paper/o20DEC%202003%20.pdf; Open Mobile Alliance, Press Release, The Open Mobile Alliance
Shows Growing Industry Impact 1-2 (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.openmobilealliance.
org/docs/AGM2005RlsFINAL.pdf.
36. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20 ("OMA DRM is taking hold primarily in Europe; the stan-
dard's loss of momentum is jeopardizing its chances for adoption across the Pond in North Amer-
ica.").
37. Id. ("One reason for the OMA DRM slowdown has been the still-unresolved wrangling
over DRM patent licensing terms .... ").
38. See Susanne Guth & Renato lannella, Critical Review of MPEG LA Software Patent
Claims, INDICARE, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read article.php?articleld=90 (ques-
tioning the validity of ContentGuard's patents).
39. See id. ("If the claims of MPEG LA are validated, the work of the ODRL Initiative and
other RELs such as the Creative Commons Licenses will be critically endangered.").
40. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20 (mentioning a number of other proprietary standards like
Groovy Mobile and Melodeo in the U.S. and Canada or Cingular's cooperation with Apple's Fair-




language with semantics pre-defined in a (potentially extensible) diction-
ary. Two significant efforts for defining such a rights expression lan-
guage have been undertaken recently-the commercial XrML/REL and
open source license-free ODRL, but neither will likely become the
dominant standard in the medium term, nor will any of the available al-
ternatives. The lack of a common standard, however, does not put in
dispute the central need to represent usage rights in DRM.
III. REPRESENTING RIGHTS IN DRM
To date, DRM systems are used to control access to copyrighted in-
formation content, be it movies, video games, software or music. Tech-
nically, these different types of content are all the same: streams of bits,
with associated meta-data that restrict what can be done with them. As
DRM systems are built to control access to "digital" information, they
are fundamentally rights agnostic-that is, they can in principle restrict
any digital bit stream.
Hence, one could potentially extend such DRM systems to intellec-
tual property rights beyond copyright.42 For example, one could envision
trademark rights to be managed through DRM. If one were to use a
trademarked name or image, the DRM system could facilitate the licens-
ing of such trademarks or prevent their use. Widening the scope of rights
management in such a way would require, however, a significant modifi-
cation of the semantics of usage. So far, these semantics-as evidenced
for example by the Rights Data Dictionary (RDD)-focus on simple uses
of managed content, like printing, displaying, storing or modifying.43
Including trademark rights in DRM would necessitate deepening the
"understanding" that the DRM system has of the context of use: Is the
trademark just mentioned descriptively, or does its use infringe upon the
rights of the trademark holder? Answering this question may require
machines to understand substantially more about the substance of infor-
mation than is currently available. Yet, in a number of instances existing
DRM systems may easily be able to protect trademark rights, just as they
protect copyrights. Take for example the use of logos on web pages: in
such cases the DRM could require (and facilitate) the user to obtain con-
sent from the trademark owner. To be sure, this would not stop some-
body from scanning in a trademarked logo and then using it, but it would
arguably prevent a user from downloading a trademarked logo from the
trademark owner's website to use the same logo on her website, even if
the logo itself were not copyrighted.
42. Although, perhaps with the exception of trademark rights, it is a bit hard to imagine what
these other intellectual property rights could be. Simply put, unlike copyright, patent rights protect
product or process ideas, not just concrete instantiations of these ideas. Thus, it is hard to see what
bit stream a DRM intent upon protecting patents rights would control and how.
43. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
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Intellectual property is but one right over information our legal sys-
tem recognizes. DRM systems could potentially be used to manage other
rights over information. Given how much we expose personal informa-
tion on the Internet and the extent to which this exposure is abused, one
obvious candidate for such an extension could be informational pri-
vacy-the management and protection of personal information.
A. Advantages of DRM-Based Protection of Personal Privacy
At least at first blush, such protection of informational privacy
through a DRM system seems to be a useful idea for a number of rea-
sons.
First, the Internet has made processes less transparent. With com-
plex information processing in our computers, protecting personal infor-
mation is less obvious to users than before. A DRM system would take
care of this complexity of information flows for users-providing users
with options without exposing them to the underlying complexity.
Second, due to the abundance and affordability of digital processing
and storage, we capture, process and store much more information about
ourselves-from photos and movies to financial transactions - compared
with pre-digital times with its specialized equipment and relatively ex-
pensive storage costs, thereby increasing the footprint of our individual
digital shadows. 44 With DRM built into all devices that acquire, store
and process information, this surge in stored information of personal
character would not necessarily translate into an equal increase in per-
sonal vulnerability.
Third, even without our expressed wish, information processing
equipment we use-from personal computers to cell phones-acquire
and store much more information about our interactions than ever be-
fore-much of which may represent personal information to which we
would like to control access. 45 A DRM system would enable us to do so.
44. See, e.g., Chip Walter, Kryder's Law, SCIENTIFIC AM., Aug. 2005, available at
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=000BOC22-0805-12D8-
BDFD834l4B7F0000&ref-sciam (arguing that Moore's law about "the doubling of processor speed
every 18 months is a snail's pace compared with rising hard-disk capacity" and stating that "[s]ince
the introduction of the disk drive in 1956, the density of information it can record has swelled from a
paltry 2,000 bits to 100 billion bits (gigabits), all crowded in the small space of a square inch.").
45. A recent victim of this lack of control over one's personal information has been socialite
Paris Hilton, whose cell phone was allegedly hacked. See John Schwartz, Some Sympathy for Paris
Hilton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 4, at 1. More generally, malware, spyware, hacking, and other
attacks on communications devices has dramatically increased over the last couple of years - includ-
ing the hundreds of thousands of computers in the U.S. alone that are hijacked and remote-controlled
from abroad. See, e.g., CERT/CC Statistics 1988-2006, http://www.cert.org/stats/ (last visited Sept.
14, 2006) (stating that the number of reported attacks against intemet-connected systems has in-
creased from 21,756 in 2000 to 137,529 in 2003). For a more detailed analysis, see Jonathan L.
Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2008-13 (2006).
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Fourth, the original thrust of protecting personal information in the
United States stemmed from the fears of a "Big Brother"-like, overarch-
ing (federal) government.46 Born out of the shadow of the Watergate
scandal, the Federal Privacy Act 47 therefore protects citizens from intru-
sion by the federal government.48 At least since the advent of the Inter-
net and electronic commerce, consumers have come to realize that com-
mercial entities may threaten their privacy just like governments. In con-
trast to the European privacy landscape, U.S. federal legislators so far
have not enacted an omnibus data protection statute that covers the pri-
vate sector as well. 49 A DRM system could address this problem by em-
powering people to control access to their personal information regard-
less of whether the party attempting such access is a government agency
or a commercial entity.
Fifth, unlike copyright laws that have been harmonized around the
world through a century of international treaties, informational privacy
statutes, despite some international coordination like the OECD Guide-
lines on the Protection of Personal Data, have not seen a similar har-
monization.50 In particular, in the United States, informational privacy
rights remain a patchwork of state and federal laws, making it possible
for personal information to be exported with the help of the Internet to a
jurisdiction with less stringent privacy laws.5  This leads to legal arbi-
46. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY - DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES vii (1992); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES - THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA,
AND THE UNITED STATES xiii (1989); Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Generational Development of
Data Protection in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219, 221 (Philip
E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
47. Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2006).
48. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 92 (1996) ("The
Privacy Act represents the most comprehensive attempt to structure information processing within
the public sector.").
49. There are, however, a number of rather specific sectoral omnibus data protection statutes,
such as the Video Rental Record Protection Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2006)), the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-25 (West 2006)), the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320d, 1320d-1 - 1320d-8 (West 2006)), or the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3403 (West 2006)). See also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 48, at 215-18 (giving a brief overview of data protection in the private sector in the U.S.).
50. Organization for Co-Operation and Economic Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1 1_1 1,00.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2006). Harmonization has therefore taken place to a certain degree. However, in the
European Union this was largely due to the European Union Data Protection Directive. See EU
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of such Data, Oct. 24, 1995, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/indexen.htm [hereinafter Data Directive].
51. While there is no comprehensive and homogeneous body of privacy law at the federal
level in the U.S., informational privacy is protected to varying degrees by rather diverse state laws.
See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 48, at 129-30 ("[N]o two states have adopted precisely
the same system of regulation."). This is one of the reasons why the European communities linked
the export of personal data to third countries to the requirement of a certain minimum level of pro-
tection. See Data Directive Art. 25, supra note 50 ("The Member States shall provide that the trans-
fer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for process-
ing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provi-
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trage-a modem form of "forum shopping., 52  A DRM system would
have global reach and work largely independently of the jurisdiction it is
being used in, thereby overcoming the arbitrage problem.53
Sixth, and related, entrusting a DRM system to protect our informa-
tional privacy would not necessitate the passage of a comprehensive digi-
tal privacy law, which legislative priorities as well as federalism con-
cems in the United States may preclude. As DRM relies on law to stop
leakages from occurring too frequently, a relatively simple amendment to
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 54 prohibiting tampering
with DRM systems in general (and not just in the context of intellectual
property rights) could suffice.
Because of the potential of DRM systems to address these privacy
challenges, DRMing personal information may possibly offer all of us
better individual control over our personal information than current pri-
vacy law does.
B. Three Challenges to DRMing Informational Privacy
To achieve success, however, at least three issues exist-one tech-
nical, one foundational, and one conceptual-that may prevent us from
using DRM in the personal privacy context.
1. The Technical Challenge
As I have described above, DRM systems depend on meta-data of
permissible use that is linked to the content to which the meta-data re-
fers. 55 This linkage has to be hard to break, because once separation hap-
pens, content essentially loses its protective cover and can no longer be
protected by DRM. A number of technical methods are used by DRM
systems to ensure the linkage between (as well as the integrity of) meta-
data and content. For example, meta-data can be "embedded" in content,
sions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection."). Subsequently, an EU delegation negotiated with the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce the so-called safe-harbor principles. See U.S. Department of Commerce,
Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
52. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE 129, 140-50 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997); Viktor Mayer-
Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 605, 615 (2003); see also Joel Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Modernism,
5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 577 (1998) ("One dark side of cyberspace is its facilitation of
private sector jurisdictional evasion and, at least in some contexts, its facilitation of regulatory arbi-
trage."); Sean Selin, Comment, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32
GONZ. L. REv. 365, 381-82 (1996) (speaking of the "lowest common denominator" that would result
in such regulatory arbitrage).
53. To be sure, as I have mentioned above, technology requires laws to prohibit the creation
and use of tools to break technological locks. In the absence of supportive laws one could overcome
the restrictions the DRM system imposes without breaking the law. However, even in these situa-
tions, one could imagine contract law to take over some of the role of the (inexistent) laws.
54. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2006).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
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using mechanisms like steganography 56 and encryption. 57  As a rule of
thumb, employing these methods is easier when the amount of meta-data
is relatively small compared with the content that needs to be protected.
This is the case with multimillion-pixel photographs, megabyte-sized
music files, or videos measured in gigabytes.
Unfortunately, personal information is much smaller. Our social
security number is only nine digits in length, all of which are numbers.
In such cases the meta-data defining permissible usage would be substan-
tially bigger than the informational content it intends to protect, requiring
DRM system builders to fundamentally adjust their systems, while steg-
anography and similar methods of "hiding" and "embedding" meta-data
would have to be replaced by more robust mechanisms that work without
depending on a relative size difference between meta-data and protected
content.
Yet, providers of DRM systems may have to face this challenge re-
gardless of whether we want to include personal information or not. As
digital creators continue to combine and modify pre-existing elements to
build new works, the notion of the individual creator producing a mono-
lithic creative work is rapidly substituted by ideas of peer production,
John Seely Brown's creative bricolages, and a modus operandi of "rip,
mix, and bum., 58 Providers of DRM systems will have to contend with
this brave new world of intellectual production, in which individual crea-
tive elements that are assembled, combined, and mixed, may get smaller
and smaller in size. If that is the case, the problem of linking smaller
pieces of information with its meta-data that I have described above may
get solved anyway.
2. The Foundational Challenge
For a DRM system to be comprehensive and effective in managing
personal information rights it needs to keep track of what users are doing
when, how, and in what context.59 Consequently, in order to protect the
privacy of individuals, a DRM system needs to keep track of every-
body's every move, thus creating a system of total surveillance.
56. Steganography is "the act of embedding or hiding a message inside a seemingly innocent
digital vessel" so that nobody except for the recipient knows of its existence. See J. William Gurley,
From Wired to Wiretapped: Forget Privacy Rights. The Real Problem With Government Net Snoop-
ing is That it Won't Work, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 214.
57. See SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE 187-208
(Deborah Russel ed., 1997) (referring to the process of converting a plaintext message into a suppos-
edly unintelligible ciphertext by using an encryption algorithm, i.e. a mathematical equation).
58. For a comprehensive analysis of social production as a new paradigm, see generally
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
59. See generally Richard Gooch, Requirements for DRM Systems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 16 (Eberhard
Becker et al. eds., 2003) (providing a general overview of the requirements of an effective DRM
system).
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Inherent in this perplexing situation is the notion that such DRM
systems need to be tracking comprehensively in order to be effective.6 °
Yet, as I have discussed above, DRM systems do not need to offer per-
fect, but only sufficient enforcement. 61 Limited leakage is not detrimen-
tal as long as most individuals continue to choose transacting through
DRM rather than circumventing it.
The problem of leakage, however, might become more difficult the
smaller and more fluid the informational content DRM intends to protect.
Leakage of a multi-gigabyte movie file may be less troublesome, because
distributing such a file at current transmission speeds carries non-trivial
transactional costs. 62 Such costs are practically non-existent for a piece
of personal information that just contains a person's name and social
security number. Sending and receiving such information across the
Internet takes milliseconds. Therefore, one could argue that the smaller
the information pieces DRM systems have to protect, the more compre-
hensive such systems must become.
Yet, such a view presupposes that transaction costs stay constant.
The more bandwidth users will have at their disposal, the lower the
transaction costs for transferring even large pieces of information. As
providers of DRM will adapt their systems to a high bandwidth world,
for example by building the capacity to "forget" into our digital systems,
such leakage could be controlled effectively.
3. The Conceptual Challenge
Existing DRM systems incorporate a semantic of property. This is
not surprising considering that they are designed to protect copyright.
The dictionaries they employ-for example the RDD-are based on
property-related actions, like "sell." The legal foundation of informa-
tional privacy claims, on the other hand, is based on a negative liberty, a
right to keep others out.63 It is not conceptualized in terms of permission




63. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890) (the seminal article that became the basis of the right to privacy in the U.S.). Legal
academics have argued since for different notions of privacy. Charles Fried equates informational
privacy with control over information. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
Paul Schwartz argued for a concept based on informational self-determination. See Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1653 (1999). Julie
Cohen suggested individual autonomy as a foundation for privacy. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1423 (2000). Both
Schwartz's and Cohen's approach are instantiations of essentially European, if not German notions
of informational privacy. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 707 (1987); Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 46, at 229-32. Categorizing these and
similar conceptions of informational privacy, Daniel Solove has identified six main themes: the right
to be let alone, limited access to self, secrecy, informational control, personhood, and intimacy. See
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This results in a mismatch between the semantics available in cur-
rent DRM systems and the conception of the claim-informational pri-
vacy-we intend to incorporate. There are two options to overcome this
divergence.
First, one could adjust our conception of informational privacy to
conform to the property paradigm already built into DRM systems; that
is one could change the law to fit the technology. As long as the relation
between humans and information can be represented in terms of owner-
ship and property, such "propertized" informational privacy claims could
be included in existing DRM systems.
"Propertizing" information privacy is not a novel idea. Experts from
Kenneth Laudon to Lawrence Lessig have suggested it before.64 They
argue that while our legal system has not conceived of informational
privacy as a property right, markets have. Personal information has be-
come a valuable commodity that is traded once it has been collected.
Hence, using property as a legal foundation for informational privacy
would arguably bring the legal system in line with economic reality, with
the benefit of empowering the original source of personal information-
the individual herself. Such "propertization" of personal information
could then provide the conceptual foundation that enables DRM systems
to manage access to such information, thereby potentially-as Lessig
contends-enabling the individual to decide whether and to what extent
to trade away her privacy interests in personal information.65
Yet, as has been pointed out, such a reconceptualization of informa-
tional privacy is not without significant problems.66 First, copyright and
patent rights are granted to offer an individual economic incentive for the
production of creative works to overcome potential underproduction of
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002). None of these
privacy conceptions, however, is founded on a property paradigm similar to copyright.
64. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 92 (1996);
LESSIG, supra note 11, at 122-134; Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAC. 56, 58 (1999); see also Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, II BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996); Richard
S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J.
2381, 2381 (1996); Edward Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 899, 900 (2003); Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 230, 267 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2055, 2058 (2004).
65. See LESSIG, supra note 11, at 156-62. But see Andrew Orlowski, Lessig, Stallman on
"Open Source" DRM, THE REGISTER, Apr. 15, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/15/lessigstallman drm.
66. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1136-
46 (2000); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, § 2 (2001); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren &
Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 8, 12; Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1193 (1998); Janger, supra note 64, at 914-16.
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such works.67 This is different for personal information, which arguably
is not underproduced.68 Second, intellectual property laws in the United
States are designed, as the Constitution states in unambiguous terms, to
advance the public good through the advancement of science and the
arts.69 There is no such utilitarian rationale in facilitating the dissemina-
tion of personal information. 70 Third, propertization is anathema to those
that conceptualize informational privacy in terms of individual autonomy
and dignity.7' Fourth, certain uses of a creative work after its copyright
had been sold may infuriate the creator, but unlike personal information
will not threaten her persona.
72
Moreover, our traditional notion of creative works is atomistic:
Creative works stand on their own; they may shape (at least in part) the
context they are put in, not vice versa. For example, one can read a
Shakespeare play, or a Beckett novel on the beach, in the subway, or in a
library-it, we assume, rises above the context in which it is read. Con-
sequently, in most cases creators have little interest in dictating where we
consume their creations. This is different in the realm of personal infor-
mation. The use of personal information in one context may be perfectly
benign and acceptable to the individual the information refers to, but use
in a different context may have serious negative consequences for that
person.73 Through the act of propertization, the originator loses control
of her personal information and cannot stop it from being used by others
who have legitimately obtained "ownership" rights over it.
67. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
68. See Kang, supra note 66, at 1193 n.237; see also Murphy, supra note 64, at 2383; see also
Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1139.
69. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8 (stipulating that "Congress shall have power ... to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to author and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
70. See Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1140-41.
71. See Kang & Buchner, supra note 64, at 234-36; see also Samuelson, supra note 66, at
1142-43.
72. See Rotenberg, supra note 66, at § 93 (noting that Warren & Brandeis in their seminal
paper on privacy "purposefully distinguished a privacy right from an intellectual property claim,
noting that copyright typically protects an interest once publication occurs, privacy protects a right to
simply not publish"); see also Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1138 (stating "[flree alienability works
very well in the market for automobiles and land, but it is far from clear that it will work well for
information privacy. An individual may be willing to sell his data to company N for purpose S, but
he may not wish to give N rights to sell these data to M").
73. An extreme example is offered by the development in the 1930s in the Netherlands of a
comprehensive population registration system. The objective of the system echoes some of the
rationales for more sophisticated information technologies today-to streamline administration and
to reduce burdens on citizens. That system, however, was subsequently used to assist the Nazis in
apprehending Dutch Jews and Gypsies, who suffered a much higher death rate than any other occu-
pied western European country, or, notably, Jewish refugees in the Netherlands, who were not in the
registration system. See William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role
of Population Data Systems in Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOCIAL RESEARCH 2 (2001); see also
David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Information
Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from other Government Data Systems, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 366, 368 (2006).
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Proponents of DRMing personal information may rebut that the
dangers of de- and re-contextualization are not unique to personal infor-
mation. In fact, they could argue, the more we tend to combine, modify
and adapt creative works in digital bricolages, the less such creative
works are able to evoke their own individual context. Creators conse-
quently will desire to retain more control over the contexts in which their
creative works are being used, moving away from the property notion
underlying current DRM systems. In turn, this may force DRM systems
to augment their underlying structure of usage rights to include context-
granted a very tall order, given the current state of technologies.
A second, possibly more sensible option is the reverse; to make
technology follow the law, by altering DRM systems to include non-
property based concepts. This is relatively straightforward as long as it
can be achieved by adjusting the semantics of rights expressed in DRM.
Relevant dictionaries, like the RDD, would be modified, thereby making
way for the inclusion of informational privacy into DRM systems. Yet,
it is uncertain that such a simple semantic "patch" can be sufficient, for
the concept of property not only rests on semantics, but on how we con-
strue the relations between humans and information. In a property
framework, such a relation is constructed in terms of a subject/object
relationship of exclusive ownership and control. If, however, our con-
ception of informational privacy is built on an alternative conceptualiza-
tion of the linkage between humans and information, if, to quote Julie
Cohen's words, in informational privacy the "subject" is the "object,, 74 a
simple semantic modification of DRM is no longer feasible.
This is not to suggest that Cohen's conception of informational pri-
vacy is the most appropriate one. Rather, it is precisely the absence of a
prevalent conception of informational privacy-unlike the property-
inspired orthodoxy of copyright-that makes it so difficult to adjust
DRM systems to. If we fail to agree on a conception of the right we
want to protect, how can we hope to express this conception in code, i.e.
in standardized, relatively unambiguous language? And even if we had
such an agreed-upon conception of informational privacy we would have
to incorporate it into a DRM system in addition to the conception of
copyright that is already mapped in our DRM systems. How would these
two presumably very different conceptions coexist? Would such a DRM
system use one common or two separate dictionaries expressing the vari-
ous elements of usage rights and relations between user, rights holder,
and information?
The obvious, but conceptually complex solution, of course, is to
suggest a common structure of rights over information that is able to
represent a variety of different rights over information, from copyright to
74. Cohen, supra note 63, at 1373.
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privacy.75 Given the pitfalls of other solutions, investing serious thought
into conceptualizing such a common structure seems the most promising
long-term solution.
CONCLUSION
This article examined DRM systems and their capacity to manage
not just copyrights but also other kinds of rights over information. In
particular, I looked at whether, to what extent and under what conditions
informational privacy rights could be managed through DRM. I dis-
cussed a number of advantages of DRMing informational privacy rights,
and presented three significant challenges to its adoption-a technical, a
foundational, and a conceptual one-and suggested possible paths to
address them.
While these hurdles are significant and it is not clear whether and
when they can be cleared, it is in the DRM system providers' best inter-
est to broaden the scope of the systems they use, not only because it wid-
ens the market, but also because empowering individuals to better man-
age their informational privacy rights may in turn bring about a public
reassessment of the value DRIVI systems offer.
75. Finding such common ground may be easier in the continental European context. See





The current patent system is argued to be in a state of crisis. Although
much recent criticism about the patent system has been leveled at so-
called "patent trolls, " another trend has emerged that may prove more
enduring and potentially more troublesome. Patent holders have devel-
oped more systematized and strategic methods to obtain revenues from
the patent system, building business plans around leveraging monetary
value from what are called "liquid patents " herein. Recognizing that the
patent right can be monetized into licensing fees and damages in an ac-
tion for patent infringement, some entities have undertaken formalized
programs to gather or acquire critical patents in particular fields. These
practices are supported by patent rules of law, but are in contravention
of the larger goals of the patent system. This work traces certain attrib-
utes that encourage liquid patent holders' strategies. Further, the paper
proposes that the remedies provisions of the patent system should be
modified to ensure that this practice does not harm innovation. In addi-
tion, the traditional antitrust protections for patent holders should be
eliminated to prevent abuse and curb liquid patent holders' ability to
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INTRODUCTION
When patent systems first developed, rewarding the inventor as a
creative force was a paramount and express purpose.1 Now some five
centuries later, the state of the patent system has undergone momentous
change. Serious questions have been raised about how well the patent
system is serving invention and society. Critics have deemed the patent
system in the U.S. at a crisis point.
2 Legislators have called for reform.
3
1. The first known patent statute was enacted in 1474 in the Venetian Republic, and has been
translated to read:
We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices...
if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that
others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor's honor away, more
men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great util-
ity and benefit to our Commonwealth.
Venetian Republic Patent Statute (1474), reprinted in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 10-11 (Donald S.
Chisum et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
2. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 170
(2004) (commenting that the patent system is a "freight train out of control"); Patently Ridiculous,
N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2006, at A24.
3. Press Release, Representative Lamar Smith, Smith Introduces Reform Bill (June 8, 2005),
available at http://Iamarsmith.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=648; see also H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. (2005) (tracking the introduction of the Patent Reform Act).
LIQUID PATENTS
Some condemnation of the current patent system has been leveled at
"patent trolls," a term coined 4 to describe patent holders who do not
commercialize an invention, but rather raise money by asserting the pat-
ent against those who do.5 Patent trolling has ignited a highly polarized
policy debate. On one hand, patent trolls are characterized as "profi-
teers" that demonstrate that something has "gone very wrong" with the
U.S. patent system, having turned the purpose of the patent right "on its
head, using [patents] to tax, blackmail, and even shut down productive
companies unless they pay high enough ransoms.",6 On the other hand,
this activity has been argued to constitute "simply enforcing the right of
exclusion granted to them by the Constitution, and ... help[ing] to en-
sure that the system is functioning properly and as intended."' Indeed,
one prominent lawyer who specializes in asserting patents has been de-
scribed as "a guardian angel" for solo inventors who would otherwise be
unable to enforce their patents. 8 At the same time, it is difficult to avoid
the evidence that the system is being used to create considerable private
wealth. 9 Although the term has been characterized as too vague,' 0 overly
broad, 1 and "used unfairly to deride" patentees, 2 the phrase patent troll
is always used in the pejorative and contrary to how a healthy patent
system should operate.
Patent trolls have become the fulcrum for public debate about the
underlying incentive structure of the patent laws. The necessity for pat-
ent reform depends, to some degree, on whether patent trolls are a per-
manent fixture in the patent landscape. At the same time, another trend
has emerged that may prove more enduring. Although patent trolling
raises some troubling issues, some patent holders have developed even
more systematized and strategic methods to obtain revenues from the
patent system, building business plans around leveraging value from
asserting patents. This activity-which for purposes of this article is
4. The term "patent troll" was reportedly coined in 2001 by Peter Detkin, a patent attorney,
while working as counsel for Intel Corp. See Rob Garretson, Has the Enemy of the Patent Trolls
Become One?, CIO INSIGHT, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,1902291,00.
asp.
5. Testimony of Peter Detkin, TRANSCRIPT OF THE FTC/DOJ HEARINGS ON THE
IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 112 (Feb. 2, 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/worddocs/competition.doc.
6. Patently Ridiculous, supra note 2.
7. John LaPlante, The Case for Abandoning the Term "Patent Troll, " INTELL. PROP. LITIG.,
Winter 2006, available at http://www.rkmc.com/TheCase forAbandoningtheTermPatent_
Troll.htm.
8. Lisa Lerer, Meet the Original Patent Troll, IP L. & BUS., July 20, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 153299926232.
9. Id.
10. What the Heck Is a Patent Troll?, PHOSITA: AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BLOG,
Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.okpatents.com/phosita/archives/2006/04/what-the-heck-i.html.
11. See Dennis Crouch, What is a Patent Troll?, PATENTLY-O, May 12, 2006,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/what-is a_paten.html#comments (excluding from the
definition of "patent troll" those entities who do research and development).
12. LaPlante, supra note 7.
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termed "liquidizing patents"- treats patents as a commodity. As ex-
plored further in this article, using patents as liquid assets invokes prob-
ing questions about patent policy and the manner in which the system is
administered.
Recognizing that the patent right can be monetized into licensing
fees and damages in an action for patent infringement, some entities have
undertaken formalized programs to gather or acquire critical patents in
particular fields.' 3 Firms have made patents the financial centerpiece of
their businesses, by developing patentable ideas internally or through
purchase.'4 Other entities have become market makers, undertaking pro-
grams such as patent auctions to facilitate patent transfers. 5 Some uses
of patents as assets have become financially creative, for example one
entity uses patents as collateral, having established a multi-million dollar
fund to provide loans that are secured by the debtor's intellectual prop-
erty.
16
The framers of the U.S. Constitution authorized the patent system
with the purpose of promoting invention. " Specifically, the patent sys-
tem was developed to provide inventors a reward of the right of exclusiv-
ity for a limited period of time.' 8 The patent laws provide this advantage
to inventors for the ultimate benefit of the public. 19 Under current law,
the patent right can be transferred from the original owner of the idea-
the patent's inventor-in a written contract to an assignee who becomes
the patentee and thereby succeeds to all of the rights originally held by
the inventor. 20 The patentee can license infringers or seek court interven-
tion to prevent others from practicing the invention and seek monetary
relief.
The U.S. patent system treats the patent right as immutable. Objec-
tivity, uniformity and certainty are driving forces in the development and
application of patent law. Under these policies, the patent has taken on a
monolithic quality that, once the right is set in the patent document, be-
comes unchangeable as an engraving in stone unaffected by changes in
ownership. Thus, unlike other legal rights for which the plaintiffs indi-
vidual circumstances are legally relevant to the existence of the plain-
tiff's right to recover, a liquid patent holder can purchase, sell, license
13. See infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 47-67.
16. OCEAN ToMo, OCEAN TOMO INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL EQUITY (print on file with author).
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
18. Id.
19. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that in order to obtain a
patent, the invention must have substantial utility, meaning it must provide some benefit to the
public).
20. 35 U.S.C.A § 261 (West 2006).
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and assert the patent without concern that the scope of the right is
changed or diminished by any of this activity. Those who commoditize
patents obtain all of the benefits of the laws that were created for the
protection of inventors.
Perhaps inadvertently, the patent laws have created incentives for
the transfer and financial exploitation of patents that are disconnected
with the development of inventions for public benefit. The profit-
seeking activities of liquid patent holders seem intuitively at odds with
the pubic interest sought to be served by the patent system. Further, liq-
uid patents pose the potential to harm inventive activity in the long term
by amassing control of patents that extracts above-market licensing fees
or that entirely prevents others from performing research or making im-
provements on existing technology.
Part I of this article examines how a liquid patent holder uses estab-
lished patent laws to create the liquid patent right. This section further
explores various examples of how liquid patent holders use patents to
create or amass markets from the patent system. Part II considers how
the patent system has created opportunities for patent holders to shift
their use of patents as means to protect commercial markets to liquid
assets. Part III examines whether the patent system should be modified
to accommodate liquid patents, in light of the system's goals to promote
uniformity. Part IV explores whether the use of liquid patents fits with
the existing justifications for the patent system, and finds that such uses
are either dissonant or contrary to these policies. After considering the
importance of uniformity to the patent system, Part V explores modifica-
tions to the remedies provisions of the Patent Act to resolve concerns
created by the use of liquid patents. Part VI considers a modification to
the protections that patentees have historically enjoyed against antitrust
theories as a further means to prevent liquid patent holders from acting in
a manner that forecloses consumer choice. The final section concludes
that the activities of liquid patent holders are likely to continue, and that
those who administer patent law must remain sensitive to this activity so
that the overall goal of fostering invention is advanced.
I. LIQUID PATENTS AND THEIR OWNERS
The creation of a market for liquid patents depends on the patent
system's ability to create and allow the enforcement of rights that are
severable from the patent's initial inventor. An exploration of the pre-
sent patent system reveals that the statutes not only facilitate liquid pat-
ent rights, but in some instances create incentives to do so. Although the
creation of separate markets for patents may not be based on conscious
or deliberate decisions by lawmakers, nonetheless a number of entities
are using the patent system as a means to transfer and exploit patents as
commodities. The following section explores the creation of liquid pat-
ent rights under the present patent laws. This section also provides some
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examples of several entities engaged in different facets of the creation of
separate markets for patent rights.
A. Creating the Liquid Patent Right
Perhaps the simplest explanation for why liquid patents are growing
in popularity is that this activity "is not only profitable but also perfectly
legal.",2' A liquid patent right is created through a straightforward appli-
cation of the current patent laws. These laws consider the patent right a
bundle of rights similar to a personal property interest that can be con-
veyed, subdivided and exploited for its owner's benefit.
22
As background, an application for a patent must be made by or on
behalf of the actual inventor.23 A party can license and bring an action
for patent infringement if that party is the "patentee," defined by statute
as one who owns the patent or is an exclusive licensee. 24 U.S. patents
can be granted for ideas that have not yet been refined to the point of a
commercially viable product. Thus, an inventor who wishes to patent
an idea before development into a marketable product can do so.
Although the inventor is the presumptive owner of a patent,26 own-
ership can be assigned to another.27 Patents and patent applications can
be readily purchased through individual negotiation, auction or any other
means devised to transfer the right in writing. 8 Except for the writing,
no legal relation between the transferor and the transferee need exist for a
valid assignment. Once ownership is transferred, the patent owner be-
29comes the patentee and can assert the patent against infringers in court.
Patentees can also license, sublicense, further assign and otherwise fully
exploit the patent right to the full extent permitted by the laws.30
Liquid patent holders use the rules authorizing patent transfers to
obtain rights directly from individual inventors, corporations who wish to
raise revenue, or other sources. 1 Such individuals or entities may lack
21. Marcus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals- "Being Infringed"
as a Nornatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy, at 3 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-885914 (select "Social Science Research Network, New York, USA" icon
under SSRN Electronic Paper Collection).
22. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
23. 35 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2006); Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888).
24. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100(d), 261, 281; see also Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255
(1891); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
25. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Usefulness in patent law ... necessar-
ily includes the expectation of further research and development.").
26. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
27. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2006).
28. Id. ("Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by
an instrument in writing.").
29. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG, 944 F.2d at 873-74.
30. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652, 659 (Ct. Cl. 1979).




the resources or desire to engage in the risk and expense of exploiting
patents themselves. As an exploited patent raises no money on its own,
the inventor or original owner has an incentive to transfer the patent in
exchange for either a lump sum or share in royalties earned by the pur-
chasing liquid patent holder.
B. Liquid Patent Holders' Strategic Assertion of Patents
After acquiring the patent right, the liquid patentee selects and in-
vestigates a potential infringer and may decide to commence licensing
negotiations. 32 One common strategy is to find patentees who have inte-
grated the patented invention into a commercial product.33 Both the liq-
uid patent holder and the potential infringer are aware that a failed nego-
tiation can lead to litigation, with the possibility for both monetary dam-
ages and injunctive relief.34 Such negotiations raise the concern ex-
pressed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion of eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L. C. ,35 that in such circumstances "the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations," par-
ticularly when the patent at issue covers only one aspect of a complex
product.36
Some liquid patent holders employ a number of strategies to maxi-
mize their leverage, and consequently their profit. For example, some
liquid patent holders own patents through holding companies that do not
produce any products. Such entities cannot be countersued for patent
infringement and thus the alleged infringer is in a poor position to exer-
cise any counter-leverage in the licensing negotiation. This considera-
tion does not bar enforcement of the patent right, as the existence of the
patent right is unaffected for patentees who decide not to commercialize
their invention.37 Indeed, one entity creates a shell corporation for each
32. License to Gamble: In-House IP Experts Offer Advice On Making Money From Licensing,
CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, March 2005, at 56 (roundtable interview with individuals from IBM,
Qualcomm, Burnham Institute, Sun World, and TARGUSinfo concerning licensing strategies).
33. Business Perspectives on Patents: Hardware and Semiconductors: FTC/DOJ HEARINGS
TO HIGHLIGHT BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY, Feb. 28, 2002 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President, Worldwide Patent
Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) ("They try to patent things that other people or companies will unin-
tentionally infringe and then they wait for those companies to successfully bring products to the
marketplace. They place mines in the minefield."), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/ipsecond.htm
(scroll down to February 28, select "Robert Barr" hyperlink); see generally Reitzig, supra note 21
(discussing the problem with patent trolls by use of a microeconomic model).
34. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 283, 284 (West 2006).
35. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
36. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Jeremiah Chan & Matthew
Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 9 (2005) ("An injunction can be
a death sentence for a company, especially an emerging technology firm without a diversified prod-
uct portfolio. Patent trolls often target such companies for quick cash because the targets cannot
afford to risk an injunction.").
37. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908).
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technology subject matter in which it acquires patents,38 which in many
cases would even further insulate a parent corporation against any liabil-
ity incurred by the shell for any conduct associated with patent assertion
activities in each individual field.
A liquid patent holder who acquires a large number of patents in the
same field as the alleged infringer is well positioned to demand payment,
as the possibility of litigating the validity or infringement of a large
number of claims becomes an expensive impracticability. 39 In a sense,
these multiple patents covering a single product create a "patent thicket"
by a single patent owner.40 This is because patent litigation is sometimes
too costly for small companies or those with marginal profit margins to
sustain.41 Such companies may be forced to settle with liquid patent
owners rather than to litigate infringement and validity of all of the as-
serted patent claims.
Those asserting patents may keep their patent ownership quiet, and
then assert the patent against inadvertent infringers who are already en-
gaged in manufacturing and selling product based on an infringing de-
sign.42  This strategy is based on the view that an infringer who discov-
ers a patent before a product is manufactured will simply redesign
around the patent. 43 By contrast, an infringer is more likely to pay for a
license after locking into an existing design and being faced with the
potential for a large litigation damage award.44
If a patent that covers a key aspect of a feature for which no substi-
tutes are available, the patentee may threaten to shut down a manufac-
turer, leading to a "hold up" problem that throws the infringer's business
38. Michael Kanellos, Microsoft Alums Amass Thousands of Patents, CINET NEWS.COM, Nov.
3, 2005, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+alums+amass+thousands+of+patents/2100-1014_3-
5929360.html.
39. The litigation costs for a case involving a single patent with approximately $1-25 million
at issue costs over $1 million. American Intellectual Property Lawyers Ass'n, 2005 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-109 (2005); see also Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES.COM, June 24,
2002 (describing IBM's negotiation strategy in response to invalidity and non-infringement argu-
ments made in licensing negotiations asserting seven patents, in which IBM asserted, "... we have
100,000 patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and
find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you just want to make this easy and just pay us $20 mil-
lion?").
40. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, at 1-2 (Mar. 2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-273550 (select "Social
Science Research Network, New York, USA" icon under SSRN Electronic Paper Collection) (de-
scribing a "patent thicket" as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company
must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.").
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See also Vincent J. Napoleon, Patents Take
Center Stage in Business Litigation and the Global Business Environment, INSIDECOUNSEL, July
2006 ("Some have referred to patent litigation as 'the sport among kings' because of its expense and
complexity.").
42. See Reitzig et al., supra note 21, at 5.
43. Id. at 17-18.




into doubt.4 5 As others have noted, this problem may be most acute in
the biotechnology area where the proliferation and goals of various in-
terests prevent vital downstream research.46
In combination, such strategies have the potential to allow liquid
patent holders to obtain more licensing revenue than the value of the
patent, even if the patent is invalid. This imposes a monetary burden that
acts as tax on those commercializing or seeking to improve on the sub-
ject matter of the liquid patent. Moreover, hold ups prevent subsequent
invention entirely, perhaps for years as a case is litigated. Such tech-
niques pose a threat to the larger goals of encouraging advancement in
developing knowledge, creating follow-on inventions and commercializ-
ing the benefits of this knowledge for use by the public.
C. Liquid Patent Markets and Holders
A number of business models have developed to facilitate liquid
patents. These include brokerage services that work with either buyers
or sellers and provide assistance for valuation and negotiation and offer-
ing strategic advice. 47 Governmental, educational and some commercial
entities have set up formal technology transfer offices that facilitate li-
cense or transfer of intellectual property rights generated by the offering
48institution. A number of companies who commercialize products open
separate departments to license or assert patents in order to raise licens-
ing revenue.49 Other entities that are engaged in activities that use pat-
ents as financial or strategic assets may assert patents for licensing fees
or attempt to create markets for patent transfers. These are more fully
described in the following subsections.
1. Patent Auctions
A reference to "patent auctions" has a ripped-from-the-headlines
quality that is associated with catchphrases like "[t]he new IP market-
45. Id. at 19.
46. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698, 699-700 (arguing that the prolif-
eration of patents in biotechnological research can set up a "tollbooth on the road to product devel-
opment" that may hamper research, noting "[w]hen owners have conflicting goals and each can
deploy its rights to block the strategies of the others, they may not be able to reach an agreement that
leaves enough private value for downstream developers to bring products to the market.").
47. Examples of patent brokers include IPotential, http://www.ipotential.org/overview/
index.htm, and Thinkfire, http://www.thinkfire.com.
48. An organization which lists a number of these offices is The Association of University
Technology Managers, http://www.autm.net/memberConnect/index.cftn. This organization prints an
annual report that features various success stories that demonstrate transfers from idea to commercial
use. See, e.g., THE ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER STORIES: 25 INNOVATIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2006), available at
http://www.betterworldproject.net/documents/AUTM-BWR.pdf.
49. For example, companies such as IBM both create patentable inventions and offer certain
patents for licensing. See IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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place, 50 "here to stay,"51 and drawing in a "carnival buzz., 52 A number
of auction formats exist, such as the Sotheby's-style auctions held at four
star locations, 53 bankruptcy proceedings designed to raise funds to pay
off creditors,54 do-it-yourself auctions on eBay.com and a free patent
auction website. 55
The name most widely associated with patent auctions is Ocean
Tomo, a self-described "integrated intellectual capital merchant banc"
that plans to conduct two patent auctions per year for the next three
56years. Introduced in April 2006, Ocean Tomo's first patent auction
attracted over 400 professionals, including 30 press attendees, and re-
sulted in the transfer of over $8 million in patent rights.57
Ocean Tomo precedes each auction with a structured process that
requires sellers to pre-qualify their patents according to Ocean Tomo's
own quality and valuation system, which measures the patent's potential
auction value.58 Sellers must also provide information about the patent's
ownership, validity, licensing activity and any known or suspected in-
fringers. 59 A due diligence meeting between the seller and potential bid-
ders takes place. 60 The auction is conducted live, and a contract for the
sale of the patent is formed by the highest bid made above the seller's
reserve and before the fall of the auctioneer's hammer.
61
50. See GREENBERG TAURIG, THE NEW IP MARKETPLACE: PATENT AUCTIONS (2006),
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2006/0403.pdf.
51. Id. at 4; see also Barry Evans & Gregory Dolin, Why Patent Auctions Are Here to Stay,
THE DAILY DEAL, Apr. 18, 2006.
52. First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, REDHERRING.COM, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www,
redherring.com/article.aspx?a= 16433#.
53. For example, on April 6, 2006, Ocean Tomo held an auction at the San Francisco Ritz
Carlton Hotel, which charged $1,500 fee to bidders preceded by a Gala Dinner. OCEAN TOMo, THE
OCEAN TOMO SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, April 5-6, 2006, at 5, (print on file with author)
[hereinafter OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION]. Ocean Tomo will hold another auction
in Fall 2006 at a Ritz Carlton in New York City. See Ocean Tomo,
http://www.oceantomo.com/auctions.html.
54. John Markoff, Auction of Internet Commerce Patents Draw Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2004, at C4.
55. See, e.g., Item No. 230006349370, eBay.com (U.S. Patent No. 6,286,439, filed Apr. 20,
1999, asking price $150,000); Item No. 130002119843, eBay.com (asking price $28,000,000); Item
No. 170006433907, eBay.com (U.S. Patent No. 6,570,340, filed July 10, 2000, asking price
$20,999,999 plus 10% royalties); see also Free Patent Auction, http://www.freepatentauction.com/.
56. See Ocean Tomo, http://www.oceantomo.com/; First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, supra
note 52.
57. Press Release, Ocean Tomo, World's First Live, Multi-Lot Patent Auction Exceeding
Expectations (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.oceantomo.com/auctionresults.html; see Ocean Tomo,
Auction Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.oceantomo.com/auctionsFAQ.html (print on file
with author).
58. See Ocean Tomo, Open Call for IP Submissions, http://69.59.189.170/auctions/
submissionl.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
59. See OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, supra note 53, at 9; see also Patentrat-
ing.com, http://www.patentrating.com (last visted Sept. 1, 2006).
60. See Ocean Tomo, Auction Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57, at 13.
61. Id. at 14.
208 [Vol. 84:1l
LIQUID PATENTS
Ocean Tomo's first auction offered patents from patentees including
Motorola, Clorox, The University of California and Ford Motor Com-
pany.62 Bids ranged from $2,000 to $1.9 million, and attendees included
GE, DuPont, Microsoft, Nokia, Kodak, IBM, AT&T and some who bid
anonymously. 63 Ocean Tomo declared its own first auction a success,
stating, "We are now poised to make a true market for intellectual prop-
erty liquidity a reality." 64 When combined with certain sales that were
negotiated post-auction, about forty percent of the offered patents had
been sold.65
Ocean Tomo touts the benefits of a patent auction over individual-
ized negotiation as a means to transfer intellectual property rights, ex-
plaining "the live auction creates a sense of urgency and closure to the
sales process it keeps the assets in public forum which result in a bidding
war, and shifts the burden to purchase from the sellers to the buyers. 66
At the same time, Ocean Tomo views auctions as means to create a mar-
ket for patents as assets, in other words as "a stepping stone to a new way
of thinking about invention" and to "help people to become more accus-
tomed to buying and selling intellectual property., 67 Ocean Tomo's ef-
forts serve as one example of a transition to a market where patents are
used as liquid assets.
2. Acacia Research Corp.
Acacia Research Corp. was founded in 1995 as a venture capital
firm, shifting focus in 2001 to concentrate on patents after earning $26
million from licensing technology. 68  Currently, Acacia is a publicly
traded company that includes a division that liquidizes patents on a large
scale, controlling over 160 U.S. patents through subsidiaries and holding
companies which are estimated to be valued at over $19,600,000.69 In a
recent filing, Acacia reported licensing revenues of $4.7 million for the
first three months of 2006.70 Acacia also reports thirty-one (31) ongoing
patent infringement lawsuits, some of which name multiple alleged in-
62. See GREENBERG TAURIG, supra note 50.
64. OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, supra note 53, at 6.
65. See Kanellos, supra note 38.
66. Ocean Tomo, Auction Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
67. First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, supra note 52 (quoting Jim Malackowksi, CEO of
Ocean Tomo's Auction division).
68. L. Gannes, Q&A: Acacia's Paul Ryan, REDHERRING.COM, July 9, 2006,
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=l7514&hed=Q%26amp%3BA%3A+AcaciaE2%80%9
9s+Paul+Ryan&sector=QAndA&subsector=Executives.
69. Acacia Research Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4, 11 (May 10, 2006).
70. Id. at 39.
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fringers. 7  Acacia claims to have settled lawsuits against over two hun-
dred companies.72
In response to criticisms,73 Acacia points out that their business
model helps inventors who lack resources to enforce their patent rights,
explaining that, "[w]hat we are doing is leveling the playing field by
giving inventors the opportunity to monetize all of their hard work.,
74
Additionally, Acacia states that patent licensing serves companies with
expertise in inventing and innovating, rather than commercialization and
marketing.75
3. Intellectual Ventures
Intellectual Ventures is a privately held company that was founded
in 2000 by two former software executives, including Nathan Myhrvold,
who formerly oversaw Microsoft's two billion dollar research and devel-
opment budget.76 Intellectual Ventures views itself as a type of market
maker that has "set out to amass one of the biggest holdings of patents in
the information technology world," as "part of a plan to create a new
investment market" around patents.77
Intellectual Ventures' patenting strategy is built on acquiring a high
volume of patents in a broad spectrum of industries.
Intellectual Ventures acquires patents from other inventors, report-
edly thousands of them.79 Additionally, the company works with both
staff and external engineers and scientists to conceive and patent inven-
tions, filing five hundred patent applications to date.80 Intellectual Ven-
tures does not currently commercialize, but professes plans to later create
spin-off companies to develop, commercialize and manufacture products
based on its patents 81 and to generate revenue by licensing the patents
that Intellectual Ventures has acquired.82 Others are more skeptical of
Intellectual Ventures' plans, anticipating that asserting enforcement liti-
71. Id. at 40-42.
72. See Charles Cooper, Have Patent, Will Sue, CINET NEWS.COM, July 10, 2006,
http://news.com.comlHave+patent/o2C+will+sue/2008-1014_3-6091975.html.
73. See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 2005,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0506.rothsidebar2.html.
74. Daily, supra note 31.
75. See Gannes, supra note 68.
76. See Ken Auletta, The Microsoft Provocateur, THE NEW YORKER, May 12, 1997, at 66-67.
77. Richard Waters, Invention Shop or Patent Troll Factory, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 25,
2006, at 10.
78. Lisa Lerer, Tech World Worries as Company's Patent Stockpile Grows, IP LAW AND
BUSINESS, June 14, 2006, at 32-33; see also Intellectual Ventures, http://intellectualventures.com
("Our current focus is on developing our invention portfolio.").
79. Brad Stone, Factory of the Future?, NEWSWEEK.COM, Nov. 22, 2004, at 60; see also
Lerer, supra note 78, at 32.
80. Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files 500"' Patent Application
(June 26, 2006) (on file with author).
81. Id.
82. Nicholas Varchaver, Who's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 110.
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gation will necessarily follow.83 Regardless, Intellectual Ventures de-
votes a significant portion of its business toward patents as liquid assets.
D. An Incentive to Liquidize
Although critics accuse liquid patent holders of trolling or abusing
the patent system, established rules of the patent system presently sup-
port the use of patents for private benefit. The law authorizes private
assignments of patent rights.84 According to Congress, a patent has "the
attributes of personal property., 85 Some courts have likewise character-
ized the patent right as a property right86 that is intended to create incen-
tives for invention and investment.87 As such, the patent right fits within
the classic legal definition of an entitlement subject to transfer without
government intervention for a privately negotiated value.88
The ability to transfer the patent right for profit is well established.
For example, the 1888 case Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.,89
describes patent rights transferred by a solo inventor to a company "com-
posed of leading business men from all parts of the country," who pooled
five million dollars to establish a telephone company that would "cer-
tainly result in the driving out of all telephones in the market, save the
ones they hold, or else the compelling the Gray, Bell, and Edison lines to
pay the new company a munificent royalty." 90 Dolbear is an early ex-
ample of a solo inventor seeking to use a patent to obtain a financial re-
turn through transfer.
83. Id. (citing Joe Beyers and Shane Robison of Hewlett-Packard).
84. 35 U.S.C.A § 261 (West 2006).
85. Id. ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.").
86. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States., 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) (observing that "a
patent is property... "); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of 'property."'); see
also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (explaining
that the patent laws provide "a temporary monopoly ... [which] is a property right.").
87. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting J. BENTHAM,
THEORY OF LEGISLATION, chs. 7-10 (6th ed. 1890). Specifically, the Paltex court described patent
rights with reference to Bentham's justification for property as follows: "It is supposed that men will
not labor diligently or invest freely unless they know they can depend on rules which assure them
that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the product as the price of their
labor or their risk of savings."
88. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972) (describing one form
of property as a government granted entitlement that can be transferred on the basis of an individu-
ally negotiated price).
89. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
90. Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 549. The inventor who claimed priority was described as a "poor
mechanic" who "[o]wing to his poverty," "was unable to push his patent on the market" using his
own resources. Id. Ultimately, the "poor mechanic" lost the priority battle to the patent obtained by
Alexander Graham Bell. Id. at 567.
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From a number of perspectives, significant social benefits derive
from the transferability of intellectual property rights.91 Today, research
for more complex technology frequently requires a significant monetary
investment, multiple inventors and firms that can foster inventive activ-
ity. Some benefits derive from a firm's ability to combine large financial
resources with the work of employee inventors.92 In a typical scenario,
the employees work under patent rules authorizing assignment or pursu-
ant to common law shop rights that transfer the invention to the firm.93
The firm seeks a patent and develops a product or service based on the
invention disclosed in the patent application.94 The patent is granted, and
the patentee is able to exclude competitors and thereby charge a suffi-
ciently high price for the product to enable recovery of the investment in
the research and development of the product. 9'
Patent transfers may be necessary to facilitate innovation. 96 For ex-
ample, a typical model to bring an idea to a commercial market may re-
quire the effort of several companies which must obtain rights to the pat-
ent to bring a product to market. 97 For example, basic research may be
performed at universities or research laboratories. 98 Some percentage of
these inventions may be transitioned to a small company, which incu-
bates the idea and undertakes the risk of taking the idea toward a "com-
mercially viable" product or service.99 A larger company may then un-
dertake late-stage product development and market access. 00 Creating
91. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1740 (2000) (recognizing that transferability permits
inventors to capitalize on inventions). Kitch states
It is clear that the ability of owners of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights
in whole or in part is an important feature of the systems. The rights can easily arise in
the hands of persons or firms who are not in the best position to exploit them. In order to
involve others in the full exploitation of the economic potential of the right, the owners
must be able to enter into a wide range of arrangements with other firms.
Id.
Permitting inventors to assign or license patent rights may permit more inventions to reach consum-
ers in the form of commercialized products.
92. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 15 (2004)
(discussing the lack of a "work made for hire provision" in current United States patent law).
93. Id.
94. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,950 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
95. Id.; see also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001) (discussing the need to develop inventions "into
some commercial embodiment").
96. The distinction between the terms invention and innovation highlights how a patent is
different from a final, commercial product. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success And Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives On Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 805, 807 (1988) (An invention
refers to an inventor's idea as patented. By contrast, an innovation is the "functional version of the
invention: the version first offered for sale.").
97. Developments in Nanotechnology: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation (Feb. 15, 2006), at 1 (Statement of Dr. Todd L. Hylton, Director, Ctr. for






alliances and relations through patent transferability rules among these
different entities thus may be crucial to the full development of a single
idea. Such collaboration will be even more critical for new fields of re-
search and development, such as nanotechnology, 10 which requires sig-
nificant research and development costs.
Another alternative to facilitate innovation is a cross-license be-
tween firms that allows freedom to operate without concern over patent
lawsuits. 10 2 A cross-license permits two companies to carry out product
design and manufacture based on non-exclusive cross-licenses to the
intellectual property of the other.10 3 In contrast to liquid patents, these
examples of the alienation of patent rights assist product or service de-
velopment that may inure to the benefit of the public.
Few would argue that the transfer of patents should be prohibited
because such transfers may be critical to the growth of innovation. The
patent statute explicitly authorizes patent transfers.' 0 4 As a system based
on economic and commercial principles, patent transfers do not carry the
same difficult moral and societal freight that warrant the prohibition on
transfers of voting rights, human organs or illegal substances. 105
Patent licenses also offer benefits to the inventor. 0 6 Facilitating in-
formation transfers through patent assignments have benefits such as
certainty and efficiency, particularly compared to trade secret transfers
which are typically encumbered by confidentiality agreements, monitor-
ing mechanisms and ownership uncertainty.'0 7 Preventing the transfer of
information may create undesirable societal effects. For example, im-
101. Id. at 2 (noting the long lead time and significant investment necessary for nanotechnol-
ogy research, which can be expected to require a more complex and interdependent business and
funding model).
102. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations In The Intellectual Property Protection
Of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 n. 173 (1994) (discussing the award of a cross-license to smaller
firm).
103. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited, An Empiri-
cal Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 109-
110 (2001) (discussing the use of patents for cross-license bargaining).
104. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2006).
105. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854-55 (1987)
(explaining that "market-inalienability negates a central element of traditional property rights").
106. DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 101-02 (2000). Teece notes that
patent holders enjoy a number of benefits by contracting their intellectual property rights. These
include permitting the innovator to have the benefits of a commercialized invention without incur-
ring the cost of the assets needed to incorporate the invention into a product, which reduces both risk
and cash requirements. Id. In addition, Professor Teece notes that "contractual relationships can
bring added credibility to the innovator, especially if the innovator is relatively unknown when the
contractual partner is established and viable." Id. at 10 1.
107. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,482 (2005)
(explaining that "partitioning an information asset through contract law and secrecy can be vastly
more complex and costly").
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peding or barring assignments may force inventors into becoming man-
agers of those rights, even if ill-suited for that role.
108
At the same time, the private transfer of patent rights causes con-
cern because control over the exclusive use of an idea has far broader
implications than a typical private transfer of goods. 109 This is because
patents have the potential to impact competition, society and future inno-
vation. As has long been recognized, the patent system is fundamentally
intended to benefit the public."'0 Availability may affect such vital issues
as public health,"' education 1 2 and communication, 13 among other
things.
In effect, the patent rules create an incentive for inventors to liquid-
ize, a circumstance that is perhaps inadvertent on behalf of those who
create and implement patent law. The patent system readily permits pri-
vate patent transfers, which carry the right to enforce against innocent
infringers and which have enormous potential to impact public welfare
and the future of innovation.
Such transfers have the ability to affect society and have a potential
for abuse. Patent owners can single-handedly control an entire area of
research merely by paying the price to which an inventor agrees. A solo
inventor or nearly bankrupt inventing company finds such transfers not
only profitable, but many find undertaking the risk of bringing an inven-
tion to market impossible. Transfers of otherwise unused patent rights
may be profitable, providing an incentive to the fruits of research and
development into the hands of those primarily interested in private gain.
108. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications For Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 137-38 (2004) (noting that "[c]reators are often terrible managers").
109. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, And Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside The
Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 224 (2002) (A patent "is not a private contract between two par-
ties, but rather a property right that impacts all competition in a given technology.").
110. See Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1859).
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was
never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or com-
munity at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing
that monopoly. This was at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed
by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts
for the same important objects.
Id.
111. Medecins Sans Frontieres, A Matter of Life and Death: The Role of Patents in Access to
Essential Medicines, Nov. 2001, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/
reports/2001/doha-l 1-2001.pdf (arguing that "[p]atents can become obstacles in providing afford-
able treatment... "); see Keith Bradsher, Pressure Rises on Producer of a Flu Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2005, at 1 (describing international controversy over access to vaccine against avian flu
pandemic, which is covered by a patent owned by Swiss pharmaceutical maker Roche).
112. Corey Murray, Schools Targeted In Streaming Video Patent Claim, ESCHOOL NEWS
ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2004, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/showStory.cfm?ArticlelD=4937 (detail-
ing Acacia Research Corp.'s assertion of patent claims against university distance learning pro-
grams).
113. Tom Krazit & Anne Broache, Blackberry Saved, CINET NEWS.COM, Mar. 3, 2006,
http://news.com.com/BlackBerry+saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html (describing settlement of
patent dispute that appeared on the verge of shutting down wireless email communication system).
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II. PATENT POLICIES THAT FOSTER THE PERSISTENCE OF
LIQUID PATENTS
Some insight into specific provisions of existing patent law shed
light on how liquid patents have facilitated-and perhaps even encour-
aged-liquid patent holders to use patents as assets. These provisions
are the result of policy decisions made about the historic uses of patents
as intended to create "new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods
and trade benefits."'"14 The cumulative effect of these doctrines is that
liquid patent holders obtain their advantages without providing the socie-
tal benefits that these rules were intended to foster.
A. The Patent as Monolith: A Uniform System of Rights
Patent law has been viewed as an area of law where uniformity of
application matters, although the extent to which uniformity should be
permitted has been the subject of some controversy. The U.S. Federal
Court of Appeals, which exercises jurisdiction over all patent appeals for
the federal courts within the U.S., was formed by Congress in 1982 with
the express purpose of enhancing uniformity in the administration of the
patent system. 1 5 This change has been observed to "have increased the
respect enjoyed by patents in the United States and the value patents
command in the global economy" and to have played in important part in
the development of the U.S. economy.'l 6 With these important princi-
ples at stake, the Federal Circuit treats patent rights as "central to the ne
information-age economy in the United States and ... as having signifi-
cant value as intellectual assets."' 17 Further, the Federal Circuit has been
noted to have a pro-patent bias. 
1 8
As purchasers of these favored rights, liquid patent holders are the
recipients of this system of strengthened rights. At present, the patent
right is viewed as a document that is valuable and derives value from
immutability. 119 Once crystallized into a right, a patent's strength does
114. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West 2006) (providing that the U.S. Court of Appeals has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases decided in the U.S. District Courts); Richard Linn, The
Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned
21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (Federal Circuit jurist noting the court's "mission to bring
understanding and uniformity to judicial interpretations of the patent statutes").
116. Linn, supra note 115, at 734-35; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n. To Promote Innovation:
The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 861, 865 (2004) ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the sole court for most
patent law appeals, has brought stability and increased predictability to various elements of patent
law.").
117. Linn, supra note 115, at 734.
118. Id. at 734 (recognizing the criticism that the court favors of patentees, and stating, "I
admit to some bias....").
119. Id. at 735 (noting the "reflection in the court's opinions of the value patents command as
legal documents, deserving of full and fair consideration by the courts and entitled to
enforcement").
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not vary based on differences in use, lack of use or ownership. As dis-
cussed in a recent article:
Patents are bundles of rights, the most important of which is the right
to exclude others from practicing the invention. Whether for business
reasons, spite, or pure stupidity, a patent owner can exclude others
from using his property, much as a land owner can keep out trespass-
ers. A purchaser at auction, therefore, will have no rights different
from or in addition to those of the original owner. The new owner
may commercialize the invention or not as he wishes.
120
The Federal Circuit's administration of patent law has exhibited a
trend toward preferring the promulgation of rules over flexible standards,
emphasizing certainty and predictability. 12' Uniformity has unquestion-
able benefits. Generally, the use of such rules fosters a sense of equal
treatment consistent with a sense of justice and fair play, enhances pre-
dictability, and acts as a check on the judiciary and the influence of pub-
lic will into the rule of law. 122 The commercial context in which much
patent law operates has contributed to the perception that stability is a
necessary component for application.
23
As explained by now-Chief Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit,
creating law for patent rights can be analogized to a country's efforts to
draw borders based on citizenship. 24 According to Judge Michel, flexi-
bility inherent in case-by-case determinations is undesirable because of
the tendency of decision-makers to interject subjectivity in drawing lines
and also because variation creates uncertainty among those trying to fix
their own legal citizenship status. 125 Applying Judge Michel's analogy to
the patent system leads to the concern that patent examiners, prospective
patentees, their competitors and the public enjoy benefits from a uniform,
predictable system that does not always require redress from the
courts. 1
26
According to Judge Michel, absent such predictability, the Federal
Circuit is in danger of impeding "the very commerce our court was cre-
120. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
121. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (2003)
("The Federal Circuit seems ever more prone to the pronouncement of categorical rules meant to
govern future patent disputes.").
122. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
123. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 683, 687 (1993) ("Like all commercial law, the cost of guessing wrong about the law and
its application is rarely recoverable. The responsibility placed on the Federal Circuit mirrors that
placed on all courts, for a useful and reliable law requires that the law is known and knowable.").
124. Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Juris-
prudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1233-35; cf Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental And Emotional
States in United States Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 296-97 (2000) (arguing that
case-by-case determinations made based on the inventor's or infringer's mental state encumbers the
adjudication of patent disputes and makes such litigation too expensive and complicated).
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ated to promote."' 127  Proponents of uniform application of patent law
principles stress that consistency helps a number of those affected by
patent rights. 28 Uncertainty about the categorization of rights creates
difficulties for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's patent examiners
who must determine whether to grant patent rights in the first instance. 1
29
Once fixed, the patent right remains unchanged as the patent is li-
censed or assigned. Unlike other legal rights in which the plaintiffs
circumstances are legally relevant to the existence of the plaintiffs right
to recover,1 30 the patent right is embodied in the document which leaves
the patent's owner entirely out of the picture. A liquid patent holder can
purchase, sell, license and assert the patent without concern that the
scope of the right is changed or diminished by any of this activity.
The uniformity with which the patent system has been administered
has inured to the benefit of liquid patent holders. There are few, if any,
policy-based exceptions to the administration of the patent law. The
system, established for the benefit of inventors, society and the economy
more generally, carries all of these rights forward when the patent right is
transferred.
B. Patent Enforcement
The right to enforce the patent right has been economically justified
as a means to prevent free-riding from significant invention investments.
According to theorists, patent law's protection for a patentee against in-
fringers who independently developed their products is supported by the
necessity to maintain a reward for initial inventor who may have made a
high level of investment in the invention. As explained by William Lan-
des and Judge Richard Posner:
If patents did not protect against independent duplication, then an in-
ventor who had spent enormous sums to be the first to discover some
useful new idea might find himself unable to recoup his costs be-
cause someone else, working independently toward the same goal,
127. Michel, supra note 124, at 1233, 1235, 1242 (recognizing that infringement decisions
"may lead to plant closings or even business failures.").
128. Id. at 1234-35.
129. Id. at 1233-34.
130. In this regard, patent law stands in contrast to trademark law, where the trademark
owner's conduct in using the trademark within particular channels of commerce is relevant to
whether there is a likelihood of confusion with the defendant's use of a mark. See e.g., Malletier v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing the impor-
tance of analyzing effect on consumers in the markets for both the mark holder and the accused
infringer); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing the
respective parties' marketing channels as relevant to whether there is a likelihood of confusion as the
test for trademark infringement).
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had duplicated his discovery within weeks or months after he made
it. 131
Landes and Posner's rationale justifies maximum levels of patent
protection most neatly for innovations which are expensive or time-
consuming to develop.1
32
However, liability for patent infringement extends much further,
encompassing implementations that have been independently developed
by the innocent infringers, where no free riding has or could have oc-
curred. Specifically, patent infringement is demonstrated by a compari-
son between the patent claim and the accused device, method or proc-
ess. 133  Infringement acts essentially as strict liability under tort law-
that is, if the accused device incorporates the claim elements then in-
fringement is found. 134 There is no requirement for a patent holder to
show that the infringer actually copied the invention in order for liability
to exist. 135 Patent infringement can be established where the infringer
has independently developed the technology that is the subject of the
patent holder's claim.' 36  If the accused device includes the invention
stated in the patent claims, the fact that the infringer included additional
innovations or improvements does not preclude a finding of patent in-
fringement.
137
Further, patent law does not distinguish levels of protection based
on the level of investment required for the development of the invention.
The patent protection afforded to a life-saving pharmaceutical 3 8 which
requires hundreds of millions of dollars to develop is entitled to the same
strength of protection as a fortuitously conceived invention.1 39 One fa-
mous example is the invention of Teflon, invented in an experiment gone
awry and ultimately incorporated into "everything from space capsules to
131. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 295-96 (2003). Landes and Posner point out that this protection
comes at an economic cost, because the rule "fosters patent races and the rent-seeking costs that such
races can impose." Id. at 296.
132. See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 16, 27 (2004)
(recognizing the high cost of developing increasingly complex technological solutions).
133. See, e.g., Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing
standard for determining patent infringement as a comparison of the claims with the accused device).
134. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 401 n.8, 408 (2006); cf Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandno-
ble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to construe a claim element as requir-
ing any state of mind on the part of the infringer).
135. Holbrook, supra note 134, at 401 n.8; see also Amazon.com, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1353 (refus-
ing to construe a claim element as requiring any state of mind on the part of the infringer).
136. Holbrook, supra note 134, at 401 n.8.
137. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
138. See, e.g., Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug (2006),
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/cost.htm (estimating that costs to develop a new phar-
maceutical through delivery to customers range from $800 million to $2 billion).
139. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2006) ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.").
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heart valves to frying pans" and patented in 1941.14° Patentability does
not require inquiry into the level of investment made by the patentee.
Additionally, the value, significance of the invention or the likeli-
hood that a particular invention might be appropriated is not relevant to
patentability.' 4' As a practical effect, the reward policies that protect
incentives for the most expensive, valuable inventions set the level of
legal protection for all patents.
Liquid patent holders benefit from these policies by seeking to
maximize the obtainable profit for the lowest possible sum, perhaps more
than the patent is worth based on an objective market measure. A liquid
patentee can assert the patent against any infringer, including those who
are innocently infringing. A liquid patent holder has the luxury of hold-
ing onto the patent, waiting to determine which infringers are going to be
successful enough to pursue, as the patentability remains the same until
the patent expires. Indeed, a liquid patent holder's damages may be
driven upward by infringers who have experienced market success after
infringement has begun 142 and may become locked into a particular de-
sign once the market has accepted their product.
43
Although the patent system rests on the prevention of free riding to
protect significant incentives to invest in innovation, the system is ad-
ministered with uniformity into areas where such policy considerations
are factually absent. A liquid patent holder who purchases a patent right
at low cost may assert the patent against an innocent infringer. Liquid
patent owners thereby obtain the benefit of an economic policy justifica-
tion for the patent system even where such justifications have no place in
their practice.
C. The Utility Standard
35 U.S.C. section 101 requires that inventions be "useful" as a con-
dition to patentability. 44 An appropriate level of patentability requires
sensitivity to several underlying considerations. The trajectory of devel-
opment ranges from the thought of a problem to be solved on one end of
the spectrum, to a fully developed, commercialized product on the other
end. The transition from one side of the spectrum to the other may take
time, financial resources, research and development. When determining
140. See Robert Friedel, The Accidental Inventor, DISCOVER, Oct. 1996, at 58, available at
http://www.discover.com/issues/oct-96/features/theaccidentalinv893 (describing Roy Plunkett's
accidental invention of Teflon, which occurred while Plunkett was researching a new type of Freon);
U.S. Patent No. 2,230,654 (filed Feb. 4, 1941) (Plunkett's original Teflon patent).
141. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 300.
142. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (indicating that courts can consider post-infringement sales in determining royalty
awards).
143. See Reitzig et al., supra note 21.
144. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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where on the spectrum to set the utility standard, courts are making a
normative choice that influences a potential patentee's ability to obtain
legal protection during a particular phase of development.
A utility standard that would grant patents for abstract ideas has the
potential to harm innovation by granting a right to exclude others who
may wish to research and develop within a new field, without providing
a sufficient social benefit.' 45 On the other hand, a utility standard might
be set which requires a fully developed, commercialized product for a
patent grant to issue. In In re Brana,146 the Federal Circuit rejected this
view, recognizing that usefulness "necessarily includes the expectation
of further research and development" in the context of a pharmaceutical
invention. 147 The Brana court reasoned that a contrary rule and its "as-
sociated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent
protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive
to pursue, through research and development, potential cures in many
,,148crucial areas ....
Courts such as Brana have established a rule of law based on cer-
tain assumptions about how patents will be used which are not sustained
by the use of liquid patents. Certainly in a traditional invention-
innovation-commercialization cycle, the court's reasoning is sound and
demonstrates how the patent system can lead to tremendous public bene-
fits. However, liquid patent holders do not attempt to deliver on any
promise of further research and development. Although the utility stan-
dard is set low enough in anticipation of further efforts at commercializa-
tion, liquid patent holders seek revenue by asserting patents against com-
panies that have commercialized successfully.
D. Unifonn Construction of the Patent Right
The strength, scope and nature of the patent right is viewed as one
that should be objectively verifiable from the four corners of the patent
itself and the public record of the patent's prosecution history whenever
possible. For example, the doctrines surrounding patent interpretation
favor the use of the four corners of the patent as the fundamental starting
point. 149 Considerations which might be deemed "subjective" in the
sense that these matters are outside the patent and prosecution history,
145. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (explaining that a low standard of
utility "may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
benefit to the public.") (footnote omitted).
146. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
147. In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568.
148. Id. Brana, which considered an invention in the pharmaceutical area, is arguably at odds
with the higher utility standard that the U.S. Supreme Court sought to establish in Brenner. See
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law And Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53
VAND. L. R. 2081, 2087 (2000) (recognizing a conflict between the Brenner and Brana standards for
utility).
149. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) ("A patent is
a legal instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its tenor ....").
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such as inventor, expert or lay witness testimony about the meaning of
patent claims, are considered the exception rather than the rule.' 50
In Phillips v. A WH Corp.,151 the Federal Circuit set forth a hierarchy
of interpretive sources for the interpretation of patent claims that relies
most centrally on the intrinsic patent document. 52 There, the court reaf-
firmed the primacy of the patent claim as delineating the meaning and
scope of a patent claim.' 53  In Phillips, the Federal Circuit further recog-
nized that the claims must be considered in light of the patent specifica-
tion.' 54 Phillips places the strongest emphasis on these two interpretative
sources-the patent claims and the written specification, both of which
appear within the four comers of the patent document- for determining
the scope of the patent right. 55 Evidence that is extrinsic to the patent,
such as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, are
lower on the hierarchy of determining the meaning of patents. 
56
The necessity for resting the meaning of the patent on the claims,
written description and prosecution history has been viewed as a critical
feature for placing the public on notice of the metes and bounds of the
patent right. 57  The Phillips court outlined reasons that extrinsic evi-
dence is disfavored and viewed with some suspicion. For example, Phil-
lips viewed expert evidence as testimony created for litigation that "thus
can suffer from bias."'
158
150. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89. In Markman, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that a jury-rather than a judge-should interpret the claims of a patent. Id. In doing so, the
U.S. Supreme Court explained that cases the court was "doubtful that trial courts will run into many
cases" in which witness credibility determinations were critical, stating, "[i]n the main, we expect,
any credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the
whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way
that comports with the instrument as a whole." Id. at 389.
151. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
152. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
153. Id. ("It is a 'bedrock principle' of patent law that the 'claims of a patent define the inven-
tion to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude."') (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
154. Id. at 1314-15 (noting that claims "are part of 'a fully integrated written instrument,'
consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims 'must
be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part."') (citation omitted) (quoting Herbert
Markman & Positek, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
155. Id. at 1315 ("[Tlhe specification 'is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."')
(citation omitted) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
156. Id. at 1318-19; see also N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (suggesting that generally, the inventor's testimony as to the meaning of the patent
claims is not considered a relevant interpretive source).
157. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 ("Because the patentee is required to 'define precisely
what his invention is ... it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a
manner different from the plain import of its terms."') (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52
(1886)).
158. Id. at 1318.
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Phillips also recognized that relying on extrinsic sources of infor-
mation undermines "the public notice function of patents., 159 The public
notice function of patent claims has been viewed as important to the pat-
ent system's goal of encouraging innovation. As the U.S. Supreme Court
explains: "The monopoly is a property right; and like any property right,
its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote pro-
gress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent
holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he
does not."'
160
The Federal Circuit's reliance on the four comers of the patent gives
the patent right a monolithic quality.16' The objective rules of patent
interpretation militate toward a meaning that becomes crystallized into
the patent document that is as immutable as engraving in stone. 162  One
who purchases the right can therefore be assured that no change in scope
or meaning will occur due to the patent's transfer.
E. The Headless Patentee
As set forth in the U.S. Constitution, the patent system was con-
ceived as an incentive for inventors. 163 Giles Rich, a patent jurist and
influential author in the patent field, presents this tongue-in-cheek view:
The inventor labors in his garret and brings forth something new and
useful and beyond the capabilities of the ordinary worker in his field.
He has spent his small savings and deprived himself and his family of
comforts and invested much of his time. He has bettered the lot of
mankind in some way. There is an instinct in human nature which
holds him entitled to a reward or compensation for his achievement,
partly out of gratitude, partly from a sense of fairness which engen-
ders the feeling that he should be repaid his investment of time and
164money.
That such effort should be sheltered from the rigors of competition
and rewarded through the grant of a valuable right is a powerful theme in
159. Id. at 1319.
160. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).
161. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Con-
struction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 123, 133 (2005) (noting that the Federal Circuit "trumpets in
mantra fashion the public notice function served by a patent and its prosecution history, offering
formalistic rules to protect against the evisceration of this policy objective").
162. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000)
(describing a hyper-textual approach to claim construction).
163. Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (stating "that '[p]atents are not given as
favors.., but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a
term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention."') (quoting Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 299 (1964); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1966) (describing the patent system as "a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge").
164. Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and The Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14
FED. CIR. B.J. 21, 32 (2004). Rich stated that he believed that relying on the inventor "as inventor as
though he were the principal character in this economic drama" was "a great mistake." Id.
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patent jurisprudence. 65 This imagery is particularly prevalent in cases
decided before the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act. At that time, the
"flash of creative genius" standard was used to determine the minimum
standard of novelty for patentability. 166 The cases analyzed the inventive
process in vivid detail, attempting to define circumstances under which it
might be determined whether the inventor had "perceive[d] the vital for-
ward step to which predecessors had been blind.''167  Courts analogized
to Edison's inventive process, including reliance on such maxims as
"genius as '2% inspiration and 98% perspiration""' 168 and "genius has
well been defined as 'an infinite capacity for taking pains."",
169
Although the 1952 Patent Act attempted to establish objective crite-
ria for inventions, 7° the language of a reward for the inventor as a crea-
tive genius still resonates within court decisions. For example, in Eldred
v. Ashcroft,171 the Supreme Court has reiterated that the purpose of the
constitutional provision supporting the patent system is "by holding out a
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to
their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius...
,,172 Similarly, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, ' 3 the court under-
scored that a patent's meaning must be defined for "[t]he encouragement
of the inventive genius of others ....
Modem courts maintain these assumptions in generalized terms,
without a subjective inquiry into the actual inventor's state of mind ex-
cept for some limited circumstances. 175  This is because individualized
inquiries into an inventor's subjective mental states have been seen as
165. The use of narrative imagery as a device in judicial reasoning has been explored in legal
literature. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories": Narrative's Implications
for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (describ-
ing the use of narrative in copyright cases).
166. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("That is to say
the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the
skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the public domain.").
167. See, e.g., Trabon Eng'g Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943).
168. Trabon Eng'g Corp., 136 F.2d at 28.
169. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Consol. Expanded Metal Cos., 130 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1942).
170. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention " as Replaced by §103 of The 1952 Pat-
ent Act, 14 FED CIR. B. J. 147, 158-59 (2004) (describing the amendments to the 1952 Patent Act).
171. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
172. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829)).
173. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
174. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364, 369 (1938)).
175. Some aspects of the inventor's state of mind are relevant to U.S. patent law. See, e.g.,
Janicke, supra note 126. These include establishing the date of conception of an invention. 35
U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 2006). Another example is the statutory disclosure requirement, which
mandates that the patent disclose the inventor's subjective best mode of making the invention. 35
U.S.C.A. § 112 (requiring that the patent specification "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention").
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interfering with the objective nature of the patent right.1 76 Additionally,
subjective inquiries are viewed as introducing unnecessary factual com-
plexity and expense into the litigation of patent cases.
177
The synergy between the perception of the inventor as genius and
the view that subjective inquiries are disfavored leads to a curious the-
matic presumption that the patent system protects a creative genius even
where the actual inventor has no such qualities. More significantly for
the purpose of this analysis, patent owners are not considered at all in the
patentability inquiry, yet as recipients of all rights to the patent get all of
the attendant presumptions and benefits that the patent system provides.
In many ways, the true patentee becomes invisible. Instead, the inven-
tive genius takes the actual patentee's place as the driver of the justifica-
tions for the patent right.
Simplification and certainty are considered primary goals of patent
law, but this view operates to mask that not every inventor is Thomas
Edison and that not every patentee owner is interested in the larger goals
of society and innovation. The patent system is build on the assumption
that the inventor must be rewarded and protected, an assumption that has
created a system that benefits liquid patent owners who use patents for
individual gain. An emphasis on patents as a purely objective, stream-
lined system without inquiry into the circumstances of invention (or, into
ownership) thus furthers the liquid patent's goal to create private wealth.
III. WHETHER LIQUID PATENTS SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY:
THE DEBATE OVER INDIVIDUALIZED VERSUS UNIFORM PATENT RIGHTS
Over the past several years, there has been some debate over
whether more individualized treatment of patent law would better effec-
tuate patent policy. These arguments shed light on whether different
rules for liquid patent holders should be developed to curb the potential
for abuses of the system and to maintain the patent system's consistent
goal of encouraging invention.
As previously outlined, stability and predictability is the Federal
Circuit's primary and clear goal. 78 More individualized treatments of
patents have been proposed. One example is Professor A. Samuel
Oddi's proposal to establish an alternative to the present utility patent
176. Janicke, supra note 126, at 296 (questioning "whether, by insisting on conduct norms in
the form of mental states embedded in patent law, the U.S. patent law system is encumbered more
than it needs to be and disproportionately so to any value achieved.").
177. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 7, 117-23 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
178. Newman, supra note 123, at 688 ("[Ulnless there can be reasonable reliance on legal
advice given during the stages of invention and innovation, unless that advice can correctly predict




system: a patent system for "revolutionary" patents. 179 Professor Oddi's
system would expand the categories of patentable inventions by broaden-
ing the classes of statutory subject matter and lowering the utility re-
quirement. 180 At the same time, Professor Oddi's system would modify
the current novelty and non-obviousness standards to take into account
other characteristics of the proposed invention is considered "revolution-
ary" or "extraordinary" based on the standards set by experts in the field
of endeavor. 181
In return, Oddi proposes that applicants who successfully obtain
revolutionary patents would receive twice the term of protection than is
available for utility patents under current law. 182 Oddi's proposal is in-
tended to further proposition that the patent system produces a net bene-
fit to society where patents are only granted for those inventions induced
by the patent system-that is, patents should only be granted where the
invention "would not have been made but for the availability of pat-
ents."
, 183
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed that patent pol-
icy be implemented in view of competitive policy.184 Specifically, the
FTC proposes that the inquiry of patent law's non-obviousness stan-
dard185 be shifted to consider "whether an invention likely would emerge
in roughly the same time frame - that is, without significant delay - 'but
for' the prospect of a patent."'
186
Another discussion concerning the modification of patent law's uni-
form treatment of innovation include the work of Professors Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley. 187 Burk and Lemley identify various points of the
Federal Circuit's disparate application of certain patent doctrines in the
consideration of biotechnology patent cases when contrasted to the ap-
plication of these same rules to computer software cases. 188 Specifically,
Burk and Lemley state the courts have developed "a unique enclave of
179. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1115 (1989).
180. Id. at 1129-30.
181. Id at 1131-32; see also Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796, 798 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting that an invention "was entitled to patent protection only if it was the kind of contribu-
tion unlikely to be induced except by the promise of a monopoly, and we do not think it was that
kind of invention, because we think it would have been made anyway, and soon.").
182. Oddi, supra note 179, at 1138-39 ("To provide an incentive for applicants to seek an early
grant, the system should offer either the period of thirty-four years from grant or the longer period of
thirty-six to forty years from the filing date.").
183. Id. at 1101.
184. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7-8 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC PATENT REPORT].
185. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2006).
186. FTC PATENT REPORT, supra note 184, at ch. 4, § II(A)(2).
187. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691 (2004).
188. Id. at 706-07.
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patent doctrine for biotechnology" resting on assumptions about the per-
son of ordinary skill in this art. 189 Burk and Lemley argue that the Fed-
eral Circuit's choices fail to serve innovation in the biotechnology
field. 190 They propose changes to the substantive requirements for pat-
entability in order to facilitate an increased level of biotechnology inven-
tion.' 9' The authors conclude that "as a practical matter, it appears that,
although patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology-
specific in application.'
' 92
The degree of variation that patent law should tolerate is controver-
sial. Each of these proposals for change to the patent system has been
made in the interest of furthering the patent system's goals. Differences
in the administration of patent law create uncertainty and complexity
1 93
and therefore stand in contrast to the congressional purpose in creating
the Federal Circuit.' 94 Likewise in this circumstance, proposed modifica-
tions to accommodate the use of liquid patents should be made only to
the extent that such changes further patent policy.
Developing separate patentability rules for liquid patents is theoreti-
cally possible, of course.' 95 For example, one might condition patent
transfers on approval by a governmental agency, such as the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. Utility standards for liquid patents could be
raised to prevent potential interference with nascent markets. 196 A fur-
ther proposal might be to create a standard whereby one considered the
patent owner's motives or reasons for asserting the patent in determining
enforceability. Enforceability or remedies might be weakened for those
engaged in licensing programs that have adverse economic consequences
for innovation. Commercializing entities might be permitted an in-
fringement defense of independent development for innocent infringe-
ment. Enforcement against abuses of the patent system could be consid-
ered under alternative causes of action such as through tort or antitrust
theories.
Any proposed changes would be disruptive to the patent system's
goal toward preserving uniformity and objectivity in the patent system.
For example, resting the standards of patentability on subsequent
changes in ownership would interject a significant level of uncertainty
into a decision to invest in invention. Certainly, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office could not be expected to foresee transfer when issuing
189. Id. at 716.
190. Id. at 736-38.
191. Id. at 736-37.
192. Id. at 691.
193. R. Polk Wagner, Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 749, 755 (2004).
194. Newman, supra note 123, at 688.
195. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2006).
196. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, (1966) (discussing utility standard, stating "a
patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy").
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patents in the first instance. Rendering the patent right vulnerable to
later changes in ownership may hurt or discourage inventors who wish to
engage in licensing or exchanging patent rights in return for funding that
may be necessary for commercialization. However, such disruption may
be warranted if liquid patents are inconsistent with the patent system's
underlying justifications and Constitutional purpose. An examination of
liquid patents in light of those policies follows.
IV. FOUNDATIONAL PUBLIC POLICIES SERVED BY THE PATENT SYSTEM
Although the creation and enforcement of liquid patents are well
supported as a matter of patent law, their contribution to established pat-
ent policy is far less certain. To the extent that the patent system was
created to facilitate invention and the commercialization of products
which flow from those ideas, the creation of markets for patents as com-
modities seems to fall short. Further, to the extent that the patent system
creates incentives to liquidize, measures should be undertaken to ensure
that the use of patents is not contrary to the fundamental goals of the
patent system.
A. The Constitutional Basis of the Patent Reward as Incentive
Patents are awarded to inventors for the development and disclosure
of ideas that would otherwise be subject to copying.1 97 Over the years,
the incentive for which the patent system offers rewards has been refined
to encourage: 1) invention of new and improved technology; 2) disclo-
sure of this technology to the public; and 3) investment in the commer-
cialization of patented ideas.1
98
The patent as reward has infused U.S. patent policy since its incep-
tion in the U.S. Constitution, which authorized Congress to create the
intellectual property protection "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts . . .. ,,199 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
But in order to induce him to make that invention public, to give all a
share in the benefits resulting from such an invention, Congress, by
its legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution, has guaranteed
to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time; and the purpose of
the patent is to protect him in this monopoly, not to give him a use
which, save for the patent, he did not have before, but only to sepa-
rate to him an exclusive use. 20
197. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REv. 305, 310-11 (1992).
198. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissent-
ing).
199. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
200. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897).
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The patent is "a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowl-
edge" to further fields of human endeavor. 201
The reward for the inventor's effects is the limited time period to
202exclude others from making, using, selling or importing the invention.
This period of exclusivity prevents others from practicing the invention
until the patent expires, at which time the invention falls into the public
domain and can be freely practiced by the public without permission of
the patent holder.20 3 Innovators are deemed to develop patentable inven-
tions in expectation of receiving any rewards that can be reaped from the
period of exclusivity.2
In addition to justifying the patent laws as a whole, the patent as an
incentive has also long influenced specific policy choices in the jurispru-
dence of patent law. These include critical components of the patent
system, such as substantive requirements for patentability. 205 Other ex-
amples include the utility requirement, 20 6 inventorship,2°7 and the en-
ablement requirement.20 8 As an additional example, this policy also pro-
vides support for the rule that inventors are the presumptive owners of
their inventions. 0 9
The "reward" that is the heart of the reward theory is the right to
exclude competitors for the entire patent term. As the Federal Circuit
has explained, the patent system depends on the right to exclude as an
essential component of the reward incentive, as "without the right to ex-
clude the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote
the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined., 210  The
201. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
202. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (stating "[w]hile one great object was, by
holding out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions
for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to promote the progress
of science and useful arts').
203. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. at 239; see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933).
204. King Instruments v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Patent Act creates
an incentive for innovation. The economic rewards during the period of exclusivity are the carrot.
The patent owner expends resources in expectation of receiving this reward.").
205. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 ("Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowl-
edge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.").
206. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) ("But a patent is not a hunting license. It is
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.").
207. Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that setting a uniform federal standard of inventorship is necessary to achieve the patent
system's reward system goal).
208. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that sufficient detail must exist within the patent to demonstrate the invention to one of ordinary skill
in the arts).
209. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Ownership
springs from invention. The patent laws reward individuals for contributing to the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts. As part of that reward, an invention presumptively belongs to its creator."
(citation omitted)).
210. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 600, (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified on other
grounds, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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right to exclude captures the idea into a legally enforceable ability to
preclude others from practicing the invention, recognizing that the idea
that is the subject matter of patents are, as with other intellectual prop-
erty, a non-rivalrous knowledge good.211 That is, the information can be
used by more than one party simultaneously. Because information can
be easily shared and copied, a patentable idea could be copied and used
by others. In economic terms, information is considered a "public
good., 212  Absent an enforceable patent right, the inventor's incentive
would be destroyed by others who would use the invention to compete
with the inventor. That is, because patent law requires inventors to pub-
licly disclose sufficient details about their invention to permit reproduc-
tion as a condition of patentability, a patented invention can be copied by
anyone willing to undertake that effort.2 13 Those who choose to copy do
not need to invest the time, money or risk that the initial inventor was
required to undertake. The public goods problem that the patent system
seeks to resolve is that, absent some form of legal protection, patents
might be used as templates for copyists who could reproduce the inven-
tion without the burden of the investment risk undertaken by the inven-
tor.2'4 The legal protection afforded by the patent system permits en-
forcement and compensation for infringement as a legal barrier against
free-riding and to protect the inventor based on the creation and disclo-
215sure of the invention.
The patent system acts to prevent a disadvantage to the inventor-
who may have expended significant costs for the invention and develop-
ment of a commercial application incorporating the invention-by a
competitor who copies the product and therefore has "a cost advantage
that may lead to a fall in the market price to a point at which the devel-
oper cannot recover his fixed costs."
216
211. Non-rivalrous goods may be consumed by multiple users without diminishing the quantity
or the utility of the good. In contrast, rivalrous goods are consumed as they are used and available
only to one user at a time. Some rivalrous goods cannot be used again, such as when a particular
apple is consumed. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 37, 40 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1050-51 (2005) (describing the non-rivalrous nature of information as
a public good).
212. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 14 (explaining that a "public good" in the
economic sense is that consumption by one person does not reduce its consumption by another).
213. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2006) (requiring patent applicants to disclose information that
enables one of ordinary skill in the art to reproduce the claimed invention); Lemley, supra note 108,
at 129 ("Because ideas are so easy to spread and so hard to control, only with difficulty may creators
recoup their investment in creating the idea. As a result, absent intellectual property protection, most
would prefer to copy rather than create ideas, and inefficiently few new ideas would be created.").
214. See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 947-48 (2005).
215. SCOTCHMER, supra note 132, at 34.
216. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 294.
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B. Analysis of Liquid Patent and Patent Incentives
1. Incentive to Invent
Transfer of a patent right is temporally disconnected from inven-
tion. Liquid patents holders are interested in maximizing profits by as-
serting patents against infringers for licensing revenues.21 7  Stated sim-
ply, the liquid patent holder's role takes place after invention has already
taken place.
At best, liquid patent holders provide services that assist inventors
in asserting their rights.218 One could analogize liquid patent entities as
supplemental to the inventive process as auction houses are to artistic
and creative works. Such entities facilitate a secondary market to maxi-
mize private wealth and are not themselves the primary drivers of inven-
tion. At present, the secondary market for patents is a nascent one. The
uncertain significance of this market, including the types and numbers of
patents that can be supported, may provide an insufficient incentive to
encourage investment in invention. The possibility of obtaining a finan-
cial reward in the market for liquid patents may not warrant the expense
and time of developing an incentive, unless a clearer path to that market
219exists.
To the extent that a liquid market for patents becomes viable, care
must be taken to avoid creating incentives to "invent" based on commer-
cialized products already developed by others through the application of
the novelty and non-obviousness standards, as well as through the appli-
cation of prosecution history estoppel.220
217. See, e.g., Lisa Lerer, Quick Draw, IP LAW & BUSINESS, July 20, 2006 (describing attorney
Raymond Niro's strategy of finding a buyer for a patent, then asserting the patent against forty
companies in order to obtain $65 million in licensing fees).
218. See Acacia Technology Group, Why Use Acacia?, http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/
whyuse.htm (print on file with author).
219. For example, Intellectual Ventures has filed 500 patent applications to date, and holds
invention sessions with scientists and engineers to generate ideas for patenting. See Press Release,
Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files 500th Patent Application (June 26, 2006) (print on
file with author), available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/docs/500apps.pdf. This organiza-
tion is developing its own strategy to create a secondary market for patents, thus providing a com-
paratively certain path to market for patents that issue from these applications. A certain market also
existed for the late Jerome H. Lemelson, who had been found to have "systematically extended the
pendency of his applications by sitting on his rights... while waiting for viable commercial systems
to be designed and marketed" and then "drafted and prosecuted hundreds of new claims in the late
1980's and 1990's specifically worded to cover those commercial systems." Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., Ltd. P'ship, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156 (D. Nev. 2004),
aff'd, 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating Lemelson's patents). Because Lemelson's pat-
ents were based on an already-existing commercialized market, the path for obtaining revenue from
Lemelson's efforts at "invention" was certain.
220. See Symbol Techs., 301 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
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2. Incentive to Disclose
The patentability requirements include the inventor's obligation to
disclose the details of the invention. 22' An inventor must include a writ-
ten specification that describes the invention and tells the public how to
make and use the invention.222 In return, a patent applicant forgoes the
potentially lengthier trade secret protection and the public gains the in-
ventor's knowledge reproduced in the patent.223 Thus, meaningful de-
scription of the invention and its underlying technical information is part
of the quidpro quo of the patentee's grant of the right to exclude 224 "in
the hope that, among other things, the disclosure of all inventions will
add to the sum total of knowledge available to the general public.2 25
Including sufficient details about the invention permits members of the
226public to make and use the invention after the patent's expiration.
As with invention, post-patent application transfers of the patent
right are temporally disconnected from the inventor's decision to file a
patent application. Non-commercializing inventors are likely to pursue
patenting and the required disclosure. This is because non-
commercializing inventors that seek to license are unlikely to be con-
cerned about maintaining their inventions as trade secrets, as trade se-
crets are much more difficult to license compared to patent protection. 227
Commercializing inventors will be unlikely to liquidize their patents, so
long as they continue to commercialize the product made under the pat-
ent. Thus, the likelihood that the availability of a system of liquid pat-
ents will assist the disclosure policy of the patent laws is not significant.
Over time, patenting practices may increase if a stable asset market
for patents emerges. If more patents are filed as the potential for profit
becomes more readily realizable, the disclosure of more technical infor-
mation may occur. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, "in
light of the highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they
disclose as little useful information as possible-while broadening the
221. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2006) states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to en-
able any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.; see also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
222. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
223. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in
their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238 n.95 (2006).
224. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
225. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting).
226. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
227. Heald, supra note 107, at 482.
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scope of the claim as widely as possible-the argument based upon the
virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated.
228
i. Commercialization
Commercialization has been called "the fundamental purpose" 229 of
the patent system, and is intended to encourage public benefits in the
form of available commercial products and the private rewards generated
in the sale or licensing of the patent. In the 1974 case Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp.,23° the U.S. Supreme Court explained the reward incen-
tive in terms of the need to use the patent system to develop, commer-
cialize and sell products that derive from the inventions:
The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclu-
sion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on soci-
ety through the introduction of new products and processes of manu-
facture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased• . 231
employment and better lives for our citizens.
Commercialization of the ideas embodied in patents has been ar-
gued to provide significant social benefits that outweigh costs that the
patent system imposes on society.232 By way of example, innovative
products and cost reductions that flow from research and development
have been argued to be "quite remarkable," and to outweigh the eco-
nomic loss that society pays in licensing rates and other rents.233 One
Federal Circuit jurist has explained that the court has allowed patent law
to be "placed in the perspective of the marketplace: the destination con-
templated in the Constitution. '234
The importance of commercialization as an incentive to the patent
system was thoroughly discussed at the time of the 1952 amendments to
the patent laws and the writings of a significant proponent and co-author
228. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
229. See Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d at 599; see also, Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722
F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Another policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of
risk capital in the commercialization of useful patentable inventions so that the public gets some
benefit from them, which may not occur in the absence of some patent protection.").
230. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
231. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480.
232. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
252 (1994) (explaining that innovation "leads directly to consumer benefits in the form of new
products and lower prices"). The expansion of output and the reduction in price achieved through
technological progress resulting from research and development may be quite remarkable, far be-
yond any possible social loss from rent seeking.
233. Id. (citing Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Com-
pany, 7/1/91 HARV. BUS. REV. 69, 70 (finding the price of computers measured in millions of in-
structions per second fell from about $250,000 in 1980 to less than $2,500 in 1990).
234. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 123, at 687.
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of those amendments, Giles Rich. 235 In a five-part essay that described
the tension between the patent system and antitrust law, Rich placed the
greatest emphasis on the last of these as "by far the greatest in practical
importance" as "responsible for the actual delivery of the invention into
the hands of the public. 236
Rich's article quoted Conway P. Coe, then-Commissioner of Pat-
ents, emphasizing that, "[a]n inventor will not be rewarded and society
will not be benefited until the invention passes into commercial chan-
nels., 237 Coe likened the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to "sort of a
national suggestion box" which others could use to further innovation.
238
Critically, Rich recognized that many patents which had been submitted
to this "national suggestion box" had never and would never be ex-
ploited, and opined that these "unused potential rights to exclude ... do
not adversely affect the public. ' 239 However, liquid patent holders have
disturbed Rich's calculus that unused patents impose no social costs.
240
This is because holders of liquid patents have taken the unused patents
out of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's so-called "suggestion
box 241 to seek royalties on those engaged in commercialization.
242
Liquid patents contradict the commercialization goal of patent law,
because such patents are expressly not commercialized. Rather, such
patents are used to generate revenue without undertaking the risks that
innovation, commercialization and marketing would require.
Generally, economists assume that those willing to be exposed to
increased risk might be expected to earn higher returns than if they had
less exposure to risk.243 Applying this rule to patent principles, however,
liquid patents provide inventors with the option of declining to avoid the
risks of commercialization and instead sell their patents to a liquid patent
holder for a specific and certain sum. Liquid patent holders have the lux-
ury of holding onto the patent right until an appropriate and perhaps in-
nocent commercializing infringer emerges. This raises the potential for
waste, as the commercializing infringer independently develops the in-
vention and incorporates the design into a product. In this scenario, all
235. Kieff, supra note 95, at 741.
236. Id. at 741-42 (citing Rich, supra note 164, at 133-34).




241. Id. (quoting then-U.S. Patent and Trademark Commissioner Coe).
242. According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patentees abandon patents by failing
to pay maintenance fees. Specifically, 20% of patentees abandon their patents by failing to pay their
first maintenance fee at 3.5 years, 43% abandon by failing to pay at 7.5 years, and 75% abandon at
11.5 years. See United States Patent and Trademark Office Questions and Answers Regarding the
GATT Uruguay Round and NAFTA Changes to U.S. Patent Law and Practice (Feb. 1995), avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/QA.html.
243. See Economics A-Z, THE ECONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.com/research/
Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=R#RISK (defining "risk") (print on file with author).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the risk of commercialization is on the infringer. Further, liquid patents
are likely to encourage the anticommons problem244 by creating a poten-
tially lucrative market for patents that are not commercialized into prod-
ucts for use by the public. That is, given the choice an inventor may sell
the patent to a liquid patent holder rather than brave the market by creat-
ing a product. The patent system has allowed a right to be created with-
out the corresponding social benefit that encourages the inventor to inno-
vation and commercialize based on the original idea. Moreover, the op-
portunity to generate more ideas in the process of innovation (such as the
better means of manufacture) or during commercialization (for example,
improvements to the original idea based on customer feedback) are lost.
The courts' view of the reward system as a means to assist firms in
invention and ultimately in taking steps toward commercialization has
created an anomaly in the discussion of the goals of the patent system.
Although the courts long ago recognized that as a policy matter the pub-
lic was intended to benefit from products created by the patent owner's
commercial exploitation of invention,245 more recently courts have made
clear that the strength and existence of the patent right is unaffected
where the owner decides not to commercialize or license the invention.246
Thus, the rule of patent law is that the existence of the patent right is
entirely separate from those considerations-stated simply, one does not
have to practice or license the patent as a condition of patentability.247
As a consequence, the problem of liquid patents sits squarely be-
tween the fundamental policy of reward theory and the rule of law. That
is, reward policy favors implementation of the claimed invention, but
patent law rules do not require incorporation of the patented idea into any
product or service. Liquid patents seek the full level of protection that
the patent system can provide despite their failure to contribute to the
commercialization goal of the patent system.
244. The anticommons problem occurs where multiple early patent owners restrict develop-
ment for later innovators. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). This results in inefficient
pricing. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 187, at 729 ("If a product must include components A and
B, and A and B are each covered by patents that grant different companies monopoly control over
the components, each company will charge a monopoly price for its component. As a result, the
price of the integrated product will be inefficiently high-and output inefficiently low-because it
reflects an attempt to charge two different monopoly prices."). Further, if a single patentee of a key
component refuses to license, all subsequent innovation relying on that component may be impossi-
ble.
245. See Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1859).
246. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213-14 (1980); Cont'l Paper Bag
Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908).
247. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995). When
invoking this rule, Rite-Hite invoked the disclosure policy without crediting the commercialization
policy. Id. ("A patent is granted in exchange for a patentee's disclosure of an invention, not for the
patentee's use of the invention.").
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C. Ex Ante Justifications for the Patent System: Kitch's Prospect Theory
A further goal of the patent system is outlined in a prominent 1977
article by Edmund Kitch describing his "prospect theory" of patents. 48
In that article, Kitch describes certain ex post justifications for the patent
system. 249 Liquid patents operate ex post, that is, such transfers and re-
lated assertions occur after the patent has issued. Thus, an examination
of how liquid patents fare under Kitch's theory may be helpful in deter-
mining where liquid patents fit within the current theoretical framework
of the ex post use of patents.
1. Kitch's Prospect Theory
Analogizing patents to the mining claim system for public lands in
the developing American West in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Kitch theorizes that the patent system confers socially beneficial
activity after a patent right is created. 250  Kitch's prospect theory is
grounded on the patent system's award of exclusive and publicly re-
corded rights to first inventors who seek to develop a particular technol-
ogy solution-typically, one who seeks the status of a pioneer in a par-
251 te~ticular field. Just as the former mineral claim system created incen-
tives "for prospectors to pack their burros and walk off in the desert in
search of mineralization," Kitch believed that the patent system could
allow pioneering inventors to control the development of their field of
technology as an ex post reward for obtaining the patent right.
252
Kitch argued that once a patent is granted, the public disclosure of
the patent's issuance signals rivals to stop duplicative innovative activity
for that technological field.253 According to the prospect theory, this cir-
cumstance puts the first inventor in the exclusive position to efficiently
coordinate resources to enhance the patent's value.254 Under this theory,
patent exclusivity provides an incentive to invent first to capture the pat-
ent, and prevents the waste of resources that would otherwise result if
competing inventors continue duplicative inventive activity.
Kitch's theory makes a clean separation between the inventions
which appear in patent claims, and the later commercial embodiments
which typically require additional research, refinement and optimiza-
248. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 271,274.
251. Id. at 266.
252. See id. at 274, 276.
253. Id. at 278. As Kitch explains, "[n]o one is likely to make significant investments search-
ing for ways to increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements
with the owner of the patent." Id. at 276.
254. Id. at 276.
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tion.255 Further to this same point, Kitch argued that the patents encour-
age their owners to undertake the investment necessary to finalize and
manufacture a commercial product based on the patent prospect without
concerns about the competitive disadvantages that might be created, such
as where a patent owner expends resources to promote consumer demand
for a product in a manner that might benefit others firms within the same
market.256 Kitch's prospect theory also recognizes a patent owner's in-
centive to seek licenses before the patent issues, based on the likelihood
that the patent will issue.257 Indeed, Kitch proposes that patent licenses
could be used to prevent wasteful duplication of innovative activity by
allowing the patent holder to seek agreements that preclude competitors
from designing around the patent owner's invention.258
At its core, Kitch's prospect theory argues in favor of early, broad
grants of patent protection to a single inventor. In Kitch's world, the
public grant to a single pioneer prevents wasteful duplicative technologi-
cal investigation by others, because a publicly disclosed patent grant
signals others that a winner has been declared. As one commentator has
noted, "[b]ecause the right to innovate is a common right (it is not under
exclusive contTol of any one firm), competition among firms will lead to
inefficient races to invent that can dissipate any social surplus associated
with an invention. ', 259 The prospect theory holds that permitting a broad
patent granted in the early stages of an innovative activity prevents this
inefficiency as a disincentive to perform wastefully duplicative re-
search.26°
2. Application of the Prospect Theory to Liquid Patents
Although Kitch's prospect theory has been subject to criticism,
261
Kitch argued that "the prospect function is a significant, if not predomi-
nant, function of the American patent system as it has operated in
fact.,, 26 2 Yet Kitch's prospect theory as proposed does not address how
the patent system operates in situations where the invention as embodied
in a patent is created to be transferred or sold to another.263 The theory
focuses on ex post incentives that are intended to drive the inventor's
initial decision to engage in innovative activity as well as the prevention
255. Id. at 271 ("Many inventions, including many important ones, are patented in a commer-
cially significant form, yet the patented form is trivial in significance as compared to the later de-
rived and improved versions.").
256. Id. at 277.
257. Id. at 278 ("[T]he patent gives [the] owner an affirmative incentive to seek out firms and
inform them of the new technology, even before issuance, if the most efficient and hence patent-
value-optimizing way to exploit the invention is to license it.").
258. Id. at 279.
259. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 439, 440
(2004).
260. Id. at 444.
261. See id. at 442-43 (recognizing scholarly criticism of Kitch's prospect theory).
262. Kitch, supra note 248, at 267.
263. See, e.g., id. at 269 (examining priority rules).
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of socially wasteful activity in the commercial market by non-
inventors.264
It might be argued that liquid patents are entirely consistent with
Kitch's theory, which hypothesizes that the patent system puts "the pat-
ent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and
market enhancement of the patent's value so that duplicative investments
are not made and so that information is exchanged among the search-
ers." 265 Liquid patents may be argued to carry out the view that patent
transfers permit a patent's maximum value and potential exploitation.
266
There are several problems with this argument that demonstrate that
the prospect theory fails to account for liquid patents. As an initial mat-
ter, the patentee's right of control-using the term "control" in the same
sense as Kitch described as continuing to invent and commercialize
around the original grant--ends with the patent's transfer of ownership
to another. Kitch's fundamental assumption that a single inventor/owner
has an incentive to mine the innovative activity that led to the patent
grant simply disappears when the patent is sold.
Although it is possible that liquid patents can be used in a manner
consistent with the rewards that Kitch identified by permitting transfer-
ability to an entity which is better positioned to market the benefits of the
patent in the most economically and socially desirable manner possible,
nothing in the patent law requires or even encourages a patentee to do
SO. 2 6 7 Liquid patents can be readily sold to a licensing entity which adds
the patent to its portfolio in the hopes of using the patent to generate li-
censing revenue, without any further incentive to invent or innovate
around the original patent. That is, Kitch's interest rewarding patentees
as prospectors is not backed by any patent rules that provide the benefits
of commercialization of the products incorporating the patented inven-
tion. This is because the strength of the patent does not depend on
whether or how a patentee seeks to reap the benefits of the right in a
commercialized product.2 68 Further, nothing in patent laws requires that
264. Id. at 266 (noting the patent system's ability to achieve efficiency in the development and
management of technological prospects "by awarding exclusive and publicly recorded ownership of
a prospect shortly after its discovery").
265. Id. at 276. Burk and Lemley point out that Kitch's Prospect Theory operates in this re-
spect as classic Coasean bargaining. Burk & Lemley, supra note 187, at 725 ("This is the Coase
theorem at work. Under that theory, giving one party the power to control and orchestrate all subse-
quent use and research relating to the patented technology should result in efficient licensing, both to
end users and to potential improvers .. "); see, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960) (setting forth the Coase theorem).
266. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2656 (1994) (describing the Coase Theorem as a system of allocating rights
which permits transfer of rights to permit their highest-value use through private bargains).
267. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90-92 (1902) ("[T]he general rule is
absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States."); United
States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
268. See, e.g., Cont'1 Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424-25.
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a patent transfer be socially beneficial, economically efficient or allow
for public access to the benefits of the invention.
Fundamentally, Kitch's theory envisions an inventor who under-
takes efforts to manage resources, such as manufacturing, raising con-
sumer interest in the product and resources necessary to finalize a com-
mercial embodiment based on the patented invention, to maximize a pat-
ent's value. 269 The benefits that flow from single stewardship of a broad
patent granted early in the life of a patent do not necessarily flow where
the patentee relinquishes that benefit to an entity engaged in licensing as
a revenue generation model.270 The subsequent sale of the patent to an
entity that does not itself engage in innovative activity is entirely attenu-
ated from a patent system designed-to use Kitch's analogy-"for pros-
pectors to pack their burros and walk off in the desert in search of miner-
alization." 271 Kitch's prospect theory does not stretch far enough to jus-
tify the full range of rights afforded to those who purchase patents at an
open market.
D. Summary ofLiquid Patents and the Relation to Patent Theory
Liquid patents are geared to take financial advantage of rules that
have stabilized and maximized patent protection in order to serve the
overarching goals of innovation. Yet liquid patents do not serve-and in
some cases act in contravention to-the policies developed by the courts
and in the legal scholarship. While these rules may serve the goals of the
patent system well in most instances, their application to permit profit-
taking from using patents as assets is not supportable.
Patents raise the opportunity for strategic behavior 27 2 that does not
always maximize social access to the fruits of inventive activity. An
entity that seeks to license patents is interested in maximizing negotiating
leverage against those who are commercializing products in order to ob-
tain the maximum amount of licensing fees or damages in a lawsuit.
Some of this behavior can adversely affect innovation by seeking to
"tax" subsequent innovation with license fees that exceed an objective
market licensing rate for the patent.273 Moreover, liquid patent holders
can use their patents to threaten or even prevent entire areas of research
while attempting to maximize their negotiating position.
269. See Kitch, supra note 248, at 276 (theorizing that ex ante benefit of a patent is that the
right "puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and market
enhancement of the patent's value").
270. This circumstance might occur where a patent is purchased solely to "hold up" one's
competitors or seeks to use the patent only to raise money through licensing revenue.
271. See Kitch, supra note 248, at 274.
272. See Merges, supra note 266, at 2659.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 32-46.
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To the extent that patents are viewed as a system of regulation,274
the patent laws have not attempted to regulate liquid patent holders' stra-
tegic behavior. The disposition of post-grant patent rights are considered
private rights which can be freely used to further the owner's-and not
the public's-interest. 275 Although in formation the patent right is fun-
damentally intended to benefit the public, post-grant uses of patents are
generally deemed to be essentially free of regulation even when those
rights are used in contravention to the public interest.
Proposed changes that would specifically target liquid patents con-
flict with the goal of uniformity that pervades the patent system. The
patent as an immutable right has been entrenched in the U.S. patent sys-
tem for the past two hundred years, and this circumstance has not been
interfered with lightly. Modifications to the patentability standards or
the ability to transfer patent rights create the possibility of interfering
with favorable goals.
The patent laws currently consider the patentee's status primarily in
determining remedies for patent infringement. A proposal that focuses
on the remedies aspect of the patent statutes is therefore most consistent
with the current structure of the patent system as a set of uniform rules.
As liquid patent holders are primarily interested in maximizing licensing
rates, a proposal for change that affects remedies may have the greatest
potential effect on patent holders' negotiating conduct.276 Moreover,
limiting the immunities that patent holders obtain under tort theories,
such as the antitrust law, may serve to curb abuses of the patent system
that are currently insulated from liability.
V. A PROPOSAL: USING PATENT REMEDIES AS A SOLUTION
A. Injunctive Relief
Before the recent case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L. C.277 was
decided, as a general rule, a district court would issue a permanent in-
junction in patent cases that prohibited the future manufacture, import
and sale of an infringing device after a judgment of infringement had
been entered. 278 At that time, the Federal Circuit noted that "courts have
in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in
274. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and The Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bar-
gain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1317 (2004).
275. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 108, at 149 ("Individual companies are neither omniscient,
pure-hearted, nor necessarily rational. Indeed, at best, they are out to line their pockets with as much
money as they can find. No less a capitalist than Adam Smith warned us not to expect individual
private companies to behave in the public interest.").
276. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-52 (1979) (arguing that parties reach agreements in private
ordering based on considerations on the alternatives that adjudication would likely award).
277. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
278. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (2006).
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order to protect the public interest. ''279 A case had to be "sufficiently
exceptional" to the degree that, as a practical matter, the discretion to
deny injunctive relief was very rarely exercised.280
The general rule favoring injunctive relief was reversed in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange L.L.C.281 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a patentee must satisfy the traditional test before a court would exer-
cise its power to grant permanent injunctive relief.28 2 In order to obtain a
permanent injunction, the patentee must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies avail-
able at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunc-
tion.
2 83
By requiring courts to meaningfully apply this four-factor test, the
eBay court severed the patent right to exclude from the previously held
law that permanent injunctions nearly always and almost inevitably fol-
lowed a judgment of infringement.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the eBay case agreed that
the well-established, four-factor test must be used to determine whether a
permanent injunction should be granted against a defendant who has
been found to have infringed a valid patent.284 Justice Kennedy's con-
currence proposed that the historic outcome that injunctive relief should
be granted may be different now that "[a]n industry has developed in
which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees., 285 Justice Kennedy
recognized that in those circumstances the patent "can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent., 28 6 Although Justice Kennedy singled out
licensing entities as a potentially inappropriate case for permanent in-
junctive relief, Justice Kennedy's opinion expressly rejected that such
determinations should turn on "categorical rules. 287 Thus, Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion appears to reject any notion that all non-commercializing
patentees be barred from permanent injunctive relief.
279. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc, 56 F.3d at 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
280. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
281. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
282. Id. at 1839.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
285. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
287. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The eBay case presents an opportunity to solve part of the problem
that liquid patents create-that is, the hold up problem that can prevent
the implementation of subsequent invention and commercialization by
others. Justice Kennedy's concurrence should be adopted as an instruc-
tive example of how the majority opinion can be applied to liquid pat-
ents. As a practical matter, many liquid patent holders may have diffi-
culty establishing a right to permanent injunctive relief now that eBay
has shifted the legal standard. Primarily, liquid patent holders may have
difficulty demonstrating irreparable harm, a critical element of the four-
part test adopted by the eBay court.
Generally, irreparable harm is defined as an injury that cannot be
compensated by monetary damages.288 Violation of the patent right
alone is not irreparable harm, at least in the manner in which courts have
defined that term in determining motions for preliminary injunctions.289
Companies can show irreparable harm by demonstrating an inability to
calculate their injury by demonstrating, for example, a harmful impact to
goodwill, erosion of a customer base or the diminishment of a competi-
tive position in the marketplace. 290 Liquid patent holders who do not sell
product cannot establish any irreparable harm relevant to their competi-
tive market position or lost customer base, because such companies have
no market or customer base to protect. As the Federal Circuit has ac-
knowledged in the context of considering preliminary injunctive relief,
"[a]lthough a patentee's failure to practice an invention does not neces-
sarily defeat the patentee's claim of irreparable harm, the lack of com-
mercial activity by the patentee is a significant factor in the calculus., 29'
The remaining three factors of the eBay four-factor test are more
fact-dependent and therefore the result may vary depending on the liquid
patent holder's conduct. For example, a liquid patent holder's willing-
ness to license has been viewed to demonstrate that an adequate remedy
at law exists.292 As for the balance of the parties' hardships, an infring-
ing product that brings significant public benefits may be found to out-
weigh a non-producing patentee's interest in enforcement through in-
junction.293 Similarly, if a liquid patent holder can be made whole with
288. See, e.g., Dominion Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1257-58
(I0th Cir. 2004).
289. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting argu-
ment that harm to the patent right to exclude constitutes irreparable harm); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Application of a concept that every patentee is
always irreparably harmed by an alleged infringer's pretrial sales would . . . disserve the patent
system." (emphasis omitted)).
290. Dominion, 356 F.3d at 1261.
291. High Tech Med. Instruments v. New Image Indus. Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
292. T.i. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consolid. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (licensing is "incompatible with the emphasis on the right to exclude that is the basis for the
presumption" of irreparable harm).
293. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 714 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[lI]n
a case such as this, the public does not benefit from a patentee who obtains a patent yet declines to
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licensing fees awarded in the form of monetary relief, a court may be
reluctant to hold that the balance of hardships warrants an injunction.
As for the public interest factor, courts are generally reluctant to as-
sist a defendant who has been adjudged an infringer. This is because the
public interest is generally considered to favor relief for those whose
valid patent rights have been violated, and an injunction might be viewed
as integral to the reward theory's encouragement of invention and disclo-
sure. However, a patentee who does not make or sell any product cannot
establish that the patent system's interests have been served.
eBay's requirement for an individualized assessment of the parties'
positions will necessarily ask courts to examine the liquid patent holder's
position in relation to the patent system and the public, both as a general
matter and within the specific factual circumstances of the case. Liquid
patent holders are likely to encounter significant impediments to perma-
nent injunctive relief. If Justice Kennedy's guidance is adopted in the
lower court's application of the eBay case, liquid patent holders will not
have the threat of injunction as a negotiation tool.
B. Monetary Remedies
1. Background: Money Damages Under the Patent Act
According to the patent statute, "[u]pon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement .... A key term in the statutory language is "compen-
sate., 295 Section 284 was enacted to "ensure that the patent owner would
in fact receive full compensation for 'any damages' he suffered as a re-
sult of the infringement.,
296
Monetary compensation includes the patentee's lost profits, a rea-
sonable royalty, or a combination of both. A patentee can establish re-
covery for lost profits by demonstrating that the infringing products or
services resulted in the patentee's loss of earnings.297 The fundamental
allow the public to benefit from the inventions contained therein."), rev'd, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
294. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2006).
295. Id.
296. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983). A patentee may also *
seek damages for infringement for up to three times the damages award. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284; see,
e.g., Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv. Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In addi-
tion, a patentee obtains attorney fees, prejudgment interest and costs under certain circumstances. 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 284, 285 (West 2006).
297. Typically, patentees demonstrate lost profits by relying on the test in Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). To meet the Panduit test, "a patent
owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes, (3) [its] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
detailed profit he would have made." Id. at 1156. A patentee does not need to demonstrate these
factors with absolute certainty, but rather a reasonable probability that such sales would have been
made absent infringement. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545. Polaroid's burden of proof on the lost profits
is not absolute, but one of "reasonable probability." Id. To obtain lost profits, a patentee does not
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question for determining whether a patentee can obtain lost profits is
whether the patentee can demonstrate with reasonable probability that,
but for the infringement, the patentee would have made the sales that
were made by the infringer.
298
As liquid patent holders do not sell product, the more realistic
means of recovery is a reasonable royalty, which also derives from sec-
tion 284. This section explains that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer .... " 299 Typically, a patentee who
has never commercialized a product will be in a poor position to demon-
strate lost profits.300 This provision was enacted to "ensure that 1,.. pat-
ent holder would in fact receive full compensation for 'any damages' he
suffered as a result of the infringement., 30  The inquiry to find reason-
able royalty consists of two steps: 1) determination of a reasonable com-
pensation base, i.e., the total value of the infringing items on which the
patentee is entitled to royalty payments; and 2) determination of a rea-
sonable royalty rate to apply to that compensation base.302
To determine the royalty rate, courts consider evidence from a
number of sources. These include a fifteen-factor test from the Georgia
Pacific case, otherwise known as the Georgia Pacific factors.30 3  The
most salient portions of the Georgia Pacific test are the prior license
rates obtained by the licensee, the commercial relationship between the
patentee and the infringer, and the market rate for the patented invention
that the parties would have reached if a rate had been negotiated between
them.304 All factors do not need to be considered in every case, but rather
fact finders have discretion to consider those that the court deems most
relevant. 30 5 Generally, a very important factor in this inquiry is the hypo-
need to prove that the patentee's product incorporates the asserted patent, so long as the patentee's
product competes with the infringing product. Id. at 1548-49.
298. Id. at 1545.
299. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (emphasis added).
300. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1548 ("Normally, if the patentee is not selling a product, by defini-
tion there can be no lost profits."). But see King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 944
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a patent holder who did not practice the patent could recover lost
profits where both parties marketed competing tape loading machines that that court found sufficient
related to the patented technology for tape reel changing assembly). Specifically, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court finding that the patentee would have made sales of the patentee's machine
absent infringement by the defendant. Id. at 953.
301. Devex, 461 U.S. at 654-55.
302. See generally Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(affirming trial court's use of royalty rate multiplied by a royalty base).
303. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co., v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The test
derives from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
304. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
305. TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 899 (affirming reasonable royalty and rejecting the argument
that the calculation method was flawed due to the special master's determination not to analyze all of
the Georgia Pacific factors).
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thetically negotiated rate between the parties.3 °6 Despite the fact that the
fundamental purpose of patent damages is compensation for the patentee,
the reasonable royalty test contains no linguistic tether to the patentee's
actual harm.
2. Disparities between Patent Value and the Value of a Liquid Pat-
ent
a. The Problem of Using Patent Purchase Prices In Litigation
One misconception that relates to liquid patents is whether price
paid for the patent equates to the liquid patent holder's damages. This
error fails to appreciate the theoretical distinction between the two. Pat-
ent damages represent compensation for harm suffered by the patentee
for the infringer's use of the invention in a particular product, process or
method.3 °7 Because patent damages have a causative requirement, re-
covery for patent infringement is necessarily the specific harm from the
use of a particular patent in a particular infringing device.3 8 That is, the
right to recover for patent infringement measures the right of the patent
holder to recover as against one particular party, the infringer, as that
patent is being used in the infringer's products. 30 9 By contrast, market
prices represent an amount paid for an entire patent right separate and
apart from the context of actual use.
This issue becomes significant because liquid patent purchasers
who seek to exploit patents as commodities may base the potential value
of the patent on licensing expectations drawn from anticipated jury
awards. A court's acceptance of the purchaser's assumptions of the pat-
ent's value as correlative of an appropriate liability amount would both
usurp the jury's role and create an unfortunate echo effect of the buyer's
expectations of a patent's value influencing the measure of their own
306. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554.
307. Id. In this case, the Federal Circuit explained the modem formulation of compensation
under the patent statute. The Rite-Hite court emphasized that compensation for harm to the patentee
was the fundamental purpose of the patent damages statute. Id. at 1544-45. The court found that
damages required a causative relation between the infringement and the patentee's harm. See Paul
E. Strand, Back to Bedrock: Constitutional Underpinnings Set "New" Standards for Patent In-
fringement Causation, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 375,392 (2002).
308. See Riles v. Shell Explor. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TWMMfg.
Co., 789 F.2d at 901 (calculating damages separately based on the particular point in time at which
the infringing act occurred). This rule has been expanded by the Federal Circuit's reading of the
entire market value rule, as well as the court's willingness to permit recovery for bundled and con-
voyed sales into the base figure of a reasonable royalty award for damages. Amy L. Landers, Let the
Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 307, 356-62 (2006); see also Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
309. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964). Patent
holders can recovery only nominal damages if the infringer's use causes no actual harm to the pat-
entee. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 510.
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harm. This result interferes with the objective standards by which liabil-
310ity rules operate.
Further, a patent purchaser's expectations of value may not reflect
the patent's actual market value. For example, patents obtained at a liq-
uidation bankruptcy or from a distressed company may have prices that
fail to represent the full potential value of the invention.31  A bankruptcy
trustee or individual responsible for the transfer may not have sufficient
experience with technology assets or sufficient contacts to maximize the
asset's value.
31 2
The price paid for a liquid patent may be of limited usefulness in a
damages award, as the circumstances of the patent's acquisition and ul-
timate use of the patented invention play an important role. 313 The pur-
pose of providing compensation for the patentee's harm may not be
served with reference to the price paid by the liquid patent holder.
b. The Problem of Using Patent Auction Pricing in Litigation
Just as there are misconceptions surrounding the effect of a patent's
purchase price on monetary damages, patent auctions have been errone-
ously argued to represent an objective measure of a liquid patent's li-
censing value:
In an auction, the determination of the fair price of the patent will not
be the blind man's bluff exercise that often characterizes two-party
negotiations, where neither party knows exactly what the other side is
willing to accept and where both therefore risk either overpaying or
underselling. In an open auction, the true value of the patent can be
measured by the interest of multiple buyers. The seller can gauge the
market value of his patent in the bidding process and the buyers can
gauge the behavior of rival buyers.
314
An examination of these assumptions demonstrates that the dynam-
ics of auctions do not deliver the same results as a negotiated royalty.
This issue is significant because the patent holder may seek to pin the
310. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88, at 1107-08 (noting that liability awards are based on
objective measures and that "there is no reason to believe that a market, a decentralized system of
valuing, will cause people to express their true valuations and hence yield results which all would in
fact agree are desirable").
311. David E. Leta & James H. Jones, Valuing Intangible Assets in Bankruptcy Cases, 18
UTAH 133. 22, 22 (2005) ("In general, an intangible asset will have the highest value when it is being
used in the business that created the asset, rather than when it is being sold apart from that busi-
ness.").
312. Ronald J. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High Tech
Firms, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375, 1390-92 (2004).
313. See, e.g., Integra Life. I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(amended December 3, 2003), revd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (recognizing that where
the purchase price of an entire company was $20,000,000, "[a] $15,000,000 award figure to com-
pensate for infringement of only some of [the patent owner's] patents before [the] acquisition seems
unbalanced in view of the overall acquisition price").
314. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
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patent's actual value to the auction price. Secondly, the patentee may
attempt to license the patent based on the price paid at auction. Further,
the liquid patent holder may argue that the auction price represents a
significant figure for purpose of setting a damage award. However, there
are a number of reasons why an auction price varies from each of these.
For example, the number of bidding parties at auction influences
price, while bargaining power tends to be more significant in a two-party
negotiation. 315 Competition among a number of bidders tends to drive
prices higher at auctions when compared with prices resulting from two-
316party negotiations. Moreover, it has been recognized that an auction
winner is not the bidder who paid market value but rather the bidder with
the highest estimated value for common value items, a phenomenon
known as the "winner's curse. 317 This factor is difficult to quantify, as
the price differential associated with the winner's curse varies with the
structure of the auction and the sophistication of the bidder.
318
The auction value paid may also vary due to an individual bidder's
circumstances, such as his or her ability to learn from the information
disclosed during an open auction, and the bidder's attitudes toward tak-
ing risks more generally. 319 Research on the effect of emotions on bid-
ding behavior is in a nascent stage, one recent study has introduced the
emotional state of the bidder as another factor that affects bidding behav-
ior.320  This study was based on a controlled experiment found that bid-
315. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180,
180 (1996) (study analyzing auctions for the sale of a company).
316. See Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 19 (1989).
[W]hen a seller employs an English auction to sell an item worth $100 to himself to a
pair of potential buyers with reservation values of $170 and $200, the equilibrium theory
suggests that the sale will occur at $170. Not only is the result efficient, but the seller
gets a good price: By bargaining singly with the $200 evaluator, the seller can at best
hope to split the gains, getting a price at $150 ....
Id. (citation omitted).
317. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1094 (1982). Most literature finds that the winner's curse does not exist for
purely private value auctions, because bidder evaluations for such auctions are inherently individual-
ized and therefore it cannot be said that one overpaid relative to an objective price. See, e.g., Robert
C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of
Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 95
(2004).
318. Dan Levin, et. al., Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value
Auctions, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 442-43 (1996); see also Marshall & Meurer, supra note 317, at
95 ("A sophisticated bidder avoids the winner's curse by recognizing that winning means all other
bidders received less favorable signals, so she should adjust her expected valuation and bid accord-
ingly.").
319. See John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common
Value Auctions, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 894, 912 (1986) (noting that some bidders who adopted more
aggressive bidding strategies were more successful than others, suggesting that bidders' attitudes
toward risk and individual abilities toward processing information were important to auction out-
comes).
320. Ronald Bosman & Amo Riedl, Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction:
An Experimental Study, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2003-056, 1 (May 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=417660.
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ders who were in a negative emotional state tended to increase their bid
amounts.32  The authors concluded, "emotions influence behavior of
economic agents in a non-trivial way, even in competitive environments
[such] as first-price auctions. 322
Prices obtained at an auction may vary from the market price for
other reasons, including either explicit or implicit collusion among bid-
ders or predatory behavior.32 3 One famous example involves the auction
of ten blocks of spectrum sold by Germany in 1999,324 where two parties
used signals embedded in bid amounts to divide a market between
them.325 Such collusion may be difficult to detect, as an auction seller
may not wish to police collusion by eliminating bidders because seller
may be in a better position by keeping more bidders in the auction even
if a depressed price is expected to result from the collusive activity. 326
Thus, the effect of collusion may cause an effect on the patent price that
makes calibration to the patent's actual licensing value difficult to meas-
ure.
Prices set at auction may vary significantly for a number of reasons
unrelated to an objective market measure of the good that is the subject
of the auction, or as measured by a negotiated rate between the parties.
The statement that "the true value of the patent can be measured by the
interest of multiple buyers, 327 fails to consider the full complexity that
underlies auction pricing.
3. Compensation for Patent Infringement: Innovating Patentees
and Liquid Patent Holders
One reason that the damages calculation presents an appropriate
place for proposed changes is that damages focus precisely on the pat-
entee. Proposed changes to the damages rules are also appropriate be-
cause some of the potential for harm to invention and innovation concern
321. Id. at 17.
322. Id. at 18.
323. Paul Klemperer, Collusion and Predation in Auction Markets 1 (February 2001 draft),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-260188.
324. Id. at 2-3.
325. Id. In that instance, Germany set a rule that new bids on a block of spectrum had to exceed
the previous high bid by at least 10 percent. Id. One company, Mannesman, submitted a high first
bid on blocks 1-5 of 18.18 million deutschmarks per megahertz and 20 million on blocks 6-10. As
one economist explains:
[t]he point . . . is that 18.18 plus a 10% raise equals 19.998 = [approximately] 20. It
seems T-Mobil understood that if it bid 20 million [deutschmarks] on blocks 1-5, but did
not bid again on blocks 6-10, the two companies would then 'live and let live' with nei-
ther company challenging the other on 'the other's' half. Exactly that happened.
Id. One of T-Mobile's managers confirmed, "There were no agreements with Mannesman. But [T-
Mobile interpreted] Mannesman's first bid was a clear offer." Id.
326. Klemperer, supra note 323, at 5 (noting a government seller that took no action against
collusive bidding because the seller was afraid to reduce the number of potential bidders). The U.S.
Department of Justice has expressed concerns about collusive bidding. See Marshall & Meurer,
supra note 317, at 83 (noting the antitrust community's lack of attention to auction collusion).
327. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
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a liquid patent holder's ability to use strategies to increase licensing rates
above the market. As illustrated by the comparison of two cases-
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak328 and MercExchange LLC v. eBay
Inc.32 9-there is a distinction between the nature of the harm suffered by
a patentee who commercialized a patented invention and the owner of a
liquid patent.
a. Polaroid v. Kodak: The Nature of A Commercializing Pat-
entee's Harm
Polaroid's patent infringement case against Kodak 330 provides a
useful illustration of a case involving an innovating patent holder. Polar-
oid filed suit against Kodak, who was found to have infringed twenty
claims of seven patents that the court determined incorporated instant
photography as implemented by both parties.331 Polaroid sought dam-
ages on the two available damages theories-lost profits and a reason-
able royalty.
Polaroid's case represents the paradigmatic case for the reward and
prospect policies embodied in the patent laws. Polaroid's technology
was developed by the company's founder, Edwin H. Land,332 who ob-
tained his first patent in the field in 1933. 333 Upon the introduction of
product to the market in 1948, "[i]nstant photography created a sensation
.... "334 At that time, the technology was relatively crude. After taking
a picture, end users had to pull out a positive and negative "sandwich"
packet from the camera.335 The end user then had to separate the sand-
wich by peeling the negative away, to reveal a monotone, sepia-colored
photograph.336
As Kitch's prospect theory might have foretold, Polaroid continued
to innovate in the instant photography field and ultimately developed an
"elegant, highly sophisticated camera and film system" such that "[t]he
photographer needs to do nothing but focus the camera and expose the
film to obtain a finished print. 3 37 Polaroid continued to obtain patent
improvements, some of which were asserted against Kodak in the law-
328. No. 76-1634-MA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990, corrected Jan.
11, 1991).
329. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 401
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cit. 2005), rev'don other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
330. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968.
331. ld. at *1.
332. ld. at * 12.
333. Polarizing Refracting Bodies, U.S. Patent No. 1,918,848 (filed Apr. 26, 1929) (issued July
18, 1933).
334. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *12.
335. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 830 (D. Mass. 1985) (describing
the earliest versions of the technology).
336. Polaroid Corp., 641 F. Supp. at 830.
337. Id. at 831.
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suit.338 Consistent with the reward incentive, Polaroid enjoyed market
exclusivity from 1948 until Kodak entered the market in 1976.
Beginning in 1969, Kodak began research and development efforts
for an instant photography system for projected entry into the market in
1976.339 Several parallel projects were pursued with at least one project
becoming abandoned after Kodak spent as much as $94 million dollars in
research and development. 340 Kodak purchased large quantities of Polar-
oid's products, and ordered several groups to familiarize themselves with
Polaroid's technology.34' In September 1973, Kodak's Development
Committee stated that Kodak's "development should not be constrained
by what an individual feels is potential patent infringement., 342 Kodak
ultimately entered the market with a series of simple cameras that sold at
a lower price range than Polaroid's more sophisticated versions.343
After Kodak was found to have infringed Polaroid's patents, Polar-
oid asserted that Kodak's entry into the market had forced a price war,
that Polaroid had been forced to change business strategy to prioritize
lower-priced cameras to hold market share against Kodak's inexpensive
products, and that Polaroid was unable to raise prices based on the fear
that the market would tip in Kodak's favor.344 After reviewing substan-
tial evidence submitted by the parties, the court found that Polaroid lost
profits of over $248 million.345 In addition, the court awarded a reason-
able royalty of ten percent of Kodak's sales and prejudgment interest for
a total award of over $870 million.34
Kodak's infringement harmed Polaroid in a number of ways. Po-
laroid's right to exclude under the patent right was being violated by
Kodak. Polaroid had incurred significant research and development
costs for the technology at issue, building on work since the company
had been founded several decades earlier.347 In addition, Polaroid suf-
fered direct market harm by lost sales to Kodak as a competitor. 34 8 Po-
laroid also claimed that its "historical business practices, and the sensible
business direction it would have taken, was altered and diverted because
it had to respond to Kodak's entry into the instant photography mar-
338. See id. at 830 (describing the patents at issue).
339. Id. at 831.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 832.
342. Id.
343. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *17.
344. See id. at *28-30.
345. Id. at *208.
346. Id. at *220, 246; see also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1364-MA, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 344, at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991) (noting the corrected final judgment amount).
347. See Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *183.
348. See id at *20-2 1.
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ket., 349 Polaroid further argued that Kodak had waged a price war that in
turn forced Polaroid to reduce prices for its products.35°
b. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.:351 The Nature of a
Liquid Patent Holder's Harm
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. provides an opportunity to ex-
amine the damage positions of a liquid patent holder. MercExchange
technology concerned particular methods for purchasing on the inter-
net.352 The patent was developed by MercExchange's founder, Thomas
Woolston, an electrical engineer and patent attorney.353 Woolston filed
his first patent application in April 1995, which was the parent of the
patent asserted against eBay in the lawsuit. 354  Woolston invented his
system to use in a business that would practice his invention. 355
MercExchange developed a business plan, sought capital and hired em-
ployees to put the patents into practice.356 In addition, MercExchange
sought to license the patents,357 including through discussions with
eBay.358 In 2000, it became clear to MercExchange that it lacked the
capital to commercialize its inventions. 9
MercExchange filed suit against eBay, a successful Internet com-
pany, and two other entities alleged to be using MercExchange's tech-
nology.360 At trial, these defendants were held to have willfully infringed
MercExchange's patent.36' Despite the Schumpeterian view that "[a]s
long as they are not carried into practice, inventions are economically
irrelevant, 3 62 the trial court entered judgment for $29.5 million in favor
of MercExchange.363 The amount awarded by the jury was three times
higher than the figure proposed by MercExchange's expert.3 4
349. Id. at *29.
350. Id.
351. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 401 F.3d 1323,
1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev 'don other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2006).
352. Brief for Respondent at 2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130).
353. Id. at 1.
354. Id.




359. Id. at 4.
360. Id. at 4, 29.
361. Id. at 6. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated a permanent injunction against eBay and re-
manded the case, directing the trial court to consider equitable principles in determining whether
such relief was appropriate in the case. eBaylnc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
362. See Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 188 (1998) (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 88-89 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1951)).
363. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
364. Id. at 709.
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The difference between the economic harm that Polaroid suffered
compared to the type of harm suffered by MercExchange lies in the criti-
cal details of each plaintiffs position. Unlike Polaroid, MercExchange
did not lose sales because MercExchange did not sell any product or pro-
vide any selling service relating to the patent. Rather, MercExchange's
sole use of the patent was to license the patent to infringers.365  The
argument that lost profits should be recoverable because the infringer
effectively prevented the patentee's ability to enter the market was not at
issue in the MercExchange case. Likewise, MercExchange did not argue
that eBay's infringement prevented MercExchange's ability to obtain the
financing necessary for MercExchange to commercialize. Rather than
pursuing such theories, MercExchange sought a reasonable royalty and
damages for willful infringement.366 MercExchange also took the posi-
tion that eBay's infringement made licensing to others more difficult.
367
In short, the type of harm that MercExchange suffered was different
in kind that that suffered by Polaroid. Although both MercExchange and
Polaroid developed technology, unlike Polaroid MercExchange was not
harmed by the infringement with respect to costs relating to the creation
of a market, lost sales to a competitor or by losing the costs to develop
and commercialize a product. MercExchange did not suffer competitive
harm.
There are a number of sound reasons why patentees do not com-
mercialize their inventions.368 As with the patentee in the MercExchange
case, the inventor may lack sufficient financial resources to bring the
patented idea to the market. The patent may be targeted to a market that
has not sufficiently developed to support manufacture and sale. There
may be implementation problems for the commercial application of the
idea. A patent holder may determine that licensing the patent is more
profitable or poses fewer risks than commercialization. Under patent
law, there is no question that compensation for non-commercialized pat-
ents is available.369
However, the case law has not clearly defined the analysis to suffi-
ciently compensate harm from infringement of liquid patents. As a lost
365. Brief for Respondent, supra note 352, at 4.
366. See MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
367. Brief for Respondent, supra note 352, at 4.
368. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1, 75-76 (2001). This article cites the following: (1) the invention is not commercially viable,
due to circumstances such as lack of demand, cost, lack of financing, inability to develop a market-
able embodiment, or underestimation of its commercial value; (2) the technology is commercially
viable but less promising than other technologies the patent owner is investigating; (3) the technol-
ogy lacks commercial applications within the area of the patent owner's expertise; (4) the patent
owner has been unable to find a willing licensee to commercialize the patent; and (5) the patent
owner resists commercialization, because the new invention would compete against some other
product the patent owner currently markets. Id.
369. King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 949.
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profits analysis is unlikely to apply to an entity that is solely devoted to
licensing, the relevant standard for damages for infringement of a liquid
patent is reasonable royalty.370 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit agree that patentee compensation is the fundamental pur-
pose of patent damages.371 In short, "while the statutory text states
tersely that the patentee receive 'adequate' damages, the Supreme Court
has interpreted this to mean that 'adequate' damages should approximate
those damages that will fully compensate the patentee for infringe-
ment." 372 However, there is no test which assists the lower courts in de-
termining how much a violation of the patent right-in the abstract and
without any related market harm-is worth. Further, and somewhat cu-
riously, no Georgia Pacific factor asks the fact finder to consider the
type or extent of the patentee's harm although this is the fundamental
statutory purpose of section 284. 7
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have recog-
nized that damages must have a causative relation to the harm suffered
by the patentee to the damages awarded.374 Yet the Georgia Pacific fac-
tors, which represent the fundament test for reasonable royalty damages,
do not contain any causative requirement.
Where both parties are competitors that innovate and sell products,
the absence of considerations, such as the nature of the patentee's harm
from the Georgia Pacific factors creates little difficulty. Just as Polar-
oid's right to exclude was accompanied by actual harm to Polaroid's
efforts to commercialize instant photography, many patentees suffer
harm to business in a measurable, tangible way when encountering in-
fringing competitors even though such harm is not compensable as lost
profits under section 284.
At present, the reasonable royalty test does not include a concrete
framework for differentiating between the types of harms suffered by
liquid patent holders from those patentees who have undertaken the ex-
pense and risk of innovation and commercialization. A jury is given no
criteria to measure harm that flows from the violation of the right to ex-
clude in isolation. Yet it is precisely this violation that is at stake when a
liquid patent is asserted in litigation. Creating a method to quantify such
370. See supra text accompanying note 299.
371. See, e.g., Devex, 461 U.S. at 653-54; Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544-45.
372. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
373. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2006).
374. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 507 (The question to be asked in determining damages is "how
much had the Patent Holder and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is]
primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would the Patentee Holder-Licensee have made?")
(quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries, Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958); see
also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
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harm would permit more accuracy in jury awards, and would also pro-
vide parameters for licensing discussions with liquid patent holders.375
4. Proposal for Modifications: Addressing Monetary Damage
Awards for Infringement of Liquid Patents
Proposals to change the patent system to accommodate the practices
of liquid patent holders fit within the contours of existing law for patent
damages. The damages calculation, which is directed to compensate
harm to the patentee, should specifically consider the patent owner's use
and exploitation of the patent. The following proposals are therefore
appropriate for the damages calculation for a liquid patent.
a. Fact finders should expressly consider the nature of the
harm to the patentee.
The patent holder should outline the nature of the harm that is suf-
fered, consistent with the acknowledged statutory purpose of 35 U.S.C.
section 284. Currently, both innovating patentees and liquid patent hold-
ers may seek reasonable royalty recovery under the general rubric of the
Georgia Pacific test. 37 6 However, the nature of the harm suffered by
each may be quite different in kind, as one who undertakes the risk and
expense of innovation is likely to suffer different harm than one who
purchases a patent. The Georgia Pacific test should be modified to ex-
pressly require patentees to identify the nature of the harm that has been
suffered.
Additionally, the patentee should identify the causative relation be-
tween the amount sought to recover for infringement and the harm suf-
fered by the patentee. Thus, those patentees who have been precluded
from entering the market by an infringer are likely justified in seeking a
higher royalty award than those who have made an independent decision
to refrain from commercialization independent of any conduct of the
infringer.
This proposal should not suppress royalty awards, as one would ex-
pect the owner of a very valuable liquid patent to obtain a substantial
royalty award based on the infringer's use. If the patentee's harm is
based on the infringer's failure to take a license, the standard is intended
to focus the fact finder's attention on the effect of that conduct on the
patentee.
375. Cf Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 276, at 950-51 (arguing that parties reach agree-
ments in private ordering based of considerations on the alternatives that adjudication would likely
award).
376. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1116.
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b. If the harm to the right to exclude a liquid patent is in-
fringer's failure to take a license, the parties should proffer
a proposed royalty rate that does not depend on the avail-
ability of a mandatory injunction against future infringe-
ment.
Until eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.377 was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2006, the Federal Circuit applied a "general rule that
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement ab-
sent exceptional circumstances." 378  As a practical matter, permanent
injunctions were routinely granted in the district courts after a finding of
patent infringement.379
Historical license rates have been skewed upward by the practice
that patent holders have been able to threaten to shut down production
with these nearly automatic injunctions that would prevent their licensee
targets from selling any future products. 380  The widespread and certain
availability of a permanent injunction in patent cases permitted patent
holders to hold out and negotiate royalty rates that exceed the value of
the patented invention.8 Under those circumstances, patent owners
were overcompensated for the inventions, particularly in those cases
where the invention covered only a portion of the accused device or
process.
382
Negotiated royalties established under the threat of the entry of an
automatic permanent injunction have been subject to the hold out effect.
At the same time, the reasonable royalty damages calculation favors a
rate based on historical licensing rates to the extent that such rates ex-
ist.383 To the extent that a patentee has had the benefit of licensing nego-
tiation leverage based on the ready availability of injunctive relief, the
established royalty should be discounted to reflect the patentee's harm.
377. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
378. Id. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
379. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners at
2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (noting the trend toward
the automatic entry of an injunction in patent cases).
380. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (noting that for licensing entities, "an injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent") (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
381. Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold Ups and Patent Royalties, Aug. 2006,
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf ("Royalty over-charges are greatest for weak
patents covering patented features that offer minor contributions to complex products sold at prices
well above margin cost.").
382. Id. at 1 ("The principal finding in this paper is that the current U.S. patent system system-
atically overrewards the owners of weak patents, especially in the information technology sector
where a single product can incorporate many patented features.").
383. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554 ("The royalty may be based upon an established royalty, if




The patent holder's ability to hold out based on the threat of an perma-
nent injunction under the former law should not supersede the fundamen-
tal purpose of the damages statute, which is to provide the patentee with
compensation for harm.
c. The amount paid for the patent by the patent holder should
not be determinative of the royalty rate for infringement in
the litigation.
As detailed above,384 the amounts paid by a patentee have limited
assistance in determining the current value of a patent or in setting the
measure of a patentee's harm. The circumstances and dynamics of the
acquisition should be examined to determine whether the patent holder
paid a price that is informative of the patent's fair market value.
Further, 35 U.S.C. section 284 dictates that damages be awarded
"adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer..."
This statutory language puts a clear focus on an examination of the pat-
ent as implemented in the infringing product. Thus, a patentee's recov-
ery is in the nature of a non-exclusive license for a particular use for a
specific time frame. The price paid to obtain the patent has limited use-
fulness for that purpose.
d. The award to the patentee should not award the risks of in-
novation to the liquid patent holder.
Unless there is a causal relation between the infringement and the
patentee's determination to license rather than to commercialize the pat-
ent, the fact finder should not award innovation costs to the patentee.
The Georgia Pacific test asks the jury to consider as the thirteenth factor
"[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the inven-
tion as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by
the infringer." 385 However, this factor is stated too narrowly to allow
attribution of all innovative activity to the infringer. For example, the
popularity of a product that is due to the infringer's advertising, devel-
opment of a market, superior consumer support, the infringer's name or
development of marketing and distribution channels are not valid com-
ponents of the patentee's harm.
Even if this issue were resolved, however, difficulties remain. A
jury should be presented with relevant, scientifically valid evidence that
permits consideration of the relevant contribution of both parties to the
infringing product. The jury would then calculate a royalty that consid-
ers the efforts of both parties to product sales. Such a procedure would
384. See supra Part V.B.2.
385. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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attempt to isolate the value of the invention as used in the infringing
product. To the extent that courts wish to include some damages to ac-
complish deterrence by increasing the damage award, that measure could
then be added. Because courts have failed to apply damages policies and
evidentiary standards meaningfully, royalties awarded in patent cases fail
to be accurate measures of a patentee's harm.386
Moreover, the trend over the past several years has been to award
more of the infringer's innovative activity to the patentee and not less. In
part, this has been because the court has expanded the "entire market
value" rule.387 The entire market value rule is applied where both pat-
ented and unpatented components are sold together.388 Essentially, the
entire market value rule expands the royalty base to permit the patentee
to recover for unpatented components, in recognition that "the economic
value of a patent may be greater than the value of the sales of the pat-
ented part alone., 389 Formerly, royalty awards were increased by ex-
panding the royalty base if the patented components were of "substantial
importance" the sale a multi-invention product.390  For example, the
Federal Circuit permits expansion of the royalty base where the unpat-
ented components are foreseeably sold with the patented components. 391
This broad forseeability standard permits a jury to award damages for
unpatented component to the patentee so long as all components are sold
together. Indeed, recently the Federal Circuit has upheld a royalty award
that was based on sales of products to the parent company of the patent
holder.392 In that case, the parent company commercialized the product,
but the patent holder did not.393 The entire market value rule as recently
applied awards more of the value of infringer innovation and commer-
cialization to the patentee.
For liquid patent holders who have made a conscious decision not to
engage in any product development, marketing or sales, expanded
awards are not adequate reflections of the patentee's harm. Permitting
liquid patent holders to recover the full benefit of the defendant's innova-
tive activity does not serve the purpose of compensating patentees for the
harm suffered, which for liquid patent holders amounts to a lost opportu-
nity to grant a non-exclusive license to the infringer. Patentees operating
under the current standards may determine that undertaking the risk of
386. Landers, supra note 308, at 334-35.
387. See King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 951 n.4.
388. See id.
389. See id.; see also Site Microsurgical Sys., Inc. v. Cooper Cos., 797 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.
Del. 1992) ("The rule merely recognizes the actual economic value of the patented technology.").
390. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 962, 973-974 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
391. Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (although the
patent claims covered only a device for fusing materials, the court awarded damages on the fused
materials themselves, as a foreseeable harm from the infringement).
392. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
393. Union Carbide Chem., 425 F.3d at 1377.
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commercialization is irrational, as the monetary rewards of selling prod-
uct will flow to them by succeeding against an infringer who has already
done so. Thus, a more balanced approach that prevents patentees to re-
cover more than their harm will better serve the commercialization pur-
pose that the patent laws are intended to promote.
Fundamentally, the patent right provides patentees with the right to
exclude and is intended to foster the encouragement of investment-based
risk.394 The patent right provides no assurance of market acceptance, that
manufacture will be feasible and cost effective nor that a more desirable
means to solve the same problem will not compete with the patented
invention. The concepts embodied by the term "investment-based risk"
stand on uncertainty, and the risks of approaching the marketplace with a
patented invention may be significant. 395 A liquid patent holder is not
entitled to obtain the benefits of the risks that the patentee did not under-
take.
VI. LIQUID IP: PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES
Liquid patent holders have the potential to purchase some measure
of power through acquisition of patent rights. The purchase of even a
single key patent can prevent an entire industry from engaging in re-
search, development and sales in a particular field. The liquid patent
holder may be demanding fees based on a patent of questionable validity.
License rates demanded by liquid patent holders may be far above the
patent's value. Although the parties can litigate the merits in court, the
mere fact that a patent lawsuit is pending can harm an alleged infringer's
sales 396 even if the lawsuit is ultimately dismissed or the patent is adjudi-
cated as invalid.
Generally, a patentee's activity in asserting and licensing is insu-
lated from such forms of liability as antitrust law, even where the patent
holder's conduct is injurious. This protection is policy based, grounded
in an assumption that subjecting a patentee to antitrust scrutiny would
"severely trample upon the incentives provided by our patent laws and
thus undermine the entire patent system. 3 97 However, this policy-based
rationale lacks support for liquid patent holders. In many cases, the in-
394. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
395. The phrase "investment-based risk" stands on much more uncertain ground than the
phrase "investment backed expectation" that is used to define a compensable property right under
takings law. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
396. See, e.g., Andrew R. Hickey, Experts: Don't Deploy BlackBerry, MOBILE COMPUTING
NEWS, December 9, 2005, http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sid40_gcil151223,00.html (reporting warnings to potential customers not to invest in
accused wireless messaging device, despite the fact that an appeal was pending and a request to
invalidate the patent in suit was pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
397. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1209 (2d Cir. 1981); Miller Insituform, Inc.
v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding "[t]here is no adverse effect
on competition since, as a patent monopolist, [the patentee], from the start, had exclusive right to
manufacture, use, and sell his invention").
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ventor and innovator have sold the patent to a liquid patent holder, who
is engaging in conduct similar to any other business. To such entities,
patents operate as an asset and not as a vehicle for invention.
A. Antitrust Protection for Exploitation of the Patent Right
As background, there is an inherent tension between the patent
law's right of exclusivity and the antitrust law's disfavor of economic
monopolies.398 Antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition.399
Although not all patents confer monopoly power in the antitrust sense,400
a patent or the product based on a patented invention may develop into
dominance in an industry. Fundamentally, a patent grants a patentee the
right to exclude others entirely from profiting from the patented inven-
tion in one or several markets.40 1 In such cases, a patentee's exercise of
the right to exclude-whether by refusing to license or asserting the pat-
ent against an infringer-may prevent the type of competition that the
antitrust laws were enacted to protect.
Yet a patentee's conduct in exploiting the patent right is typically
insulated from antitrust scrutiny. The patent right includes the right to
suppress the invention while continuing to prevent all others from using
it, to refuse to license others and, if a patentee decides to license, to
charge the highest royalty that the market permits during the patent
term.40 2 Although such actions may have anticompetitive effects, the
government grant of exclusivity embodied in a patent in most cases
shields patent holders against antitrust liability for exercising the patent
right because such anticompetitive effects are considered "part and par-
cel of the patent system's role in creating incentives for potential inven-
tors. ''4 3 Thus, courts have drawn a distinction4°4 between the economic
monopoly prevented by the antitrust laws and patent assertion because a
patentee is "the owner of a monopoly recognized by the Constitution and
by the statutes of Congress. 4 5
398. United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recog-
nizing "the fundamental fact that a patent by definition restrains trade, and in effect makes most
exclusive patent licenses per se violations of the antitrust laws").
399. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986).
400. See, e.g., I1l. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006) (finding
that products that are patented are not entitled to a presumption of market power on the patentee);
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13 1, at 374.
401. Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1127.
402. Id.
403. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
404. Some scholars have observed that this distinction is not considerable, as the antitrust laws
"are generally hostile to" claims of refusing to deal, even where no intellectual property rights are at
stake. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Unilateral Refusals to License, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2006) ("The Supreme Court's repeated invocation of the rule that the
antitrust laws 'protection of competition, not competitors' seems applicable here." (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (footnote omitted)).
405. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70,88 (1902).
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The Federal Circuit has promulgated a general rule that "the con-
duct at issue is illegal if it threatens competition in areas other than those
protected by the patent, and is otherwise legal. ' 4°6 For example, in U.S.
v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, the court rejected the United States' argu-
ment that the patentee's refusal to license created such anticompetitive
harms as excluding potential sellers from the market, selling products
made with the patented process in excess of competitive levels, and re-
straining trade in related technology were insufficient to establish an
antitrust violation.4 °7 The court found that "[n]one of these restraints go
beyond what the patent itself authorizes," and that the "exclusion of
competitors, and charging of supracompetitive prices are at the core of
the patentee's rights, and are legitimate rewards of the patent monop-
According to the Federal Circuit, conduct that excludes competitors
from competing in a market that may raise concerns under antitrust law
will typically present no legal liability where that conduct is a legitimate
exercise of a patent right.40 9 Further, in the Federal Circuit, a competi-
tor's subjective motivation to exclude a competitor is irrelevant if those
circumstances are met.4 1°
The protection against antitrust penalty provided to patent owners is
founded on the policy of preserving patent law's incentives. The Federal
Circuit has explained that certain protections against antitrust suits based
on a patentee's conduct are necessary to preserve intellectual property's
incentive system.41' As one scholar elaborates, the public benefit gained
from innovation justifies permitting intellectual property holders to en-
gage in conduct necessary to enforce their rights without antitrust scru-
tiny:
Even the introduction of a product subject to monopoly power can
represent a gain to society. That is the underlying logic of our patent
system, in which the monopoly profit expected from innovation cre-
406. Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1128.
407. Id. at 1125-26.
408. Id. at 1128.
409. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Robert
Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921-23 (2001).
410. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why
Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between 1P and Other Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 741,744 (2004) (noting that the case "establishes a rule of per se legality" for the exercise of the
exclusionary rights under copyright and patent law). But see Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting patent owner's intellectual property justifi-
cation for alleged exclusionary conduct could be rebutted by a showing that the justification was
pretextual).
411. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1343-44; see In Re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at
1327-29; Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1059.
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ates an incentive to provide the gain to society. It has been estimated
that the social return to invention significantly exceeds the private re-
turn. That means that antitrust should be especially wary when its
action reduces the return to innovators of intellectual property be-
cause we know that there already is too little incentive to create such
intellectual property.
412
Some criticize the Federal Circuit's rulings as going too far by "ex-
alt[ing] protection of intellectual property rights" to the detriment of anti-
trust enforcement.41 3  Typical of this view, one commentator notes,
"[t]oday it is quite clear that an antitrust claim at the Federal Circuit will
fail.
, 4 14
B. Antitrust Limitations on Anticompetitive Patentee Conduct
There are exceptions to the doctrine that the exercise of a patent
right is protected against antitrust liability. For example, a patent holder
who procured the patent through "knowing and willful fraud" is not im-
mune from antitrust liability.415 Further, a patent holder is not shielded by
antitrust liability if the patent owner asserts an objectively baseless suit
that is subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-
competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable legal remedy.4 16
Conduct that reaches outside the patent may be actionable, for example
where patent holders have pooled their patents and fix prices on the
products for themselves and their licensees, 4 17 tying,418 use the patent to
or restrict sales of unpatented products4 19 or to seek royalties beyond the
expiration of the patent term.420 However, liquid patent holders can ex-
ercise a significant amount of market power without violating any of
these exceptions.
There are antitrust principles which consider the problem that pur-
chasing patents creates the possibility that monopoly power can be ac-
412. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal To Deal-
Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 673-74 (2001) (footnote omitted)
(citing Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 1119 (1998)).
413. Pitofsky, supra note 409 at 921-22. ("[Q]uestions arise as to what the Federal Circuit's
approach portends-i.e., an approach that seems to exalt protection of intellectual property rights-
with respect to continuing validity in the Federal Circuit of the long-standing balance between anti-
trust and intellectual property."); J. Robert Robertson, FTC Part III Litigation: Lessons from Chi-
cago Bridge and Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 20 ANTITRUST 12, 13 (Spring 2006) (noting
that the federal circuit "is not known to be pro-enforcement in the antitrust area").
414. Thomas, supra note 12 1, at 794.
415. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1326.
416. Id.
417. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 380 (1952).
418. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
419. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-37 (1969).
420. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
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cumulated. 421 The antitrust laws create liability for the accumulation of
422market power through patent acquisition. In particular, section 7 of
the Clayton Act 423 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act 424 provide arguable
grounds to address such conduct.425 Over the past several years, how-
ever, private parties have had an increasingly difficult time bringing such
claims.
Although the U.S. Department of Justice has brought some en-
forcement actions under the antitrust laws for the accumulation of market
power in patents during a corporate merger, 426 and historically such re-
lief was available to private parties, courts have become more reluctant
to permit private litigants to succeed.
For example, in the 1952 case of Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump
Co., 427 the court examined the conduct of patent holder Kobe, who had
obtained seventy-two patents from a predecessor and entered into a
closed pooling arrangement with another company to dominate the mar-
ket for oil drills. 428 Kobe asserted five of these patents against defendant
Demsey, a new entrant competitor who was held to have infringed one of
the patents that had been held valid.429 In assessing Demsey's counter-
claim under the Sherman Act, the court found that "Kobe did not insti-
tute the infringement action in bad faith," but nonetheless found that
Kobe had violated antitrust laws. 430 The Kobe court explained that "al-
though Kobe believed that some of its patents were infringed, the real
purpose of the infringement action and the incidental activities of Kobe's
representatives w[ere] to further the existing monopoly and to eliminate
Dempsey as a competitor.
'A31
More recently, courts have been reluctant to grant relief for non-
government plaintiffs. Examples include both Axis, S.p.A. v. Micafil,
432
421. See Kitch, supra note 91, at 1740 (noting that "agreements which concentrate a number of
single rights under common control have the obvious potential to create monopoly power").
422. Id.
423. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2006).
424. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
425. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18; see also Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.
1952); SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1205; Yee Wah Chin, Unilateral Technology Suppression. Appro-
priate Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 441,446 (1998).
426. See e.g., United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. CIV. I:01CV01237(GK) (D.D.C. Sept. 4,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9OOO/9019.pdf; United States v. Miller Inds.,
No. CIV 1:00CV00305 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4100/4188.pdf; In the Matter of CIBA-Geigy Ltd., CIBA-Geigy
Corp., Chiron Corp., Sandoz Ltd., Sandoz Corp., and Novartis AG, Docket No. C-3725, File No.
961 0055, at 1, 19-20 (F.T.C Apr. 8, 1997) (complaint, decisions, and orders available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3725.htm).
427. Dempsey Pump, 198 F.2d at 419-21.
428. Id. at 420-21.
429. Id. at 418.
430. Id. at 424.
431. Id. at 425.
432. 870 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1989).
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and SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,433 both of which challenged the pat-
entee's acquiring certain patents as a violation of the antitrust laws. In
Axis, S.p.A. v. Micafil, antitrust plaintiff Axis asserted a violation of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act against defendant Micafil, who had a acquired a
company along with a number of patents on the only two methods of
cutting wire for components used in small appliances.434 Axis alleged
that Micafil's acquisition of those patents were "the only things prevent-
ing Axis' entry into the market. ' ,43' Axis further alleged that had suf-
fered an antitrust injury-that is, an injury that reflects a causal connec-
tion to the anticompetitive act that is the subject of the antitrust viola-
tion.436 An antitrust injury is a necessary although not always sufficient
requirement to demonstrate certain antitrust claims.437
The Axis court accepted that the acquisition violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and that "the patents presented an impenetrable barrier to
the plaintiffs entry" to the market.438 Rejecting Axis' damages claim for
lost sales and lost profits, the court found that Axis could not establish an
antitrust injury.439 Specifically, the court reasoned that the patents pre-
sented as much a barrier before the merger as afterwards, and therefore
Axis would have suffered the injury regardless of the antitrust viola-
tion.44 ° On this basis, the Axis court affirmed dismissal of the antitrust
claims.441
The Axis case appears to create an impenetrable bar to antitrust suits
brought by infringers where an antitrust injury is an essential element.
An infringer can never establish antitrust injury from the acquisition of
an existing patent, since a patent is always owned by someone and so the
potential for enforcement exists regardless of the owner's identity.
442
The antitrust injury requirement for section 7 of the Clayton Act strictly
thus limits the ability to enforce that provision.
Additionally, in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit has
held that liability under Section 7 of the Clayton Act for the acquisition
of a patent with monopoly power cannot occur where the patent has not
been commercialized at the time of the acquisition. In SCM Corp.,
Xerox had acquired patents relating to copying that did not require using
433. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
434. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1105-06.
435. Id. at 1106 (quoted source contains an alteration to the original).
436. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111-12; Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1107.
437. See id.; Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1105-07.
438. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1107.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at llll.
442. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (denying antitrust claim for lack of antitrust injury finding that "[tihe cause of [the infringer's]
injuries was not that [the patentee] enforced the... patent, but that the patent was enforced at all"),
abrogated on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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any wet chemistry. 443 After entering into a series of license agreements
for the patents, Xerox purchased various patents for the technology be-
tween 1956 and 1959. 444 However, Xerox did not commercially sell a
plain paper copier until 1960.445 Plaintiff SCM Corp. sued Xerox, alleg-
ing that Xerox's acquisition of the patents violated Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act in the market for plain and coated paper copiers in the office
copier market." 6 The Second Circuit held that SCM Corp. could not es-
tablish this claim, because Xerox did not begin selling products into the
market until one year after the last patent had been acquired." 7
As with cases examining protections for a patentee to assert or re-
fuse to license a patent, both the Axis and SCM Corp. courts rely on pat-
ent policy of encouraging incentives to invent as bases for their deci-
sions.448 Acknowledging that "the acquisition of a patent can create the
potential for tremendous market power," 449 the SCM Corp. court invoked
the image of the inventor who bestows the benefit of genius on the pub-
lic: "That the first patent laws were enacted at the second session of our
first Congress manifests the importance our founding fathers attached to
encouraging inventive genius, a resource that proved to be bountiful
throughout this nation's history., 450 Further, SCM Corp. acknowledged
that the patent law's reward "with the power to exclude others from ex-
ploiting his invention" is balanced with "the public benefits from the
disclosure of inventions, the entrance into the market of valuable prod-
ucts whose invention might have been delayed but for the incentives
provided by the patent laws, and the increased competition the patented
product creates in the marketplace." 4"5  Significantly, the SCM court
found that these policies and protections apply to those who invest-and
not only those who invent-within the patent system. 52
More generally and because of these policy justifications, antitrust
law provides leeway to liquid patent holders to acquire and assert pat-
ents, in some instances even where the patent has monopoly power. Par-
ticularly for cases adjudicated in the Federal Circuit where antitrust
443. Id. at 1199; see THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF XEROGRAPHY 4 (1983) (print on file with author), available at http://files.asme.org/
ASMEORG/Communities/History/Landmarks/5663.pdf.
444. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1199-1200.
445. Id. at 1200.
446. Id. at 1199 n.1.
447. Id. at 1207, 1211 (inferring that the court left open the possibility that an acquisition made
into a reasonably foreseeable economic market might violate section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act).
448. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1111 (noting "[o]ur patent and antitrust laws seek to further
different and opposing policies. Patent laws grant a monopoly for a limited time in order "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... " Further, "a lawfully acquired patent creates a
monopoly that does not violate the antitrust laws."); SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203-05.
449. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1205.
450. Id. at 1203.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1206 n.9.
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claims have been most difficult to bring, a liquid patent holder with a
colorable assertion of infringement can assert the patent so long as ex-
ceptions to antitrust immunity are not present. If the liquid patent holder
performs adequate due diligence to ensure against fraud, tying and frivo-
lous claims, many of these exceptions can be eliminated as a legal or
factual possibility.453 Assuming that the liquid patent holder does not
itself possess monopoly power, those who seek to obtain patents in un-
derdeveloped commercial markets may be able to avoid scrutiny for ac-
quisitions of patents by a private actor who infringes, particularly under
Xerox in a market that has not yet been commercialized.454 The courts
have therefore left liquid patent holders with considerable room to ac-
quire and use patents in a manner which might cause harm to the market
or to consumers.
C. Liquid Patent Holders and Antitrust Law
The deference that antitrust law provides to liquid patents is not
supported by the incentive policy justification. Patent purchasers who
seek to profit from another's inventive activity lack any connection with
those who require an incentive to invent. Unlike those who fund inven-
tion or patent prosecution, those who seek to profit by purchasing patents
to assert against those engaged in commercial activity appear too late in
the process to have contributed to the incentive to invent or disclose pat-
ented inventions.
The societal benefits of the assertion of liquid patents are not sub-
stantially supported by the traditional patent law policies. As evidenced
by the need to enact section 7 of the Clayton Act, the acquisition of con-
centrated power may cause harm by foreclosing consumer choice
through acquisition.455 Even where industry is content with the state of
competition, the broader public interest may be harmed by the elimina-
tion of those engaged in commercial activity.456 The patent laws do not
453. Pitofsky, supra note 409, at 921 (explaining, for example, the fraud exception is not
exceptionally difficult to avoid, having been described as "more difficult to prove than almost any
antitrust allegation" because the patent applicant must be shown to have "made knowing and willful
misrepresentations that resulted in a patent that would not have issued in the absence of a misrepre-
sentation.") (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-71).
454. However, governmental inquiry into an already existing or reasonably foreseeable market
may lead to liability into a patent acquirer's conduct.
455. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963) ("A fundamental purpose of
amending [section 7 of the Clayton Act] was to arrest the trend toward concentration [and] the
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared ... " (punctuation deleted)).
456. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (D.C.N.Y. 1958)
(noting the types of harm that were sought to be remedied by enacting section 7 of the Clayton Act
include:
(1) elimination in whole or in material part of the competitive activity of an enterprise
which has been a substantial factor in competition, (2) increase in the relative size of the
enterprise making the acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its competitors
threatens to be decisive, (3) undue reduction in the number of competing enterprises, or
(4) establishment of relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals of
a fair opportunity to compete.
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themselves allow consumers court access to challenge any patent-related
anticompetitive conduct even when such patents are invalid.457 Like-
wise, the patent laws provide no relief for those against whom the patent
is asserted. Any redress must be through other causes of action, such as
the antitrust laws.
Antitrust protections for patentee conduct are concurrent with the
scope of the claim language-that is, limited to the scope of the govern-
ment-granted monopoly-look opaquely at the incentive rewards in the
broadest sense. The decisions do not address the more complex and nu-
anced policy issues raised by liquid patent holders' methods of exploiting
patents that provide-and indeed may interfere-with the patent sys-
tem's purpose of serving innovation. For example, the SCM Corp. court
notes that antitrust protection is appropriate for more than the inventor,
explaining that:
Investors . . . play a key role, if not an indispensable one today, in
both the inventive process and commercialization of inventions. And
it is fair to say, we think, that the contribution of the investor in both
the funding of research that leads to inventions and the promotion
that necessarily must follow to achieve successful commercialization
is of comparable value.
458
The SCM Corp. court's justifications do not extend to liquid patent
holders who do not fund research or assist in commercialization. The
public benefit that is presumed to flow from the activity of an investor
who funds research or bringing products to market is simply absent for
many liquid patent holders. The SCM Corp. court's policy justification
is illustrative of the larger problem. That is, the courts have articulated a
policy basis that protects all patent holders but falls short for a liquid
patent holder that engages in conduct that may harm a market as the pub-
lic benefits that are presumed to flow from the operation of the patent
system are substantially minimized.
Fundamentally, those who hold patents have the power and ability
to foreclose consumer choice and forestall competition. Because the
justifications for such conduct is lacking, there is little reason to continue
to shield liquid patent holders as under the current law. Specifically,
some consideration should be provided for the fact that liquid patent
holders are engaged in profit-making enterprises that are no different
from those in other industries. The continued deference that antitrust law
provides to liquid patent holders may, in the end, tolerate conduct that
harms both markets and innovation.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8)).
457. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
458. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1206 n.9.
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CONCLUSION
The patent system's preference for the uniform administration of the
patent laws has created an opportunity for liquid patent holders to create
markets for patents as commodities. Currently, liquid patent holders
work within the patent laws to create the right. Although at odds with
the policies that support the patent system, liquid patents are likely to
stay so long as their practice remains profitable and the long-established
drive for a uniform patent system remains.
Creating modifications to patentability and enforcement laws based
on use and ownership of the patent right may introduce a troubling and
counterproductive uncertainty into the patent system. Much of the po-
tential harm caused by liquid patent holders is financial in nature-that
is, a liquid patent holder who is able to demand more than a patent is
worth has the potential to harm subsequent innovators who are seeking to
commercially exploit ideas. Some of this is due to the fact that liquid
patent holders are able to extract above market prices due to the threat of
an injunction. Although the eBay case opened the door to the possibility
that such threats may be diminished, modification to the damages provi-
sions should be adopted to prevent abuses of the system. As the law
currently accommodates consideration of patent use and ownership into
its remedies provisions, modifications to those portions of the patent law
may best serve the overall goal of innovation. Further, the protections
against abuse that are currently built into laws, such as the antitrust law,
should be re-examined in light of the liquid patent holder's failure to
support the policy goals of the patent system.
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DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET:
IMPACTS OF THE ABOLITION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
MARKET POWER IN PATENT TYING CASES
INTRODUCTION
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Tool
Works Inc. v. Independent Ink was "whether, in a claim based on unlaw-
ful tying under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the existence of a patent on
the tying product raises a presumption that the patent holder has market
power,",2 thus rendering the tying agreement illegal per se. In a decision
that logically followed the United States Supreme Court's and Con-
gress's more recent expansion of patent holder rights, the Court held that
the existence of a patent does not presumptively confer market power on
patent holders. By abolishing the presumption, the Court rejected argu-
ments to maintain an irrebuttable presumption of market power or to
create a rebuttable presumption.
In future patent tying cases, the moving party must now prove that
the patent holder has market power under a rule of reason standard. By
adopting a rule of reason standard, the Court moves away from equating
the legal monopoly granted on patent-holders with the economic monop-
oly that is assailed by antitrust law. While providing only vague guide-
lines to assess this standard, the Court properly recognized that each pat-
ent is unique, and sufficient information exists to analyze the market
power of the patented tying product. By permitting defendants to contest
the issue of the market power of its patent, the Court has increased 1) the
burden to prove the market power of the patent, 2) the importance and
role of experts in patent tying cases, and 3) the burden on the court sys-
tem because parties will choose to fully litigate claims instead of settling.
Despite these burdens, the most beneficial impact of Independent Ink,
however, is that courts will decide an issue of law based not on a blanket
presumption, but on the merits of each case. After Independent Ink, for a
patent tying arrangement to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, evidence
must be presented to prove market power in the relevant market regard-
less of the existence of a patent.3
Part I of this Comment will examine the cases and legislative ac-
tions that influenced the Independent Ink Court. Part II will discuss how
the case came before the Court, as well as analyze the Court's unanimous
1. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (Alito, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
2. Kevin D. McDonald, Baseball as a Metaphor: On Illinois Tool and the Presumption of
Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, SL025 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 25, 27 (2005).
3. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
decision. Part III addresses the policies advocated by the parties in Inde-
pendent Ink and the impact of the Court's ruling on patent tying ar-
rangement antitrust litigation. This final section will also explain why
any standard other than an irrebuttable presumption of market power
increases the burden of a plaintiff bringing a patent tying arrangement
antitrust claim.
I. BACKGROUND
A tying arrangement is a "form of marketing in which a seller in-
sists on selling two distinct products or services as a package."4 The
foundation of a tying claim lies in the Sherman Antitrust Act. Section 1
of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract ... in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal."5 A patent confers upon its holder a limited mo-
nopoly, preventing others from manufacturing, selling, and using a pat-
ented invention and its substantial equivalents. 6 In an antitrust context,
the "essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms."7 The patent policy of encouraging innovation via a grant of a
limited legal monopoly is at odds with the antitrust policy of prevention
of restraints on competition and trade.8 Despite the inherent differences
of antitrust and patent law, the Court's decisions interpreting the scope of
the legal monopoly in patent tying cases have consistently been guided
by antitrust law. By adopting antitrust law into its patent tying jurispru-
dence, the Court effectively presumed that a legal monopoly was the
equivalent of an economic monopoly.
Presumptions are equitable constructs developed to take the place of
evidence that was otherwise, at no fault of the offering party, unavail-
able.9 The presumption of market power in patent tying arrangements
was created during an unsophisticated regulatory regime, in which anti-
trust law was in its infancy, seeking its boundaries. The presumption of
market power in tying arrangements where the tying product is patented
evolved over four distinct periods with its origins in the patent misuse
doctrine. "Patent misuse is generally defined as an impermissible at-
4. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
5. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 2006).
6. Craig McLaughlin, Monopoly Power of Patents and Antitrust Law Collide in Patent
Tying, 48 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 38, 44. (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2006).
7. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
8. Alison K. Hayden, Patent Tying Agreements: Presumptively Illegal?, 5 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 94, 100 n.37 (2005).
9. Id. at 115 n.142.
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tempt to extend the time or scope of the patent grant."1° Initially, the
patent misuse doctrine was created as a defense to patent infringement
claims. The Court took a doctrine that had been solely applied as a de-
fense to patent infringement, and applied it in an antitrust context in In-
ternational Salt Co. v. United States." At this period, the Court viewed
all tying arrangements as per se illegal, regardless of whether the tying
product was patented.
12
In the half century following International Salt, however, the atti-
tudes of the Court, Congress, and regulatory agencies slowly swung back
in favor of patent holders. While it once may have been impossible to
project a motion picture film or make a light bulb without access to pat-
ents that dominated those markets, such difficulties are less of an issue
today.' 3 The Court eventually adopted the position that tying arrange-
ments may offer pro-competitive effects. 14 At the end of the twentieth
century, the Court, Congress, and the government's antitrust regulatory
agencies each took actions that further undermined the strength of the
market power presumption, setting the stage for Independent Ink.
A. Patent Misuse Doctrine and the Creation of the Presumption
The patent misuse doctrine evolved as a defense to patent infringe-
ment claims. The Supreme Court first encountered tying arrangements
in the course of patent infringement in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.' 5 A. B.
Dick Co. brought a patent infringement action against a licensee.' 6 A. B.
Dick patented and licensed a mimeograph to customers on the condition
that all stencil paper, ink, and other supplies used with the mimeograph
(all unpatented items) be purchased from A. B. Dick Co.17 The Court
held that the defendants infringed on A. B. Dick Co.'s patent by using
ink from a different supplier. 8 Chief Justice White dissented from the
majority, classifying the tying arrangement as an "attempt to increase the
scope of the monopoly granted by a patent ... which tend[s] to increase
monopoly and to burden the public in the exercise of their common
rights."' 9
In response to the Court's opinion in A. B. Dick, Congress amended
antitrust laws to reflect Justice White's fears of the anticompetitive ef-
10. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 402 (2003).
11. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
12. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 41.
13. 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1737c (2d ed. 2004).
14. See Fortner Enters. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1969) (Fortas, J. and White, J.,
dissenting).
15. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
16. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. at 11.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 12, 49.
19. Id. at 70 (White, J., dissenting).
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fects of patent-tying arrangements. 20 Through legislation, Congress clas-
sified the conditioning of a sale of a patented or unpatented product on
the purchaser's promise to not use the supplies or materials offered by
competitors of the merchant-seller as per se illegal. 21 The amendment
effectively overruled A. B. Dick.
22
Five years after A. B. Dick, the Court heard another patent-tying
case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.
23
Motion Picture Patents owned a patent on a film projection machine, and
required, by a notice affixed to each projector, licensees of the projector
to only show films containing a patent owned by Motion Picture Pat-
ents.24 The patent on the films was separate and unrelated to the patent
on the projector. The Court found no support in the patent laws for the
proposition that a patentee may "prescribe by notice attached to a pat-
ented machine the conditions of its use and the supplies which must be
used in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent.,
26
Patent law "allows a grant only of the right to an exclusive use of the
new and useful discovery which has been made-this and nothing
more."
27
The final case in this period, United States v. Loew's, Inc., 28 in-
volved a copyright tying agreement. In Loew's, the Court held illegal,
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the practice of conditioning the sale
or license of one or more copyrighted films on the purchase of one or
more inferior or unwanted films. 29  The Court stated that "[m]arket
dominance-some power to control price and to exclude competition-is
by no means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite eco-
nomic power. 30  Abstaining from performing even the most spurious
market analysis, the Court instead held that the "requisite economic
power may be found on the basis of either uniqueness or consumer ap-
peal ... [and] it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to em-
20. See generally Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917).
21. See 38 Stat. 730 (1914). It is unlawful
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . machinery, supplies or other
commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale ... or fix a
price charged therefor ... on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use... the goods... machinery, supplies or other commodi-
ties of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518.
23. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
24. See id. at 505-07.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 509.
27. Id. at 513.
28. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
29. See Loew's, 3 71 U.S. at 40, 52.
30. Id. at 45.
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bark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant mar-
ket for the tying product ....
B. Migration of Presumption from Patent Infringement to Antitrust Law
In International Salt Co. v. United States,32 an antitrust case, the
Court, while never citing the patent misuse doctrine directly, applied the
presumption that a patent confers market power in an antitrust case.33
While "patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward..
• [they] confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt.,
34
In upholding the district court's ruling, the Court stated that "by contract-
ing to close this market for [unpatented] salt against competition, Inter-
national [Salt] has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents
afford no immunity from the antitrust laws. 35
In International Salt, the Court broadened the scope of its analysis
of the rights and limitations conferred on patent holders to consider the
impact of a patent tying arrangement on the marketplace. The Court
conducted a weak market analysis of International Salt's patents, one
lacking any quantifiable assessment of the product or competition, stat-
ing that "[t]he volume of business affected by these [tying] contracts
cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial .... The paucity of
the Court's market power analysis in International Salt likely influenced
the Loew's Court's aversion to economic analysis fifteen years later.
In the same term as International Salt, the Court reinforced the link
between the patent misuse doctrine and antitrust law in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co.3 7 In Columbia Steel, the Court stated that "where a
complaint charges that the defendants have . . . licensed a patented de-
vice on condition that unpatented materials be employed in conjunction
with the patented device, then the amount of commerce involved is im-
material because such restraints are illegal per se."
38
C. Unlinking of the Patent Misuse Doctrine from Antitrust Law
After International Salt, the Court expanded the scope of its patent
tying jurisprudence beyond the traditional line of cases. While the tradi-
tional line of tying arrangements restricted the type of unpatented articles
31. ld. at 45 n.4.
32. 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (finding International Salt in violation of antitrust laws by requiring
licensees of its patented salt processing machines to purchase all salt used in the machine from
International Salt, even though International Salt agreed to meet any competitor's lower price).
33. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct at 1289.
34. Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 395-96.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
38. Id. at 522-23.
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used by a licensee in operating a patented machine, 39 in Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Investment Co.,4° the Court addressed a tying arrange-
ment in the context of a combination patent. 41 In Mercoid, the unpat-
ented component at issue was combined with several other unpatented
components to form a unique and distinct product, patented as a combi-
nation.42 The Court felt that this form of tying was an unlawful expansion
of the rights granted through a patent and held that it could not find a
"difference in principle where the unpatented material or device is itself
an integral part of the structure embodying the patent [or a supply con-
sumed in the operation of a patented machine]. 43
Congress viewed Mercoid as "a barrier to enforcement of patentee's
rights." 44 And, when Congress enacted the Patent Act, it "significantly
changed existing law, and the change moved in the direction of expand-
ing the statutory protection enjoyed by patentees., 45 By enacting Section
271(c) of the Patent Act,46 Congress granted to patent holders a statutory
right to "sell non-staple parts or materials and confer an express or im-
plied license on the purchaser to use the patented combination or proc-
ess,"47 thus effectively overturning Mercoid.
However, despite Congress's actions, the Court continued to pre-
sume that a patent conferred market power over the tying product
through the end of the 1960's. The Court "consistently assumed that
'[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition.' 48  In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp. (Fortner 1),49 for example, the Court continued to apply the stan-
dards set by International Salt and Loew's: reaffirming "the applicability
39. See, e.g., Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. at 51-52; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 490 (1942); A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. at 70 (White, J., dissenting); Motion Picture Patents Co.,
243 U.S. at 502.
40. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
41. See Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 664-65.
42. Id. at 667.
43. Id. at 665.
44. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213 (1980).
45. Id.
46. Section 271(c) of the Patent Act states:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a mate-
rial or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C.A § 27 1(c) (West 2006).
47. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.05[l] (Mark H. Wasserman et al. eds.,
Matthew Bender Co. 2006) (1978).
48. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1286 (citing Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 305-06 (1949)).
49. 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner 1) (holding that respondent U.S. Steel Corp. violated anti-
trust laws by tying low cost financing provided by a subsidiary (U.S. Steel Homes Credit) on the
condition that petitioner Fortner Enterprises, Inc., a real estate developer, purchase artificially high-
priced prefabricated homes made by U.S. Steel Homes).
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of the per se standard for general tying agreements without the necessity
for inquiry into . . .[the defendant's] market power., 50 Though not a
patent-tying case, Fortner I involved tying inexpensive financing to the
purchase of above-market priced pre-fabricated houses. 5' The Court
found the tying arrangement illegal.52 In his opinion for the majority,
Justice Black wrote that "restraint [on competition] results whenever the
seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the market, even
if his power is not complete over them and over all other buyers in the
market.,53 It is notable that four justices dissented from the majority in
Fortner L54
In his dissent, Justice White reasoned that tying arrangements may
not be per se illegal, as "[t]he principal evil... of tying aims is the use of
power in one market to acquire power in, or otherwise distort, a second
market. This evil simply does not exist if there is no power in the first
market. ' 55 In a separate dissent, Justice Fortas disagreed with the major-
ity, but for a different reason than Justice White, writing that Fortner I
was not even a tying case, but one that "distort[s] the [tying] doctrine
' 56
because it merely provides "advantageous financing"
57 to the customer. 58
The dissent's view that tying arrangements may be pro-competitive pre-
vailed in Fortner H.59
D. The 1988 Patent Act Amendment and the Changing Attitudes of the
Court, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission
Toward Tying Arrangements
In 1977, the same parties in Fortner I appeared once again before
the Court in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
(Fortner 1/).60 In Fortner II, the Court unanimously held that "[w]ithout
any evidence that the [U.S. Steel Homes] Credit Corp. had some cost
advantage over its competitors . . . the [remaining evidence] does not
support the conclusion that petitioners had the kind of economic power
which Fortner had the burden of proving in order to prevail .. .,,6' The
50. Hayden, supra note 8, at 99 n.30.
51. See Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 497.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 503.
54. See id. at 510, 520.
55. Id. at 519.
56. Id. at 522.
57. Id. at 523.
58. See id. at 522-23 ("This is a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of fi-
nancing. It is not a sale of one product on condition that the buyer will not deal with competitors for
another product or will buy the other product exclusively from the seller.").
59. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1287. See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc.
(Fortner 11), 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (finding that the advantageous financing terms given by petitioner
did not automatically mean that petitioner's economic power was sufficient to make the tying ar-
rangement unlawful).
60. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner 11).
61. Id. at 622.
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Court's desire for evidence of market power in Fortner H constituted a
direct rejection of its previous holdings in International Salt and Loew's,
where the Court required little or no economic analysis to establish the
market power of a tying product.
Though the Court in Fortner II eroded the presumption of market
power in tying arrangements, generally, the Court continued to presume
market power where the tying product was patented. 62 In Jefferson Par-
ish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,63 the penultimate case before the
Court on tying arrangements, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the
presumption of market power where the tying product is patented.
64
While maintaining the presumption, Jefferson Parish is noted for Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
advocated "abandon[ing] the 'per se' label and refocus[ing] the inquiry
on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits,
that the tie may have.,
65
Just as Justice White's dissent in A. B. Dick spurred legislative action,
four years after O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Congress
amended the Patent Act to eliminate the presumption of market power in
the patent misuse context.66 Section 271(d) of the Patent Act expanded
protections for patent holders in tying arrangements to require a court to
conduct a market power analysis on the tying patent, instead of merely
presuming a patent-tying arrangement per se illegal.67 Despite the elimi-
nation of the presumption in the Patent Act, this did not necessarily
eliminate the presumption in an antitrust context.
In line with the Court's erosion of the irrebuttable presumption of market
power and Congress's expansion of patent holder protections, the De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued the
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property in 1995.68
Through these guidelines, the government's antitrust enforcement agen-
62. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16.
63. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
64. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1290.
67. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(5) (West 2006). Section 271(d) of the Patent Act states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement
of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: ... 5) conditioned
the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition
of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of
the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the pat-
ent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.3 (1995), available at http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/0558.pdf.
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cies adopted the view of Justice Fortas's dissent in Fortner /,69 that
"[a]lthough tying arrangements may result in anticompetitive effects,
such arrangements can also result in significant efficiencies and procom-
petitive benefits. 70 Instead of prosecuting all patent tying arrangements
under one standard, "[a]gencies will consider both the anticompetitive
effects and the efficiencies attributable to a tie-in., 71 After the issuance
of the Antitrust Guidelines, all three branches of government were in
agreement that a patent alone does not presumptively confer market
power, and that each patent tying case should be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis. It is in this context that the dispute between Illinois Tool
Works and Independent Ink arose.
II. ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC. V. INDEPENDENT INK, INC. 72
A. Facts
"Trident, Inc., and its parent company, Illinois Tool Works Inc., (collec-
tively "Illinois Tool Works") manufacture and market printing systems
that include three relevant components: (1) a patented piezoelectric im-
pulse ink jet printhead; (2) a patented ink container ... ; and (3) specially
designed, but unpatented, ink."
7 3
Illinois Tool Works sells its systems to "original equipment manu-
facturers (OEMs) who are licensed to incorporate the printheads and
containers into printers that are in turn sold to companies for use in print-
ing barcodes on cartons and packaging materials., 74 "The OEMs agree
that they will purchase their ink exclusively from [Illinois Tool Works],
and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented contain-
ers with ink of any other kind., 75 This action commenced after Inde-
pendent Ink, Inc. "developed an ink with the same chemical composition
as the ink sold by petitioners.,
76
B. Procedural History
Illinois Tool Works reacted to Independent Ink's ink sales by filing a
patent infringement claim against Independent Ink, which was summa-
rily dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.77 Independent Ink subse-
quently filed suit against Illinois Tool Works, "seeking a judgment of
non-infringement and invalidity of Illinois Tool Works's patents. 78
69. See Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 523.
70. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 5.3.
71. Id.
72. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
73. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1284.
74. Id. at 1284-85.
75. Id. at 1285.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1284.
78. Id.
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Independent Ink then amended its complaint, alleging that Illinois Tool
Works's patent tying arrangement violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.79 Both parties filed for summary judgment.80 Independent
Ink did not "discuss the products at issue, their substitutes, or the relevant
markets," nor perform any "market power or at all. 8 1 Because the only
evidence of market power presented by Independent Ink was the patent
on the printhead, and it failed to define the tying product's product and
geographic markets, to show a dominant market share, or to identify bar-
riers to entry, the court entered summary judgment for Illinois Tool
Works.
2
Independent Ink appealed the district court's decision to grant the
Illinois Tool Works motion of summary judgment on the respondent's
Sherman Act Section 1 claim.83 After a careful review of the long his-
tory of Supreme Court decisions on tying arrangements, the Federal
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. 4 The court held
that "Supreme Court cases in this area squarely establish that patent...
tying, unlike other tying cases, do not require an affirmative demonstra-
tion of market power. Rather, International Salt and Loew's make clear
that the necessary market power to establish a [Sherman Act] section 1
violation is presumed., 85 The appellate court found that the Illinois Tool
Works arguments erred by "ignor[ing] the fact that it is the duty of a
court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the
Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them."
86
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to undertake a fresh exami-





C. Justice Stevens's Opinion
The Court heard arguments to determine whether the presumption
that a patent confers market power upon its holder "should survive as a
matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law." 88 In delivering
the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the Court's historically
"strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished"
since the Court first encountered tying arrangements in the course of
patent infringement litigation in A. B. Dick Co.89 Then Justice Stevens
embarked on a discussion of the rise of the presumption from the patent
79. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. 111. Tool Works, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (2002).
80. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
81. Id. at 1160.
82. See id. at 1167-73.
83. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. 111. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
84. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1285 (internal quotations omitted).
85. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348-49 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1351.
87. Indep. Ink., 126 S. Ct. at 1285.
88. Id. at 1284.
89. Id. at 1286.
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misuse doctrine, the doctrine's intersection with antitrust law in Interna-
tional Salt, its reinforcement in Loew's, and finally, its untangling from
antitrust law in Fortner H and Jefferson Parish.90
Independent Ink conceded that the Court should not maintain a rule
of per se illegality, but argued in the alternative that the Court should
adopt either a narrower, limited irrebuttable presumption or establish a
rebuttable presumption of market power.91  In reliance on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish, the consensus of the "vast
majority of academic literature," and the belief that "[m]any tying ar-
rangements, even those involving patents ... are fully consistent with a
free, competitive market," the Court rejected each of the Respondent's
proposals.92 The Court unanimously concluded that the mere fact that a
tying product is patented does not support such a presumption. 93 In abol-
ishing the presumption, the Court aligned its patent tying jurisprudence
with the sentiments of Congress, antitrust enforcement agencies, and
most economists.94
III. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision to abolish the presumption that a patent con-
fers market power was not only the logical choice of the three alterna-
tives presented by the parties, it was also the correct decision. While
conceding that the Court should not maintain a rule of per se illegality,
respondent Independent Ink argued that the court should (A) adopt a
narrower, limited irrebuttable presumption, (B) establish a rebuttable
presumption of market power.95 Petitioner Illinois Tool Works, in reli-
ance on recent Court decisions, the legislative actions of Congress, and
the wide support of academic and government enforcement authorities,
asked the Court to (C) eliminate the presumption altogether and adopt a
rule of reason standard.
Under the rule of reason, all purposes and potential effects of the
challenged restriction will be evaluated.96 Courts that apply the rule of
reason usually note briefly that the plaintiff has failed to define a relevant
market or has otherwise failed to show any significant threat to the health
of competition in the tied market.9 7 One factor, likely the most difficult
to define, is the identification of the relevant tying product and geo-
graphic markets in which it competes 98 Additionally a rule of reason
standard will require the presence of power in that market, for where no
90. Id. at 1285-91.
91. Id. at 1291-92.
92. Id. at 1292.
93. Id. at 1284.
94. Id. at 1293.
95. I11. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291-92 (2006).
96. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 114.
97. See Former Enters. v. United States (Former 1), 394 U.S. 495, 499-501 (1969).
98. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 112.
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market power exists, antitrust law is generally unconcerned by the be-
havior of firms.99 A third factor that courts may consider under the rule-
of-reason standard is the nature of the challenged restraint and that re-
straint's likely effects on competition.'00
Further, the Court's adoption of a rule of reason standard to assess
the market power of tying products in Independent Ink left two key ques-
tions unanswered. First, how does a party prove market power and how
much market power is sufficient to deem a patent tying arrangement ille-
gal? Second, how will the additional burden on parties to develop evi-
dence of market power impact judicial resources? An analysis of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish as well as a brief analysis of
the United States Satellite Television market from 1997 through 2006
will help answer the first question. The latter question will be answered
by analyzing the market power evidence presented by Independent Ink
and, additionally, A.L Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,101 a Sixth
Circuit tying case decided after Jefferson Parish.
A. Create a Limited, Irrebuttable Presumption
In its brief, Independent Ink argued for a narrow ruling that would
maintain an irrebuttable presumption in limited cases.10 2  Independent
Ink asked the Court to presume market power when the "tying arrange-
ment involve[s] the purchase of unpatented goods over a period of time,
a so called 'requirements tie.,, 10 3 Independent Ink's proposal is anti-
thetical to the 1988 amendment to § 271(d) of the Patent Code, which
abolished the market power presumption in the patent misuse context. 
°4
While the legislative history of the 1988 Patent Code Amendment indi-
cates that Congress intended to maintain the market power presumption
for patents in an antitrust context, 0 5 the Court has since held that "it
would be anomalous to equate patents with power for antitrust purposes
but not for misuse purposes."' 0 6 Independent Ink's limited irrebuttable
presumption proposal also conflicts with the 1995 Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission antitrust guidelines that state that the
government's two antitrust enforcement agencies "will not presume that
a patent ... necessarily confers market power upon its owner."'10 7 Fi-
nally, the Court's decisions in Fortner II and Jefferson Parish make clear
99. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 400.
100. See id. at 403-04.
101. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding the district court's summary judgment order
because defendant lacked sufficient market power in the tying product market to influence the mar-
ket for the tied product).
102. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291-92.
103. Id. at 1292.
104. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(5) (West 2006).
105. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. 32, 295 (1988)).
106. AREEDA, supra note 13, 1737c.
107. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 2.2.
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the Court's desire for market power evidence before condemning a tying
arrangement.
08
B. Create a Rebuttable Presumption
Alternatively, Independent Ink proposed that the Court "should en-
dorse a rebuttable presumption that patentees possess market power
when they condition the purchase of the patented product on an agree-
ment to buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee."' 0 9  By
ruling that there was a rebuttable presumption, the Court would essen-
tially be following the court of appeals' decision." 0 However, that
would be a mistake. The court of appeals' finding of a rebuttable pre-
sumption was based on a misinterpretation of Jefferson Parish."' While
the court of appeals concluded that "Jefferson Parish confirmed that In-
ternational Salt created only a [rebuttable] presumption of market
power,"'"12 in the instant case, the Court stated that Jefferson Parish
maintained the irrebuttable, "patent-equals-market-power presump-
tion." 3 The court of appeals' misinterpretation of Supreme Court dicta
is especially ironic considering that the appellate court scolded Interna-
tional Tool Works for requesting a form of relief outside the bounds of
precedent.'114
C. Abolish the Presumption
While the question of the market power in the relevant market for
the tying product is but one of four requirements in a claim arising under
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 1 5 it is the most difficult to
prove. Per se rules permit the court to conserve judicial resources by
avoiding a burdensome market power inquiry where anticompetitive
conduct likely exists.1 6 The per se presumption of market power in pat-
ent tying cases was incorrect for three reasons. First, courts have
108. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner 11), Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); see
also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984).
109. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
110. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating
that "[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, it is the defendant's burden to rebut
the presumption of market power and consequent illegality that arises from patent tying").
111. See Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1351 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16) (stating
that Jefferson Parish confirmed that International Salt created only a presumption of market power
and that "it would stretch the language of 'fair to presume' beyond the breaking point to say that
such a presumption is irrebuttable").
112. Id.
113. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct at 1290.
114. See Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1351.
115. See Indep. lnk, Inc. v. Trident Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
In order to establish that a tying arrangement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff must establish: 1) two distinct products or services; 2) a sale or agreement to sell
the tying product conditioned upon the purchase of the tied product; 3) market power in
the relevant market for the tying product; and 4) the tied product involves a not insub-
stantial amount of interstate commerce.
Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1162 (internal quotations omitted).
116. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 16 n.25.
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adopted an overly broad interpretation of the Court's holding in
Loew's 17 by blurring the distinctions between patent and copyright law.
Second, the Court has traditionally disfavored presumptions in antitrust
law, preferring instead to examine each claim on a case-by-case basis.' 1
8
Third, the presumption, especially an irrebuttable presumption, treated
defendants in patent tying claims unfairly. For the foregoing reasons, the
Court correctly rejected Independent Ink's arguments for a limited irre-
buttable presumption or a broader, rebuttable presumption, and instead
adopted a rule of reason standard to examine market power.
1. Overly Broad Interpretation of Loew's
Instead of relying on a fact-driven analysis of the tying product's
market or the product's power in a market, the Court has previously used
a uniqueness test.' 9 Uniqueness, in the context of copyright and patent
tying cases, is a term of art, requiring that "the product is distinctive and
unusual, leading some customers to prefer it over any others; and there
exists a barrier preventing competitors from producing the product.'
20
The uniqueness test was first stated in Loew's, in the context of a block-
booking case. 121 In Loew's, the Court stated that "the mere presence of
competing substitutes for the tying product. . . is insufficient to destroy
the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the copyrighted
product."
122
Proponents of the presumption argue that patented products, such as
the printhead at issue in Independent Ink, satisfy this uniqueness test be-
cause they "are novel by statutory definition; they are legally unique,
distinctive and enforceable through infringement actions.' 23  However,
such a broad interpretation of Loew's incorrectly blurs the distinctions
between patent and copyright law. Where copyrights protect original
works of authorship, patents cover novel and useful products and proc-
117. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (stating that the economic
power required for a claim arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act may be presumed where "the
tying product is patented or copyrighted").
118. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n. 145. Hayden stated,
Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities
are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular facts disclosed by the record.
In determining the existence of market power, and specifically the responsiveness of the
sales of one product to price changes of the other, this Court has examined closely the
economic reality of the market at issue.
Id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992))
(internal quotations omitted)).
119. William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and
Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1985).
120. Id. at 1146-47.
121. Id. at 1142 ("Block-booking is an arrangement whereby a film distributor licenses one
film or group of films only on the condition that the exhibitor lease another film or group of films.").
122. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49.
123. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44.
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ess. 124 While a copyrighted work may conceivably be so unique or dis-
tinctive it has no identifiable substitute, practical substitutes for a pat-
ented product are available so long as the patent's claims do not preclude
any foreseeable alternative.1 25 It is the presence of practical substitutes
for patented tying products, so clearly absent in the context of a copy-
righted tie that permits a factual inquiry into the tying product's market
power, absolving the necessity for a presumption.
2. The Court's Traditional Disfavor of Presumptions
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed antitrust cases either through a
per se standard or under the rule of reason. 126 However, as stated by
Justice Blackmun in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc. ,127 the Court prefers to examine antitrust claims on a case-by-case
basis, and not through presumptions.128 In choosing to abolish the pre-
sumption, the Court followed Justice Blackmun's guidance, holding that
"tying arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated
under the [rule of reason] standards applied in cases like Fortner II and
[O'Connor's concurrence in] Jefferson Parish, rather than under the per
se rule applied in Morton Salt and Loew S.,,
129
A rule of reason analysis involves inquiry into an alleged restraint
on trade by examining the effect of the practice on the marketplace.
30
Courts that have applied the rule of reason usually note that "the plaintiff
has failed to define a relevant market or has otherwise failed to show any
significant threat to the health of competition in the tied market."' 31 A
determination that a patent tying arrangement is illegal "must be sup-
ported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere
presumption thereof."' 32 The Court's decision provides for a more equi-
table treatment of defendants in patent tying cases at a cost of increasing
the burden on parties to prove the existence, or non-existence, of market
power.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West 2006) (defining works of authorship as literary and musical
works, sculpture, motion pictures, and others); see also CHIsUM, supra note 47, § 1.01.
125. See Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters
of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (2006); see also Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and
Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730
(2000).
126. Hayden, supra note 8, at 98 n.26.
127. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
128. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67; see also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925); Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n.145.
129. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
130. See AREEDA, supra note 13, 1511; see also Aliza Reicher, Comment, Off With Their
Printheads! An End to the Per Se Presumption of Illegality for Patent Ties in Illinois Tool Works v.
Independent Ink, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 300 n.20 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 2006).
131. Hayden, supra note 8, at 104 n.67.
132. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
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While it may be argued that a rebuttable presumption would have
"fairly allocate[d] the burdens [on plaintiffs and defendants] and dic-
tate[d] an efficient ordering of proof at trial,"' 33 it is unlikely. Even if
there is a rebuttable presumption of market power, each party has an
incentive to develop evidence of market power, or lack thereof. In other
words, a rebuttable presumption is the worst of both worlds: it lacks the
efficiencies inherent in an irrebuttable presumption and plaintiffs, fairly
or unfairly, are burdened with developing evidence contradicting the
patent-holder's denial of market power. 34 In its own brief for this case,
and as further developed below, respondent Independent Ink states that it
developed evidence that the petitioner's tying product had market power,
undermining its arguments that developing evidence of market power is
costly to plaintiffs, is difficult to obtain, and that such evidence is not
necessary to succeed in a patent tying claim.
3. Presumption was Unfair to Defendants
Though the Court has evaluated tying arrangements under a more
liberal standard than other antitrust behaviors deemed to be per se illegal,
the standard applied to tying arrangements has been interpreted to pro-
hibit tying that economic analysis has shown to be beneficial to consum-
ers. 135 "Application of the per se standard and presumption of market
power for patented products eliminates the need to define a relevant
market," ignoring any pro-competitive benefits created by the tie. 
36
"The Supreme Court has consistently grounded its per se rule... on
the special statutory grant of monopolistic rights afforded patentees. 137
Ironically, while patent tying rules were shaped to fit antitrust law, the
patent policy of encouraging innovation via a grant of a limited monop-
oly is at odds with the antitrust policy of prevention of restraints on com-
petition and trade. 138 However, a legal monopoly protected by a patent
"is not necessarily or even typically a market monopoly."' 3 9 "The fact
that a tying agreement involves a patented product should not matter for
133. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 46.
134. Contra McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 46.
135. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 116.
137. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 42.
138. See Axis S.P.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Our patent and antitrust laws seek to further different and opposing policies. Patent laws
grant a monopoly for a limited time in order 'to promote the progress of... useful arts..
. .' Antitrust laws, on the other hand, are designed to promote and protect competition in
the marketplace. Thus, a lawfully acquired patent creates a monopoly that does not vio-
late the antitrust laws.
Axis S.P.A., 870 F.2d at 1111 (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647
(9th Cir. 1981)).
139. AREEDA, supra note 13, at 1737a.
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purposes of an antitrust inquiry."'140 While market forces may not impact
or impede patented products in the same manner as unpatented products,
market power for the patented product does not automatically follow
from the fact that the product is patented.' 41 Despite such evidence indi-
cating differences between the legal monopoly granted by a patent and
the anticompetitive aspects of an economic monopoly, the irrebuttable
presumption unfairly prevented defendants from presenting evidence
distinguishing legal monopoly from economic monopoly.
Those in favor of the presumption have argued that the elimination
of the presumption will only shift a heavy burden from defendants onto
plaintiffs and consumers. 142  First, proponents argue that defendants
should prove the absence of market power in the tying product because
the "defendant . . . is best positioned to have [market power informa-
tion.]"' 43  This argument is undermined by the market power evidence
presented by Independent Ink in its brief.'44 Further, a plaintiff would
also be strategically disadvantaged by not developing contradictory evi-
dence to refute a defendant's definition of the relevant market.
Second, proponents also claim that big business will force consum-
ers to purchase "replacement tires, batteries, motor oil, or even gasoline
from only your automobile's manufacturer" in the absence of the pre-
sumption. 145 This proposition exaggerates the potential impact of the
abolition of the presumption. Such forced arrangements would still be
subject to review of the economic benefits offered by the tie.
1 46
Finally, Independent Ink, relying on the amicus brief of Professor F. M.
Scherer, argues that a rebuttable presumption of market power is correct
because patents involved in litigation are much more valuable than simi-
140. Hayden, supra note 8, at 114 n.139 (citing Hovenkamp et al., The Interface Between
Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law: Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1725 (2003)).
141. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 114-15 n.141; see also Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 395-96, 401-02 (1947) (holding that the challenged tying agreements were unlawful de-
spite the fact that the tying item was patented, not because of it); John Homick, The Per Se Rule in
Tying Contexts: A Critical View, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 714 (1985) ("In arriving at its decision...
the Court placed no reliance on the fact that a patent was involved nor did it give the slightest inti-
mation that the outcome would have been any different if that had not been the case.").
142. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 38-39 ("Defendants seek to have the Court require
plaintiff to prove by way of survey evidence, expert market analysis including complicated and
expensive proofs of cross-elasticity of demand, and likely more, that defendants actually possess true
market power in the printhead, monopoly power of its patent notwithstanding.").
143. Id. at 45-46.
144. See Brief for Respondent at 45-48, Il1. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281
(2006) (No. 04-1329) (conducting a market power analysis entitled "The Judgment Below Should
Be Affirmed Because, Even Without a Presumption, Market Power Was Demonstrated on the Re-
cord Below").
145. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 39 ("This case should be important to everyone who does
not wish to be forced to purchase, for example, replacement tires, batteries, motor oil, or even gaso-
line from only your automobile's manufacturer, or replacement film from only the maker of your
camera, or generic or off-patent drugs in combination with desirable patented drugs.").
146. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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lar patents that were not involved in litigation.147 However, the value of
one patent isolated from all other substitutes is irrelevant in an antitrust
context, and thus Professor Scherer's basis for maintaining a presump-
tion fails on two grounds. First, Justice O'Connor's market power analy-
sis guidelines require a comparison of the tying product to others in the
marketplace.148  Professor Scherer's method, in contrast, analyzes the
tying product in isolation, failing to consider possible substitute products.
149 Second, by determining market power on the grounds that a party
filed a lawsuit effectively substitutes the courtroom for the marketplace,
failing to consider the possible beneficial effects of the tie on the market-
place. 150 Adopting the litigation equals market power standard advanced
by Professor Scherer would place an even more egregious burden on
defendants than already exists.
D. Under the Rule of Reason, How Do Parties Prove Market Power and
How Much Market Power is Sufficient to Deem a Patent Tying Ar-
rangement Illegal?
By abolishing the market power presumption, the Court now re-
quires both parties in a patent tying suit to present evidence of the tying
product's market power, or lack thereof, sufficient to meet a rule of rea-
son standard. This new standard requires parties to "prove by way of
survey evidence, expert market analysis including complicated and ex-
pensive proofs of cross-elasticity of demand ... that defendant's actually
possess true market power. ' ' 151 While the United States Department of
Justice defines market power as "the ability profitably to maintain prices
above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of
time,"' 152 in her concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor of-
fered a more open-ended explanation of market power. An examination
of how regulators and competitors in the satellite-broadcast market have
defined the market provides a view of how difficult it can be to define a
product's market. It will also provide guidance on how future litigants in
147. See Brief for Professor F. M. Scherer, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-01329). Professor Scherer's brief
states,
Research into the subject of why particular patents are valuable has shown that patents
involved in litigation are much more valuable than similar patents that were not involved
in litigation. Results from a study of German patents show that patents in litigation are
between 11.2 and 42.6 times more valuable than other patents, all else equal. In other
words, the fact of litigation itself is a strong signal of a patent's "appreciable economic
power."
Id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464); see also Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
148. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 37-38 nn.6-7 (arguing that market power, meas-
ured by a high market share, is a factor in determining illegality, but only when it includes "all
reasonable substitutes for the product").
149. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147.
150. See id. at 34 (noting that courts have not found tying agreements illegal per se without
further proof of an anticompetitive effect on the market place).
151. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 39.
152. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68, § 2.2.
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patent tying cases will strategically define the market to suit each party's
desired outcome.
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in Jefferson Parish
In her concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O'Connor touched
on, but left unresolved, the question of how much market power is neces-
sary to adversely impact the tied-product market. 53  While Justice
O'Connor identified several Court opinions that considered market
power in tying arrangements, previous attempts at market power analysis
by the Court were tepid at best.' 54  These cases demonstrate that the
Court, even when applying the patent-equals-market-power presumption,
has never been willing to condemn all tying arrangements as illegal
without proof of market power. 55 Because a patent was automatically
presumed to confer market power, the courts were not required to con-
duct a substantial market power analysis, instead relying on a "unique-
ness test."'' 56 The Court in Independent Ink likewise neglected to state
how much market power is required to affect the marketplace. 57 The
Court's reticence to define such a key, qualitative component of the anti-
trust analysis in either case runs counter to Congress's intention that the
courts would do So.15
Though Justice O'Connor did not provide future courts with clear
directions of how to assess market power, she stated several general ele-
ments that should be considered. In Jefferson Parish, a market share of
thirty per cent was not considered to be an indication of significant mar-
ket power. 5 9 From Fortner II, Justice O'Connor cited the Court's con-
sideration of "the size and profitability of the firm seeking to impose the
tie, the character of the tying product, and the effects of the tie."'' 60  In
both Fortner I and II the Court defined market power as the ability to
raise prices "above the levels that would be charged in a competitive
market."
161
A second analysis proposed by Justice O'Connor attempts to deter-
mine whether there is "a substantial threat that the tying seller will ac-
153. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 37-38 n.6.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 34 (stating that tying arrangements are unlike other antitrust behaviors such as price
fixing and division of markets are subject to per se illegality).
156. Montgomery, supra note 119, at 1146.
157. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291-92 (arguing against a per se rule as patents can convey
varying degrees of market power resulting in different abilities to affect the market place).
158. See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie? ", 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 90 n.556 (1991) (noting that Congress intentionally provided a vague and
open-ended definition, with the direction that the Courts should tailor the remedy to fit the particular
market context of patent rights).
159. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 26-27.
160. Id at 38 (citing Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 620) ("(T]he effects of the tie tare] the price
charged for the products, the number of customers affected, [and] the functional relation between the
tied and tying product.").
161. See id at 27 n.46 (citing Fortner 11, 429 U.S. at 620 and Fortner l, 394 U.S. at 503-04).
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quire market power in the tied-product market."' 162 This analysis is con-
cerned with the tendency of the tying agreement to preclude a buyer from
purchasing the unpatented tied product elsewhere163 and addresses the
Court's historical concern that tying arrangements "attempt to increase
the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent"'164 to impact the market
for the tied product. In markets with many stable sellers or with low
barriers to entry, the risk of the seller acquiring market power in the tied-
product market is likely low.' 65 For example, "if one of a dozen food
stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also
took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its
competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.'' 166 Applying this
example to Independent Ink, the tied unpatented ink, like example's
sugar, is a commodity available and used for a plethora of purposes.
Through analyzing the availability of substitutes, the final indicia of
market power identified by Justice O'Connor, courts are better able to
evaluate market share evidence. 167 Evidence of a product's high market
share indicates market power only if the market is properly defined to
include all reasonable substitutes. Since Jefferson Parish did not involve
a patent tying arrangement, it is likely that "Justice O'Connor's reference
to 'close substitutes' presumably does not include close substitutes that
are infringing"' 16 on a patent. In defining the boundaries of a patent,
courts include close substitutes of the patented product under the doctrine
of equivalents.169 In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the court de-
termines whether the disputed product falls within the claims of the pat-
ented product.170 Because a patent grants the holder the exclusive right
to manufacture and sell the patented invention and its substantial equiva-
lents, substitutes may eitherinfringe upon the patented product or are too
distinct to actually be considered a substitute.171
Independent Ink provides an example of how substitutes do not vio-
late the doctrine of equivalents. Illinois Tool Works's patented printhead
was developed as an alternative to print-and-apply labels. 172  The
printhead performs the same basic functions as the labels, but it does it at
a lower cost and more efficiently. 73 When the case returns to the district
162. Id. at 38.
163. Hayden, supra note 8, at 108.
164. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912) (White, J., dissenting).
165. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 38.
166. Id. at 12 (internal quotations omitted).
167. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 109 n.99.
168. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 44.
169. Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 47, § 16.02[l][a][ii].
170. See CHISUM, supra note 47, § 16.02[1][a][ii] (stating that when an accused product or
process falls within a patent's claims, there is literal [patent] infringement and that using the claims
of a patent to develop a new product or process meets the definition of equivalency).
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court, Illinois Tool should be able to argue that while its printhead is both
unique and distinct enough to deserve a patent, it does not have market
power because there are substitutes available that perform the same func-
tions.
2. Example: United States Satellite Television Broadcasting Market
1997-2006
In defining a product's market, "there are a range of markets vary-
ing in scope that may be chosen for use in an antitrust case." 174 For an
example of how both time and expectation shape market identification,
consider the satellite television industry from 1997 and 2006. In this ten
year period, the Department of Justice, EchoStar, and DirecTV in a less
than public fashion, reversed their market definitions of satellite-
broadcast companies. 75 While this example discusses market definition
in the context of mergers, it is analogous to the sort of scenario a court
might face in a patent tying case. As such, it reveals the complexity of
identifying a product's relevant market. As demonstrated in the exam-
ple, EchoStar reversed the definition of its own product's relevant market
in a twenty-month period. 176 The process of identifying the product's
relevant market will likely be a protracted endeavor, possibly foreclosing
business opportunities to litigants, as the speed of change in the business
world outpaces the drawn-out judicial review process.
177
DirecTV and EchoStar are satellite television providers that offer
consumers hundreds of channels of programming with the purchase of a
satellite receiver and a monthly subscription. 178 In 2002, EchoStar failed
in its bid to acquire DirecTV from Hughes Electronics Corporation on
antitrust grounds. DirecTV was later sold to News Corp. in 2003.
DirecTV and EchoStar provide satellite service to 27 million of the 110
million homes in the United States, 179 or roughly ninety percent of all
satellite-connected homes in the U.S.180 Cable television companies pro-
vide service to 66.5 million of the 110 million households.'1
8
174. Hayden, supra note 8, at 116 n.150.
175. See Andy Pasztor & Yochi J. Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments May Foil Its Bid for
Hughes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at B8 [hereinafter Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Argu-
ments]; Andy Pasztor & Peter Grant, Leading the News: Regulators Sue to Block EchoStar Deal,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2002, at A3 [hereinafter Pasztor & Grant, Regulators Sue to Block].
176. See Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 175, at 18.
177. See Editorial, Who Defines a Market?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2004, at A16.
178. See http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/contentPage.jsp?assetld=1400010 (last
visited Sept. 26, 2006); http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/aboutus/companyprofile/
index.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
179. Julia Angwin & Andy Pasztor, Weaker Reception: Satellite TV Growth is Losing Altitude
as Cable Takes Off, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2006, at AI [hereinafter Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Re-
ception].
180. Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 175, at B8.
181. Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Reception, supra note 179, at Al.
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Since 1997, the Department of Justice, EchoStar, and DirecTV have
publicly and frequently offered seemingly contradictory definitions of
market for satellite-broadcasting companies. 182 In 1997, in reviewing a
proposed acquisition of a satellite-broadcast firm by News Corp., the
"Justice Department ruled that [the satellite-broadcast company] com-
peted in a broad market comprising both cable and the satellite com-
pany." 183  In a lawsuit filed in February 2000 by EchoStar against
DirecTV's former parent company, "EchoStar's lawyers specifically
argued that satellite-to-home broadcast services constituted a stand-alone
market, distinctly separate from the cable business;' 84 a narrow market
definition. In 2001, when EchoStar attempted to purchase DirecTV from
Hughes Electronics, it changed its argument to combat antitrust con-
cerns. 85 EchoStar now argued for a broader market definition, insisting
that satellite and cable providers "should be considered a single market,
providing . . .entertainment options and Internet connections that are
indistinguishable from each other regardless of how consumers get the
signal."'' 86 EchoStar's bid to purchase DirecTV was blocked by regula-
tors and lawmakers, with News Corp. initiating a behind-the-scenes lob-
bying campaign that emphasized the antitrust issues of the acquisition, as
seen through a narrow market definition. 8 7 Today, now that cable pro-
viders bundle television programming, broadband internet, and telephone
service at a price comparable to an EchoStar or DirecTV television pro-
gramming price, some analysts predict EchoStar and DirecTV will be
forced to merge. 188  For these companies to merge, DirecTV would be
compelled to adopt a broad market definition that recognizes cable op-
erators as competitors.
E. How Will the Burden to Develop Evidence of Market Power Impact
Judicial Resources?
The two subsections below provide a context for understanding the
type of information that future patent tying litigants will present and how
courts will analyze this information. While arguing that a market power
analysis is burdensome, unjustifiably costly, 189 and irrelevant where the
182. See Pasztor & Dreazen, EchoStar's Past Arguments, supra note 174, at B8; Pasztor &
Grant, Regulators Sue to Block, supra note 175, at A3.




187. See Andy Pasztor & John Lippman, EchoStar Talks with Murdoch, Liberty Media About
Possible Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan 21, 2003, at Al.
188. See Angwin & Pasztor, Weaker Reception, supra note 179, at Al.
189. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 42 ("The rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a
burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompeti-
tive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case
at bar involves anticompetitive conduct." (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 16 n.25 (1984))).
[lit should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to embark upon a full-scale factual
inquiry into the scope of the relevant market for the tying product and into the corollary
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tying product is patented or copyrighted, Independent Ink actually sub-
mitted a market power analysis of International Tool Works's patented
printhead in its brief to the Court.' 90 The sole purpose of a presumption
is to fill an otherwise unavailable, evidential void. 191 Independent Ink's
argument that maintaining the presumption is undermined by presenting
evidence that previously unavailable evidence of market power of the
tying product is, in fact, available.
While the brief did not mention Independent Ink's source or process
for obtaining such information, it is of a type that might logically be pre-
pared by an expert. In future cases, it is likely that courts will define the
tying product's relevant market, only after hearing competing testimony
from party experts.
Also, in A.I. Root v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,192 a case heard
twenty years before Independent Ink, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals'
very broad interpretation of Loew's compelled it to examine market
power evidence of a copyrighted tying product. While the court may
have decided issues of fact in an appeal from summary judgment, neither
party appealed. Though A.I. Root was summarily adjudicated, it is likely
that future parties would prefer to more fully litigate patent tying claims
than settle. As explained through the satellite-broadcast market example
above, the process of defining the relevant market of a tying product can
be a complicated and confusing proposition. A party whose expert can
bring clarity to the court will be greatly advantaged.
1. Independent Ink's Evidence of Market Power for Illinois Tool
Works's Patented Printhead
The market power evidence presented by Independent Ink is sub-
stantial. 193 In the final section of its brief, Independent Ink defines the
relevant market for Illinois Tool Works's printhead,194 presents printhead
market share information currently and historically, 95 and compares
Illinois Tool Works's tied-ink pricing to competitors.1 96  While Inde-
pendent Ink provides a good roadmap for conducting market analysis in
problem of the seller's percentage share in that market. This is even more obviously true
when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, in which case ... sufficiency of eco-
nomic power is presumed.
See id (quoting United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962)).
190. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 45-48 (conducting a market power analysis).
191. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 nn. 142-43.
192. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
193. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 45-48 (presenting market power evidence).
194. Id. at 45 (stating inkjet printers used for carton coding applications are the relevant mar-
ket).
195. Id. (stating that Illinois Tool Works accounts for ninety five percent of the inkjet printers
for carton coding applications market currently, and approximately 100% of the marketplace from
1994 to 1998).
196. Id. at 46 ("[Illinois Tool Works] charged nearly three times more than Independent Ink
and other competitors for replacement ink .... ).
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future patent tying cases, the analysis' quality and location as Independ-
ent Ink's final argument to the Court undermines Independent Ink's cen-
tral goal of maintaining some form of presumption.
2. AI Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.
In A.L Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found the tying arrangement involving a copyrighted
product to be legal after examining the market power of the tying prod-
uct. 19 7 By analyzing the tying product's market power, the court veered
from the per se rule, rejected Loew's and instead relied on Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish and a Columbia University
Law Review note. 198 This case and the emphasis it places on identifying
a product's relevant market, provides a roadmap to understanding the
structure of future patent tying cases.
The court conducted a two-part analysis that first determined the
relevant market of the tying product and second analyzed the defendant's
position within the relevant market. To identify the tying product's rele-
vant market, the court used a reasonable interchangeability standard that
examined identical or available substitutes to the tying product.' 99 The
plaintiff, A.I. Root Co., sought to define the relevant market narrowly to
only equipment that used the copyrighted software.2 00 The court, how-
ever, identified the relevant product market as the small business com-
puter market, a much larger market that includes IBM, NCR, and Seiko
as competitors to the defendant. 20  By comparing the defendant in the
larger, small business computer market, the defendant's market share
was determined to be two to four per cent of the market.20 2 Since the
tying product was copyrighted, application of the narrower standard ad-
vanced by the plaintiff would likely find the defendant possessed the
requisite market power.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision to abolish the presumption that a patent con-
fers market power was not only the logical choice of the three alterna-
tives presented by the parties, it was also the correct decision. The per se
presumption of market power in patent tying cases was incorrect for
three reasons. First, courts have adopted an overly broad interpretation
197. A.I Root, 806 F.2d at 675.
198. See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 43-44; see also A.1 Root, 806 F.2d at 675-76.
199. A.I Root, 806 F.2d at 675 ("The essential test for ascertaining the relevant product market
involves the identification of those products or services that are either (1) identical to or (2) available
substitutes for the defendants' product or service." (quoting White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp.
Supply, 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983))).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 675-76.
202. See id. at 675.
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of the Court's holding in Loew 's20 3 by blurring the distinctions between
patent and copyright law. Second, the Court has traditionally disfavored
presumptions in antitrust law, preferring instead to examine each claim
on a case-by-case basis. 2°4 Third, the presumption, especially when it is
irrebuttable, treats defendants in patent tying claims unfairly. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court correctly rejected Independent Ink's argu-
ments for a limited irrebuttable presumption or a broader, rebuttable pre-
sumption, and instead adopted a rule of reason standard to examine mar-
ket power.
While the Court in Independent Ink did not define the factors of an
illegal tie, other sources provide guidance. Future courts faced with pat-
ent tying cases should refer to the elements cited by Justice O'Connor in
-Jefferson Parish, the Sixth Circuit's market power analysis in A.1. Root,
and the market analysis submitted by Independent Ink in the final section
of its brief. The most difficult element for courts in future patent tying
cases will be to define the relevant market of a tying product, because
parties have a strategic interest in having the Court adopt their own defi-
nition of the tying product's relevant market.
Thomas P. Walsh, 11"
203. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 46 (1962) (stating that the economic
power required for a claim arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act may be presumed where the
tying product is patented or copyrighted).
204. See Hayden, supra note 8, at 115 n.145 ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic
distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court
has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular facts
disclosed by the record. In determining the existence of market power, and specifically the respon-
siveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other, this Court has examined closely
the economic reality of the market at issue." (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted)).
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